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Introduction
There is . . . a lot of work that needs to be done on the role of women in 
the Revolution. The woman in the town, in the mountains, in the enemy 
administration, the prostitute and the intelligence that she obtains, the 
woman in prison, under torture, in the face of death, and before the 
tribunals.
Frantz Fanon, L’An V de la révolution algérienne (1959)
From 1926 onwards, the date of the foundation of the Algerian pro-
independence movement the Étoile nord-africaine (ENA), the forces of 
nationalism began to gain a mass popular base and to place enormous 
pressure for change on a colonial regime that was intent on preserv-
ing the social, political and economic domination of European settler 
society. The tensions between the two communities reached break-
ing point at the end of the Second World War. The declaration of the 
Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941) in which Churchill and Roosevelt 
offered a vision of a post-war world in which all peoples would have 
the right to self-determination; the Anglo-American landings in North 
Africa in November 1942; the fall of the Algerian pro-Pétainist regime; 
coupled with expectations that the massive involvement and sacrifi ce 
of Algerian soldiers in the European campaigns against fascism would 
receive political recompense, generated an intense expectation of change 
among the nationalists. However, the right-wing settler political elites 
were determined to respond to this challenge not by carrying out long-
overdue reform and by accepting Algerian equal rights, but rather by 
trying to reassert the pre-war status quo that was based on a system of 
military power, repressive laws, policing and state violence. The tensions 
fi nally came to a head on VE day, 8 May 1945, when the nationalists 
participated in mass demonstrations to celebrate the defeat of the Nazi 
regime. At Sétif the Algerians paraded the illegal fl ag of the independ-
ence movement, and this was met with police gunfi re that in turn trig-
gered off a small-scale peasant revolt in which a hundred settlers were 
killed.
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This presented the opportunity that reactionary colonials had been 
waiting for, and the whole of the North Constantine region was sub-
jected to a huge and disproportionate repression by the French army, 
navy and air-force and by settler civilian militias, which slaughtered 
tens of thousands of Algerians. The aim of this massive repression was 
to teach the Algerians a lesson, to reassert colonial hegemony and to 
stop in its tracks the dynamic expansion of the nationalist movement by 
arresting, torturing and killing its political cadres.1 The murderous wave 
of colonial repression assumed its clearest logic in the provincial town 
of Guelma where, under the guidance of the Sub-Prefect André Achiary, 
impromptu militias arrested the most educated and promising of local 
Algerian youth, condemned them to death before ‘revolutionary’ tribu-
nals of Public Safety, and dispatched them by lorry to isolated killing 
fi elds.2 A prime target for Achiary was the cultured Reggui family, 
upwardly mobile entrepreneurs who enjoyed a rich intellectual life that 
was rooted in both Arab and Francophone language and culture. The 
logic of the situation dictated that the Reggui, a local symbol of inte-
gration between the Algerian and European communities that offered 
a beacon of hope for the future, had to be destroyed by settlers who 
were blindly intent on asserting their domination and on wrecking any 
chance of a peaceful inter-ethnic resolution to the deepening crisis of 
colonialism.
After the brutal elimination of two of the fi ve Reggui sons, the only 
daughter Zohra, with enormous courage, directly confronted Achiary 
about the fate of her brothers only to be arrested and shot in turn. Zohra 
Reggui was an exceptional young woman by the standards of provincial 
Algeria: highly educated and ‘westernised’, she did not wear the veil 
and personifi ed the rare example of the emancipated Muslim woman. 
As a symbol of modernity and Franco-Algerian integration Zohra also 
had to be eliminated by the die hard reactionaries, and among the many 
hundreds of executions carried out by the Guelma militias she, the most 
independent and Francophile, was the only woman.3
Thirteen years later in May 1958, and four years into the Algerian 
War of Independence, the revolt led by generals Salan and Massu again 
appropriated the revolutionary and republican symbolism of the French 
Revolution by seizing power through a Committee of Public Safety. 
But, in a reversal of the events of May 1945, the rebels orchestrated 
ceremonies of mass unveiling by Muslim women and quickly promul-
gated a raft of ‘emancipation’ policies. One of the questions that this 
book explores is how and why this U-turn came about. Why was it that 
a repressive colonial system that had for over a century maintained the 
material and intellectual backwardness of Algerian women now, in the 
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midst of a bloody war of decolonisation, turned to an extensive pro-
gramme of ‘emancipation’, which included reform of the personal status 
law, granting of the franchise, health and social security programmes, 
educational provision and unveiling?
The principal aim of this introduction is to provide a general con-
textualisation and interpretive framework to set the scene for the more 
detailed investigation that follows. Firstly, the term ‘emancipation’, 
which is retained throughout, is not used in the sense of contemporary 
or ‘second-wave’ feminism since this would be evidently anachronistic, 
but rather in the sense that it was used constantly during the Algerian 
War by the colonial government and military. This meaning will 
become increasingly evident as the book progresses, but underlying it 
was a reformist agenda that sought to extend citizenship and equal-
ity of rights to Algerian Muslim women so that they could ‘catch up’ 
with their European sisters in metropolitan France and Algeria with 
regard to voting rights, education, professional training, employment 
opportunities, health care and welfare.4 But it should be kept in mind 
that the yard-stick or model of progress being applied by the colonial 
authorities was that of contemporary French society, which during this 
period (1954–62) saw women relegated to a highly conservative posi-
tion marked by a Catholic and natalist ambiance, and repressive laws 
in relation to marriage, divorce and birth-control. Implicit within the 
drive to ‘emancipation’ was a Eurocentric and assimilationist model 
that sought to transform Algerian women into ‘civilised’ and western-
ised beings who would share the essential cultural features of bourgeois 
French women in relation to everything from dress style to consumerism 
and an idealised model of the nuclear family and the conjugal married 
couple bound by mutual affection.5
The emancipation programme of the French army, like the overall 
strategy of counter-insurgency, had a dual reformist and repressive 
purpose that generated constant and ultimately irresolvable tensions.6 
This contradiction arose from the fact that emancipation was initiated 
as part of a repressive and intelligence gathering process and, simulta-
neously, as a reformist endeavour to win Algerian hearts and minds to 
the French cause. The policy on women that fi rst appeared in late 1956 
coincided with, and was engineered by, psychological warfare specialists 
of the Fifth Bureau, which rose to gain extraordinary levels of political 
power in the army between late 1956 and early 1960. The Fifth Bureau 
was inspired by the idea that attempts to win over the Algerian popula-
tion to the French side could not afford to neglect women, one half of 
the population. Moreover, good or accurate intelligence – which was 
regarded as the key to any successful counter-insurgency programme 
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– was crucially dependent on building close contacts with informers and 
local populations in general,7 and women in particular. One anonymous 
general told the journalist Jacques Perrier, ‘Algerian women constitute 
a third force between us and the Front de libération nationale (FLN). 
When, in certain regions that are infested with rebels, the women come 
over to our side then pacifi cation is not far off’.8
In this drive to bring Algerian women on side, the military had come 
to share one of the key ideological beliefs of Algerian nationalism, the 
view that women and the family constituted the last remaining bastion 
of religious, cultural and social identity. This mythical structure or 
topos refl ected or was grounded in some kind of reality in the sense 
that French colonialism had, during over a century of penetration, 
subjugated and fragmented the basic economic and social structures of 
indigenous society, but had hesitated to encroach on the ‘private’ reserve 
of the family which remained subject to Muslim law and custom. One 
line of enquiry in this study is to see how the French, under the umbrella 
of emancipation, attempted through a ‘strategy of contact’, particularly 
through female army social workers, to breach the defence-works of 
secluded Muslim women and build bridges to the wives and daughters 
of fi ghters and militants of the FLN.
While many French colonels and offi cers regarded intelligence gath-
ering as primary, others placed economic development at the heart 
of the overall emancipation strategy. A key assumption of the French 
government and army was that victory in modern guerrilla warfare was 
not dependent on the strength of advanced technology or conventional 
forces, but on winning over the allegiance of the masses so that insurgent 
forces would be deprived of their support base. In the famous Maoist 
dictum, guerrillas fl ourished among the people like fi sh in water, unless 
the enemy succeeded in draining away the lake. Algerian women would 
be won over to the French side by a raft of measures that included com-
bating the endemic poverty and misery of peasants and slum-dwellers 
who had been systematically marginalised and discriminated against by 
the colonial system, measures that included free medical and food aid, 
primary education, job creation and better housing.
From one angle there seems to be nothing particularly surprising about 
the French agenda: pragmatic common-sense would seem to dictate that 
Algerians would side with Algérie française if they became convinced 
that France offered the prospect of a higher standard of living under 
the fi nancial and technical umbrella of an advanced European state, as 
opposed to the risky endeavour of ‘going it alone’, trapped in the dire 
poverty of a Third World country led by ‘communist’ or ‘pan-Arab’ ter-
rorists.9 The agenda could be seen as a fairly standard developmental 
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programme, one that was symbolised by de Gaulle’s announcement of 
the industrial and agrarian investment of the 1958 Constantine Plan. 
Such a programme did not necessarily have to be addressed to women 
in particular: indeed, during the fi rst two years of the war, notably 
under the Governor Jacques Soustelle, there was little specifi c mention 
of women or gender, largely because women were tacitly assumed to 
be the ‘trickle-down’ benefi ciaries of an overall economic transforma-
tion and progress. There was little discussion during 1954–56 regard-
ing Algerian women as women: rather their ‘backwardness’ would be 
abolished along with the improvement in living standards of the whole 
population.
However, from late 1956 onwards the colonial government began to 
shift its attention towards a quite specifi c gendered policy of develop-
ment that was targeted at women. What began to emerge was a pro-
gramme that moved far beyond any technical or economic logic and 
which sought to ‘modernise’ Algerian women, to liberate them from 
what was perceived to be the ignorance and the benighted horrors of 
Muslim patriarchy and seclusion, and to transform them via a European 
model of womanhood. The prison of domestic seclusion would be bat-
tered down, and the degrading practices of child-marriage, polygamy 
and repudiation, of love-less arranged marriage, would be exchanged 
for a western model of the nuclear family and conjugal relations founded 
on mutual attraction and equality. One of the themes of this study is 
an examination of the structure of this model and of the propaganda 
techniques deployed by the army, from cinema and radio to village 
assemblies, to try and diffuse western concepts of emancipation. While, 
as will be seen, this initiative appeared from late 1956 in response to 
quite specifi c events and contingencies in the development of the war, it 
was far from unique and can be better understood when placed within 
a wider historical and comparative perspective of similar authoritar-
ian and largely male-driven state reform programmes throughout the 
Middle East.
During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century bour-
geois nationalist intellectuals throughout the major urban centres of the 
Middle East and North Africa were preoccupied by the vital question of 
the backwardness of their own societies, and why they were so economi-
cally and militarily weak compared to European powers that invaded 
both through armed force and a dynamic capitalism. One emergent 
school of thought, well represented by the Egyptian lawyer Qasim Amin 
in The Liberation of Women (1899), was that national regeneration 
could only be achieved through the emancipation of women.10 Male 
intellectuals and politicians in the Middle East, through contact with 
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western society and travels in Europe, were impressed by the relative 
state of freedom enjoyed by western women and their contribution to 
social and economic progress. It took about two decades for such an 
ideological position to impact signifi cantly on political practice, par-
ticularly through the radical initiatives of Mustapha Kemal (‘Atatürk’) 
in Turkey. Kemal promulgated the ‘top-down’ emancipation of women, 
symbolised by unveiling and the introduction in 1926 of a modern, 
secular family code based on Swiss law, as part of a broader package 
of measures to create a strong state.11 The Kemalist ‘revolution’, par-
ticularly in relation to women, had a signifi cant impact on a number 
of neighbouring militarised and authoritarian regimes, including that 
of Riza Shah Pahlavi in Iran (1925–41),12 King Amanullah (1919–29) 
in Afghanistan, and, most dramatically of all, Bolshevik colonialism 
in Central Asia.13 The key feature of the inter-war period was that 
women’s organisations were given a considerable boost as an integral 
part of nationalist movements, but at the same time such an alliance 
served to harness the energy of women to the needs of ‘state feminism’ 
that had little interest in facilitating the basic rights and autonomy of 
such organisations.14
There are a number of shared features of these inter-war movements, 
that can be characterised as an ‘autocratic secular nationalism’,15 that 
help to throw light on French policy during the Algerian War. Forced 
emancipation tended to create deep divisions between pro-western mod-
ernisers and conservative, religious forces that regarded the penetration 
of European culture as a dangerous subversion and corruption of Islam 
and an authentic religio-national identity. Battle lines over radically 
opposed visions of the nation were invariably formulated by reference 
to the ‘woman question’, dress codes and the veil. The centrality of the 
veil arose from the fact that it provided a readily identifi able symbol, a 
public and visible marker, of support or opposition to Islamic values, 
gender segregation, familial honour and the socio-political domination 
of the male lineage. For the leaders of authoritarian, modernising states 
who were keen to carry out a cultural revolution, dress codes provided 
a ready mechanism for the policing of society, the public exposure 
of degrees of inner resistance or of levels of support for the offi cial 
agenda of national construction. Such strategies have a long history: for 
example, the Enlightened despot Peter the Great (1682–1725), in his 
attempts to force a backward Russia to catch up with western Europe, 
had compelled his courtiers to cut off their beards (or pay a special tax) 
and to dress in a European style.
The instrumental purpose of such dress codes is shown by the 
fact that in Turkey and Iran in the 1920s they were directed as much 
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towards males as towards women through the offi cial banning of the fez 
and turban for a European-style hat.16 Iranian policemen and soldiers 
publicly tore off and trampled turbans, to which riotous crowds led 
by conservative clerics responded by making bonfi res of the ‘Pahlavi 
hat’.17 Long before the orchestration of mass unveiling ceremonies by 
the French army in Algeria during May 1958 (examined in chapter 3) 
such spectacles had occurred in Egypt (1923), Uzbekistan (1927) Syria 
(1942) and Lebanon (1944).18 Resistance to such campaigns or general 
processes of cultural westernisation took the form of physical assault 
by male (and sometimes female) Islamist vigilante groups on women 
who were accused of dressing like ‘whores’, wearing make-up, drinking 
alcohol, smoking or displaying themselves in public spaces, especially 
cafés and cinemas which were regarded as places of debauchery.
The veil, as the key symbol of the subordination of women, always 
referred to far more than tensions over the relatively trivial question 
of dress design: it was a marker of the total form of society to which 
bitterly opposed camps aspired. In particular the widespread battles 
over the veil throughout the Middle East, Soviet Central Asia and 
the Maghreb after 1919 were intimately linked to processes of state-
building. In western Europe the modern state had developed over many 
centuries through processes of centrifugal expansion from geographical 
heartlands (the courts of London, Paris, Madrid and elsewhere), and the 
gradual  extension of power over the periphery, by destroying regional 
particularism or alternative foci of loyalty or identity. The centre imposed 
homogenous and ‘universal’ systems of governance across the national 
space through the bureaucratic maintenance of uniform systems of law, 
language, coinage, taxation, education and conscription.19
The emerging nations of the Middle East were attempting to ‘catch 
up’ with the west by accelerating, often within the space of a few 
years or decades, processes that had taken many centuries in Europe. 
The Kemalist model of modernisation that was infl uential in Iran, 
Afghanistan, Egypt and elsewhere was much like a contemporary form 
of enlightened despotism: many reformers saw the best chance for 
the rapid transformation of the nation not through slow processes of 
democratisation, but via highly militarised regimes, backed by power-
ful reformed armies, which could impose ‘revolutionary’ change from 
above without being deterred by the fear of mass resistance by religious 
or conservative populist revolt, particularisms that could be crushed 
by soldiers and police forces. Typical of such autocratic reformism was 
Riza Shah Pahlavi who, much impressed by Kemal during his state visit 
to Turkey in 1934, sought to impose western dress as just one com-
ponent of a much vaster programme to create a strong state through 
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a centralising drive that included census registration, conscription, 
judicial reform and radical secularisation.20 As Zehra Arat points out, 
the reform programme of Kemal was to provide Turkish women with 
education and skills as instruments of the economic development of the 
nation, but this was certainly not feminism in the sense of liberation 
that would promote women’s individual or collective consciousness ‘for 
themselves’. Turkish women, through modernisation, were to improve 
their skills as wives and mothers.21
Authoritarian regimes, in the drive to emancipate women as part of 
the modernising process, invariably met diffuse but dogged resistance 
at the level of the most fundamental social unit, the family. Historians 
have explored in detail how the modern European state gradually pen-
etrated and transformed the private autonomy of feudalism, the clans, 
kin and extended family networks that as units of localised production, 
economic autarky and primary loyalty long provided an alternative core 
of identity.22 In the Middle East and North Africa however, ‘tribal’ and 
extended family groups, underpinned by a religiously sanctioned ideol-
ogy of patriarchy, remained a strong and dynamic force well into the 
late twentieth century. Authoritarian reformism was confronted with 
the almost insuperable problem of trying to erode or transform the very 
bedrock of society; a problem of particular importance to the Algerian 
situation, to which we return below. A number of specialists on women 
in the Middle East, notably Deniz Kandiyoti, Suad Joseph and Mounira 
Charrad, have argued that the changing position of women in Muslim 
societies can be best understood through linking it to state-building 
processes.23 It was precisely because family structure carried within it 
a blueprint for the global society, everything from property relations to 
political power, that it was the focus of bitter struggle. While veiling, as a 
symbol of this wider fi eld, generated much passion, the most crucial way 
in which opposing forces attempted to steer or shape the internal logic 
of the family was through conservative defence of Islamic law (sharia) 
or through reform of the personal status laws relating to marriage.24
After this digression into the broader processes at work throughout 
the Middle East, we are in a better position to understand the nature 
of French emancipation during the Algeria War of Independence. 
Firstly, French policy towards Algerian women after 1956 was directly 
infl uenced and, to some extent, modelled on the earlier programmes 
introduced in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere. 
Many colonial cadres in Algeria, both military and civilian, had had 
a direct experience of the more advanced Arab women’s organisations 
in other French colonies, protectorates or mandates, particularly inter-
war Lebanon and Syria.25 The colonial government was inspired by a 
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Kemalist approach in its modernisation of Algerian society, a reform 
programme that recognised that a developmental project could not 
work unless it included women. Secondly, the emancipation was also 
very much part of a highly militarised agenda, in which a huge army 
through the policy of quadrillage, the occupation and control of the 
entire geographical space of the colony, possessed the bureaucratic and 
armed power to impose a radical ‘top-down’ reform on a recalcitrant 
periphery. Finally, and most crucially, the French army – not unlike the 
quasi-dictatorial regimes in inter-war Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan 
– aimed at a ‘forced march’ modernisation programme. In the French 
case the urgency arose from the need to win over the population as a 
condition of victory in a violent and costly colonial war that needed to 
be terminated as quickly as possible. Signifi cantly both Atatürk and the 
French colonels found inspiration in the Jacobin Revolution, the primary 
symbol of a radical secularisation and process of state- formation that 
depended on a programme of forced centralisation, populist élan, and 
the crushing of priestly and provincial obscurantism.26 It was no mere 
coincidence that the generals’ revolt of May 1958 led to the establish-
ment of a Committee of Public Safety that, among its very fi rst acts, 
orchestrated mass unveiling parades.
It may seem surprising to characterise the French occupation and 
repression of 1954–62 as a project of state-building, particularly as 
France has been so widely interpreted by historians as an exemplar of 
the advanced bureaucratic and centralised nation. However, the colo-
nels saw their revolt as an attempt to regenerate the weak and effete 
government of the Fourth Republic from the colonial periphery, but 
also to weld Algeria, a literal extension of French soil, into a strong 
and integrated economic power.27 Under the offi cial slogan of ‘l’Algérie 
nouvelle’, the colonels set out to create a dynamic nation-state through 
a process of ‘integration’ that would completely transform the identity 
and mind-set of both the colons, who were regarded by them as a prime 
cause of the colonial crisis through their egotistic racism and unbending 
refusal to accept Algerians into the cité, as well as of the impoverished 
Algerians. The foundation myth of this new imperial nation was estab-
lished during the ecstatic and theatrical ‘fraternisation’ parades of May 
1958 when both settler and Algerian women embraced each other in 
the Algiers Forum. Muslim women, claimed the army, expressed their 
‘spontaneous’ wish to meld into the new nation by unveiling and declar-
ing their deep wish to become identical to their European sisters in 
dress, freedom from seclusion and basic rights.
The apparent conundrum of France, one of the most highly developed 
nations in the world, engaging in a process of accelerated state-building 
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at such a late stage as the mid-twentieth century, can be resolved by the 
fact that it showed simultaneously the features of both a ‘strong’ and a 
‘weak’ state. As Matthew Connelly has noted, the geography or ‘fron-
tier’ of a ‘North–South’ divide between an advanced western economy 
(metropolitan France) and an impoverished ‘Third World’ colonial 
Algeria did not lie along the barrier of the Mediterranean Sea, but 
rather ran east–west some two hundred miles south of the Algeria coast 
separating the advanced urban and European dominated societies of the 
northern literal from the underdeveloped interior in which 70 per cent 
of Algerians lived in abject poverty as peasants and nomads.28
The difference between the two Algerias was the consequence of 
long-term and complex processes by which colons had ensured a 
monopoly of state investment in their own settlements, the commune 
de pleine exercice (CPE), in the form of roads, electrifi cation, water 
supply, schools, hospitals and other infrastructures, and the withhold-
ing of modernisation for the native zones, the commune mixte (CM), 
that were left in endemic poverty.29 However, as Claudine Chaulet and 
others have argued, the dualism of Algerian space did not mean that 
the isolated interior (bled) was simply ‘abandoned’ to its fate by the 
European settlers, since the rural and mountainous interior, as with 
the Bantustan system of apartheid in South Africa, offered a reserve 
of cheap, mobile labour for the colon estates, docks, construction sites 
and industries to the north.30 Colonial capitalism thus had an interest in 
actively retaining the ‘breeding’ capacity of Algeria’s rural population, 
and this system carried major implications for women who paid the 
heavy costs of reproducing and sustaining labour-power.31 However, the 
civilian and military heads of the Algerian government after 1954, most 
of them without previous experience of the colony, were shocked to 
discover the extent of the ‘Third World’ backwardness of the bled, pre-
cisely the interior, mountainous and forested zones in which the Armée 
de libération nationale (ALN) guerrilla army established a support base 
among the local population. It seemed crucial to the generals to win the 
battle for hearts and minds in rural Algeria, but the attempt to carry 
out a crash modernisation programme faced the almost insuperable 
problem of trying to reverse the accumulated effect of what was euphe-
mistically referred to as under-administration (sous administration), 
over a century of under-investment, neglect and weak government
The biggest challenge facing the colonial government in its project 
of emancipation was the endemic poverty, illiteracy and ignorance of 
women in the bled. But in the periphery the modern state was histori-
cally weak (lack of local administrators, of courts, an accurate civil reg-
ister, schools, doctors, roads) while the potential foci of resistance to 
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state encroachment, such as ‘traditional’ tribal, kin and religious organi-
sations, were at their strongest. A key part of our overall argument is 
that the colonial economic and political system had for over a century, 
until the insurrection of 1954, worked to ensure the ‘protection’ of the 
extended family group, and the ideology of patriarchy that underpinned 
it, thus reinforcing the domestic structures that would radically impede 
modernisation of the family by the French (1956–62), and then by the 
post-independence FLN government. After 1956 the heavily militarised 
colonial government, in its attempt to force through an accelerated 
‘revolutionary’ transformation of women’s position, faced problems of 
breaking down the opposition of patriarchal authority and conserva-
tive religious leaders that was very similar to the diffi culties faced by 
authoritarian and militarised regimes engaged in state-building proc-
esses in Soviet Central Asia, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the 1920s. 
If anything French interventionism in Algeria was even more forceful 
in the context of the Cold War since US and European ‘political devel-
opment theory’ and counter-insurgency doctrine, upholding a need to 
aid weak colonial states that were exposed to communist insurgency, 
often saw modern armies as bureaucratic organisations that were best 
able to guide ‘archaic’ societies towards modernity.32 But one of the big 
questions facing the French after 1954, as for the 1920s regimes, was 
whether reform might be pushed too far and too fast so as to generate 
revolt and public opposition on a scale to threaten the survival of gov-
ernment, as occurred with the Afghan tribal revolts that brought down 
King Amanullah in 1929.
The French emancipation agenda, far from accepting full equal-
ity between European and Algerian women, a process of integration 
founded on pluralism and multiculturalism before the letter, was built 
on a Eurocentric cultural model of domesticity through which Muslim 
women would reach true freedom by a modernisation process that 
would ‘westernise’ them in every respect. Underlying French policy 
and discourse on Algerian women was a fundamental, and perhaps 
fatal assumption of an inevitable global progress by which all societies 
would, sooner or later, move from simple or primitive forms of organisa-
tion to a ‘higher’ phase of civilisation, a stage that was overtly or implic-
itly always imagined by reference to contemporary western models. 
According to this teleology Algerian women would, through economic 
change, urbanisation, education and entry into a modern world of 
consumerism, eventually come to share an identical lifestyle to that of 
European women. As will be seen, the vision of a golden future held 
out by army propagandists to Algerian women was essentially a petit-
bourgeois dream of gleaming Formica kitchens, washing machines, the 
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nuclear family and the conjugal couple bound together by sentiment.33 
A considerable part was played in the promulgation of this model of 
domesticity, as in many other colonial contexts, by European women, the 
wives and daughters of senior army offi cers or the women recruited into 
mobile welfare teams, the Équipes médico-sociale itinérantes (EMSI). 
The great, and unforeseen, danger of this civilising mission was that the 
French wrongly assumed the inevitable and necessary triumph of their 
own culture: it was, to them, so unquestionably superior and right, that 
they could not imagine Algerian women (and men), once educated and 
rational actors, choosing to adhere to an ‘inferior’ and backward way 
of life. This model, which was shared by developmental policy-makers, 
meant that the French were overly optimistic about the way in which 
the emancipation agenda would sweep all before it and, more impor-
tantly, they were blind to the enormous resilience and power of Algerian 
extended family structures that worked according to a radically differ-
ent logic from the European nuclear family. The French emancipation 
programme, like that of Algerian post-independence modernisation, 
was broken on the invisible rocks and reefs of patriarchy.
The FLN, nationalism and the marginalisation of women
While the centre of gravity of this study lies in the history of French 
emancipation as an instrument of counter-insurgency and modernisa-
tion (chapters 2 to 8), it is also concerned with the impact of this strat-
egy on the FLN. As will be seen, it is not easy to establish whether the 
‘liberation’ policy and practices of the FLN originated in response to 
French innovations, or vice versa. Once the emancipation agenda had 
taken off on both sides during 1956 it is evident that the opposed forces 
entered into a constant struggle to command the support of Muslim 
women and developed techniques or programmes that mimicked or 
were modelled on the other. But in general, it is argued that the French 
army had a much stronger motivation to deploy a discourse and practice 
of liberation than the FLN, which assumed a more reactive position. 
This nationalist discourse was to carry long-term conservative implica-
tions for Algerian policies on Muslim women both during and after the 
war (chapters 9 to 11).
During the Algerian War and the fi rst years of independence the lib-
eration struggle of Algerian women was held up across the globe as a 
shining beacon by socialist, Third World and anti-colonial movements. 
The predominant media image was of maquis heroines and urban ter-
rorists, strong and determined women who, it was assumed, would 
claim a full and equal place in the future independent society. This was 
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the message conveyed by Gillo Pontecorvo’s powerful fi lm, The Battle 
of Algiers (1965), in which female freedom fi ghters broke through the 
constraints of traditional Muslim gender roles, and also by the thesis of 
Frantz Fanon’s infl uential essays in L’An V de la révolution algérienne 
(1959).34 This heroic myth, which entered the main stream of western 
culture and for long obscured the reality of Algerian policy on women, 
is itself a testimony to the effi cacy of FLN propaganda. However, in 
particular after the conservative and sharia-based legislation on women 
and the family formulated during c. 1980–84, feminists have widely 
accepted the fact that the post-independence Algerian state assumed a 
highly regressive position on women’s rights, one that was more reac-
tionary than that of many comparable modern states in the Middle East, 
and in particular of neighbouring Tunisia.
For long there was a tendency to explain this failure as the result of 
an authoritarian, single-party regime that through a quasi-military coup 
at the point of independence shattered the revolutionary optimism gen-
erated during the war. The idea of a key break in 1962 has been more 
recently revised by historians, following in the steps of Mohammed 
Harbi’s innovative work,35 who instead of operating in terms of a binary 
colonial/post-colonial opposition have begun to trace the long-term 
origins and continuities of the contemporary Algerian state in the early 
history of the nationalist movement from the 1920s onwards.36 Since the 
1990s this approach has been facilitated by historians’ access to a wealth 
of previously unavailable ‘inside’ information about the war-time FLN. 
Firstly, the Algerian political crisis after 1988 shattered the ideological 
hegemony of the single-party, authoritarian FLN-led state, the attempt 
to impose an offi cial version of the history of the ‘revolution’ and to 
exercise a tight control over access to Algerian archival sources. For 
example, the ground-breaking research of Djamila Amrane (née Danièle 
Minne), a former FLN militant who was imprisoned by the French, was 
based on oral sources as well as access to the offi cial registers of the 
veterans’ organisation (Ministère des Moudjahidine) relating to 10,949 
women combatants.37 Secondly, since the 1990s the systematic cata-
loguing of, and more open access provided to, the immense military and 
civilian archives ‘repatriated’ in 1962 and deposited in Paris and Aix-
en-Provence have facilitated a remarkable change in the character and 
volume of research on the Algerian War.38 While the archives provide a 
vast amount of information on the internal and often secretive workings 
of the war-time military and civilian government – the key source used 
for mapping our main theme of French emancipation – they provide 
information that extends well beyond the mind-set and practices of the 
dominant colonial power. The French army and police captured a mass 
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of internal FLN reports, which allow the organisation to be interpreted 
through its own documents rather than being refracted through the 
prism of the French army. This material is now facilitating a major shift 
in the historical understanding of the FLN,39 and has provided the basis 
for a wave of new research relating to Algerian women.40
In the light of these sources, which relate primarily to the opposing 
male-led agendas of the French government and the FLN, it should be 
emphasised that this study is not concerned with an attempt to try and 
unlock the extremely diffi cult and contested fi eld of subaltern studies, to 
reconstruct the subjective experience and universe of Algerian women. 
Such a project remains problematic for the period of the Algerian War, 
in part because some 96 per cent of all women were illiterate and left 
very little in the way of written evidence, but also because it has proved 
particularly diffi cult to gather and interpret oral evidence.41 However, 
while Algerian women often appear to be silent victims that were caught 
or crushed between the masculine agendas of power, of colonial occu-
piers and resisters, the archive still provides a considerable amount of 
valuable information (as long as it is interpreted with care as an expres-
sion of the male voice) about the organisation and role of Algerian 
women. For example, confi dential or secret reports provide almost daily 
information about the diffi culties faced by army teams working to build 
contact with women in rural locations, including, for example, inci-
dents involving women sabotaging generators or the electricity supply 
during the showing of propaganda fi lms. The reports of police spies 
and informers between 1944 and 1954 provide invaluable information 
about what was happening inside the meetings of the early nationalist 
women’s organisations (chapter 1). The colonial government and army 
also employed specialist colonial offi cers, mainly from the services des 
affaires indigènes as well as ethnographers like Germaine Tillion and 
Jean Servier, who were profi cient in Arabic and Berber dialect and had 
a close knowledge of Islamic and customary law, to investigate the 
situation of Algerian women. The archive thus contains a consider-
able volume of sophisticated commentary on women, and employed 
social scientifi c methodology, including, for example, a 1959 report 
on Algerian attitudes towards French emancipation that was based on 
15,000 questionnaire returns. One advantage of this extensive material 
is that it enables a more detailed picture to be built up of the situation of 
the great mass of women in the interior, the heartland of the rebellion, 
who tend to have been under-researched.42 The wealth of sociological 
and intelligence data has been further enriched by utilising the exten-
sive archive of photographs of women taken by professional photo-
journalists and rank-and-fi le soldiers.43 In particular the photographs of 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   14 21/7/09   12:16:10
 Introduction 15
Marc Garanger have served as the starting point of a detailed case-study 
approach (chapter 6) to the situation of peasant women within the 
context of military violence and ‘reform’ in the isolated village of Bordj 
Okhriss.
In chapter 1 it is argued that an organised Algerian women’s move-
ment appeared much later than in many other states in the Maghreb 
and Middle East. During the decade 1944–54 a militant and dynamic 
organisation fi rst appeared in the major urban centres as an integral 
component of the wider nationalist movement. While under normal 
peacetime conditions this infant organisation might have been expected 
to expand and lay the basis for a strong, post-independence femi-
nist movement, in reality this promising current was arrested, if not 
‘broken’, by the War of Independence. While this set-back can be partly 
ascribed to the repressive violence of the French army and the disloca-
tion of family life, equally important was the way in which any move-
ment which represented the specifi c demands of women was voluntarily 
dissolved for the duration of the war into the urgent and higher priority 
of the struggle for independence. FLN propaganda, which made skilful 
use of the heroic symbol of female warriors while superfi cially appear-
ing to international opinion to champion the position of women, did 
no such thing: rather it was able to draw upon a long oral and written 
tradition within Muslim societies that, in an Islamic version of the myth 
of Joan of Arc as national saviour, referred back to historic or mythic 
female warriors who during moments of mortal danger to the commu-
nity temporarily assumed the martial role of men.44 In the deployment 
of the traditional myth of the heroine fi ghters the assumption was that, 
once victory was gained, women would revert to their allotted domestic 
and maternal functions.45 Algeria followed in a path that was shared 
by many other nationalist movements: a common but contradictory 
pattern was that while resistance and independence movements played 
a major role in providing an impetus to women’s organisations, once 
victory was assured and constitutional or independence goals achieved, 
governments proceeded to renege on or dampen female militancy or 
reformist demands.46
However, in a fast changing world in which women’s rights as citizens 
were being rapidly extended and built into UN and other international 
conventions, the FLN, which laid claim to being a modernising force for 
the liberation of a subject people, could not afford to be seen to neglect 
the issue of women’s rights. In the decade between 1944 and 1954 the 
emerging women’s movement was not split by a simple binary opposi-
tion between modernisers and ‘traditionalists’, but revealed a complex 
pattern of internal tensions and contradictions. For example, many 
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progressive women did not view Islam as incompatible with women’s 
interests,47 but what the deadly divisions of war achieved was to halt the 
complex and potentially fertile debate emerging in the women’s move-
ment before 1954 and to channel it into deeply entrenched positions. 
As in Iran where Riza Shah’s autocratic intervention on veiling caused 
‘an unbridgeable chasm’ among women,48 so did the French army drive 
to emancipation, a strategy that was designed precisely to outfl ank the 
nationalists by the pre-emptive occupation of this ideological terrain.
With the outbreak of the war for independence a signifi cant strata 
of educated Algerian women (évoluées) found themselves moving into 
the French camp, which appeared to them to offer the best hopes of a 
progressive, modernising agenda, so draining away part of the potential 
support base for a unifi ed women’s movement. Facing them were nation-
alist and communist women activists whose movements were virtually 
dissolved into the FLN organisation where they became subsidiary to, or 
locked into, a male-led agenda. The FLN hierarchy throughout the war 
was riven by numerous internal divisions, one of them being between a 
current of more secular intellectuals who favoured a Kemalist or social-
ist model of women’s rights based on a separation of civil and religious 
powers, and a more conservative ‘Islamo-Arabic’ current that ultimately 
triumphed in the battle for political power. In general women on the 
FLN side began to share a religious nationalism that emphasised Islamic 
cultural resistance to dangerous western subversion of the sharia, Arab 
language and identity, an authentic nationhood that was constructed 
by a highly gendered ideology that placed women as the mothers of the 
people, the guardians of the sacred space of the family/household, and 
the educators of a future generation of male warriors and citizens.
The ideological formulation of the ‘family-as-cultural-fortress’ can 
be found in nationalist movements throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa in the twentieth century, and it served to internally 
fracture and weaken women’s organisations.49 However, the balance 
of forces between ‘modernising’ and ‘traditionalist’ agendas varied 
considerably from one country to another, depending on the specifi c 
historical and political context. Elizabeth Thompson has suggested that 
in independent states like Turkey or Egypt (after 1922), it was politi-
cally possible for governments to support a modernising agenda for 
women by opposing or eroding the position of the conservative reli-
gious establishment: a degree of westernisation or secularism was seen 
as compatible with nationalism.50 Under Kemal the élan of nationalism 
and modernisation of women drove in the same direction. Similarly, in 
the remarkable instance of Tunisia, Bourguiba was able to make good 
use of the popular prestige that he enjoyed at independence as leader of 
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a successful liberation struggle, to legislate immediately the progressive 
1956 reform of the personal status law.
In the colonial context, the dynamic could be quite different. As 
Douglas Northrop notes, historically most imperial powers had not 
sought to assimilate indigenous peoples through extension of equal 
legal, political or citizenship rights, but had preserved a dualistic system 
that locked ‘native’ masses of the periphery into an inferior subject 
status. Soviet colonial policy in Central Asia was unusual in the extent 
to which it sought complete integration such that Muslim women ‘were 
to be remade into fully modern Soviet citizens’.51 However, French 
policy on Algerian women after 1956 went through an abrupt U-turn 
from a dualistic system of domination to one of integration that was 
remarkably similar to the Soviet model. This had considerable implica-
tions for the reinforcement of conservative Islamist ideology at the core 
of nationalism.
In some post-1945 colonial contexts, such as Nigeria, where the tran-
sition to independence was relatively peaceful, it was possible for the 
British government to invest in development aid and reform for women, 
from extension of education to health and welfare programmes, with 
the tacit support of nationalists. Post-independence government openly 
acknowledged its debt to the positive side of planned decolonisa-
tion.52 But in the Algerian instance, emancipation was embedded in an 
extremely violent liberation war and in these circumstances any Algerian 
women siding with westernisation could be viewed as traitors. While in 
many nationalist struggles we can fi nd traces of currents or tendencies 
that associated female support for western forms of emancipation with 
treason,53 perhaps nowhere was this more damaging than in Algeria 
where the association was welded in the crucible of a long and bloody 
war, and in which the occupying army championed European forms 
of female modernity and liberation with particular force. This linkage 
was to have extremely negative, long-term implications for Algerian 
women.
The ideological formulation of the ‘family-as-cultural-fortress’ pro-
vided FLN ideologues during the war with a powerful means to counter 
French emancipation as a dangerous Fifth-column agenda to penetrate 
and subvert the very life-force of the nation. Conversely, Algerian women 
who favoured the advancement of women’s rights could be marginalised 
as colonialist lackeys. That this conservative, rather than progressive 
and secular, position on women won out within the FLN can also be 
linked to the roots of Algerian populist nationalism. The internal FLN 
documents captured by the French army show that in general militants, 
guerrilla fi ghters and the wider population in which they found support, 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   17 21/7/09   12:16:11
18 Burning the veil
were far less ‘revolutionary’ than has often been imagined, particularly 
by left-wing commentators in the past. To the mass of illiterate peasants 
the battle against the French had little if anything to do with Marxist 
or socialist forms of transformative liberation, but rather with removal 
of the oppressor tout court. This is not to deny the enormous potency 
of the utopian faith which inspired the huge sacrifi ces that were made, 
but this was formulated more in terms of a messianic vision constructed 
on the restoration of a ‘true’ Islamic society that lay nascent beneath 
centuries of colonial destruction, rather than with relation to a secularist 
blue-print. The FLN, instead of opposing or marginalising the ideologi-
cal position represented by Islamic clerics, and in particular the infl u-
ential Association des ulema musulmans algériens (AUMA) founded 
by Ben Badis, absorbed the Islamist leaders and their doctrine into the 
core of the nationalist movement. As in Lebanon the nationalists forged 
a ‘gender pact’ with Islamic populism which operated in two stages. 
Firstly, during the phase of armed confl ict, nationalist women would 
agree to postpone their demands as women until independence was 
won. But with victory assured the pact between male nationalists and 
clerics would ensure that masculine authority would be fi rmly reasserted 
over women who in the chaos of war might have challenged seclusion, 
veiling and patriarchal controls.54 The infant, but dynamic women’s 
movement that had appeared during 1944–54 was thus ‘mothballed’ for 
the duration of the long struggle (1954–62), but did not exit from the 
war with the expected new-found energy, but was radically smothered 
for another two decades.
Finally, it is argued, the FLN did not only enter into a pact with 
Islamic forces because of the strength of religion in society, but also 
because Islam provided the ideological expression and legitimation for 
patriarchy. The term ‘patriarchy’ is not used here in the radical femi-
nist sense of a universal and a-historical male domination, but refers 
to complex kinship systems and modes of inheritance that sought to 
enhance the long-term chances of survival of family groups through 
strategies that controlled access to land, resources and reproduction 
(labour power and male descent). In the ‘classic patriarchy’ prevalent 
throughout the Middle East, girls were given away to their husband’s 
family group, where they were subordinate to both males and senior 
women.55 Marriage strategies, which ideally aimed to prevent subdivi-
sion of land and property through endogamy, were crucially dependent 
on alliances built through arranged marriages that were ‘rationally’ 
controlled by elders, not by the romantic choice of youth. The ‘market-
ability’ of women, the negotiation of the ‘good marriage’, was crucially 
dependent on the group’s ability to guard sexual honour and status 
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through rigorous gender segregation (seclusion, veiling). Women, in 
particular the older matriarchs, were not (as often perceived from the 
‘west’), subjugated and passive victims but actively colluded in the 
reproduction of the system and its values. Conversely women who 
fell outside the stability and protection offered by the family (widows, 
divorcees, refugees and victims of disrupted groups) were condemned to 
a life of harsh poverty, toil, marginalisation and dishonour.
Deniz Kandiyoti, Mounira Charrad and Suad Joseph note that the 
patriarchal system varied from one state or region to another in the 
Middle East and North Africa, but that in order to understand such dif-
ferences it is important to make an analytic distinction between Islam 
and the underlying social, economic and political logic of kinship.56 
Geographically Islam made various accommodations to the complex 
mosaic of societies it encountered on the ground. However, since Islam 
provided the crucial ideological formulation, the sacred and encoded 
doctrinal base for family regulation (notably through the sharia and cus-
tomary law), most Algerians believed that the defence of patriarchy was 
a religious obligation. Unlike the earlier historiography of the Algerian 
War that portrayed it as a revolutionary movement, access to the FLN 
archive reveals the extent to which the moudjahidine and population 
in general were motivated by a diffuse, but very real religious or jihad-
ist sentiment. The conservative FLN nationalist discourse on women’s 
rights refl ected a certain real politik, a pragmatic recognition of the 
strength of patriarchy in Algerian society. In the mortal struggle with 
the French for popular support it proved wiser not to alienate the con-
servative religious leaders (imams, the Ulema, cadis, caïds) that held 
such infl uence over the masses, nor to challenge existing structures of 
familial and clan power that subjugated women. It was the French who, 
through a risky emancipation agenda, ran the greater danger of inciting 
resistance and reinforcing support for the FLN. The Algerian extended 
patriarchal family group (the ayala) showed extraordinary adaptability 
and powers of resistance to the threat posed by the chaos of war, social 
and economic dislocation, mass uprooting and the centralised planning 
initiatives of post-independence governments. It is argued (chapters 
10–11) that it was the recognition by the state of the inner strength of 
the ayala that led FLN political elites after 1962, as they manoeuvred 
for political power in a situation of civil war, instability and confl icting 
clientele systems, to quietly acquiesce in the subordination of women 
and the retention of highly conservative personal status or family laws.
The vitality of a patriarchy that adapted well to provide economic 
security in a rapidly changing society carried some negative implications 
for the extension of full civic rights to women. As Suad Joseph notes, 
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there exists a deep contradiction between the western liberal theory of 
rights, an individualism that treats the citizen in an abstract way as an 
autonomous being who enters into a contract with the sovereign state, 
and the patriarchal family system in which the ‘relational rights’ of the 
collectivity is primary.57 The newly independent Algerian state did, on 
paper, in various constitutional and legal statements, announce the full 
and equal rights of women. However, there existed an enormous gap 
between such principles of universal rights and the reality of the con-
tinuing subordination of women to male control. For example, many 
women failed to exercise voting rights or to participate in political asso-
ciations because male members of the family exercised the vote ‘on their 
behalf’ or imposed strict seclusion. It was FLN recognition of patriarchy 
both during and after the War of Independence that prevented any move 
by nationalists to counter the French project on women by offering its 
own emancipation agenda. In the long term it is possible to trace a link 
between this fatal pact with conservative Islamist forces and the bloody 
civil war after 1992 during which extreme levels of male aggression and 
violence were directed specifi cally against ‘modern’ women who were 
perceived as a threat to patriarchy.
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From the Sétif Massacre to the 
November insurrection: the origins of the 
Algerian women’s movement, 1945–54
The centre of gravity of this study lies in the French emancipation cam-
paign from 1956 to 1962, but to understand the extent to which this 
was innovative or marked a break with the past requires some idea of 
that which preceded it. This chapter explores a number of issues: fi rst, it 
provides a brief background sketch of the overall social, economic and 
political situation of Algerian women during the post-war decade. The 
triple colonial oppression of women by ethnic or racial discrimination, 
class and gender goes far to explain why it was so diffi cult for them to 
become politically conscious or to engage in any kind of emancipation 
movement. Secondly, despite these impediments various factors con-
tributed to the emergence of the fi rst signifi cant women’s organisations 
in the main urban centres. Despite the marginalisation of women, the 
modernisation of large colonial cities like Algiers, Oran and Constantine 
inevitably led to the appearance of a small, but highly signifi cant strata 
of young, educated women, mainly students, teachers, secretaries and 
health workers, who were drawn into the nationalist struggle and 
 provided the backbone of the new women’s organisations.
During the decade activism was inspired by the close collaboration 
between European women, many of them left-wing, communist or 
Christian militants from metropolitan France, and Algerian women. 
The former, who had made signifi cant political and social gains after the 
Liberation, including the vote, now campaigned to extend these rights to 
Algerian women. Thirdly, the colonial General Government1 responded 
to this challenge by close police surveillance of the new women’s organi-
sations, and by careful structuring of the Algerian electoral system and 
‘representative’ institutions so as to totally exclude Muslim women. 
This containment, which was symptomatic of the overall blockage of 
reform by settler interests intent on preserving their domination, helped 
drive the nationalists from a reformist towards a revolutionary solution. 
The failure of reform through the decade 1944–54 enables us to see how 
the military-led programme of emancipation after 1954, examined in 
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chapter 2, represented a signifi cant reversal in colonial policy, and why 
the long accumulation of under-development and neglect of the rural 
and urban poor presented almost insuperable problems of investment. 
Lastly, a close examination of the three key women’s organisations 
reveals various tensions, in particular an incipient division between those 
currents that were drawn to a more secular or socialist agenda and those 
infl uenced by an Islamo-nationalist vision of cultural resistance. These 
tensions show that the divisions on the issue of women that internally 
fractured the FLN during the war and on into the post-independence era 
were already emerging well before the insurrection.
Following the invasion of Algeria in 1830, the basic policy of the 
French was to establish a settler colony through which European immi-
grants from the Mediterranean basin would settle on land appropriated 
from the indigenous nomadic and peasant population by conquest and 
‘legal’ destruction of communal rights.2 By 1920 the colons had largely 
completed the process of taking over the richest and best irrigated 
arable land in the valleys, a process achieved by breaking up tribal 
society and its forced relocation into poor, rocky and arid marginal 
zones. Unable to survive, even at subsistence level, the Algerian rural 
population was compelled to seek external resources either by working 
as day-labourers for local colons, or by temporary labour migration to 
northern cities and France. By the 1930s and 1940s the rural popula-
tion was trapped in a desperate situation: per capita production of grain 
and livestock was falling; traditional handicraft industries collapsed as 
cheaper, factory-made goods were imported; the majority of men faced 
massive under-employment, fi nding waged labour for one hundred days 
a year or less; and cyclical famine, like that of 1942–45, ensued. The 
demographic historian Louis Chevalier, in a report of 1947, described 
a classic Malthusian crisis:3 the population growth rate had doubled 
between 1921 and 1930, and this demographic transition was to carry 
enormous negative consequences for women.4 Large numbers migrated 
from the inhospitable rural interior towards the urban centres, but the 
colonial economy was unable to provide enough employment since 
metropolitan capitalists had protected their own interests and prevented 
Algerian industrialisation.5 The Algerian urban population expanded 
dramatically, but most of this growth consisted of impoverished, illiter-
ate migrants who swelled the rapidly expanding shantytowns (bidon-
villes).6 However, despite accelerating urbanisation, by 1948 Algeria 
was still a predominantly rural society in which 84 per cent of the 
indigenous population lived outside the forty-seven urban centres,7 and 
provided the centre of gravity for a War of Independence that was pre-
dominantly a peasant-based phenomenon. Table 1 provides a summary 
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of the geographical division of Algeria by 1954 into three zones, with 
a massive concentration of Muslims in the impoverished interior where 
very few Europeans chose to live:
While the situation of Algerian women can be understood against 
this wider background, in general, as the ‘prolétaires des prolétaires’, 
they experienced an even more deprived and oppressed way of life than 
their husbands and brothers.8 On the eve of war in 1954, while virtu-
ally all European children aged six to fourteen years received primary 
schooling, this was true for only one in fi ve Algerian boys, and one in 
sixteen girls.9 In 1948 some 90 per cent of males aged over ten years 
were illiterate in French and Arabic, and 96 per cent of women.10 Of the 
two million women of working age in 1954, some 1.1 million or about 
95 per cent of the active female population were engaged in agricultural 
work,11 undertaking a range of heavy manual tasks within the peasant 
economy that were in addition to their domestic role as mothers of large 
families (fetching wood and water, weeding, harvesting, tending veg-
etable gardens and livestock, weaving). Outside the domestic economy, 
particularly within the towns, remarkably few women worked outside 
the home since any form of labour was regarded as dishonourable: in 
general, with the exception of a tiny strata of educated women who 
were entering the service sector (secretaries, nurses, teachers), most 
female workers came from the pool of desperately poor women who 
were forced to do so from necessity, repudiated, abandoned or widowed 
women who had no extended family group to protect them.12 As will 
be seen throughout the study, the backward position of women did not 
derive only from the negative effects of an exploitative colonial order, 
such as the failure to invest in schooling for Muslim girls, but also from 
Table 1: Geographical distribution of European and Muslim populations 
c. 1954
Area European population Muslim population 
Zone 1









Source: L’Effort algérien, 1,167 (20–26 February 1959)
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a patriarchal system that secluded women within the household, iso-
lated them from external political and cultural forces, and removed the 
minority of girls who did receive education from school at puberty.
The fi rst organised Algerian women’s movement that appeared in 
the decade 1944–54 was confi ned to the towns and made little impact 
in rural society because of extreme poverty, isolation and illiteracy. 
However, this fi rst urban-based movement appeared historically very 
late compared to most other countries in the Middle East. During the 
1920s and 1930s dynamic women’s organisations were already active 
in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and India and 
a series of international conferences held in Damascus (1930), Tehran 
(1932), Istanbul (1935), Cairo (1938) and elsewhere was leading to the 
global sharing of ideas on everything from veiling to the franchise.13 
Algerian women delegates appear to have been totally absent from these 
international meetings, a fact that may in part have refl ected the wider 
intellectual isolation of the Maghreb, and especially of Algeria, from the 
more advanced political and religious ferment of the Middle East. Recent 
scholarship has shown that Algeria was far less sealed-off from currents 
in the Middle East than previously thought,14 but the repressive French 
regime, ever paranoid about any revolutionary or pan-Islamic or pan-
Arab threat to the most prized of the colonies, exercised a formidable 
policing of ideas and persons circulating across the borders.15
Equally signifi cant was the fact that between c. 1900 and 1944 the 
debate on the issues facing Algerian women was monopolised by met-
ropolitan and colonial Frenchwomen.16 French feminists like Hubertine 
Auclert had, since 1900, engaged in a campaign for the emancipation 
of Muslim women who were perceived through Orientalist and racist 
stereotypes as degraded victims of child-marriage, veiling, seclusion, 
polygamy, repudiation and ‘feudal’ patriarchy.17 French feminists, such 
as the lawyers Maria Vérone and Suzanne Grinberg, were active within 
the Union française pour le suffrage des femmes (UFSF) and campaigned 
for the extension of republican rights, including the vote and secular law, 
to Algerian women, as well as for ‘modernisation’ through education, 
employment opportunities and welfare or maternity benefi ts.18
European feminists shared the predominant position of French male 
politicians in the more reformist liberal, socialist, communist and left-
republican parties that fundamentally upheld a colonial paternalist 
model of the ‘civilising mission’ and assimilation as in the best interests 
of the ‘natives’. However, French feminists found it almost impossible to 
develop links with, or gain support from, Muslim women, and the UFSF 
delegates to the conference of the Alliance internationals des femmes in 
Istanbul in 1935 bemoaned the absence of grass-roots activity compared 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   30 21/7/09   12:16:11
 From the Sétif massacre to the November insurrection 31
to other Middle Eastern states that were represented: ‘In Algeria we live 
side by side with millions of Muslim women, who are the most back-
wards of any land’.19 Compared to most other colonies in the Middle 
East, Algeria had a large and deeply embedded settler society, and since 
Europeans dominated most of the spheres of intellectual life, from lycée 
and university teachers to newspaper editors and writers, French thought 
and culture exerted a hegemonic power over the small and relatively 
weak class of educated Algerian women (évoluées). Down to c. 1945 any 
potential for an independent Algerian women’s movement to develop 
was smothered by, or incorporated into, European-led  organisations, 
from charitable networks to ladies associations and circles.
How and why did this situation change after 1944? While there 
exists almost no information about the political activity or attitudes of 
Algerian women prior to 1944, a fairly rich body of oral and archival 
evidence points to the growth of a dynamic movement in the post-war 
decade, one that succeeded in reaching for the fi rst time down into the 
ranks of the urban proletariat.20 At its peak in 1948–50 this represented 
a level of autonomous women’s mobilisation that was not to be seen 
again until after 1980. The emergence of a women’s movement was an 
integral part of the wider and almost continuous political ferment in 
Algeria between 1936 and 1954 as pro-independence nationalism pen-
etrated deep into society, and aroused a bitter and often violent response 
from colonial interests. After the Allied landings in Algeria in November 
1943 and the fall of the Pétainist regime, the nationalists increased in 
self-confi dence, buoyed up by the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 
which pronounced the rights of people to self-determination. The end of 
the Second World War led in the Maghreb, as it did globally across the 
declining European empires, to a massive acceleration in the pressures 
for decolonisation. Algerians were highly optimistic that the new politi-
cal order that emerged from the long war to defeat fascism would fi nally 
lead to radical change. The immediate response of the colonial regime 
to this challenge was to unleash the extremely violent repression at Sétif 
in May 1945, and to imprison thousands of nationalists, but far from 
bringing the independence movement to a halt this simply deepened the 
political crisis and drove the nationalists towards the preparation of an 
armed insurrection.
The women’s movement that appeared after 1943, far from being 
unifi ed, was divided by deep and often bitter internal divisions that 
refl ected the more global tensions between different political strands 
of the anti-colonial struggle. The three main umbrella parties under 
which the women’s organisations grouped were the Parti communiste 
algérien (PCA), the reformist Union démocratique du manifeste algérien 
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(UDMA) headed by Ferhat Abbas, and the nationalist, pro-independence 
Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratique (MTLD) and the 
associated Parti du peuple algérien (PPA) of Messali Hadj.21 Eventually, 
after the outbreak of the War of Independence, the communists and the 
reformists disbanded their organisations and dissolved their member-
ship into the FLN. This assertion of FLN hegemony from 1956 onwards 
was to carry important consequences for the future women’s movement 
since it marked the marginalisation of a more secular and ‘western’ 
brand of feminism, and the dominance of a more conservative and reli-
gious current. The following sections look at these three movements in 
turn to show in more detail the new forms of activism and organisation 
that emerged after 1944, and the differing ideological currents at work.
The Communist Party and the Union des femmes d’Algérie
Throughout the history of the Algerian nationalist movement, between 
the foundation of the ENA in 1926 through to the outbreak of the 
War of Independence in 1954, the relationship between the French and 
Algerian communists and the Messalist movement was one of bitter 
antagonism. The Parti communiste français (PCF), and the PCA which 
fell very much under its control, was opposed to the idea of Algerian 
nationalism and the struggle for independence, a movement which 
it derided as backward and manipulated by conservative, fascist and 
fanatical interests, a ‘xenophobic nationalism of primitives’.22 True 
liberation would only come about under the aegis of France, through 
the prior revolutionary and class struggle of the French proletariat. This 
‘Marxist’ analysis tended to go hand in hand with an ‘assimilationist’ 
and colonialist agenda: Algerians were far too backward to manage their 
own affairs in an independent state,23 and they would best fi nd the road 
to full citizenship and civilisation by full integration into metropolitan 
France. The deep, almost visceral hostility of the rank-and-fi le European 
militants in the PCA towards the PPA refl ected the general fear of the 
‘poor white’ settlers towards being outnumbered by a growing Algerian 
population that was facing endemic poverty, and which threatened at 
any moment to boil over into a bloody insurrection.
However, as the PCF came to recognise the growing strength of the 
nationalist movement after 1934, so it came to see the need to establish 
a more autonomous Algerian Communist Party, which through a pro-
gramme of ‘arabisation’ would seek to extend its infl uence among urban 
and rural Muslim workers, and to develop policies that would refl ect 
their experience and ambitions. Between 1935 and 1936 the number 
of Algerian party members increased from 60 to 700.24 In 1946, after 
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the violent repression of Sétif by a Gaullist government which included 
communist ministers, the PCA made a signifi cant change in policy by 
approaching the Messalists, as well as the more moderate nationalists 
of Ferhat Abbas’ UDMA.25 The PCA tried to re-establish contact with 
the Algerian masses by organising party cells in both urban and rural 
zones, and by campaigning on a range of progressive issues, including 
agrarian reform, extension of equal state welfare provision, health care, 
education, and an end to discriminatory distribution of rationed food to 
settlers.26 It was as part of this wider change in the Algerian Communist 
Party towards ‘arabisation’, and a drive to organise among the peas-
antry and urban proletariat, that the fi rst signifi cant women’s movement 
appeared, the Union des femmes d’Algérie (UFA).27
The leading fi gure in the UFA, which was established in 1944, was its 
general secretary and leading politician Alice Sportisse. After de Gaulle’s 
ordinance of 21 April 1944 which granted the vote to metropolitan 
and European women in Algeria, she was one of thirty-three women 
who were elected to the Constituent Assembly. In the Assembly she 
campaigned for the extension of the franchise to Algerian women, and 
although the Organic Law of 20 September 1947 in principle granted 
this, underhand measures were taken to ensure this would not be imple-
mented.28 In the early years of the UFA the organisation was run largely 
by and for European women: for example, at a major public meeting 
in Algiers on 9 April 1946 only two Muslim women were present 
among the 300 European women and fi fty men.29 However, the move-
ment was able to attract talented and highly dedicated radicals (exiled 
Spanish republicans, Marxist intellectuals from metropolitan France, 
left- Catholic militants) who were prepared to organise among the 
largely illiterate and impoverished mass of Algerian women in the bled, 
or in the shantytowns and ‘native quarters’ of the urban centres.
These militants were particularly successful in establishing a com-
munist organisation that reached out from the urban centres into the 
rural hinterland of the Department of Oran: a penetration that may 
have been more successful than anywhere else in Algeria because of 
the more ‘advanced’ proletarian condition of labourers on the colons 
estates.30 Typical of these new women activists were Lisette Vincent, 
Myrian Ben and Jacqueline Guerroudj, who were posted as teachers to 
rural schools where they were shocked by the hardship faced by peasant 
women and children, the constant malnutrition, their primitive dwell-
ings, and an almost total absence of any modern infrastructure, includ-
ing roads, electricity, water supply and primary health care.31 Jacqueline 
Guerroudj travelled on foot with her husband into the outlying douars 
(villages) of Ouchba, Chouli, Terny and Oum Oulalou, where she held 
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meetings with local women, providing advice on hygiene and child-care, 
reading from newspapers and debating current events.32
The UFA militants became radicalised through their ability to break 
through the normal segregationist barriers and to gain a direct, personal 
experience of indigenous society.33 The UFA provided a framework in 
which women from the three religious communities (Christian, Muslim, 
Jewish) were brought into contact and could share elements of their 
differing cultures. The European militants began to develop a fi rst-hand 
experience of the cultural and linguistic problems of organising among 
Muslim women who were largely illiterate, spoke only Arabic or Berber 
dialects, and were hampered by the strict rules of gender segregation. 
The extent to which female seclusion served to prevent wider education 
or involvement in the main-stream associational and political life of 
the colony should not be under-estimated. Once girls reached puberty 
or were married extremely powerful forms of family, community and 
self-regulation came into force, the main object of which was to prevent 
women having any contact whatsoever with males outside the bounda-
ries of the immediate family and household grouping.34 In general 
Algerian males were prepared to tolerate women’s social networking 
outside the domestic space within certain ‘traditional’ female spheres 
such as private houses, Turkish baths, weddings, circumcision fêtes, 
or visits to cemeteries and holy sites, activities from which men were 
excluded or in which mutual surveillance and kinship links could guar-
antee that honour was safe. By 1947 the UFA had adapted to this situ-
ation by organising strictly female meetings in the major urban centres 
and this succeeded for the fi rst time in drawing in Muslim women in 
large numbers. Baya Allaouchiche, perhaps the most infl uential of 
Algerian women in the UFA, notes:
Everywhere was used to hold discussions: cemeteries, Moorish baths, 
marriages and baptisms. We were always ready to explain the rights and 
role of women in the world. We thought we could advance the cause of 
women in this way. On their side they found pretexts to get out of the 
house saying they were going to the Moorish baths. We organised cinema 
shows with hired fi lms. One or two women explained the fi lm [in French, 
Arabic or Berber], the meaning of the theme, and discussion then took off 
. . . they used extraordinary ingenuity to come and get educated.35
Such women-only meetings, which also used Arabic and Berber 
interpreters, and cinema and theatrical performances to appeal to the 
illiterate, succeeded by 1948 in attracting, at least by Algerian stand-
ards, enormous numbers of Muslim women to UFA public meetings. 
Police informers reported in October 1948 the presence of 800 Algerian 
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women at a meeting in the Algiers’ Foyer Civique to mark Aïd-el-kébir, 
at which the general secretary Alice Sportisse attacked the failure to 
implement the vote for women, ‘who have to struggle in a situation close 
to poverty’.36 The UFA, probably through studying the methods of the 
PPA nationalists, also proved adept at using propaganda techniques and 
cultural forms that would appeal to illiterate Arab or Berber speaking 
women, particularly through popular fi lms like the Egyptian Gawhara, 
theatrical sketches, and Arab female orchestras such as ‘Aissa’, and ‘El 
Nedjema’. Success can also be measured by the spread of UFA women’s 
groups across Algeria into the main urban centres of Algiers, Oran, 
Constantine, Relizane, Bône, Sétif and Sidi-Bel-Abbès.37
The UFA also helped to create for the fi rst time an internationalist 
dimension to the Algerian women’s movement, which before 1945 had 
been so isolated from external contacts. This was an era during which 
the Cold War reached its zenith and the UFA, in line with interna-
tional communism, attacked the danger to the Soviet Union of global 
imperialism led by the United States and NATO. Equally prominent 
was the theme of the international solidarity of women engaged in 
anti-colonial struggles across the globe. At the Third Congress of the 
UFA held in May 1949 in the Algiers town hall the number of Muslim 
women outnumbered Europeans by 400 to 250, and among the main 
speakers was a delegation of women from the Women’s International 
Democratic Federation (WIDF), the socialist and anti-colonialist organ-
isation founded in 1945. Archimède Gertie, a lawyer and deputy from 
Guadaloupe, described how in her country ‘natives, as in Algeria, were 
considered in the same way as “beasts of burden”’, and encouraged 
Algerian women to engage in the struggle of all peoples against colonial-
ism. The delegate Thai-Thi-Lien denounced the ongoing French colonial 
war in Vietnam and emphasised the key role of women in the ‘struggle 
for total liberation’, both through support for combatants and, on the 
social front, through a mass drive against illiteracy.38 Algerian women 
delegates attended, and reported back from, international women’s con-
ferences held in Budapest, North Korea, Peking, Cairo and Stockholm. 
By 1952 the attention of the UFA had turned to the violent military 
and police repression taking place across the border in Tunisia and on 
international women’s day, 8 March 1952, at a meeting attended by 300 
women in the Cinema Suffren Mme Mandouze spoke against, ‘The mas-
sacres of children, the rape of women, the destruction of crops, carried 
out by the forces of repression in Tunisia’.39
The UFA played a particularly prominent role in organising campaigns 
that were directed more towards social and ‘class’ issues, than towards 
the nationalist struggle. During 1944–45 the Algerian populace was 
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confronting a situation of widespread famine, and the communists dem-
onstrated against the high cost of living, black-market traders, and the 
discriminatory supply of rationed rice to European families.40 They also 
demanded the extension of social security and pension rights to Muslim 
women on a par with those available to European women, attacked the 
conditions in the bidonvilles, and encouraged women to challenge the 
exclusion of their children from state primary schools by getting them 
enrolled. The movement also attacked the deepening repression of the 
Algerian government as it tried to keep a lid on the growing strength of 
the nationalists, campaigned for the release of political prisoners, and 
exposed the fl agrant corruption of electoral procedure by the Governor 
Naegelen after 1948, including the refusal to implement the vote for 
Muslim women. Quite exceptional, if not unique, was the decision of 
the PCA to stand two Muslim women in the municipal elections of 
1945, Bendjaoui Kateb at Bône and Mérami Fatma at St-Cloud in the 
Oran department, both of whom won council seats.41
Through the organisation of petitions, protest meetings, strikes and 
street demonstrations the UFA undoubtedly succeeded in raising the 
political awareness of large numbers of lower-class women. These 
Muslim women were not, as was often claimed, quiescent victims 
of Islamic patriarchy or the passive followers of European militants. 
Algerian women, records Lucette Laribère, were always at the forefront 
of demonstrations, which could be met with extreme levels of police vio-
lence, including gunfi re. ‘I remember how during the dockers’ strike in 
Beni-Saf an Algerian woman gave birth, and she had absolutely nothing 
to clothe her baby, she wrapped it in newspaper’.42 The UFA had a 
particularly strong presence in the Oran region and on one occasion a 
column of about a thousand veiled women marched on the Prefecture of 
Sidi-Bel-Abbès to hand in a petition demanding the right to vote. During 
the agricultural workers strike of 1951–52 women in the same region 
lay down on the railway line to stop a train departing with male prison-
ers for the notorious prison of Berrouaghia.43 During the 1953 strike to 
blockade ships destined for Indochina during the colonial war, women 
interposed themselves between the Compagnie républicaine de sécurité 
(CRS) riot police as they were about to attack the dockers, and removed 
and tied their long veils (haïks) around their waists so that their hands 
could be free to bombard the police with stones.
How successful was the UFA movement during the decade 1944–54? 
As a section of the wider communist apparatus, the UFA possessed the 
advantages of a sophisticated, well-funded and experienced party, with 
its own printing presses, journalists, bureaucracy, communications and 
links into both the trade unions and local and national government. 
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Between January 1945 and April 1946 the membership climbed rapidly 
from 7,000 to 20,000.44 Algerian historians have often claimed that this 
dynamic movement in the long term undermined the PPA and weak-
ened the key battle for national independence. In reality the extremely 
turbulent politics of the period, the constant tensions and battles inter-
nal to different currents, the complex and cross-cutting party alliances 
and splits, makes it diffi cult to impose a simple grid, a binary opposi-
tion, between the pro-independence PPA and the ‘assimilationist’ PCA. 
During 1946–47 Alice Sportisse made repeated efforts to approach 
Messali Hadj to create a united front organisation, the Front national 
démocratique,45 and the UFA and the nationalist sister organisation, the 
Association des femmes musulmanes algériennes (AFMA), maintained a 
dialogue through members who attended joint meetings.46 However, any 
move to unity was doomed to fail: the Messalists could not overcome 
their hostility towards the communists who had for decades sought to 
obliterate their movement, and the PCA retained a deep ambivalence 
towards nationalism. European communists frequently betrayed an 
underlying assimilationist stance towards Algerian identity, the assump-
tion that in time and with progress Muslims would caste aside their sup-
posedly inferior religion, culture and society for a secular and modern 
way of life. At a UFA rally in September 1947 one speaker reported on 
her attendance at a meeting of the recently formed nationalist AFMA at 
which the audience had ‘declared itself in favour of keeping the veil until 
independence of the country’, but on the contrary, she claimed, the veil 
should be suppressed.47 Tensions were exposed within the UFA in the 
preparation for the 1949 Congress when Muslim delegates, supported 
by a minority of Europeans, objected to the decoration of the stage with 
numerous red, white and blue fl ags.48 Many of the rank-and-fi le women 
supporters of the PCA were unable to overcome the visceral racism and 
superiority towards Algerians that was endemic in pieds-noirs society.49 
As Muslims attending UFA meetings began to outnumber Europeans 
after 1947 there are signs of the latter withdrawing in increasing 
numbers and failing to re-new membership,50 precisely the same pattern 
of ‘white-fl ight’ that, as will be seen later, army Women’s Circles began 
to experience after 1958.
The Union démocratique du manifeste algérien and secular feminism
The second strand in the Algerian women’s movement was smaller in scale 
than the UFA, but of interest for the light it throws on an important secu-
larist and westernising tendency. This feminist current grew under the aegis 
of Ferhat Abbas’ party, the Union démocratique du manifeste algérien, 
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which was created in early 1946 by a generation of reformist politicians 
who had originally subscribed to a moderate assimilationist agenda.51 
This movement found its early roots in an elite strata of professionals, 
mainly doctors, lawyers, politicians and teachers, who had received a 
high level of education within the French lycée and university system. 
This francophile group, sometimes referred to as ‘évolués’, was headed 
by Ferhat Abbas who during the 1930s was unreservedly in favour of full 
assimilation: ‘either the population becomes completely French or it will 
perish’.52 With the Manifesto of 12 February 1943 Abbas was forced to 
recognise the failure of the assimilationist project and accepted that some 
form of Algerian independence was desirable, but he still favoured close 
links with France, a kind of Dominion status, and preferred to achieve this 
goal through peaceful parliamentary and legalistic methods.53
On 1 May 1949 the UDMA established a new youth organisation, the 
Jeunesse de l’union démocratique du manifeste algérien (JUDMA), which 
during 1951 to 1954, in the columns of the party weekly La République 
algérienne, widely debated the issues facing Algerian women. In 1951 
the paper carried a number of interviews with leading Egyptian femi-
nists, including Saiza Nabarawi and Mounira Charaoui of the Egyptian 
Feminist Union, and Fatma Nimet Rashid of the National Feminist 
Party.54 Egypt had a far more advanced and mature women’s movement 
than Algeria and during the post-war era served as a beacon for emerg-
ing feminist and Arab nationalist struggles.55 The message conveyed by 
the Egyptian militants to their Algerian sisters was a highly radical and 
political one, by the standards of the repressive French colony. They 
described the enormous role that Egyptian women had played, including 
in the mass street demonstrations of 1919, in the revolt against British 
rule: ‘For the fi rst time ever one saw veiled women taking the lead of 
demonstrations’.56 Most crucial was the Kemalist idea that the Arab 
nation could only liberate itself through harnessing the full potential of 
women through education.57 But if women were to liberate themselves 
and play a full role through education, training and employment, they 
would have to battle against traditional customs, seclusion and the veil: 
‘against the absurd, if not criminal, habits and customs that keep the 
Arab woman a slave outside the life of the nation . . . The veiled woman 
cannot assume any meaningful role in society . . . The veil is a rampart 
that it is absolutely necessary for Arab women to climb over if they 
wish to defi nitively emancipate themselves from the tight restrictions of 
imperialism’. This liberation was entirely legitimate, they claimed, since 
veiling and seclusion had no basis in the Koran and ‘had nothing to do 
with Islam’.58 Throughout 1951–54 La République algérienne inter-
nationalised the issue of Muslim emancipation through articles on the 
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women’s anti-colonial struggle in Pakistan, India, Syria and elsewhere. 
Numerous photographs of strong Muslim women as uniformed soldiers, 
aviators, telephonists, doctors and engineers provided icons of unveiled, 
liberated women placed in association with visual symbols of scientifi c 
progress and modernity (aeroplanes, cars, electric machines).59
The liberationist message made an enormous impact on young, edu-
cated Algerian women and through the letter columns of La République 
algérienne during 1953–54 they launched an extraordinary and viru-
lent frontal assault on conservative religious forces in Algerian society, 
propounding the thesis of a ‘double imperialism’ that depicted custom 
as a form of oppression that was equal to colonialism itself. One cor-
respondent, ‘Nadia G’, attacked the daily suffering of young women 
forced to work for derisory wages or into prostitution: we are told ‘it’s 
the fault of colonialism’, but more blameworthy were the prejudices of 
parents and Muslim opinion, ‘who insult us, denigrate us, expel us from 
their bosom like evil beasts that one wants to crush’. The male leaders 
of political parties and of Islamic organisations were indifferent to their 
fate, blind to ‘this pain that gnaws young hearts smothered by the “pro-
tective” shadow of white veils that conceal so much dark suffering’.60 
The idea of a double oppression seems to have gained some currency 
in 1953, and Fadila Ahmed, in an article in the Arab newspaper Al 
Manar, entitled ‘The twin jailors of women’, wrote: ‘we Algeria women 
have two jailors: colonialism . . . and those listless beings who cling to 
the customs and traditions inherited, not from Islam, but from their 
ignorant fathers. The second jailor is worse than the fi rst’.61 Another 
young woman from Constantine wrote, ‘In the atomic age it is abso-
lutely unacceptable that women be odiously locked up, sequestrated, 
ridiculed’, and also opposed the veil, ‘noxious ancestral ideas’ and the 
‘double imperialism’ of both colonialism and conservative Muslim 
society.62 A woman from Tlemcen attacked the veil and spoke of the 
humiliation of being photographed in the street by American ‘gentle-
men’ tourists like freaks, ‘a spectre looming up from by-gone ages’.63 
These militants were demanding, in particular, to be freed from the 
constraints of arranged marriage, not to be traded like cattle between 
families and thrown into ‘the bed of a stranger who rapes them’ and 
for the right to chose a partner on the basis of mutual attraction, ‘to 
make a marriage of love’.64 As will be seen in later chapters, this femi-
nist discourse was identical to that which was solicited and reproduced 
by the army psychological warfare campaign for emancipation after 
1956, and provides an important clue as to how one key current in the 
pre-war nationalist movement, that of the évoluées, resurfaced later in 
the French camp.
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The radical voice of the young feminists was not, however, representa-
tive of the wider, male-dominated leadership of the youth movement and 
parent UDMA. The anonymous editor (J. A) of La République algéri-
enne dissociated himself from the more outspoken letters, chastised one 
contributor for talking of ‘noxious ancestral ideas’, and warned against 
abandoning principled behaviour for the superfi cial licence and deca-
dence of the west.65 The JUDMA feminists were undoubtedly aware of 
the contemporary campaign being orchestrated by populist elements in 
the PPA and Ulema to attack, often through violent street actions, alcohol 
consumption, dance halls, cinemas and cafés in which Algerian women 
were thought to fl aunt themselves unveiled, in make-up, aping European 
fashion and insulting all notions of honour, morality and national integ-
rity.66 JUDMA feminists who went unveiled reported that they were being 
subjected to constant harassment in the street by men who ‘follow them 
right along the road, wolf whistle, bother them and fi nally even insult 
them’, so that they were being driven back into domestic seclusion.67
Such male aggression can be seen as a hostile reaction to the threat-
ening ‘invasion’ of women into the previously banned public spaces 
of the city. The UDMA press received numerous letters from men 
who deployed a standard discourse of westernised female decadence 
to attack an emerging Muslim feminism.68 The Third Congress of the 
JUDMA in 1954 passed a resolution which warned against Algerian 
women who were taking, ‘only the superfi cial varnish and licentious 
libertinage of western civilisation, deliberately neglecting their role as 
women, spouses, mothers and citizens’.69 Faced with this male backlash 
the female militants of the JUDMA went to great pains to argue that 
emancipation was perfectly compatible with Islam, and that customary 
restraints on women represented a corrupt deviation from the Koran 
upheld by archaic patriarchy or conservative Islamic scholars. They 
emphasised that the veil was no guarantee of moral behaviour, indeed it 
was argued that some women used the anonymity of the haïk to engage 
in clandestine liaison, and engaged in a form of self-policing to show that 
unveiled women could demonstrate an irreproachable modest, respect-
ful and pure bearing: ‘Have no fear dear brothers and dear fathers . . . 
Above all do not think that we imitate certain European women in their 
fl ashy fi nery, fancy show and low-cut dresses. On the contrary, we walk 
with our head held high, always maintaining for ourselves the modesty 
of the young Muslim girl’.70 Some JUDMA feminists argued that the 
dispute about the veil was sustaining a false and divisive debate, and 
sisters had the right to veil or not as they chose.71 Afsaneh Najmabadi 
has argued that the simplifying and damaging binary opposition that 
contrasted secular modernisation (unveiling) with conservative Islam 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   40 21/7/09   12:16:12
 From the Sétif massacre to the November insurrection 41
(veiling) failed to see that Iranian feminism contained a strand that 
regarded modernity, the veil and Islam as perfectly compatible, and 
some elements of this voice can be recognised in Algerian feminism.72
Overall the UDMA leadership, despite its modernist pretensions, 
maintained a quite conservative and cautious position on women’s 
emancipation, and the focus on specifi c issues like the veil, education 
and training helped disguise a failure to address the issue of political 
rights, including the female vote which was not included in the party 
programme until 1955.73 The reformist movement was in constant 
struggle to try and fi nd an equilibrium or juste milieu, what one leader, 
Oussedik, called ‘a harmonious synthesis between the two currents of 
civilisation: the materialism of the West and the spirituality of the East’.74 
But the UDMA leaders clearly felt ill at ease with the mixing of sexes in 
party or public meetings, and photographs show rigidly separated audi-
ences with men to one side, and veiled women to the other.75 While the 
party press gave space to young women, it sought to distance itself from 
what it viewed as the intemperate language of inexperienced juveniles. 
There existed a tension between those young women who were feeling 
their way, under exceptionally adverse conditions, towards a concept of 
personal development and individual fulfi lment as women, and a party 
which subordinated their interests to those of the nation or ‘people’. 
In general the UDMA discourse, including that of many women, saw 
the education and progress of women as instrumental or secondary to 
the needs of national liberation led by men. Ibnou Cherqui emphasised 
three key roles for women: fi rst as providers of ‘the constant comfort of 
her help’ to militant husbands, brothers and fathers; second, of moral 
support for combatants; and third, as mothers and educators of children 
‘in the course of nationalism’.76 Once again nationalism was threatening 
to lock women into the private family sphere in their ‘natural’ gender 
role as reproducers. Soon the small number of young and educated 
Algerian women who shared a more radical, secularist and personalist 
agenda were to fi nd themselves politically isolated, particularly as the 
UDMA was fi rst banned by the French government and then absorbed 
into the far more integral nationalist movement of the FLN.
Religious reformism and the Association des Ulema
musulmans algériens
The reformist movement of the Ulema (or Islamic scholars) is of con-
siderable importance to this study overall since, although it was not 
directly involved in any women’s organisation, it helped formulate the 
core ideology of Messali Hadj’s PPA-MTLD and of the FLN which 
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became dominant after 1954, including the position on women. Until 
the 1980s the historiography of Algerian nationalism, most of it written 
from a left or Marxist perspective, tended to ignore or under-estimate 
the deep religious continuities within the independence movement 
and post-colonial state: but this has begun to be revised by historians 
 following the post-1988 resurgence of Islamism.
From the moment of the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 until 
about 1920 the dominant form of religion was constituted by the holy 
men or marabouts castes, and the Sufi  mystical confraternities (tariqa) 
that were located in monastic-type centres of pilgrimage and scholastic 
teaching (zaouias). By the early twentieth century scholastic learning 
was moribund, and both marabouts and offi cial imams declined in 
popular legitimacy since they were closely associated with the colonial 
regime that funded and nurtured them as an instrument of political 
control. This sclerosis was challenged by the Islamic reform movement 
that arrived from the Middle East in the early 1920s and was led by 
Sheikh Abd al Hamid Ben Badis, member of a patrician Constantine 
family, who helped to found the AUMA in 1931 which rapidly spread 
through the urban centres of Algeria.77 Islamic reformism, not unlike 
the Protestant Reformation in Europe, represented a rejection of popu-
list forms of superstition, magic and saintly intercession, and a return 
to pure scriptural sources (salafi yya). This austere, disciplined and indi-
vidualistic faith leant itself well to the rationality and modernising ambi-
tions of the Algerian urban bourgeoisie that expanded with the rapid 
economic growth of the early twentieth century.
Although Ben Badis attempted to keep the Ulema clear of any politi-
cal entanglements, it provided a powerful vehicle for emerging nation-
alism.78 The assertion of Algerian exceptionalism, the deep historical 
roots of identity, Arabic language, culture and Islamic faith that could 
never be assimilated into French civilisation, expressed a new found 
pride, a cultural nationalism that stood fi rm against the humiliating and 
depersonalising impacts of colonialism. In April 1936 Ben Badis refuted 
Ferhat Abbas’ famous statement that he could fi nd no evidence for the 
existence of an Algerian nation, by noting: ‘this nation has its history, 
illustrated by innumerable remarkable deeds; it has its religious and 
linguistic unity; it has its own culture, traditions, and values . . . it is a 
nation totally unlike France by its language, its values, ethnic origins and 
religion. It has no desire for assimilation. It has its very own fatherland, 
Algeria, with its established and well known frontiers’.79 Unlike the 
highly fragmented and segmentary structures of moribund tribalism and 
maraboutism, that were rooted in particular localities and shrines, the 
puritan individualism of the Ulema provided a kind of ‘Jacobin Islam’,80 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   42 21/7/09   12:16:12
 From the Sétif massacre to the November insurrection 43
the basis for a new national identity that unifi ed Algerians across space, 
class and clan.81 Reformism also separated Islamic spirituality from the 
sphere of natural science, which meant that Koranic orthodoxy was 
compatible with material progress, so that its followers could simul-
taneously defend religion against the inroads of westernisation while 
embracing the techniques of modernity, economic change and rational 
organisation.82 Finally, under a highly repressive colonial regime that 
constantly harassed and crushed any overt form of Algerian political or 
party opposition, reformism constituted a ‘non-political’ religious base 
of cultural resistance that the government found diffi cult to proscribe.83
During 1930 to 1936 Messali Hadj distanced himself increasingly 
from secular communism and moved towards reformist Islam. He pro-
posed the teaching of courses in Arabic language and history to migrant 
workers in France, deployed a political rhetoric infused with Islamic 
jihadist terms, and abandoned European dress for the beard, long gown 
and head-wear (chéchia) of the religious leader and prophet.84 Much of 
the basic thinking and attitude of the PPA towards women derived from 
the Ulema which, Ali Merad notes, was ‘both defensive and conserva-
tive’. The Ulema rejected the ideas of the progressive Muslim feminists 
of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Tunisia, and adopted 
the ideas of the conservative Egyptian reformist Rashid Rida (1865–
1935) as the supreme authority in this fi eld.85
Rida was a puritanical moralist who expressed horror at the specta-
cle offered by the life-style of American women, the nudity in sea-side 
resorts, the rampant hedonism and individualism of western women 
who had ready access to divorce, and who destroyed the sacred unity 
and stability of the family. It was essential to combat what he perceived 
as a Christian and atheist conspiracy to weaken Islam from within by 
an insidious subversion of morality and family life, and this could be 
best achieved by a stout defence of traditional Sunni orthodoxy. Rida, 
unlike the Egyptian feminists, opposed the abolishment of veiling, 
and reaffi rmed patriarchy, polygamy and unilateral male repudiation. 
Ben Badis and his followers stood at the opposite spectrum from the 
Kemalist evolués, from Ferhat Abbas and the young radical women of 
the JUDMA, who by abandoning the veil and women’s segregation, 
represented a kind of dangerous Trojan Horse through which Algerian 
society might be subverted from within by a creeping westernisation. 
This form of conservative orthodoxy, as will be seen throughout this 
study, leant itself to one of the most powerful and enduring myths or 
ideological constructions of Algerian nationalism, the idea that women 
constituted a bastion and core defence of traditional religious and 
 cultural identity.
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The Ulema, in an attempt to halt the corrosive effects of westernisa-
tion transmitted through the secular French school system, began to 
expand the number of ‘free schools’, the secondary médersa schools 
that could provide both boys and girls with a modern Arabo-Islamic 
education.86 The free schools played a crucial role in the formation of 
a whole generation of youth who became nationalist militants between 
1936 and 1954. Although the data are unreliable or contradictory, the 
number of schools appears to have increased from 70 in 1934–35 to 181 
in 1954, and by 1955 to have taught 21,093 boys and 14,097 girls.87 
The médersa received no government funding and were organised by a 
central association and local committees which allowed them a degree 
of independence that was worrying to the French authorities which sub-
jected them to close police surveillance. Many of the male pupils, includ-
ing the future FLN military leader and President Houari Boumédienne, 
went on to complete their education at the universities of Zitouna in 
Tunisia and El Azhar in Egypt, a connection that facilitated the fl ow of 
external Arab and Islamic cultural and nationalist infl uences into the 
Algerian lower middle class. Eventually, when the Ulema rallied to the 
FLN during 1956–57, the médersa were subjected to severe repression 
and some 133 schools were closed and many teachers were interned.
Typical of these centres of nationalist culture was the médersa 
‘Chabiba’ of Algiers, a school that was funded by an association of 
parents and supporters, which had been temporarily closed by the gov-
ernment in July 1934 after the arrest of a militant teacher, Chama.88 
Nationalist families that nurtured Arab culture as a form of resist-
ance frequently moved their daughters from French state schools into 
the médersa. The PPA militant Isa Benzekri was withdrawn from the 
French school when thirteen years old on the insistence of her maternal 
uncle and placed in the Algiers ‘Chabiba’, as was another future activ-
ist Malika Zerrouki. There they received a modern education in both 
Arabic and French language, infused with a strong nationalism includ-
ing Algerian history and the learning and singing of patriotic hymns or 
songs (nachid).89 Another activist Fatiha Bouhired comments: ‘I was 
in the French school up to CM2 [Cours moyen 2, age group 10–11 
years], then I studied Arabic in a “free” school of the Casbah, the 
“Lalla Chemma”. It was a modern school, not like the impoverished 
Koranic schools [Sid el Ouhate]. We studied the Coran, the holy sayings 
[hadith], Koranic commentary [tefsir], arithmetic. It was a political 
school. Although the nationalist hymns were banned, we still learned 
them. It’s there that we learned, still young, that we were colonised and 
that one day we would have to make a revolution against colonialism’.90 
Among the fi ve members of the fi rst clandestine women’s cell of the PPA 
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in 1946 were two future médersa teachers,91 and the key activists of the 
youth branch, the Jeunes fi lles musulmanes algérienne (JFMA) created 
in June 1948, were predominantly teachers and students from the free 
schools. A police report noted that the JFMA, like the parent UDMA, 
was opposed to ‘“the occidentalisation” of the indigenous woman’.92
The Ulema thus supported girls’ education as integral to the process of 
national regeneration, as long as they were segregated from boys in the 
classroom, their moral behaviour was closely policed, and knowledge, 
according to Ben Badis, was diffused ‘on the basis of our religion and our 
national character’.93 The reformist thinkers did not advocate education 
for girls and women on the basis of equality of opportunity and individ-
ual emancipation, but rather as a key to an Arabo-Islamic renaissance. 
Most of these young médersa women, who came to form the backbone 
of the PPA women’s organisation, were drawn from a particular strata 
in urban society, a class of relatively well-off small shopkeepers, traders 
and skilled artisans who remained independent from the state patronage 
system and retained a degree of ‘traditional’ Arab culture and learning.94 
The petit-bourgeois nature of the médersa, infl uenced by a European 
disciplinary model, is captured in class photographs of Tayeb El-Okbi’s 
médersa in Algiers which, notes James McDougall, ‘show girls in neat, 
knee-length white dresses, their hands folded in their laps, and rows of 
boys in jackets and fez, fl anked by their teachers (all in European dress, 
sometimes with a burnūs over the jacket)’.95 The reformist-led médersa 
schools played a progressive role in facilitating the expanding education 
of girls: the Ulema leader Ahmed Tawfi q al-Madani, who represented 
the liberal wing of the movement,96 in a speech to a meeting of 800 
young women in Algiers stated: ‘In order to be free, independent, it is 
necessary that our women be instructed and educated. She must be the 
equal of man and not his slave’.97 But the overall position of reformism 
towards women was conservative and sought to reinforce Sunni regula-
tion of family, marriage and gender segregation. Thus in one médersa 
programme dedicated to Arab language and history Sheikh Belkacem 
Djebali taught women from behind a curtain,98 while the president of 
the AUMA Bachir al-Ibrahimi wrote in the newsletter El Basaïr (28 
February 1950) opposing the extension of the vote to Algerian women 
on the grounds that it would provoke discord among Muslims.99
Populist nationalism and the Association des femmes musulmanes 
algériennes
The fourth and fi nal strand in the growth of women’s organisations 
between 1944 and 1954 concerns the foundation by the PPA-MTLD in 
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1946 of a network of clandestine women’s cells, followed by the estab-
lishment of the AFMA in July 1947.
Throughout the long period from the foundation of the Étoile nord-
africaine in 1926 through to the outbreak of the War of Independence 
in 1954, the Messalist movement never formulated a detailed or clear 
policy in relation to women.100 Until 1936 the ENA organised a political 
base among the community of emigrant workers in mainland France, but 
this was a society of single men with which Algerian women, left behind 
in the colony, had little direct contact or input.101 From 1936 onwards 
Messali Hadj changed the centre of gravity of PPA activism from France 
to Algeria, and during the following phase of rapid penetration of the 
nationalist organisation in the colony, women began to be drawn into 
the radical political currents. The presence of women, uttering charac-
teristic ululations, was noted in mass demonstrations of 1936 and 1939, 
when many were injured, and Messali acknowledged the presence of 
‘women who had come to hear the voice of the people’, during his key 
speech in the Algiers municipal stadium on 2 August 1936.102
However, Messalism, which has been described as a form of populist 
nationalism, was in general characterised by a certain disdain for intel-
lectuals, and appealed to the masses more through fi ery rhetoric than 
by any detailed elaboration of a programme.103 For Messali everything 
was subsidiary to the immediacy of the struggle for independence. Any 
mention of Algerian women emphasised their exploitation, poverty and 
victim status solely at the hands of the colonial system. Women were 
always under ‘the yoke of colonialism’, or ‘suffocated by the poverty 
and ignorance that were carefully nurtured by imperialism’.104 This 
analysis of the purely destructive impacts of colonialism on women and 
the family continued to provide the staple of FLN discourse through to 
1962, and found its most detailed elaboration in Saadia-et-Lakhdar’s 
sociological treatise of 1961, L’Aliénation colonialiste et la résistance 
de la famille algérienne.105 Since, the PPA argued, Algerian women’s 
plight could only be resolved through the defeat of colonialism there 
was no point in elaborating any interim programme: liberation of 
women would come about almost instantaneously and totally, as if by 
magic, from the removal of the causes of exploitation. ‘The Algerian 
woman could never advance as long as Algeria was bent under the yoke 
of French colonialism’,106 a position that was refl ected in a meeting of 
the AFMA at which it was agreed the veil should be maintained, ‘until 
the independence of our land’.107 This meant in effect that the PPA, as 
well as the FLN later on, could avoid making any policy statements 
on the issue of women, and a potentially explosive issue could be both 
delayed and marginalised. The issues surrounding women were lacking 
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in any specifi city, and were subordinated to or absorbed into the wider 
demands of the nationalist struggle.
Not until 1954, probably under the pressure of communist and 
UDMA campaigning, did Messali openly recognise the need for women 
to participate in the liberation struggle, although he shied clear of taking 
the issue further: given ‘the delicate and sensitive nature of this problem, 
it is important to approach it with prudence and care’.108 The masculine 
discourse of the MTLD-PPA in effect denied women any meaningful 
role as autonomous political agents, but reduced them to the function 
of heroic procreators, educators of the nation, and moral supporters 
of male warriors. ‘And you’, proclaimed the Central Committee of the 
MTLD in December 1953, ‘women of our Algeria, mothers, sisters, 
spouses! . . . Remember that it is on you that falls the noble task of 
giving life and to forging the future generations! It is on you that the 
future of Algeria rests’.109 The PPA was relatively at ease with the mobi-
lisation of women in so far as it fi tted into a traditional Middle East and 
Maghrebian myth of women taking over from effeminate or failing men 
a combative role in a time of danger to the people: the party journal, 
El Ouma, declaimed a Kabyle saying, ‘Women take up arms, since men 
refuse to’.110
But overall nationalism was deeply ambiguous, Janus-faced, in 
simultaneously politicising women and making them aware of colonial 
exploitation, while drawing them into an ideology of domesticity and 
traditional gender roles that would in the long term act as an iron corset 
on emancipation. In the former area, the PPA was highly successful in 
bringing women for the fi rst time into the sphere of political activism, an 
engagement that, apart from the médersa schools, was achieved through 
new forms of cultural activism and via the family cell or kin networks. 
The nationalists penetrated into urban civil society through a whole 
range of activities which were aimed particularly at youth, from sports 
clubs and scouting, to musical circles and festivals.111 Fatima Zekkal has 
described the nationalist plays and theatrical sketches written and per-
formed by militants of the AFMA, including male roles that were played 
by women. At the Algiers Opera, close to the Casbah, they staged 
‘tableaux that symbolised Algeria before and after colonisation and as 
we imagined it after independence. I appeared dressed in the Algerian 
fl ag. It was the fi rst time that the Algerian fl ag was shown on stage. The 
hall was full, bursting at the seams, the police were there’. Later, when 
Zekkal moved to Tlemcen she seized the opportunity of her wedding 
celebration to encourage women who were present to set up an AFMA 
section. ‘There was a male orchestra and at the end the gathering sang 
the PPA hymn [she sings and translates]:
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I sacrifi ce for Algeria my life and possessions
For Liberty
Long live the Party of the Algerian People dear to my heart
And long live North Africa.
Everybody stood to attention, the men separate down below [in the 
inner courtyard], the women up above and everyone standing and 
singing. The women made their youyous’.112 While the AFMA made 
ready use of family celebrations to overcome the claustration of women, 
there was at the same time indications of a signifi cant innovation in the 
major cities as meetings moved away from private houses towards mass 
performances organised in spacious public halls and cinemas. For many 
women who attended these mass meetings this was the fi rst time they 
had ever been inside a cinema, theatre or hall, and the extent to which 
they were defying convention is indicated by the fact that the turbulent 
male followers of the reformist leader in Algiers, Sheikh Tayeb El Okbi, 
disrupted normal cinema or theatre performances in early 1954 to 
protest against the presence of women.113
The most crucial factor preventing the politicisation of women was 
their high degree of illiteracy, combined with radical seclusion and 
isolation from political life beyond the threshold of the house. Muslim 
women were expected to remain silent in the presence of men, not to 
speak unless fi rst spoken to, and not to express any ideas regarding the 
external male sphere of politics. To do so was to run the risk of incur-
ring the wrath, and even physical violence, of fathers, husbands and 
brothers. Fatima Baichi reports how she was beaten and dragged by her 
hair when her brother caught her ‘doing politics’.114 Mériem Madani, an 
FLN agent who was later arrested and tortured in May 1959, notes that 
she had no idea what the revolution meant when it began in 1954, ‘I did 
not know what it was, because I was not educated, I had never studied, 
I had never been to school, and in our homes the men never talked in the 
presence of women’.115 For the tiny minority of urban Algerian women 
who did become militants before and during the War of Independence, 
the best chance of achieving a degree of political consciousness and 
engagement was if they happened to be located in households or 
extended family networks in which the men were active nationalists. 
Fatiha Hermouche notes that she was ‘through the family circle in touch 
with the movement of nationalist ideas. One relative militated actively, 
he brought friends home, and I overheard their discussions. For girls, 
the infl uence of the family milieu is vital’.116 The father and two brothers 
of Baya Hocine were PPA activists: ‘politics was much discussed among 
the men. What’s wonderful about women is that they do not discuss 
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politics, but they understand everything, and suddenly this silent mass, 
faced with a particular situation, can assume an active role’.117 But the 
fact that women’s nationalism emerged largely as a component of the 
politics of the male-led family group, and from which it was unable to 
break free, meant that this radical current was subsidiary to or depend-
ent on males who would rapidly reverse or demobilise the new-found 
momentum at independence.
Equally signifi cant was the fact that patriarchal or kinship solidarities 
bound together members of the same family, fraction or clan in which 
individualism had little place, so that if ‘conversion’ took place to 
support the PPA, or later the FLN, the Mouvement national algérien 
(MNA), or the French side in the war, it was frequently the whole group 
that would ‘go over’ collectively (ralliement) in a single instance.118 Such 
en bloc political mobilisation included all wives and daughters as an 
integral part of the collective. Baya Hocine notes that all in her family, 
which lived in the Algiers Casbah, were PPA militants, and that this was 
the case for all those who had emigrated to the city from their Kabyle 
village: ‘It’s the whole village that agrees on this, that’s how it is with us, 
the Ighil Imoula’.119 Committed PPA nationalists were more willing to 
admit women into the previously male-dominated and closed sphere of 
politics or to attend AFMA meetings, even if this meant some breach-
ing of traditional boundaries of female exclusion and segregation, since 
this was legitimated by the exceptional circumstances of clandestine 
nationalist struggle. The FLN militants Malika and Louisette Ighilahriz 
recall the solemn occasion when their father, instead of eating separately 
from the women as was usual, called all the family around the table and 
announced his political engagement and his expectation that they too 
would suffer and sacrifi ce themselves for the liberation of their country: 
‘I want you to be very courageous and that you follow my example’.120 
However, as will be seen, this channelling of women’s political energies 
into the nationalist struggle was to carry portentous implications, since 
there was no guarantee, no implicit ‘contract’, that women would be 
compensated for such a sacrifi ce by recognition of their political right in 
the post-independence order.
The response of colonial government to the emergence of the Algerian 
women’s movement, 1944–54
This concluding section examines the response of the Gouvernmente 
générale (GG) to the challenge offered by the growth of Algerian 
women’s organisations. During the decade after 1944 the government 
was intensely preoccupied with the rapid extension of the nationalist 
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movement, and how to weaken or contain it through repressive means, 
including mass arrests of militants, seizure or closure of the press, fi xing 
elections and other well-worn techniques. The women’s organisations, 
especially the AFMA, were undoubtedly weakened by the general 
climate of repression, and the interest of the Algiers government to keep 
a close eye on the various associations is shown by the extensive volume 
of intelligence and informer reports. But, given the relatively small 
membership of the various organisations, the GG showed no particular 
concern, and was happy to monitor the situation through surveillance. 
What the archives reveal is concern in a rather different fi eld, a high-
level ambition to block the access of Algerian women to the franchise 
and to do this in such a way as to fend off international criticism of the 
colonial regime.
A fundamental political issue that faced the colonial regime through-
out the period after 1900 was how to retain settler domination, despite 
the republican rhetoric of universal rights, and in a situation in which 
indigenous Algerians greatly outnumbered Europeans. The sénatus-
consulte law of 1865 codifi ed a radical difference between Europeans 
(and soon after Jews under the Crémieux decree of 1870) who had full 
French citizenship and Algerians who were given second-class status as 
‘subjects’ since they fell under Muslim personal status law (statut per-
sonnel). The dike which was constructed to retain the fl ood of Algerians 
that threatened to inundate the settler monopoly of political power 
was crucially defi ned in religious terms: as long as Algerians remained 
Muslims then they fell subject to the separate laws and customs of 
Islamic courts which regulated marriage, the family and inheritance. 
The French exclusionary ideology claimed that as long as Algerians 
remained subject to ‘barbaric’ Islamic practices such as arranged and 
child-marriage, polygamy, repudiation, dowry and veiling so it was 
inconceivable that they could become full citizens since this would be 
in contradiction with ‘universal’ French law that, by defi nition, should 
apply to all individuals without exception.121 In principle the 1865 law 
enabled Algerians to become French citizens through ‘naturalisation’ by 
renouncing Muslim personal status: time and again colonial spokesmen 
cynically offered Algerians this immediate and ready access to citizen-
ship as a warranty of their own ‘democratic’ principles, while knowing 
full well that such an act of apostasy was deeply abhorrent to almost all 
Algerians: as General Reibell remarked in 1928, ‘If they [the Algerians] 
want to become French citizens, then they can naturalise, that’s up to 
them. They can become French citizens any time they choose’.122 The 
settler regime thus used personal status, constantly reiterated through 
an Orientalist discourse of female oppression and male sexual violence, 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   50 21/7/09   12:16:12
 From the Sétif massacre to the November insurrection 51
as a key blocking device: in such a system colonials had every interest in 
sustaining and exaggerating the ‘backward’ features of Algerian family 
law rather than emancipation.123
From time to time the settler regime conceded, under intense pressure 
from liberal reformers and Algerian elites, as with the Jonnart law of 
1919, tiny additions of carefully selected categories of male Algerians to 
the European electorate, such as war veterans, property owners and the 
holders of educational qualifi cations. However, with the Liberation the 
political climate in metropolitan France was one of intense expectation 
of radical change and the institution of a new, democratic constitutional 
order, an optimism that was symbolised by the extension of the vote to 
all French women. The challenge facing the colonial regime in Algeria 
was how to engineer an electoral system that could be defended in the 
republican language of universal rights and democracy, while in reality 
built to guarantee the political domination of the European minority. 
Basically this was achieved in relation to the Algerian male electorate 
through the device of a dual chamber. After lengthy debate in the First 
and Second Constituent Assemblies (October 1945 to October 1946), as 
well as the fi rst National Assembly, the Organic Law of 20 September 
1947 continued the classic colonialist system of separate and grossly 
unequal electorates.124 The law established a quasi-parliamentary body 
of limited competence, the Assemblée algérienne, divided into a First 
College of sixty delegates, elected by 469,000 Europeans and 63,000 
Muslims from the conservative elites, and a Second College of sixty dele-
gates elected by 1,300,000 Muslim male voters. Since all major decisions 
had to pass both Colleges and by a two-thirds majority, the European 
minority could always control the agenda and block any legislation to 
which they took exception.125 Even with this institutionally corrupt 
system, designed to guarantee settler hegemony, the GG was fi nding it 
diffi cult to contain the explosive pressures of nationalism and Naegelen 
was appointed Governor in February 1948 to keep a lid on the situa-
tion by overseeing the fi rst elections to the Algerian Assembly. Under 
his supervision the regime proceeded to rig the elections on a huge and 
systematic scale, using a range of corrupt practices from the intimidation 
and arrest of nationalist candidates to the stuffi ng of ballot boxes.126
However, the colonial regime was faced with a further dilemma in 
that the enfranchisement extended by De Gaulle to all European women 
in metropolitan France and Algeria would, in principle, have to be 
extended to Muslim women. Under Articles 4 of the Organic Law of 20 
September 1947, ‘Algerian women of Muslim origin possess the right 
to vote’, but a decision on how this would be implemented was left, 
by a slight of hand, to the future Algerian Assembly which in turn was 
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so rigged as to carry an automatic European majority.127 During the 
decade from 1948 to 1958 the Algiers government repeatedly claimed 
that the women’s franchise was not blocked by the French powers but 
by Muslims themselves in the Second College. Deputies of the Algerian 
Communist Party, most notably Alice Sportisse and René Justrabo,128 
the mayor of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, continued to push for implementation 
of the franchise in the National Assembly and the Algerian Assembly 
during 1948 and 1949, and also through the campaigns of the UFA. For 
example, at a UFA meeting in Algiers during October 1948 attended by 
some 800 women, nearly all of them Muslims, Sportisse made a speech 
in which she noted that the Communist Party ‘had fought and continues 
to fi ght to obtain the right to vote for Muslim women’, and indicated 
that a UFA campaign for the political education of Muslim women 
would prepare them for the exercise of this duty.129
Naegelen, in concertation with the Minister of the Interior, responded 
in 1949 to such pressure with the trivial proposal that some 300 women 
from the Muslim educated elite be added to the electoral list of the 
First College, a measure that the European delegates quickly buried.130 
Given the predominance of highly conservative Algerian delegates in 
the Assembly, so-called ‘Yes-men’ or ‘Beni-Oui-Oui’, supporters of the 
colonial regime chosen through corrupt electoral procedures, it is not 
surprising that they clamped down on any meaningful extension of the 
female vote. Naegelen’s cynical and widespread use of electoral fraud 
represented the fi nal blocking of the way to any peaceful solution to 
the Algerian crisis and drove the PPA towards the only option left to it: 
armed rebellion.
The Algiers administration seemed quite relaxed about its cynical 
fi xing of the electoral system and its exposure in the media: this, after 
all, is what it had been doing for over a century. Nor did it see the 
communist-led campaign for implementation of the female franchise 
as a matter of concern. But behind the scenes, largely unknown to the 
Algerian nationalists, Paris and Algiers appear to have been much more 
anxious about the potential impacts on international opinion. The 
source of this preoccupation in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice 
and the Interior originated from pressure that was bought to bear by 
Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux, a politician who played a leading role in the 
post-war international women’s movement. From 1945 Lefaucheux was 
elected as deputy for the Aisne for the Mouvement républicaines popu-
laires (MRP), a Christian Democrat party which in the immediate post-
war years, inspired by the experience of the Resistance and progressive 
Catholicism, adopted with exuberance the mantle of the Gaullist ‘libera-
tion’ of women.131 Lefaucheux held a powerful, diplomatic position in 
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the French delegation to the UN, and in 1946 she played a leading role 
alongside Eleanor Roosevelt in the establishment of the Commission on 
the Status of Women (CSW), as well as in the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). During 1946–47 Lefaucheux 
pressed the Commission to monitor the status of women in protector-
ate and colonial territories, and in the following years the CSW, which 
aimed to achieve ‘equality with men in all fi elds of human enterprise’, 
engaged in centralising a huge volume of comparative information on 
women’s political, economic, civil, social and educational rights across 
the globe.132 Between 1948 and 1952 Lefaucheux, as chairwoman of the 
CSW, played a key role in overseeing the monitoring of the legal rights 
of women in marriage, especially in relation to repressive customary 
practices, and in advancing full political suffrage for women, a radical 
agenda at a time when only twenty-fi ve of the fi fty-one UN member 
states allowed women equal voting rights with men. Lefaucheux trav-
elled widely to the French colonies of North and Sub-Saharan Africa 
and, as will be seen later (chapters 5 and 8), came to play a crucial 
role in the formulation of Algerian emancipation policy and reforms 
during 1957–59. Her work as chairwoman of the CSW culminated in 
the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 1952 of the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, an instrument that helped 
highlight the ongoing denial of rights of indigenous women under colo-
nial regimes.133
Lefaucheux, as chair of the CSW, was placed in an uncomfortable 
position by her own government’s policy in Algeria. During 1951 and 
early 1952 she kept the French government informed of the CSW prepa-
ration of the Convention which was to include, ‘the political rights of 
women, their situation in common law and their access to education’ 
and in a report she recommended ‘it would be advantageous to our 
country to show evidence of initiative in relation to the advancement of 
women’.134 In a letter of 1955 Lefaucheux explained that her concern 
for women’s rights in the French colonies did not arise from her ‘femi-
nism’, but her deep regret that the government failed to recognise the 
political interest in favouring ‘the progress of women’. In particular she 
was aware of the bitter discontent among young educated women, the 
‘elite’ of nurses, teachers and students, who ‘harbour much bitterness 
because of the total indifference with which the administration allows 
unacceptable customs to continue’. France should be offering their best 
chance of progress, but these women were being drawn into, ‘move-
ments with communist or nationalist leanings’.135
Lefaucheux had clearly recognised the nature of the frustration 
building up among the Algerian évoluées, and the appeal that she was 
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making to the French government during 1951–52, in order to head 
off the growth in nationalism, was directly in line with the policy that 
Algiers would adopt after 1956. The Minister of the Interior, who had 
authority over the Governor General, relayed Lefaucheux’s concerns as 
UN delegate, as well as those of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
to Algiers and recommended in a letter of 16 January 1952, ‘vis-à-vis 
international opinion, that France could show evidence of progressive 
measures in this area’, and requested a report on the voting rights of 
Muslim women.136 Although the French government was concerned pri-
marily with diplomatic window dressing, rather than with the substance 
of reform, its anxiety was justifi ed since in the long term the political 
battle within the UN over the Algerian colony was to prove almost as 
decisive in opening the way to independence as the FLN armed strug-
gle.137 There was evident French government concern over this issue 
and the Ambassador in Moscow, the former Governor General Yves 
Chataigneau, sent a dispatch to the Foreign Minister, Robert Schumann, 
providing evidence of the failure of the Soviets after thirty years to 
emancipate Muslim women in Central Asia from the veil (parandja) and 
other repressive practices.138 These facts, he suggested, could be used 
against Soviet delegates in the CSW if they should attack French policy 
in the Maghreb.139
Over a two-year period between July 1951 and August 1953 there 
was an extensive correspondence between the Minister of the Interior 
and the Governor General Léonard, on the position that France should 
take in regard to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. 
This is of interest for the insight which it provides into the standard 
arguments and discourse deployed by the colonial regime to deny rights 
to Algerian women throughout the Fourth Republic between 1944 
and May 1958.140 Léonard advised Paris that the colonial distinction 
between French citizens and Algerian-Muslim subjects meant that as 
long as the latter remained wedded to ‘the principal institutions of 
Muslim law, contrary to our Western concept of social equality’, such as 
the abhorrent practices of polygamy, enforced child-marriage, repudia-
tion, segregation and the veil, Muslim women were not able to exercise 
the vote freely.141 Léonard, utilising a standard argument of settler 
society, remarked that the UN and international opinion should be 
informed that all Algerian women were free to exercise the right to vote 
by the simple choice of naturalisation.
Léonard went on to construct a smoke-screen: resistance to the 
franchise, he claimed, did not stem from the French government, 
which had laudable progressive motives, but rather from Muslims 
themselves. International opinion should be told that France had 
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already granted voting rights to Muslim women by the Statute of 20 
September 1947. But implementation lay with the Algerians themselves 
and when Naegelen, it was claimed, had proposed in 1949 adding 300 
Muslim women to the electoral lists of the First College in the Algerian 
Assembly, this had sunk without trace under the ‘indifference, or even 
the hostility of Muslims’. Léonard brushed over the concern expressed 
by Lefaucheux that the fate of Muslim women lay in the hands of 
an undemocratic quisling Assembly, ‘hostile to any advancement of 
women’, one which was so constructed as to prevent any power reach-
ing the Algerian electorate. The government had no power to intervene 
in the ‘private’ sphere of religion and, ‘It has to take account of the 
reactions of a society attached to its customs, essentially religious, and 
extremely touchy and oversensitive to any measure which may appear 
to violate their conscience’. The UN, he noted, should be informed 
that the best means of achieving full rights for Muslim women would 
be through the education of Algerian girls, ‘that is when the Muslim 
milieu does not itself oppose its doubts’, a long-term evolution that the 
administration would need to approach with ‘prudence’. The Governor 
was thus able to relegate political change to some distant and inde-
terminate future, while concealing the fact that the colonial regime 
carried prime responsibility for preventing access of Muslim girls to 
state education.
Lastly, Léonard quickly skimmed over the most crucial political issue 
in all this, that of settler opposition to enfranchisement of women. Even 
the tiniest concession, he admitted, ‘will be disliked by the European 
element of the population, hostile to any numerical increase in the fi rst 
college’. Since the 1930s settlers had been deeply worried by the rapidly 
growing birth rate of the Muslim population and by the prospect of 
Algerians virtually swamping the European minority.142 It had proved 
diffi cult enough to gerrymander the electoral system so as to contain 
the voting power of Algerian men, without engaging in the folly of 
granting the vote to women which would double the Muslim electorate 
from 1,900,300 to 3,800,600. By mid-1957 the Algiers administration 
estimated that a female franchise would reduce the European propor-
tion of the electorate from 25 per cent to 14.5 per cent, and that such 
a change would radically alter the electoral balance of power, would 
lead to the European loss of control of all urban municipalities, with 
the possible exception of Oran and Algiers, and result in ‘such an 
abrupt loss of infl uence for the Europeans that a sharp reaction is to 
be feared on their part’.143 The administration in 1957 was secretly 
examining various ways to restrict women’s access to the vote, through 
requirements of literacy, age and marital status, or by the argument 
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that Muslim women were unsuited to exercise such a right because they 
were illiterate, would be forced to vote according to the interests of male 
family members, or because of the veil, which would prevent identifi ca-
tion at polling stations. The idea of registering only those women who 
requested it might backfi re since nationalist women might do so, while 
‘moderate women would fear a collision with tradition’.144 It was on 
similar grounds that Léonard had opposed the UN Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women,145 and when Lefaucheux eventually signed 
the protocol on behalf of France on 31 March 1953, this was not a 
ratifi cation, and a get-out clause was added: ‘The French government, 
given the customs and religious traditions in existence in its territories, 
reserves the right to suspend the execution of the present Convention 
in relation to women residing in these territories’.146 French diplomats 
were thus able to present themselves to international opinion as keen 
supporters of the Convention, but would have to wait on conservative 
Algerian public opinion and their Assembly to change before progress 
could be made.
In conclusion to this chapter, it can be noted that the decade from 
1944 to 1954 witnessed the fi rst signifi cant political organisation of and 
by Algerian women. This movement, after a peak in 1948–49, began to 
lose impetus during the early 1950s. This refl ected in part the decline 
of the post-Liberation women’s movement in metropolitan France, to 
which the Algerian movement was closely linked, particularly with the 
advent of the Cold War and the exclusion of the PCF from govern-
ment.147 The Algerian nationalist movement also entered a phase of 
deepening crisis after 1949, a process of internal fi ssion that paralysed 
the PPA until a fi nal split between the Messalists and the new FLN in 
late 1954. Because of the major electoral advances made by the MTLD 
in November 1946, as well as the constitution of a clandestine terrorist 
network, the Organisation spéciale, the French government appointed 
two successive hard-line General Governors, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen 
and Roger Léonard, who engaged in a ferocious repression of the 
nationalists. The fl edgling women’s movement fell victim to this harsh 
phase of repression and the decline in attendance at meetings of the 
two principle associations (UFA, AFMA) provides a barometer of the 
overall crisis in the nationalist movement. By early 1953 attendance 
at UFA meetings had declined from gatherings of several hundred to 
meetings of ten to forty,148 while the PPA militant Isa Benzekri, after 
returning in 1951 from a year’s absence in a French sanatorium, found 
‘the Association [AFMA] had practically ceased to exist, it had suf-
fered from the repercussions of the divisions in the heart of the PPA/
MTLD’.149
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The women’s organisations, even at their peak, only attracted a 
tiny percentage of Algerian women, mostly educated women in the 
main towns. Estimates of the communist UFA that it had at its peak 
between 15,000 and 20,000 female supporters appear to be infl ated 
while the all-Muslim AFMA, lacking the elaborate organisational 
base of the PCA, was even smaller with a peak membership of several 
hundred women.150 However, although the Algiers government had 
no diffi culty in keeping the fragile women’s movement under close 
police surveillance and restricting its activities, this phase of mili-
tancy undoubtedly helped to politicise a whole generation of young 
women who were to form the core of FLN militants during the War 
of Independence.151
But the history of this immediate post-war mobilisation is most 
interesting for what it tells us about the emergence of deep underlying 
tensions internal to the women’s movement, ideological oppositions 
that prefi gure the profound contradictions that were to bedevil Algerian 
nationalism throughout the War of Independence, and on into the post-
colonial age. While Algerian women showed remarkable resilience in 
mobilising and fi nding cultural and political expression within the con-
straints of a patriarchal society, at the same time we can see the inner 
tensions emerging between the minority who were drawn to a more 
secular, ‘western’ and ‘Kemalist’ agenda of liberation, and those who 
accepted the Ulema/Messalist formulation of a nationalist struggle that 
embedded women in the subordinate gender position of mothers and 
guardians of the home. The FLN essentially inherited the latter position 
from the PPA, and was able to exert its ideological hegemony over the 
‘westernising’ trend when it forced both the PCA and the liberal reform-
ists (UDMA) to dissolve and join its own organisation during 1956–57. 
At the same time the colonial regime moved in the opposite direction. 
While during 1944–54 it had bitterly resisted any form of female fran-
chise or emancipation of women, it now engaged in a ‘U-turn’ and 
moved to recuperate precisely the most radical and secularist trend that 
had been voiced by young women nationalists in their attack on the 
‘dual imperialism’ of retrograde colonialism and reactionary Islamist 
patriarchy. During 1944–54 women who shared these two positions, 
which cut across the communist UFA, secularist JUDMA and Messalist 
AFMA in complex ways, could still engage in open dialogue, but with 
the coming of war the opposing visions became radically split and fi xed 
by association with either French power (western female liberation) 
or Algerian national authenticity. In the process the Algerian women’s 
movement was diverted into a suffocating cul-de-sac for the next 
quarter of a century.
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The origins of the emancipation 
campaign, November 1954 to May 1958
The military coup of 13 May 19581 was marked by demonstrations of 
‘fraternisation’ when Muslim women unveiled en masse on the Algiers 
Forum. This has been widely seen as a quasi-revolutionary moment that 
dramatically initiated the emancipation campaign. However, as will be 
seen in chapter 3, the illusion of a revolutionary break in May 1958 was 
successfully created by the propagandists of the psychological warfare 
bureau. Emancipation, far from springing forth perfectly formed as a 
triumphant expression of the popular will, represented the moment that 
a slowly maturing, but largely unseen, movement that had been gather-
ing force over the previous two years suddenly came into the limelight. 
This process has gone largely unnoticed by historians in part because 
the government and army moved initially towards an agenda on Muslim 
women through a series of piecemeal initiatives and tentative experi-
ments that were wrapped in considerable secrecy so that the FLN might 
be caught unawares, but also to conceal from French and international 
opinion the underlying military and intelligence logic of measures that 
it wished to dress in the clothing of liberal and democratic reform. 
However, an examination of this early stage is of interest, since the 
timing, and how and why the various initiatives were fi rst undertaken, is 
informative as to the underlying concerns and objectives of the colonial 
authorities in moving towards such a strategy.
This chapter, which covers the fi rst half of the Algerian War from 1 
November 1954 until the coup of ‘13 May’ 1958, falls into two parts. 
During a fi rst phase from 1954 until mid-1956, which was dominated 
by the governorship of Jacques Soustelle, the Algiers government made 
little attempt to formulate a policy that was directly or explicitly aimed 
at Muslim women. The main initiative of Soustelle, who surrounded 
himself with fellow ethnologist advisers, was a classic ‘Third World’ 
developmental policy that aimed to improve the economic position of 
Algerian society as a whole, of which women just happened to constitute 
one category. However, from this reformist agenda emerged a number 
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of new organisations, in particular the Section administrative spécialisée 
(SAS) and Centres sociaux, that were later to play a signifi cant role in an 
overall strategy that targeted women.
The second and most important phase, which lasted from the summer 
of 1956 until the spring of 1958, saw the appearance of an intense 
debate that was focused for the fi rst time specifi cally on Algerian 
women. It is diffi cult to determine whether the FLN or the French army 
was the fi rst to deploy a ‘liberation’ strategy for Muslim women that 
the opposing side then responded to by adopting forms of counter-
emancipation. However, two events during July–August 1956 made a 
big impact on French opinion and created a general climate in which the 
issue of Muslim women moved onto the agenda. In July the European 
public was astonished to see in the press photographs of three young 
nurses in military uniform who had been captured by the army in the 
maquis, images that shattered the Orientalist stereotype of secluded and 
powerless Muslim women.2 A few weeks later, on 13 and 19 August, 
the newly independent states of Tunisia and Morocco announced major 
reforms of the marriage and family law. Suddenly the nationalists of 
the Maghreb seemed to be adopting a progressive position on Muslim 
women that threatened to harness their energy through modernisa-
tion, and to isolate France in international opinion as a reactionary 
colonial power. The Algiers government of Robert Lacoste responded 
over the next year, from behind the scenes, with a range of initiatives 
that included a propaganda campaign on emancipation and un-veiling, 
a working party on the reform of the marriage law, a debate on the 
extension of the vote to Muslim women, and a secret pilot operation to 
create and test new women’s organisations.3 However, throughout 1957 
we fi nd evidence of growing tensions within the civil-military apparatus 
over a reform programme aimed at women: on the one hand Lacoste 
and an older generation of leaders were concerned that emancipation 
might trigger a strong religious backlash among conservative Algerians 
that would play into the hands of the FLN. Lacoste placed both the issue 
of the women’s franchise and the project to reform the marriage code on 
the back-burner. On the other hand, late 1956 and early 1957 saw the 
surge to power within the army of a radical new force, the young colo-
nels who detested the sclerosis of the Fourth Republic and supported 
the ideology of revolutionary warfare. This radical current was far more 
prepared to engage in unconventional forms of warfare and to develop 
a highly proactive ‘liberation’ of Muslim women that aimed to induce a 
profound psychological shock both in the French establishment and the 
FLN. While the colonels secretly tested out such new methods during 
1957 in Operation Pilot, by May 1958 they were prepared to grab power 
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in Algiers and to seize the opportunity to expand the  experimental phase 
into a full-scale and open campaign of emancipation.
Phase 1: November 1954–February 1956. Jacques Soustelle and the 
political development agenda
As the Cold War rapidly deepened after 1945 US and NATO foreign 
policy centred on an over-riding fear that international communism 
was seeking to destroy the west via support for Third World insurrec-
tion, preying on the poverty and hunger of innocent peoples that were 
the victim of colonialism and under-development. The US government 
turned increasingly to academic specialists in the social sciences, includ-
ing anthropologists, economists and social psychologists, to study the 
threat and through the 1950s and 1960s they produced an infl uential 
model of intervention often referred to as Political Development Theory 
(PDT).4 The model regarded Third World countries as highly vulnerable 
to insurgency, according to the adage ‘poverty breeds discontent’, and 
the role of the US and ‘west’ should be to provide a degree of economic 
aid and support so as to nurse fragile regimes through the transition to 
modernisation until they could stand on their own feet and establish 
democracy, political stability and nationhood. The PDT paradigm was 
one of state-building and the creation of effi cient bureaucracies that 
could provide the necessary planning and administration to ensure eco-
nomic well-being and security. Where Third World governments were 
coming under attack from communist-inspired insurgents they should, 
if necessary, be assisted by military programmes to contain this and 
to give them time to make the transition to modernity. Some analysts 
viewed modern armies as models of progressive, bureaucratic institu-
tions, which could through direct military intervention or coups provide 
the most effective route to development and security: a model that had 
obvious implications for the French army control of a joint military-
civilian government in Algeria after January 1957.
While French policy documents on development reform and counter-
insurgency during the Algerian War make very few explicit references 
to American theory, French practice overall moved towards an identi-
cal model. The Paris government, like the USA, utilised a large pool of 
academic social scientists to investigate and recommend policies in rela-
tion to the ‘Algerian problem’, and without doubt these specialists were 
aware of US thinking and helped to transmit such concepts into the army 
and civil service.5 The Governor, Jacques Soustelle, as a leading ethnolo-
gist was well placed to pick up on contemporary PDT and he, in turn, 
had recourse to the appointment of experts like Germaine Tillion and 
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Vincent Monteil. But France had its own long-established institutions of 
state-planning led by the technocrats of the grandes écoles and it should 
come as no surprise that they should develop Algerian policy documents 
in a peculiarly French style which, while they carried few references to 
US doctrine, arrived at similar conclusions on the developmental answer 
to insurgency.6 In December 1954 ex-Governor Naegelen claimed that 
the loss of North Africa would, in a domino effect, lead to the loss of the 
whole empire, ‘It would push France down to the level of a secondary 
power and even to vassal status’, and for General Calliès, ‘North Africa 
has become the No 1 stake in the Cold War’.7 The immediate response 
to the insurrection was to design a dual strategy, one of repression and 
social and economic development.
Less than three months after the outbreak of the Algerian War, 
on 25 January 1955, Soustelle, a leading Gaullist, was invited by 
the socialist Prime Minister Mendès-France, and the Minister of the 
Interior, Mitterrand, to take on the key post of Governor General. The 
Mendès-France government had taken a progressive stance on the issue 
of de-colonisation and moved rapidly to end the catastrophic war in 
Indo-China (armistice of 21 July 1954) and to disengage from Tunisia 
(Carthage Declaration 31 July 1954). Although the government was 
brought down in February by a powerful right-wing colonial lobby 
that feared Morocco and Algeria were also about to be ‘abandoned’,8 
Soustelle’s appointment remained in force and on his arrival in Algiers 
the European settlers regarded him with deep suspicion and hostility. 
However, within a year the Governor had become a hard-line supporter 
of Algérie française and had become the hero of pieds noirs ultras who 
mobbed him on his departure from the Algiers docks on 2 February 
1956.9
From the moment of his arrival in February through to April 1955 the 
new Governor studied at fi rst hand the conditions in rural Algeria and 
was particularly struck during an early tour of the epicentre of rebel-
lion in the Aurès mountains by the profound poverty of the people. He 
quickly elaborated the ‘Soustelle Plan’ for the accelerated development 
of the colony.10 The crisis and endemic poverty confronting Algeria was 
not, he argued, the consequence of an exploitative colonial system and 
France had since 1830 brought enormous benefi ts to a primitive society 
wracked by tribal wars, disease and famine. Algeria did face major 
problems of poverty and unemployment but these were not caused by 
colonialism but rather refl ected a classic problem of ‘under-develop-
ment’ rooted in such inherent problems as infertile soils, lack of rainfall, 
a population explosion and other ‘natural’ or technical aspects. Since, 
claimed Soustelle, France invested more in Algeria than it received, 
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and future industrialisation and modernisation could only be achieved 
through French assistance, it was of crucial interest to all Algerians 
that they remain part of France. For the Governor the way to defeat 
the FLN rebels, whom he characterised as a small and unrepresentative 
minority of ‘fanatics’ supported by external pan-Arab, and particularly 
Nasserite, interests, was to isolate them from the mass of the Algerian 
people. The tap-root of rebellion could be cut through economic and 
social development that would remove the causes of discontent by an 
increased investment in agricultural reform, irrigation, transport infra-
structures, education, health care, training programmes and combating 
unemployment.
Soustelle appears to have shown little interest in elaborating poli-
cies that targeted Algerian women in particular, apart from passing 
references to their backward condition, ‘Often women do not know 
how to care for a child or to sew’.11 He, like his advisers at this time, 
prepared more global economic and social development programmes 
that through improvement of agriculture, housing, health and education 
would implicitly improve the lives of women, but there was no con-
scious effort to address specifi c women’s issues or to formulate a policy. 
In general Soustelle viewed Algerian society as so tied to conservative 
tradition that there was little point in confronting the issue of eman-
cipation. On his appointment as Governor Soustelle inherited from 
Mendès-France a brief ‘Reform Plan under consideration by the former 
government’, which recommended the integral implementation of the 
1947 Statute, including extension of the vote to Muslim women (see 
chapter 1).12 Signifi cantly in this instance Soustelle followed the posi-
tion of his predecessor Léonard, using the excuse of Muslim conserva-
tive opposition to block any initiative. It would have been easy, claimed 
Soustelle, to organise, ‘during a fi rst phase a project in favour of women 
who were suffi ciently advanced (évoluées). But the enthusiasm shown 
by Muslims in this respect has been so lukewarm, to put it mildly, that 
I think it would be a mistake to move too far ahead of their beliefs’.13 
Soustelle was irritated by the opposition he faced to his plans from Alice 
Sportisse, champion of the female franchise in the Algerian Assembly, 
and he regarded the UFA as a communist front organisation, which he 
fi nally banned with the PCA on 12 September 1955.14
However, while Soustelle seems to have shown little interest in the 
question of Muslim women, he did make other innovations which from 
late 1956 onwards were to play a big part in the future evolution of an 
emancipation agenda: the creation of the SAS and the application of 
ethnographic fi eld practices to the study of Algerian society, particu-
larly through the creation of the Centres sociaux. On his appointment 
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as Governor Soustelle travelled almost immediately into the Aurès 
mountains, long the preferred location for anthropological fi eldwork in 
Algeria, where he noticed the almost total absence of any French admin-
istrative structure and personnel, so that the Muslim population was 
abandoned to desperate poverty, and ‘we have allowed a huge void to be 
dug’. The way of life of such rural people remained profoundly archaic 
and any attempt to rebuild contact needed to be ‘on the solid base of 
a scientifi c knowledge of their social structures and their system of 
values’.15 There was a long tradition within the French colonial service, 
as of so many other European imperial regimes, of ‘ethnopolitique’,16 
utilising the most advanced academic sociological, anthropological and 
linguistic knowledge to decode ‘primitive’ societies, the better to control 
them: indeed, colonial regimes were themselves highly productive of 
such specialised knowledge through the work of administrators and 
military offi cers who spend many years ‘up country’ in close contact 
with native customs.17
Soustelle’s professional background as an ethnologist meant that 
he was well-equipped to effect such a juncture: Soustelle, and his 
Tunisian-born wife Georgette, had worked together as ethnographers in 
Mexico and Guatamala between 1932 and 1934 and 1939 and 1942, 
and achieved international acclaim as authorities on pre-Colombian 
Mexican civilisation. Soustelle was much infl uenced by Mexican rural 
development projects, the ‘cultural missions’, which provided an inte-
grated approach to adult education by linking it to basic issues of 
health, literacy, welfare and housing.18 This connected approach to 
issues of poverty was stated in a key defi nition of June 1955: ‘The foun-
dation education addresses itself to all those men, women and children 
who could not benefi t from conventional schooling. It aims to mount a 
co-ordinated attack on all the causes of poverty by actively involving the 
subjects themselves in the struggle’.19
This developmental approach can be seen at work in Soustelle’s crea-
tion of the SAS in September 1955, which was to prove to be one of 
the most innovative organisations in military ‘pacifi cation’. This was 
based mainly on the experience of the old Algerian Bureaux arabes and 
the Moroccan Affaires indigènes, by which enterprising offi cers were 
permanently located among the isolated and impoverished peasantry of 
the bled where they engaged in a huge range of tasks: building schools, 
roads and irrigation projects, tackling unemployment through job-
creation projects, improving agricultural production, providing medical 
assistance, regulating local disputes, and all the other tasks that local 
government should in principle have provided.20 Although the SAS, at 
least during the fi rst year of operation, had no explicit instructions or 
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remit to address the problems faced by women, inevitably contact with 
the harsh reality of the conditions faced by local populations quickly 
raised pragmatic issues of how to gain the co-operation of illiterate 
women in relation to child-care, school attendance, water supply, health 
and other matters. The army command quickly came to see the SAS as a 
key instrument in its overall emancipation programme at local level.
Soustelle recruited two outstanding sociologists, Vincent Monteil and 
Germain Tillion, and attached them to his cabinet as advisers. Monteil 
(1913–2005), whom the orientalist scholar Louis Massignon regarded 
as his spiritual heir,21 was one of France’s leading experts on Islam 
which he studied closely during an adventurous army and academic 
career that took him fi rst to Morocco (1938–48) as an offi cer in the 
Affaires indigènes, and then as a high-level military attaché to Tunisia, 
Palestine, Iran, Indo-China, Algeria and French West Africa.22 A close 
friend of Mendès-France, whom he had known as a prisoner in Riom 
during the Second World War, Monteil, who had a deep empathy for 
Muslim society and later converted to Islam, favoured a federal and an 
early negotiated settlement of the Algerian crisis. When Soustelle fi rst 
fl ew as Governor to Algeria he was accompanied by Monteil as head 
of his military cabinet with the task of making ‘contact’ with Muslim 
society. Monteil became rapidly disillusioned with Soustelle’s marked 
shift towards the right, his tolerance of torture, and growing support for 
a guerre à outrance against the nationalists, and resigned his post on 24 
June 1955.23
Although Monteil was attached to the General Government for only 
six months, it seems likely that during this period he was responsible 
for introducing into the army and administration his expert compara-
tive knowledge of Soviet policy in Muslim Central Asia. Monteil had 
studied, among other sources, the reports of an Algerian delegation to 
Uzbekistan in 1950, which was headed by General Tubert, and included 
the writer Kateb Yacine.24 This was informed by its Soviet hosts of 
the advances made in the emancipation of Muslim women, particu-
larly through the great campaign against veiling of 1926–27 and the 
Constitution of 1936 that made it illegal to engage in acts of resistance 
to female liberation including marriage of minors, polygamy, refusal to 
educate girls, or opposition to their full voting and political rights.25 The 
problems that the Soviet Union faced in the inter-war period as a secular 
colonial power trying to impose its political authority on a deeply resist-
ant Muslim and traditional tribal society provide close historical paral-
lel to the situation faced by France in post-war Algeria.26 Monteil was 
fascinated by the lessons that could be learned from the earlier Soviet 
experience, and was aware that in Algeria, as in Central Asia, no global 
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social, economic and political progress could be made without a radical 
emancipation of women. However by the 1950s, after forty years of 
Soviet endeavour, many traditional practices, including veiling, seclu-
sion, pre-pubescent marriage and polygamy remained entrenched, even 
among members of the Communist Party. Monteil attributed this failure 
to an external political emancipation imposed on Asian society that had 
not undergone a real, internal transformation of values, and held up the 
best and most optimistic sign for progress in the Maghreb in the enor-
mous aspiration of Muslim women for education.27 Although Monteil 
left the cabinet in June 1955, his understanding of the Soviet experience 
would have reinforced Soustelle’s belief that the situation of Algerian 
woman could only be transformed by long-term reform, and that any 
replication of a Soviet style radical confrontation with Muslim society 
was doomed to failure: a position that Soustelle seemed to abandon 
three years later during the events of ‘13 May’ 1958 (see chapter 3).
The second key member of Soustelle’s small team of expert advisers 
was the ethnologist Germaine Tillion. From 1934 to 1940 Tillion had, 
along with Thérèse Rivière, carried out fi eldwork in the isolated moun-
tains of the Aurès region, an experience that had provided her with inti-
mate knowledge of the language, culture and traditions of women in the 
Chaouia tribes.28 The main centre of the rebellion of 1 November 1954 
was in the Aurès mountains and Louis Massignon, deeply disturbed 
by the fear that the French air-force would bomb the hill tribes with 
napalm, was able to arrange a meeting with Mitterrand, the Minister 
of the Interior, to which he invited Tillion.29 Tillion, as an expert on 
the Aurès, was given a three-month mission to study and report on the 
conditions underlying the revolt.
On her return via Algiers Tillion reported her fi ndings to Soustelle, 
whom she had known twenty years earlier in the Musée de l’Homme, 
the pioneer centre of French inter-war ethnography. The Governor 
invited Tillion to join his cabinet team as a chargé de mission, where 
she worked closely alongside Monteil on a study of the economic and 
social problems faced by Algeria. Despite the fact that Tillion, who had 
lived for years sharing the daily lives of Chaouia women, had a closer 
knowledge of rural women than almost any other European, and several 
years later was to write one of the most infl uential studies of Muslim 
women, Le Harem et les cousins (1966),30 she does not appear to have 
developed specifi c proposals in relation to them during 1955–56. This is 
in part because Tillion’s remit was to study the enormously complex and 
global problems facing colonial Algeria as a whole, as can be seen in a 
study which she wrote in late 1956, misleadingly published as L’Algérie 
en 1957.31
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However, this study does contain a powerful, but implicit, policy in 
relation to Algerian women. When Tillion arrived in the Aurès region 
in December 1954 after a fourteen-year absence she was profoundly 
shocked by the massive economic dislocation and ‘pauperisation’ of 
the previously stable ‘archaic’ society.32 For Tillion the root causes of 
this deepening poverty did not lie with colonialism, ‘that hoary scape-
goat’, which she characterised as a nineteenth-century phenomenon, 
but rather with a classic Malthusian crisis in which a galloping growth 
in population would massively outstrip natural resources. France was 
not viewed by her as in an exploitative or damaging colonial relation-
ship with Algeria: on the contrary the best, and perhaps only, chance 
for Muslim people to avoid catastrophic Third World poverty was 
through an ongoing French presence and assistance in the form of 
investment by Paris, the skills of the European minority, the income 
generated by labour migration to the metropolis, industrialisation and 
mass education. A nationalist victory would spell total disaster: an 
independent Algeria would be unable to ‘go it alone’, incapable even 
of developing the enormous potential of the newly discovered Saharan 
oil fi elds. Tillion’s analysis was not particularly original and refl ects the 
conventional post-war analysis of French demographers and techno-
crats like Louis Chevalier who also elaborated a Malthusian agenda 
that remained blind to the destructive impacts of colonial domination.33 
Tillion’s reformist position up to 1957, which can be characterised as 
an ‘ethnographic liberalism’ or a diffuse Christian socialism,34 like that 
of Monteil, Camus and other humanists, suffered from the illusion that 
a reformed colonialism could even at this late hour endure within the 
paradigm of a French-Algeria.35
Tillion’s answer to the ‘woman question’ in Algeria, in line with her 
developmental model, did not address the issue of a political solution, or 
relate Muslim women to the question of nationalism or independence, 
but rather provided the answers through an economic and modernis-
ing agenda. Algerian women were viewed in global terms, in relation 
to a Malthusian model, as rapid breeders of babies. The solution to the 
inevitable process of pauperisation was not birth control, a practice that 
was seen as a ‘cruel joke’ within the logic of an ‘archaic agricultural 
civilisation’,36 but rather universal education. Tillion estimated that 
some 98 per cent of all Muslim women were illiterate, while only one in 
sixteen girls was receiving primary education. But this did not mean that 
women were sunk in ignorance as to the possibilities of a better life: ‘In 
the towns, they now go to the cinema, they listen to the radio, either at 
home or a neighbour’s, they gossip among themselves, they get to know 
things, and even in villages out in the back of beyond I heard remarks of 
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an astonishing bitterness last year’, a bitterness that related to repudia-
tion, lack of rights over children, and other features of Islamic law and 
custom.37 Tillion had optimistically recognised here a popular thirst and 
potential for education as the key to modernity, and this perception led 
her to establish the Centres sociaux.
The Centres sociaux, created by the decree of 27 October 1955, 
although fi nanced by the Ministry of National Education, were not part 
of the conventional school system, but training programmes designed 
for illiterate adults and youths who had received little if any state edu-
cation: teams of teachers, social and health workers that according to 
Soustelle would work, ‘without dogmatism or infl exibility, combining 
basic instruction, post-school education, hygiene, and simple trade 
skills’.38 Although Soustelle and Tillion have been widely credited with 
the invention of the Centres sociaux, the prototype for such training 
centres had existed from about 1951 in the deprived shantytowns of 
Algiers. In 1953 Father Scotto, in collaboration with professionally 
trained social workers, Marie-Renée Chéné, Emma Serra and Simone 
Galice, established, with the support of the municipality of Hussein-
Dey, a social centre in the shantytowns of Bel Air.39 Chéné had arrived 
in Algeria as a militant of the Service civil international (SCI), an NGO 
that specialised globally in social work in impoverished urban slums.40 
The deepening crisis in traditional rural society had, since the 1930s, 
driven huge numbers of impoverished peasants from the interior into 
the mushrooming shantytowns of Algiers and other major cities, a fl ight 
from the land that accelerated further after 1955 as the army, through 
its ‘free-fi re’ zones, created a serious refugee problem (see chapter 6).41
The shantytown of Bel Air, in which the Scotto team operated, pro-
vided a typical example of a general urban crisis: 6,500 people lived 
there in appalling unhealthy conditions, with no piped water, sewerage 
system or surfaced roads, and the nearest medical dispensary was ten 
kilometres away. By 1962 the rural exodus had infl ated the popula-
tion to 35,000.42 The social workers established a small dispensary in 
the bidonvilles, delivered water by tanker, and set up courses to help 
Muslim women with literacy, domestic skills and health care. In early 
1955 Germaine Tillion, accompanied by another ethnologist, Georgette 
Soustelle,43 visited the centre at Hussein-Dey, while Father Scotto was 
invited to a meeting with the Governor, Tillion and Monteil, to discuss 
his work.44 The Bel Air centre thus served as a practical model and 
Tillion invited Emma Serra to help set up the new Centres sociaux, 
which grew in number from eleven in late 1957, to 125 at independ-
ence. Nelly Forget, who worked in the Centres sociaux, notes that they 
marked a signifi cant breakthrough by attracting large numbers of young 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   77 21/7/09   12:16:14
78 Burning the veil
women, who until then had been confi ned to low-skill, exploitative 
labour as domestics, and trained them as health and domestic skill mon-
itors. This, combined with a mixed-gender work environment, began to 
create a new, positive image for Algerian women:45 but one, as will be 
seen below, which attracted the unwanted attention of both European 
ultras and of the army intelligence services.
Phase 2: March 1956 to May 1958. Lacoste and radicalisation of the 
emancipation agenda
Soustelle, after his departure on 2 February 1956, was replaced by 
Robert Lacoste, after the new Prime Minister Guy Mollet was forced 
into a humiliating withdrawal by violent Algiers demonstrators to 
abandon General Catroux, his fi rst choice as Governor. This February 
crisis marked a major watershed in the war, the abandonment of a pos-
sible early negotiated settlement with the nationalists for a deepening 
military repression that locked France into one of the longest and blood-
iest wars of decolonisation.46 On 16 March 1956 parliament passed 
a Special Powers Act that enabled Paris and the minister in Algiers47 
exceptional authority to introduce measures to combat the FLN, includ-
ing the surrender of both civilian and military authority to the generals. 
At the same time Mollet announced the extension of conscription and 
the massive increase of the army presence in Algeria to 450,000 men, an 
expansion that marked an overall militarisation of Algerian government 
and civil society. The rapid increase in the power of the generals, which 
was capped by the appointment of General Salan as overall commander 
in December 1956, led to a radicalisation in the doctrine and practice of 
colonial warfare.
Robert Lacoste, as ministre résident between 9 March 1956 and 
10 May 1958, has generally been seen by historians as responsible for 
overseeing a phase of unprecedented military violence and repression, 
including the widespread use of torture. Daniel Lefeuvre has criticised 
this accepted opinion by noting Lacoste’s involvement in a major pro-
gramme of economic and social reform to tackle, ‘the problems posed 
by the poverty of the majority of the population’.48 But the simultaneous 
pursuit of both repression and reform, far from being incompatible, was 
a key feature of French military strategy, and Lacoste’s simultaneous 
acceleration of both aspects deepened the central, and ultimately fatal, 
contradiction of the war as a whole. At the centre of this dual agenda 
lay the emergence, particularly from August 1956 onwards, of a new 
policy that was specifi cally aimed at the ‘conquest’ via emancipation of 
Algerian women.
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One indication of a change of direction appeared on 5 February 1957 
in the form of an infl uential and provocative article by the journalist 
Monique Difrane in Le Figaro, under the title ‘Liberation for Algeria? 
Yes! That of Women’.49 The French right-wing press served, through-
out the war, as the unoffi cial voice of the army, and journalists, as was 
undoubtedly the case here, frequently served to transmit propaganda 
on behalf of the armed forces. It is signifi cant that Difrane’s article 
appeared at this particular moment in time, and the argument and style 
of the piece provides interesting evidence of a propaganda discourse that 
undoubtedly refl ected the new thinking of the army but which it did not, 
as yet, wish to publicise.
Difrane claimed to have just returned from a journey to the interior of 
Algeria, a trip that would only have been possible under the protection 
of the military, where she had visited and conversed with Kabyle and 
Arab women of all ages and classes who had raged in despair against 
their oppression by Muslim patriarchy. The author reassured her con-
servative readership that her agenda was not ‘a more or less futile story 
of “suffragettes” lending itself to laughter and mockery’, but a question 
of representing the authentic and insistent voice of Algerian women who 
were demanding change. The Muslim woman, ‘is a prisoner for life, con-
fi ned, isolated, cooped up between the four walls of her house or hut’, a 
baby-making machine subject to ‘annual pregnancies’, who could at any 
moment be repudiated and expelled penniless into the street. Difrane’s 
emphatic claim to convey the authentic voice of all Algerian women, 
their precise words and experience, needs to be treated with caution and 
her text appears to reproduce the discourse of the minority of educated 
évoluées (see chapter 1) rather than the opinions of the great mass of 
illiterate peasant women.
Difrane presented an argument that fell into two parts. Firstly, she 
analysed the various social forces at work within the colony that con-
spired to maintain women in such a state of servitude, in particular the 
Algerian ‘taboo’, the fearful conspiracy of silence surrounding the issue. 
Even those husbands of Muslim women who would like to change things 
by, for example, going out in public as a couple, were afraid to break 
with tradition because of the reprobation of Algerian society and ‘what 
the neighbours may say’. The status quo was also reinforced by the reli-
gious leaders and imams, the Ulema heads like Tawfi k al-Madani, who 
defended the sacred right of Islamic law and custom not to be interfered 
with by secular government. One highly educated woman, described as 
‘very évoluée’, had buried her head in her hands, saying: ‘If anybody 
congratulates themselves before me on this respect for our religion, our 
customs, our personal status, I think: “He’s an enemy!”. Since he drives 
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us into a different world from his own, and slams shut the ancestral 
status on us like an iron gate!’.
But, claimed Difrane, the taboo was also sustained by European 
society: the main culprits here were the French women, the wives of 
army offi cers and other ‘ladies of good deeds’, whose benevolent work 
with Algerians was limited to charitable hand-outs, ‘baby clothes for 
the fi fteenth child . . . the cooking of fritters, embroidery’ and who 
‘preach to Muslim women resignation to an unbelievable fate, as if the 
latter was without a mind or heart’. The European woman regarded the 
Muslim woman as so inferior, so abject and ‘absolutely vacuous’ that 
she was thought incapable of expressing any opinion, and was treated 
as a passive object rather than as a human being. European charitable 
workers had thus failed to pick up on the volcanic pressures building 
up among Muslim women for radical change, and also served to block 
reform through a dangerous ‘respect for customs’. Difrane was refl ect-
ing here the idea of a ‘double imperialism’ that had been expressed by 
young Muslim nationalists and évoluées of the JUDMA during 1951–54 
(chapter 1) according to which women were crushed under the double 
weight of conservative Muslim and European colonial forces. Soustelle 
had also expressed this idea: while European ultras persisted in refus-
ing Muslims full citizenship ‘on the pretext that the latter would be 
incompatible with their Islamic “personal status”, on the Muslim side 
the extremists push their fellow believers to reject this same citizenship 
as incompatible with their salvation’.50
Secondly, Difrane argued that, breaking through the ‘taboo’ on 
women’s condition, she was able to uncover among frustrated Muslim 
women an enormous pressure for change: ‘For long these cloistered 
and crushed beings have remained silent, rendered stupid by their suf-
fering, but the undeniable fact of the present is the awakening of their 
consciousness’. France, one Muslim told her, had abolished slavery, but 
not for women and she then appealed for measures that, probably not a 
coincidence, were identical to the legal reforms secretly being explored 
by the Lacoste government at that moment: ‘Give us marriages in the 
town-hall, give us new laws, suppress the Muslim magistrates (cadis), 
suppress the ease with which husbands use repudiation, arrange things 
so that we can hang the veil in the window since it’s only useful as a 
curtain!’ Difrane argued that the key plank of government policy, to 
retain the colony through integrating the French and Muslim com-
munities and by reform of the electoral system could not work until a 
revolution like that of Atatürk had been achieved. ‘One cannot dissolve 
two societies into one when one refl ects the Middle Age and the other 
the Twentieth Century’. This was no time for half measures: what was 
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needed was education and modernisation for women and tackling the 
most urgent problem facing Algerian society, the demographic explo-
sion. The stakes were high and, since four million Algerian women were 
looking to France, this was an opportunity to be seized: ‘Behind the 
blind walls seethes an inevitable revolution which will be made against 
us if it is not made with us and by us’. Difrane was giving voice here 
to an emerging current of thought among the radical advocates of psy-
chological warfare: victory would be dependent on the emancipation 
of Algerian women and France must move urgently to appropriate this 
agenda before the FLN. Behind the scenes this U-turn in colonial gov-
ernment and armed forces thinking on Muslim women was dramatically 
precipitated by the rapid move of Tunisia and Morocco towards radical 
reform of the marriage and family codes.
The Tunisian challenge: reforming the personal status law
One of the most important steps that Muslim nation-states were able to 
take during the twentieth century to emancipate women was to intro-
duce a comprehensive and radical legal code on women, marriage and 
the family (statut personnel).51 On 13 August 1956 Tunisia introduced, 
only fi ve months after independence, what has been widely regarded as 
one of the most progressive Codes ever passed by a Muslim country.52 
Six days later, by the order of 19 August, the King of Morocco also 
established a commission for the reform of the code of personal status.53 
The Tunisian Code established a minimum age for marriage (fi fteen 
for women, eighteen for men); made the consent of both spouses 
mandatory, preventing the tradition of enforced marriage; required 
that marriage be a civil matter, with formal registration; banned male 
repudiation of wives, while requiring divorce to be also a civil matter, 
enacted in a court; banned polygamy; and set out clear rules in relation 
to dowry, property rights, inheritance and care of children after separa-
tion. Such legislation was not without precedent, and Tunisia was able 
to draw upon the experience of earlier reforms, including those of Kemal 
Atatürk in 1926 and the Syrian Code of 1953, as well as international 
resolutions like that of the Third Congress of the Union féministe arab, 
passed by representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine 
and Iraq at Beirut in June 1954.54
This innovation was watched very closely from across the border 
by the Algiers government, and three months after the promulgation 
of the Bourguiba Code Robert Lacoste secretly consulted Prefects and 
the super-Prefect (IGAME)55 of Constantine on proposals to reform 
the personal status law. Lacoste noted that it was important to keep up 
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with changes in society, and ‘not to ignore the efforts of renewal and 
modernisation of Muslim law being pioneered for many years now by 
the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean basin’.56 Bourguiba, in two 
speeches of 3 and 10 August 1956 announcing the new Tunisian Code, 
noted that change was in the national interest, so that ‘Tunisia does not 
remain an abomination among the civilised nations of the world’, while 
social justice could not tolerate half of society being grossly marginal-
ised.57 France was reacting to an embarrassing situation in which its 
Algerian colony might begin to appear highly retrograde on women’s 
rights by comparison with its newly independent neighbours. Tunisia 
and Morocco, as soon as the authority of France was removed or weak-
ened, were able to forge ahead and prove themselves to be more liberal 
on women’s emancipation, so dangerously exposing French symbolic 
claims as the very founder and defender of revolutionary universal 
rights.
Further light was thrown on offi cial thinking in a report drawn up 
for the government by Henry Le Breton, Emeritus professor of law at 
Algiers University. In a close legal critique of the Tunisian legislation, 
while arguing that the substance of the Code was not as radical as it 
might appear, he praised the suppression of polygamy and repudia-
tion, which helped stabilise the family. The danger was that the Code 
threatened to stir up opposition among religious conservatives, but ‘let’s 
be thankful that it has been carried out in Tunisia by a Muslim gov-
ernment. We thus have, in the near future, the demonstration of what 
is possible in this fi eld in Algeria’. The Bourguiba reform was an act 
of bravery for a Muslim government and, ‘for the modernisers of the 
Neo-Destour Party, a resounding propaganda success which they have 
not been reluctant to use’.58 Le Breton was pointing to the fact that the 
over-cautious Algerian government had for decades simply refused to 
consider any signifi cant reform in the sphere of women’s rights because 
of a real, or imagined, backlash by powerful religious interests. The 
Bourguiba Code had the merit of demonstrating that reform of personal 
status law was not necessarily an agenda imposed from without by a 
western and infi del regime, but was perfectly compatible with orthodox 
Islam. It opened the path to France doing likewise, and demonstrated 
that this was not only politically possible but also desirable.
In late April 1957 Lacoste sent an order to Champeix, Secretary of 
State for Algerian Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, to prepare as 
a matter of urgency draft proposals (avant-projet) for a reform of the 
legal status of Muslim women.59 A working party met in four sessions 
in the Paris Ministry of the Interior during May–June 1957, and among 
its rather changing membership were experts in Muslim family law and 
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senior members of the Algerian administration, including the chair, 
Eugène Simoneau, Directeur des affaires d’Algérie in the Ministry of 
the Interior, and Louis Milliot, former dean and professor of law in the 
University of Algiers. Milliot was given the task with Raymond Charles, 
Conseiller of the Paris Appeal Court, of drawing up the highly techni-
cal draft Code.60 The recommendations of the fi nal report,61 which was 
shelved until late 1958, will be considered in a later discussion of the 
fi nal statute introduced by the Gaullist government in 1959 (chapter 8), 
but here the concern is with what the working party reveals about the 
motivation of the government in undertaking an emancipation agenda 
in mid-1957.
The chairman repeatedly emphasised the great urgency of the project, 
and that this clearly arose from the need to respond to the enormous 
public interest generated by the Bourguiba Code and for France not 
to be perceived as more backward than Tunisia. The group had been 
instructed by government, noted the chairman, ‘to go as far as possible 
in the direction of a real emancipation of the Muslim woman, and to 
go at least as far as the new Tunisian Code’.62 It is noticeable that the 
working party contained no Algerians, although it was intended that 
the proposals be later referred to some Muslim religious ‘notables’. Nor 
were there any women members until the penultimate meeting agreed 
that Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux, president of the Union des femmes 
françaises et musulmanes d’Algérie, should be briefed and invited to 
the fi nal session.63 As we have seen, Lefaucheux, as chair of the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women, had already placed pressure on 
the government for reform during 1951–53. After the UN General 
Assembly on 1 October 1955 voted to place the Algerian problem on 
the agenda, a shocked French government became intensely concerned 
to fend off international criticism of its colonial regime.64 After the 
UN adoption of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (20 
December 1952) the attention of the CSW turned to the global reform 
of discrimination in marriage (consent to marriage, minimum age, civil 
registration) as well as traditional or customary practices that were 
harmful to women, such as claustration and genital mutilation.65 This 
international UN agenda brought further pressure to bear on the French 
government, and Lefaucheux, with her intimate knowledge of the CSW, 
may have been brought on board to help formulate a reform that would 
counter the critics of French colonialism.66
Lacoste, in parallel with the establishment of the working party, sent 
instructions on 9 May 1957 to the Algerian Prefects and IGAME to seek 
their opinion on seven specifi c themes: the general desirability of reform, 
the act of marriage (consent, age, etc.), repudiation, polygamy, veiling, 
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seclusion, inheritance and political rights. The replies provide an insight 
into offi cial thinking on emancipation across the different regions of 
Algeria at an early stage in the debate.67
Most Prefects were in favour of ending repudiation and ensuring 
that divorce was legalised by a court decision, a measure that was seen 
to help stabilise the family unit. Likewise polygamy could be readily 
banned since it was in decline and survived only among a small number 
of rural traditionalists. But the general tone of the reports was one of 
caution and a reluctant acceptance that some change was needed to 
catch up with inevitable social change and to contain growing pres-
sures for reform. Change, however, could not be too advanced since 
it was likely to stir up opposition of older men who, as the Prefect of 
Orléansville noted, feared ‘an overturning of religious principles’. Such 
caution was particularly advisable in a situation of war: as the Prefect 
of Tlemcen remarked, reform was desired by young évoluées women, 
‘But in the present conjuncture of events such an initiative is inoppor-
tune and carries the danger of playing into the hands of the FLN’. The 
Prefect of Sétif expressed the opposite concern, ‘We must avoid allowing 
ourselves to be overtaken in this fi eld by the nationalists’.
The tension between those who argued against reform on the grounds 
that it would alienate an intensely religious society and reinforce 
support for the FLN, and those who defended the urgency of reform, 
or risk seeing the FLN seizing the initiative, was to plague the French 
government over the next three years. The majority of Prefects avoided 
this dilemma by favouring a gradualist and long-term preparation of 
Algerian society, particularly through the education of women. The 
Prefect of Bône, who opposed enfranchisement since, ‘the FLN will 
give out orders that will be followed by women’, thought reform would 
be best carried out by Muslims themselves ‘in a pacifi ed Algeria’. The 
IGAME of Constantine, Maurice Papon, agreed the time was not right 
for reform, and in line with his espousal of the techniques of psycho-
logical warfare,68 he placed more emphasis on propaganda (produc-
ing ‘a psychological shock’) based on prior scientifi c investigation of 
Algerian public opinion: ‘Opinion polls and preparatory campaigns 
through the intermediary of the press and radio to study the reactions of 
the Muslim masses. The development of women’s cultural, social, and 
political organisations as well as the increase in contacts with European 
women’.
It is diffi cult to piece together from the archives the line of thinking 
of Lacoste between mid-1957 and the collapse of the Fourth Republic 
in May 1958, but it seems likely that he was suffi ciently worried by the 
political repercussions of a religious and nationalist backlash against 
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legal reform, that he decided to shelve the draft Code submitted to him 
in June 1957, while holding the line with some minor, window-dressing 
measures. The law on labour relations of 6 August 1954 granted 
Muslim women the right to take part in elections to industrial tribunals 
(prud’hommes), a fairly limited right that was fi rst exercised on 16 June 
1956 and was regarded by the colonial government as a ‘success’.69 The 
law of 11 July 1957 (régime des tutelles) made one signifi cant change 
to the complex mosaic of personal status or family law by enabling 
married women to retain care of their children on the death or long-term 
 disappearance of their husbands, whereas previously, under Islamic law, 
children reverted to the guardianship of male relatives.70 Signifi cantly, 
even this minor reform which was hedged about with conservative 
restrictions, met with strong resistance from Muslim justices and was 
viewed as a daring innovation by the Algiers government.
The main tactic of Lacoste was to put off both full enfranchisement 
as well as introduction of a complete code on women’s status until 
implementation of a new local government act (loi cadre) passed on 5 
February 1958. In several debates in the Senate and National Assembly 
on the law during November 1957 to January 1958 two centre-right 
deputies, Marcelle Devaud and Francine Lefébvre, failed to carry 
amendments to guarantee the extension of the vote to Algerian women. 
They argued that their exclusion was discriminatory and in breach of the 
French Constitution. Devaud noted that this exclusion was in contradic-
tion with, ‘the dramatic global emancipation of women . . . Do we have 
to wait to be shown the way by Nasser in Egypt, Bourguiba in Tunisia, 
and Mohamed V?’71 Francine Lefébvre in the National Assembly on 28 
January 1958, attacked the blatant racial and sexual discrimination: ‘as 
a woman, I am shocked to see that you care so little about the opinion 
of women. One really gives the impression of believing that Muslim 
women are absolutely incapable of forming an opinion or expressing 
themselves’. She also held up the dangers of revolt: ‘If today we do not 
know how to respond to the hopes of these women they will begin to pay 
attention to the siren voices that sing from Cairo’.72 It is noticeable that 
Devaud, Lefébvre and Lefaucheux, who were agitating for the rights of 
Algerian women between 1951 and 1958, shared a similar background, 
that of the generation of Resistants who, although members of con-
servative or centrist parties, came to play a major  political role in the 
organisations of French feminism.73
In reply to Lefébvre’s attack in the National Assembly Robert Lacoste, 
the Minister for Algeria, noted that the Organic Law of 20 September 
1947 had insisted that Muslims be consulted on such a crucial issue as 
the vote and that this had been delegated to the Algerian Assembly (see 
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chapter 1). Now that the Assembly had itself been dissolved by decree 
(12 April 1956), this power should pass on to future regional assemblies, 
proposed by the loi cadre, in which Algerians would be represented. At 
the same time Lacoste insisted on the need to be cautious and to avoid 
a backlash from Muslim society.74 Through this sleight of hand, Lacoste 
was following closely in the footsteps of his predecessors, Naegelen and 
Léonard: fi rstly, any major reform relating to women could be deferred 
and elected Muslim political leaders could be expected to block any 
such initiative. Secondly, even if signifi cant changes were introduced 
this would be seen to be coming from Muslim representatives them-
selves and thus dampen any potential opposition and unrest to French 
interference in the religious sphere that might play into the hands of the 
FLN. This was in keeping with the advice of an offi cial in the General 
Government, that no matter how hard Muslim feminists were pushing 
for ‘revolutionary’ change of their status, ‘any initiative coming directly 
from us carries the risk of being falsely interpreted and giving rise to ten-
dentious reactions’.75 As in 1948, Lacoste, by deferring action to local 
assemblies, was able to delay reform safe in the knowledge that con-
servative Muslims could be relied upon to prevent any ‘revolutionary’ 
agenda and that any failure of reform could be blamed on ‘backward’ 
Algerians themselves.
The 1957–58 debate on the women’s franchise and the personal 
status law refl ected the more overt public and reformist side of Lacoste’s 
dual approach. Investigation of these policy initiatives lay very much 
in the hands of civil servants or administrators, advised by lawyers and 
academic specialists in Muslim law, who tended to refl ect the cautious 
and conservative traditions of the General Government in relation to 
any innovations that affected the religious sphere. However, in tandem 
with this, but working in a far more secretive way were the psychologi-
cal warfare offi cers of the Fifth Bureau who were interested in the coun-
ter-insurgency and repressive implications of women’s emancipation. 
This newly emerging force that was gathering strength within the army 
was far more prepared to engage in bold initiatives that might directly 
 challenge the ‘reserved area’ of Muslim faith and practice.
Rural counter-insurgency: Jean Servier and the emancipation 
programme, 1956–58
The single, most distinctive feature of the French army in Algeria between 
1954 and 1962 lay in the enormous political infl uence of the doctrine of 
‘revolutionary warfare’ which permeated all levels of the armed forces 
and came to constitute a parallel structure within the military hierarchy 
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and government.76 The theory was developed primarily by army offi cers, 
most notably Colonel Charles Lacheroy,77 who had recently experienced 
‘unconventional’ methods of anti-guerrilla warfare in Indo-China. After 
the humiliating and crushing defeat of the French army at Dien Bien Phu 
(7 May 1954), and the subjection of 12,000 prisoners to techniques of 
brainwashing and communist indoctrination, military theorists began 
the process of examining the hard lessons to be learned from Indo-
China and how these could be applied to colonial warfare in Algeria. 
Most of the key exponents of psychological warfare were inspired by 
a virulent anti-communism and an apocalyptic vision of a global com-
munist encirclement of the ‘west’ through support for anti-colonial and 
Third World struggles for independence. Faced with this mortal threat 
military strategists like General Chassin argued that the French army 
must adapt to the new kinds of totalitarian warfare developed by the 
enemy: ‘The time has come for the free world, unless it wishes to die a 
violent death, to apply certain of its adversary’s methods’.78
The key idea, and indirectly the most relevant to the position of 
Algerian women, was drawn from Mao Tse-tung’s work on the strategy 
of revolutionary warfare (1936) in which guerrilla forces could best 
survive, like fi sh in water, when they found logistic and moral support 
from the people: ‘But if you drain the water or a drought should come, 
then the fi sh dies or disappears’.79 From the very fi rst shots of the 
insurrection in the Aurès mountains on 1 November 1954, the War of 
Independence, despite its dramatic urban dimensions, was primarily a 
war of guerrilla fi ghters in the mountainous interior who could not have 
survived without the support of the peasantry, and primarily of women, 
who supplied them with food, accommodation, clothing, medical aid 
and intelligence. In reality, as we will see, such support was never a 
simple matter, a question of the spontaneous and automatic resistance of 
an oppressed people, but had to be gained and constantly sustained by 
the ALN through its political organisation, the Organisation politico-
administrative (OPA), and traditional or tribal leaders, propaganda, 
social work, ‘revolutionary justice’ and terror. The French specialists 
of revolutionary warfare proceeded from the idea that it was crucial to 
‘drain the swamp’, to remove the support base of the relatively small 
number of guerrillas among the peasantry, by winning the mass of the 
population over to the French side, by protecting them from ALN terror-
ism, and eventually forming villages into armed auto-defence units that 
could take on the enemy and guarantee safe-zones in which the ‘civilis-
ing’ mission of schooling and economic reconstruction could continue. 
Essentially warfare was seen as a ‘total’ phenomenon, not simply a ques-
tion of guns and armed confl ict, but a matter of fi ghting for the hearts and 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   87 21/7/09   12:16:14
88 Burning the veil
minds of entire populations, a battle that reached far into every aspect 
of everyday ‘civilian’ life. From late 1956 onwards counter-insurgency 
offi cers and specialist advisers began to recognise that such an agenda 
could not afford to neglect women, half of the total population.
The key phase in the penetration of the doctrine of psychological 
warfare into all levels of the military and civilian government hierar-
chy came, under the aegis of the Minister of Defence and later Prime 
Minister, Maurice Bourgès-Maunory, between July 1956 and August 
1957, culminating in the creation of the Fifth Bureaux.80 A signifi cant 
moment was reached with the creation of a body of offi ciers itinérantes 
in July 1956, all of them former prisoners of the Viet Minh camps, who 
were attached to commanders in the fi eld so as to lead, ‘a vast cam-
paign of disintoxication and re-education of the Muslim population’.81 
But the key turning point came immediately after the Suez debacle on 
5–6 November 1956 with the appointment of the Vietnam veteran, 
Raoul Salan as commander in Algeria. Salan brought with him a team 
of specialists in counter-insurgency, including Colonels Trinquier and 
Goussault, who played a role in elaborating subversive actions aimed at 
Algerian women.82 By August 1957 the Fifth Bureau had established a 
structure that reached through all levels of the army command, a ‘hiérar-
chie parallèle’ that studied, prepared and implemented propaganda and 
counter-insurgency actions.83 This organisation came to exercise, partly 
through its offi cer training centres at Arzew and elsewhere, a power-
ful ideological hegemony throughout the forces, and began to develop 
proto-fascist and far-right Catholic theories that encroached danger-
ously into the sphere of politics. It was with the arrival of Salan and 
Goussault in December 1956 that we see the fi rst clear, although highly 
secret, signs of a new programme directed specifi cally towards women.
A key objective of Lacheroy and other offi cers of the Fifth Bureau was 
how to deploy counter-revolutionary warfare to win the hearts and minds 
of the Algerian population. In such forms of non-conventional warfare 
intelligence not only about the FLN but also about the attitudes and 
morale of the ordinary people was crucial to the design of propaganda and 
other measures, from welfare to education. As Stathis Kalyvas has noted, 
civil wars in which there are no front lines, and in which insurgents may 
be present but ‘invisible’ in the civilian population, present a particular 
‘identifi cation problem’ to occupying forces. Local populations, fearing 
terrorist retribution, may refuse to identify combatants hiding among 
them, a situation which leaves the security forces highly vulnerable.84
The French army, faced with this problem, resorted to a combination 
of methods, from deployment of paid informers to systematic torture, 
but the approach that is of most interest here involved a ‘strategy of 
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contact’, the creation of organisations that could build bridges between 
the much feared army and a civilian population that remained stubbornly 
silent and hostile. The French colonial army had a long experience of 
such so-called rural ‘pacifi cation’ methods, the elaboration of welfare 
and health programmes in tribal or peasant societies, that would simul-
taneously win the trust of the population and enable sound intelligence 
to be gathered. The outstanding example of such a specialist organisa-
tion during the Algerian War was the SAS set up by Soustelle in 1955, 
but by late 1956, in line with the emergence of a women’s emancipation 
agenda, the army was tentatively exploring how to establish methods 
that would enable ‘contact’ with Muslim women. Such an agenda posed 
formidable problems in the bled, the rural interior in which 80 per cent 
of all Algerian women lived, the zones that served as the base of the FLN 
maquis. How could a strategy of contact be created for that half of the 
population that was radically segregated and isolated from the public 
sphere behind the walls of the home? It was this challenge that was 
fi rst addressed during 1957 by the ethnologist Jean Servier, in a secret 
experiment code-named Operation Pilot that proved to be so successful 
that it came to provide the standard model for counter-insurgency ‘paci-
fi cation’ for the whole of rural Algeria until the end of the war. Servier 
appears to have been the fi rst person during the war to design a military 
programme that was directed specifi cally at peasant women.
Jean Servier, a pied-noir ethnologist, carried out fi eldwork during 
1949 and 1954 for a doctorate on the different Berber peoples of Algeria, 
and his linguistic skills and knowledge of Kabylia, an area of intense 
growing nationalism and banditry, was of political interest to the Algiers 
government that funded and commissioned him to prepare reports in 
1952–53.85 It was by chance that Servier was carrying out fi eldwork in 
the Aurès mountains, the epicentre of the insurrection, on 1 November 
1954. He achieved considerable publicity and fame because of his rescue 
of the wounded teacher Mme Monnerot from a bus ambushed by the 
FLN, and for his defence of the besieged town of Arris through the 
distribution of fi fty rifl es to the fi rst improvised harki unit of the war.86 
This Beau Geste moment brought the young ethnologist to the attention 
of Soustelle,87 and after the presentation of his thesis at the Sorbonne in 
1955,88 Servier was recruited by the army. He received training in Paris 
during the spring of 1956 from Colonel Goussault, later head of the 
Fifth Bureau, in revolutionary and psychological warfare, and in turn 
taught courses to SAS offi cers at the Centre militaire d’information et de 
spécialisation pour l’outre-mer (CMSIOM).89
From March to August 1956 Servier was, as chargé de mission aux 
affaires politiques, closely associated as a specialist adviser during 
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the planning of one of the most secret and controversial operations 
of the Algerian War. The aim of Operation K or Opération Oiseau 
Bleu was to create and arm a ‘Third force’ counter-maquis among the 
tribes people of the Ifl issen, whom Servier had studied in 1952–53.90 
Operation K turned out to be a bloody catastrophe for the French 
army since the maquis which it armed and supported was pro-FLN and 
in a counter sting operation infl icted heavy casualties on a French unit 
during an ambush on 1 October 1956.91 Despite this débâcle Servier’s 
credit remained suffi ciently high with the army command for him to 
be placed in charge of a second clandestine Operation Pilot in January 
1957. Operation Pilot is of particular interest since this experimental 
counter-insurgency operation was particularly focused on Algerian 
women and led to the establishment of the single most important war-
time initiative to reach out to Muslim women, the EMSI. In late 1956 
Servier was in Paris when he read a newspaper account of how the 
peasants of Bou Maad, located in the Dahra Mountains to the north 
of Miliana, had revolted against the terrorist grip of the FLN and had 
handed over money collectors to the gendarmerie.92 Servier, who knew 
this area well from his fi eldwork in 1949 and 1950, was so excited by 
this potential for breaking FLN power in the bled that he left imme-
diately for Algiers and submitted to the Minister, Lacoste, a proposal 
that General Salan called, ‘an in depth action for the reconquest of the 
population’.93
Servier’s timing could not have been more propitious: Salan, newly 
arrived as commander of the combined forces in Algeria in December 
1956, brought with him a circle of ex-Vietnam veterans who were 
dedicated to the techniques of revolutionary warfare, and who were pre-
pared to experiment with daring and unconventional methods. At the 
same moment General Massu, on assuming both civilian and military 
powers on 7 January 1957, unleashed the massive operations known 
as the ‘Battle of Algiers’ to root out the FLN terrorist networks in the 
capital. The same month saw the creation of the Fifth Bureau, headed 
by Colonel Goussault, and so everything was pointing to a radicalisa-
tion of the war. It seems likely that it was Goussault who arranged a 
meeting between Servier and General Salan on 16 January to agree a 
plan that was strongly opposed by the conservative ‘Grands Services’ 
of the General Government who were shocked by a project that went 
against the policies they had followed for years.94 Salan gave the green 
light and the next day summoned the military and civilian heads of the 
Orléansville region, General de Brébisson and the Prefect Chevrier, to 
brief them on ‘Pilote 1’, which was planned to take place in their area of 
command between 26 January and 26 March.95
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The genesis of Servier’s thinking on emancipation can be traced back 
to August 1956 when he had been working as chargé de mission under 
Lucien Paye, Directeur des affaires politique,96 at the very moment that 
Lacoste’s cabinet was turning to the implications of Bourguiba’s radical 
Code of Personal Status. The ethnologist had a close knowledge of the 
way of life of peasant women in the most isolated mountain zones, and 
was in a good position to formulate policy.97 On the 12 August Servier 
sent Paye two reports from the army HQ in Tizi-Ouzou, where he was 
involved in the ‘Oiseau Bleu’ operation, one of them a Note sur le Statut 
de la Femme Kabyle. Bourguiba had fi rst announced the new Tunisian 
code in two speeches on 3 and 10 August, and it seems likely that Servier 
was responding to this news when he wrote to his director, Lucien 
Paye, who several months later was to sit on the working party for the 
 revision of the Algerian law on marriage and the family.
Servier argued in his paper on the personal status of Kabyle women 
that they were subject to the patriarchal group and ‘remain minors in 
law . . . They cannot participate in the public life of the village. They are 
neither voters nor electable and are not allowed to give witness before 
the village assembly (djemâa)’, and given present conditions, ‘it would 
seem unwise to change radically the status of women’.98 However, he 
noted that Kabyle peasants were favourable to the education of their 
daughters, but were held back by the fear of dishonour and disapproval 
of conservative society and what neighbours might say. The answer to 
this was for the government to impose universal schooling on all girls, 
a step that Kabyles would welcome. In addition, he predicted a coming 
offensive of the FLN against French schools: ‘It is likely that the FLN 
will undertake the initiative of an obligatory Koranic education of girls 
from October [1956] as part of its offensive against the French school’. 
Servier outlined a counter-programme:
The teaching of girls should be practical and based on domestic skills and 
child- care that take as their point of departure what one fi nds in a normal 
Kabyle house . . . The place of the Kabyle women within the household, 
her role in overseeing the home and the education of children, means that 
the day that the ‘old Matriarchs’ – the elderly mothers of the husbands – 
are replaced by the pupils of the French school, Kabylia will tip over as a 
block into western civilisation. This evolution can only occur if France, in 
a fi rst phase, seeks to form the future mistresses of the house rather than 
to transform those who stay squatted round the hearth.
This recommended programme was very similar to the approach that 
was taken a year later by the EMSI teams.99 Servier announced what 
was to become a central tenet of military-led emancipation, that since 
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women constituted the very bastion of Algerian-Muslim identity, culture 
and tradition, and its point of reproduction, a key aim of psychological 
warfare must be to intercept and re-shape this habitus.
Early in 1957 Servier set out his ideas for propaganda activity with 
women in a further document, Défi nition d’une idéologie pour les 
Operations ‘Pilote’.100 It announced the idea of a ‘New Algeria’, emerg-
ing truly free and modern, struggling against the privileges of the ruling 
elite of grandes familles and caïds; against the prejudices imposed by 
backward customs and religious traditions that had no foundation in the 
Koran; and against the: ‘subjugation of the woman that maintains her 
in a veritable state of slavery when in every modern country the woman 
is today free to live as she chooses, to dress as she wishes, to go out, and 
to work outside the confi nes of the house’. The concept of an ‘Algérie 
Nouvelle’ was developed in a further directive which advocated a ‘reli-
gious emancipation’ from the cadis and Ulemas, allies of the FLN which 
forbade the education of children, and deliberately kept the people in 
ignorance in order the better to oppress them and extort money.101 This 
refl ected Servier’s discovery from his earlier ethnographic fi eldwork that 
the PPA and later the FLN had penetrated secretly into the most isolated 
mountain areas during the 1950s in the form of a Ulema puritanism, 
which he detested.102 Servier forecast that FLN ‘cultural commissars’ 
would in a fi rst stage make use of marabout prestige to gain infl uence 
over the masses and to preach a holy war (jihad), but since they were 
former pupils of the reformist médersas they would in a later stage break 
the privileged position of the marabouts castes and force attendance at 
Koranic schools in which Arab language and culture would displace both 
Berber and French. Servier proposed blocking this pan-Arab hegemony 
by ensuring that the zaouias taught a modern French curriculum that 
would also be able to prepare the way for female emancipation.103
The Pilot directive, under the rubric Emancipation de la femme, ‘Insists 
on the fact that in modern society all beings are equal: women are and 
must be the equal of men’. It attacked the barbaric practices supported 
by Muslim law, by which ‘the husband can beat his wife, deprive her of 
food, and repudiate her by pronouncing a simple formula’. The Muslim 
woman was treated as a slave, ‘a beast of burden’, and, ‘as a victim of 
archaic prejudices, is kept isolated from society. From the age of puberty 
she can no longer go out except when accompanied’. As a result girls did 
not go to school, were closed to any idea of progress, were ignorant of 
basic principles of hygiene, and used the most traditional methods in the 
home, preferring the wood-fi red stove (kanoun) to Butagas or paraffi n 
cookers. Other Islamic states like Turkey and Tunisia had shown that 
modernisation was perfectly compatible with religion.104
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So much for Servier’s general ideas on emancipation, but how did 
this strategy of contact translate into practice on the ground? The idea 
behind Pilot was to target a particular isolated zone, in this case the 
mountainous area of the Dahra between the Chélif River valley and 
the coast, an area defi ned by the quadrilateral between Orléansville, 
Ténès, Cherchell and Miliana, an ‘infested corner’ where the FLN had 
established a solid military and political structure (OPA). The Dahra, 
without roads, was so cut-off from the European-dominated plains that 
there was almost no French presence, administration or infrastructure. 
One area within the Pilot zone, the military operational sector of Ténès, 
spread over 2,000 square kilometres, in early 1957 had only two civilian 
and four army doctors for a population of 115,000 people.
The initial problem facing the army was that FLN terrorism, able to 
wreak rapid and deadly force against ‘collaborators’, held the inhabit-
ants in a vice-like grip, so that no intelligence was forthcoming nor any 
degree of co-operation, even in the case of reforms that might be ben-
efi cial to the population. The strategy of ‘pacifi cation’ of the region was 
to take place in two phases, summarised as ‘destroy and build’: fi rstly, 
the army would engage in a major offensive to locate and destroy the 
ALN forces, and then move rapidly to assure protection to the popula-
tion from FLN terrorism, a crucial precondition for the establishment 
of a new order in which Algerians would eventually begin to take on 
responsibility for running their own free society that would eliminate all 
nationalist infl uence.105 The second phase of Pilot, described as a ‘work 
of in-depth pacifi cation’, represented an ambitious, ‘essentially totalitar-
ian’ plan, in the sense that every aspect of local Algerian life would be 
radically transformed using, ‘military, political, administrative, cultural, 
social and medical means’.106
The second phase, one of ‘building contact’, involved a co-ordinated 
team moving into selected villages in turn and a frequent initial response 
of the inhabitants was to fl ee, terrifi ed, into the forests, but with time 
the reassured population began to appear. The team typically consisted 
of a protective military escort led by psychological warfare offi cers (offi -
ciers itinérantes),107 a mobile loud-speaker and cinema lorry (CHPT),108 
small medical teams of army doctors and nurses (Service d’aide médicale 
gratuite or AMG), and the proto-type EMSI, small ‘mixed’ units made 
up of one European woman and one or two Muslim assistant-inter-
preters or Adjointes sanitaires et sociales rurales auxiliaires (ASSRA), 
who had the specifi c task of making contact with Muslim women.109 A 
typical example of such initial contact comes from the Douar Drablia 
on the morning of 10 July 1957, when the inhabitants were summoned 
to attend a rally at which 150 men were placed in one group, and 170 
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anxious women and children in another. After being harangued with 
anti-FLN propaganda, such as the slogan ‘Don’t let yourself be devoured 
by the jackals’, one medical team treated the men, while a medical-EMSI 
team cared for the women. The people were invited to choose a spokes-
man from each fraction of the tribe and in the following discussion one 
man asked for weapons to defend the village against the FLN. When the 
EMSI team departed, the local women ran after the Muslim assistants 
to thank them.110
The action directed towards women was one component of a larger 
range of measures initiated by Servier’s team in the Dahra. FLN prison 
labour and six bulldozers were used to rapidly build a network of dirt 
roads (pistes) that allowed rapid military intervention to protect vil-
lagers from FLN incursions.111 Servier took particular pride, as he had 
done in the Aurès in 1954, in arming and training harkis to form units 
(harkas) that protected villages (auto-défense) and tracked down FLN 
fi ghters concealed in the surrounding population. Schools that had been 
destroyed by the FLN were rebuilt and re-opened with great pomp and 
feasting.112 One of the most secretive parts of the operation was the plan 
to send hand-picked local men, including prisoners and those who had 
‘rallied’ from the FLN side, to the counter-insurgency training school at 
Arzew where they were intensely trained, using methods drawn from 
Vietnam, as ‘political commissars’.113 They were then discretely reintro-
duced back into the douars where they were to provide intelligence, 
keep watch on individual loyalties and recruit for the harkas.114 Servier’s 
vision of the future seems to have been linked to Lacoste’s ‘Third 
Force’ strategy and the important legislation of the loi cadre by which 
Algerians would themselves come to play a major role in the reorganised 
structures of elected local government, so building up a new participa-
tory democracy from the grass-roots that would eliminate the enemy 
OPA. The political commissars would play a key part in establishing 
suffi cient security to enable the inhabitants to elect local assemblies that 
were cleansed of any ‘sleeper’ FLN terrorists.115
During 1957, after the initial contact with village women, Servier 
took particular care to develop the EMSI teams, paying and equipping 
them from a special secret fund of 600 million (old francs) allocated to 
him by the Algiers government.116 Since few of the European women 
who were recruited to head each team could speak Arabic or Berber 
dialect and had little close knowledge of Muslim customs, it was abso-
lutely crucial to attach to them young Algerian women who could serve 
as interpreters and cultural intermediaries (ASSRA). It proved diffi cult 
to recruit ‘évoluées favourable to France’, but psychological warfare 
offi cers, following on from their Vietnam experience, took an obvious 
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delight in being able to use ex-FLN militants in this task, women who 
it was thought would know the enemy better than anybody.117 For 
example, the army captured a young FLN nurse, a former student and 
daughter of a cadi who, Servier claimed, had fallen into the hands of 
the ALN band of Si Mourad who used her as a sexual slave. Enraged by 
her experience, she proved easy to ‘turn’ and was readily recruited as an 
assistant, providing a model for the rapid engagement of other young 
Muslim women.118 The journalist Jean Piverd described in glowing 
terms his departure for a two-day tour of villages ‘into the outback’, 
with a team of four, a doctor, a driver and Denise B., a twenty-fi ve-year-
old woman who had previously been a secretary in the Paris Ministry of 
Defence, and Touria B., an eighteen- or nineteen-year-old Muslim who, 
it was claimed, had been forced into an FLN unit where she had served 
as a nurse for nearly a year.119 Touria’s ambition was now to train for 
a diploma in a school for ASSRA being built by Servier.120 As the team 
arrived in each village Piverd described the enormous crowds of people 
who queued up with every possible kind of malady, from purulent 
eye disease to infected cuts, and the EMSI paid particular attention to 
 child-care, cleaning, bathing and weighing babies.
Piverd’s report on the EMSI, which emphasised the heroic self-
 sacrifi ce of young French women in harsh and dangerous conditions, 
was to become one of the favourite subjects of army propaganda 
through the rest of the war, and endless photographs and fi lms recorded 
smiling, blond and white-coated assistants tending to the needs of grate-
ful peasant women and their babies.121 The outstanding example of such 
hagiography was Christiane Fournier’s, Les EMSI: des fi lles comme ça!, 
which includes a photograph of hundreds of women and children seated 
on the ground waiting their turn, with the caption: ‘A crowd that has 
descended from the four corners of the djebel, prisoners of an anachro-
nistic Middle Ages, reach out towards a better life’.122 Servier claimed 
that in some villages the women had begun to form their own commit-
tees and, with army assistance, to initiate various self-help projects such 
as weaving carpets for sale in local markets.123
How successful was the fi rst Operation Pilot, and the EMSI in 
particular? Internal army reports are rather contradictory, and reveal 
major and damaging internal battles over the operation between dif-
ferent branches of the civil and military hierarchy. Relations between 
General de Brébisson and the local Prefect Chevrier were strained, and 
the project was plagued by the lack of a coherent and unifi ed command, 
so that it suffered from disputes between different ‘fi efdoms’ over per-
sonnel, funding and decision-making. Colonel Ameil, commander of 
the sub-sector of Orléansville was sceptical about the project from the 
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beginning, and later refused to support psychological actions, the EMSI 
or Arzew training programme, an opposition which led to his posting 
back to France.124 It seems likely that this opposition was a refl ection of 
the hostility of some ‘conventional’ offi cers to the growing penetration 
and infl uence of Goussault’s Fifth Bureau into the army command, and 
by early summer Goussault, following a tour of inspection, was livid at 
the failure to expand Operation Pilot into zones that were in the origi-
nal plan, and demanding to know what commanders had done with the 
considerable resources in extra manpower and materials allocated to 
them under Pilot.
From early March onwards General de Brébisson and General 
Allard, commander of the Corps d’armée d’Alger (CAA), marginalised 
the Servier operation by developing their own agenda, and rapidly 
extending the experiment into the departments of Algiers, Médéa and 
Mostaganem,125 and in particular as Operation NK-3 in the Palestro 
area. A series of top-level meetings had to be called in the Government 
General to sort out the seething discontents (13 May and 29 May), and 
Salan instructed Allard in June that any further extension to Pilot would 
1 One of the early EMSI teams during Operation Pilot at
Bou Maad, 1957
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need to be based on a detailed plan approved by Lacoste.126 Goussault 
wisely, if opportunely, decided to halt his criticism of the powerful army 
commanders, unlike Servier who, standing outside the conventional 
military hierarchy and endowed with a sense of his superior mission, 
had no hesitation in circulating withering criticisms of both Goussault 
and the generals. Among Servier’s criticisms of the army command 
was the treatment of harkis as second rate mercenaries, lacking proper 
pay and conditions, and the failure to see that revolutionary warfare 
did not consist of ‘pure and simple brutal repression, that is to say, 
in most instances, blind, collective and unintelligent’, a comment that 
has been marginally annotated in red crayon, ‘idiot’.127 Servier, whose 
concerns seem well founded,128 recognised the central contradiction of 
army ‘pacifi cation’, that indiscriminate violence and repression fatally 
undermined any ‘good works’ achieved by SAS and EMSI to win the 
hearts and minds initiative. It seems not too surprising that the out-
spoken Servier was sidelined to a meaningless desk job in the General 
Government and soon returned in April 1958 to an academic post in the 
University of Montpellier.129
The instability and in-fi ghting surrounding the Operation Pilot 
clearly damaged the outcomes of the programme during 1957, and, 
along with it, the creation of the fi rst EMSI. The teams lived a hand-
to-mouth existence, were lacking in adequate and secure funding, and 
by July the ASSRA under Mme Guilles had still not been paid. The 
colonel in charge of the army medical service was sabotaging the work 
of the EMSI, either by attaching them to his own service, or, instead 
of providing them with decent accommodation, posted them to live 
under tents in dangerous zones where they could not carry out their 
welfare mission.130 Opinion on the success of the EMSI was divided: in 
May General Huet was lavish in his praise of their ‘excellent work’ and 
seeking further sources of funding, but good results depended on the 
overall degree of security established in their zone of operation. In some 
areas the FLN made a sustained push to re-enter zones from which they 
had been driven, and in some instances cut the throats of local women 
who had provided water to French soldiers.131 In December one colonel 
noted, after an initial positive response to the EMSI, a deterioration in 
the climate owing to FLN pressure: assistants were badly received, and 
local women said they had no need for medical or other help, which was 
patently untrue. The loud-speaker lorries (compagnie de haute-parleurs 
et de tracts, CHPTP) were greeted with a ‘hint of scepticism and irony’, 
and the commander concluded that despite six months of psychological 
campaigning by Pilot, ‘the hold of the rebel OPA is still strong in regions 
considered to have been pacifi ed’.132
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But overall the EMSI proved suffi ciently successful for the experi-
ment to be extended, and the fi ve initial teams,133 had by August 1957 
been expanded to eleven, three based at Orléansville, two at Miliana, 
three at Cherchell and three at Ténès. Lacoste, by an order of 25 
October 1957, then extended the system to the rest of the colony, 
and a special induction course was set up in Algiers.134 Among the 
key factors that inspired the high command to expand and generalise 
the EMSI, as will be seen (chapters 4 and 7), was the realisation of the 
propaganda advantages to be won via the international media, the 
lure of intelligence to be won by penetrating the intimate world of 
the Algerian family, and the advantages to be gained from seizing the 
initiative on emancipation that out-manoeuvred the FLN which, for 
religious and political reasons, was unable to support a progressive 
agenda for women.135
Urban counter-insurgency: emancipation and the ‘Battle of Algiers’
The fi nal factor that led the Algerian government and military to 
advance an emancipation strategy was the growing awareness that it 
needed to pre-empt the FLN, which was developing a similar agenda. 
The guerrilla forces of the FLN had from the very beginning of the war 
received the crucial logistic support of peasant women who cooked, 
washed clothes, acted as look-outs and concealed the fi ghters, but such 
support, the ‘natural’ domestic role of mothers and sisters, was rarely if 
ever acknowledged by either side in the war. However, during the course 
of 1955–57 the FLN began systematically to recruit educated young 
women from urban society either to serve as nurses in the maquis or 
as liaison agents in the terrorist networks. The role of Algerian women 
within the FLN structure will be examined in detail in chapter 9; here 
the aim is to consider the process by which the French army became 
aware of this growing involvement and reacted to it.
Army offi cers, who entertained Orientalist assumptions of Muslim 
women as veiled and timid beings, lacking in any initiative, subservi-
ent and crushed under the boot of male power, were astonished by 
the growing number of Algerian female militants caught in 1955–56 
during military operations. Between June 1955 and the end of 1956 
some twenty-eight women were arrested for transporting weapons and 
ammunition and housing FLN militants, but the biggest shock came 
after the fi rst arrest in July 1956 of three nurses in the maquis and the 
realisation that women were now serving with ALN guerrilla forces.136 
Doctor Nefi ssa Hamoud, an Algiers paediatrician and the fi rst woman to 
go regularly into the Kabyle maquis to provide medical aid, was arrested 
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in an ambush in October 1956.137 Documents found on the body of an 
FLN political cadre killed on 4 October 1957 indicated that Algerian 
women were serving as armed combatants in the North Constantine 
area, after receiving medical training in early 1957. At the very moment 
that the fi rst EMSI experiment was underway in Operation Pilot, the 
women fi ghters in the ALN were taking on an identical function as 
political propagandists and as ‘veritable social welfare assistants in the 
service of Algerian women’.138
However, the biggest shock for the French came during the ‘Battle 
of Algiers’ of 1956–57 when Massu’s parachutists arrested a number 
of young women who were closely involved in the transmission of 
messages, guns and bombs for Yacef Saadi’s terrorist network.139 The 
centre of gravity of the rebellion may have been in the bled, but during 
1956–57 the world media turned with fascination and horror to the 
stories of Zohra Drif, Djamila Bouhired, Samia Lakhdari, Djamila 
Bouazza and others who planted bombs in the milk bars of crowded 
Algiers from September 1956 onwards. It was the female urban ter-
rorist, later depicted in Gillo Pontecorvo’s remarkable 1965 drama-
documentary The Battle of Algiers, that provided the most powerful 
and enduring image of Algerian women’s new-found capacity to defy 
convention and assume a new role as nationalist militants and fi ghters.
The involvement of young women in the FLN networks of Algiers 
had become clear to the French authorities some time before the bomb-
ings, most notably through the lycée and student strike of May 1956.140 
The army was increasingly preoccupied with the problem of how to 
penetrate into, and gain intelligence on, the FLN networks that found 
a bastion within the warren of the ancient Casbah. It was precisely at 
this moment that signs fi rst appear of the army trying to engage in a 
‘strategy of contact’ with Muslim women through the manipulation of 
the Centres sociaux.
The military were fully aware of the extent to which the dedicated 
and idealistic social workers of the Centres sociaux, through their 
welfare work in the bidonvilles, had built up close relationships and 
trust with the urban poor, a source of contact that could potentially 
provide a mine of intelligence. A fi rst sign of military attempts to 
intrude onto the terrain of the social workers came on the night of 
26–27 May 1956 when the police and army mounted a huge operation 
to surround the Casbah, a key fortress of FLN militancy, during which 
over 4,000 men were arrested. On the 26 May all eighty social workers 
in Algiers were assembled by order of the head of the public health serv-
ices, divided into ten teams, and asked to go in police lorries to carry 
out an unknown task. When they discovered that they were expected 
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to unveil and frisk Muslim women to make sure they were not FLN 
men in disguise or carrying weapons, the team of eight led by Marie 
Chéné, and half the team of Emma Serra, refused and were threatened 
as ‘traitors’ and held in lorries or police cells overnight. On the 28 May 
Chéné wrote to the Association nationale des assistants socials (ANAS) 
in Paris, complaining that, ‘our mission as social workers will be seri-
ously compromised through participation in this policing operation’.141 
The national president of the ANAS, Mlle de Laage, managed to gain 
a retraction from Lacoste and the Paris government and a recognition 
that the action had breached the professional and legal code of social 
workers. However, the crisis revealed a serious split within the corps 
of assistants and a majority, perhaps mainly pieds noirs favourable to 
Algérie française, wrote to Lacoste opposing the ANAS, claiming that 
the police mission assigned to them was not incompatible with their 
professional ethic, particularly under the exceptional conditions in 
Algeria, and that it was proper ‘to humanise the system of control’.142 
Mme R. Bley, head of the Service social familiale nord-africain in Paris, 
who was shocked by this ‘regrettable state of mind’, was to fi nd herself 
during 1961 in the forefront of opposing a similar onslaught on the 
social services by Maurice Papon’s police before and after the massacre 
of 17 October.143
Despite the Algerian government’s retreat on this issue in May, the 
writing was on the wall, and increasingly through 1956–57, especially 
with the ‘Battle of Algiers’, the police and army moved to interfere 
with, or control, the work of both the Centres sociaux and of the social 
work teams established by Scotto. However, despite enormous pressure 
and intimidation, the authorities largely failed to harness the centres as 
auxiliaries to their repressive agenda. The army then adopted a quite 
different tactic and began publicly to denounce them as hot-beds of FLN 
sympathisers and arrested, tortured or expelled them back to France. 
Annie Steiner was arrested as early as 15 October 1956 and sentenced to 
fi ve years in prison; Hélène Gautron was arrested on 21 February 1957 
and tortured; Nelly Forget, a SCI militant, was arrested on 5 March 
1957 and tortured; and eventually thirty-fi ve liberals appeared in a kind 
of ‘show trial’ on 23 July 1957. A virulent campaign in the Algerian 
press made the Centres sociaux a target of pieds-noir hostility and led 
eventually to the murder by the Organisation armée secrète (OAS) of six 
leading members, including the writer Mouloud Feraoun, on 15 March 
1962.144
The history of the Centres sociaux during 1956–57 indicates how the 
security services were becoming increasingly interested in the processes 
by which a ‘strategy of contact’ could be constructed and developed, 
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especially in order to penetrate the segregated universe of Algerian 
women. When they found the professional social workers, who were 
supported by their national association, resistant to such manipulation, 
the army went ahead and began to develop its own parallel institutional 
base for such an initiative, particularly through the creation of women’s 
local associations or circles that expanded dramatically after ‘13 May 
1958’.
The single event, however, that galvanised the army to accelerate an 
emancipation agenda arose from the fi nal capture on 26 August and 
interrogation of Zohra Drif, the outstanding woman member of Yacef 
Saadi’s underground. The intelligence service was able to capture docu-
ments that revealed Drif’s advanced plan to set up a totally new clandes-
tine organisation for women based on the classic secure form of cells of 
three arranged in a hierarchical pyramid. During her interrogation on 2 
October Zohra Drif, who remarked, ‘I insisted on the importance of the 
social role of women’, revealed how she intended to organise a team of 
women in each Algiers quarter which would provide medical and social 
aid for poor families, support the families of FLN prisoners, engage in 
propaganda through tracts and demonstrations, serve as liaison agents 
and collect intelligence on French informers.145 This structure, which 
seems to have been in part modelled on the cells of the former PPA 
Association des femmes musulmanes algériennes, would have included 
357 women in all. Identifi cation and recruitment of ‘sisters’ was already 
under-way when Drif was arrested, and since it had been particularly 
diffi cult for the army to search or arrest veiled Muslim women liaison 
agents the proposed network offered a formidable potential for the 
regeneration of the Zone autonome d’Alger (ZAA) that had been 
 decimated by army repression.
The high command, including Generals Salan and Allard, took a keen 
interest in the discovery of this previously unknown plan, and intelli-
gence analysts reported, ‘Such an organisation constitutes in the hands 
of the rebels a powerful means to control the Muslim popular masses. 
On these grounds, it merits our fullest attention’. From this moment 
the army and civil administration began to pay particular attention to, 
and collect intelligence on, the role of women within the FLN organisa-
tion.146 From the summer of 1957 onwards the Fifth Bureau had organ-
ised a series of propaganda radio broadcasts on the theme of unveiling, 
and the modernisation and liberation of Algerian women (see chapter 
3). The army placed letter boxes in the Casbah in which Algerians could 
discreetly put messages to the authorities: one such anonymous letter 
dated 8 April 1958 from a woman expressed appreciation of the ‘Radio 
Casbah’ broadcasts against veiling, and claimed that for Muslim women 
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to become modern and civilised it was necessary to ban the veil, ‘that 
suffocates her, that hinders her in work or education . . . and which 
above all deprives her of liberty and imprisons her between four walls’. 
General Massu forwarded this letter to Allard, noting this sign of, ‘the 
aspiration of Muslim women for rapid progress’. He argued that the 
veil should be banned immediately and, ‘I have already had occasion 
to express my fear of seeing us outdistanced in this area by the FLN 
that could advocate a similar radical transformation of customs, with 
 guaranteed good results’.147
By the winter of 1957–58 the military were impressed by the results 
of their own emancipation strategy achieved during Operation Pilot, 
but they had become simultaneously aware of, and disconcerted by, the 
extent to which the FLN was also harnessing the enormous potential 
of women to the nationalist struggle. Until this moment most aspects 
of the army’s highly secretive emancipation agenda in the Dahra and 
elsewhere remained unknown to the public. While the Fifth Bureau had 
covertly utilised propaganda by radio, fi lm and newspapers to try and 
change, or gauge public opinion on female liberation, as in Difrane’s 
Figaro articles, the government was not able to gain any prestige among 
the Muslim population or international opinion for its still secretive 
emancipation campaign. The discovery of Zohra Drif’s detailed plan for 
a woman’s clandestine organisation made clear the very real danger that 
the FLN might seize the initiative, and trump the army. On 6 May 1958, 
General Allard, a key advocate of psychological warfare, forwarded 
Massu’s letter to Salan, noting:-
The action undertaken in relation to women for over a year by the free 
medical teams, by the women’s circles, and through propaganda, has 
obtained un-hoped for results.
 The time has come to go offi cially public on the emancipation of 
Muslim women so as to prevent the rebels from profi ting from the 
current change in the state of mind brought about by us through so much 
effort.148
Exactly one week later, on 13 May 1958, the military coup by the 
Generals in Algiers provided the ideal conditions for the achievement 
of this goal, the launching of a co-ordinated and open campaign for 
emancipation.
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3
Unveiling: the ‘revolutionary journées’ of 
13 May 1958
Throughout the period from early 1956 to early 1958 putschist forces 
had been gathering strength both within the army and among right-
wing settler organisations and these eventually coalesced on 13 May 
1958 when crowds gathered in the Forum and stormed the General 
Government buildings. The military rapidly used the crisis to effect 
a bloodless coup and to install a temporary ‘revolutionary’ authority 
headed by a Committee of Public Safety (Comité de salut public or CSP) 
under Generals Massu and Salan. There then followed a tense stand-
off between the army in Algeria and the new Paris government headed 
by Pierre Pfl imlin, a three-week period during which civil war was a 
real possibility, until de Gaulle agreed to assume, once again, the role 
of ‘saviour of the nation’, and was voted into power by the National 
Assembly on 1 June.1 ‘13 May’ was one of the great turning points in 
modern French history, not only because it marked a key stage in the 
Algerian War, but more signifi cantly the collapse of the Fourth Republic, 
de Gaulle’s return to power, and the beginnings of the new  constitutional 
regime of the Fifth Republic.
The planning of the coup and its implementation was extraordi-
narily complex – the Bromberger brothers in Les 13 Complots du 13 
mai counted thirteen strands2 – but basically two antagonistic politi-
cal formations reached agreement to rally to the call for de Gaulle’s 
return to power. On the one hand there was a secret plot by Gaullists, 
most notably Michel Debré (soon to become Prime Minister), Jacques 
Soustelle, Léon Delbecque and Jacques Chaban-Delmas (acting Minister 
of Defence), to engineer the return of the General so as to resolve the 
political crisis of the ‘system’, the dead hand of the party system of 
the Fourth Republic, which they viewed as destroying the grandeur of 
France. The second trend was composed of various extreme-right-wing 
plotters, mainly from the pieds-noirs community, neo-fascists, poujad-
ists, die-hard colonialists and army offi cers who shared the Gaullist fear 
of national degeneration, but who were even more concerned about a 
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‘sell-out’ in Algeria and were determined to fi ght to the bitter end for 
the political supremacy of the million European settlers. On 11 May the 
far-right Pétainist editor, Alain de Sérigny, published an overt appeal to 
de Gaulle to seize the helm, and this set the stage for the various clandes-
tine trends to converge in the coup d’état of 13 May when extreme-right 
settler activists stormed the General Government while the parachute 
regiments looked on.3 The plotters, in a move reminiscent of General 
Franco’s rebellion of 1936 when the army of North Africa fl ew from 
Morocco to attack the Spanish Republic, were laying plans to topple the 
government by an airborn invasion of Paris.
On the evening of 13 May General Massu, commander of the armed 
forces in the Algiers region, took control of the situation by announcing 
from the balcony of the General Government to the huge and excited 
crowds of Europeans packed into the Forum below, the intention to 
form immediately a CSP.4 During the twenty-three days between 13 
May and 4 June, when de Gaulle made his triumphal appearance before 
delirious crowds of pieds-noirs, the large open space of the Forum, 
which was separated from the white bulk of the General Government 
by high iron railings, was the scene of daily parades, of huge popular 
gatherings that often continued late into the night. In keeping with the 
symbolism of the Jacobin committee of public safety of 1793–94, the 
massed and euphoric crowd in the Forum was represented in the endless 
speeches and media discourse as an expression of the spontaneous 
‘revolutionary’ will of the people, an assertion of a noble and colossal 
force that carried its own inherent message of populist legitimacy. The 
most dramatic and memorable part of the ‘revolutionary’ and highly 
theatrical crowd scenes that were played out here over three weeks 
was the extraordinary ‘fraternisation’ from 16 to 18 May between 
Europeans and Muslims.5 On Friday 16 May contingents of Algerian 
men, elderly war veterans wearing decorations, harki and other pro-
French elements, marched into the Forum where they were encouraged 
to join hands with, or embrace, their ‘brother’ Europeans in a symbol of 
reconciliation and friendship that was photographed and fi lmed by the 
international media. This was deemed such a spectacular propaganda 
success that Psychological Action offi cers of the Fifth Bureau decided to 
extend ‘fraternisation’ to include Muslim women, a far more novel and 
controversial action.
On the evening of the following day, Saturday 17 May, the dramatic 
arrival of the hero of the Algérie française crowds, Jacques Soustelle, 
after his escape from virtual house-arrest in Paris, was marked by 
unprecedented scenes as a group of young Algerian women removed and 
burned their haïks before the General Government. The next day this 
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action was accelerated when hundreds of women from the Algiers slums 
marched into the Forum carrying banners and placards, removed their 
haïks or had them taken off by their European ‘sisters’, and applauded 
speeches by Muslim women expressing their desire for emancipation 
and modernity as full French citizens. From the 19 May to early June 
these elaborate ceremonies of unveiling were extended to urban centres 
throughout Algeria.
Before examining in closer detail the orchestration of ‘fraternisation’ 
ceremonies, it is necessary to examine their underlying political meaning 
and purpose. The aim of the military and Gaullist organisers of the ‘13 
May’ coup was to force Pierre Pfl imlin, who had been invested as Prime 
Minister by the National Assembly early in the morning of 14 May, to 
stand down in favour of General de Gaulle. However, there was no rapid 
resolution of a crisis that appeared to be slipping dangerously towards 
civil war: the Pfl imlin government began to take military steps to protect 
Paris, while de Gaulle remained evasive, refusing to respond to the call 
of the Algiers plotters by openly agreeing to take on the role of national 
saviour. In a Paris press-conference on 19 May de Gaulle stated that he 
had no interest in heading a military dictatorship, but indicated his will-
ingness to come forward if so delegated by the ‘Republic’: ‘Now I shall 
return home to my village and there I shall hold myself at the disposi-
tion of the country’.6 For the next ten days, during which the military 
plotters invaded Corsica, there existed a dangerous vacuum of power 
and de Gaulle seemed to hang back while desperate haggling took place 
for a constitutional resolution. In a situation of chaos the outcome of 
the three-week crisis remained unpredictable and at times the situation 
of the plotters in Algiers, who faced an economic embargo, appeared 
desperate, especially as their key player remained elusive and failed to 
respond to their appeals.
The offi cers of the Fifth Bureau, specialists in propaganda techniques 
and the manipulation of public opinion, knew that it was of crucial 
political importance to win over both the national and international 
media. It was important in the fi rst few days of ‘13 May’ to dispel the 
hostility of the international media which tended to present the Algiers 
generals as proto-fascist dictators, on a par with Franco in 1936, who 
were intent on guaranteeing a white supremacist regime. A primary 
purpose of the propaganda offensive was to negate this image and to 
gain legitimacy for their coup by showing that the ‘New Order’, far from 
being a colonial despotism, was based on full equality and ‘integration’ 
of both Europeans and Muslims. When the ad-hoc CSP was established 
on the night of 13–14 May, Massu insisted that Algerian representatives 
be added (Mahdi, Madani, Berkani, Sheikh Taïeb) and he read from 
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the balcony Communiqué No. 1: ‘The Committee beseeches General de 
Gaulle to break his silence by addressing the country . . . We are proud 
to be able to prove to the world that the people of Algiers have been able 
to give a perfect demonstration of total fraternity between the European 
and Muslim populations, united under the folds of the French fl ag’.7 
However, in the heady euphoria of ‘revolution’ few noticed that the four 
handpicked Algerians on the CSP had no popular mandate and made 
up only 7 per cent of the fi fty-fi ve-man body, whereas Muslims made 
up 89 per cent of the population. The mass ‘fraternisation’ of Algerian 
men on 16 May was organised to demonstrate the totally ‘spontaneous’ 
and euphoric support for inter-racial unity and Algérie française. During 
the following two days this message was given a far more dramatic and 
newsworthy support by the parade of Algerian women, the ‘other half’ 
of the population, who signalled their wish for emancipation within the 
French nation. The function of mass ‘fraternisation’ was to convince the 
world that the coup was a genuine and almost miraculous expression of 
the unity of the two warring communities, but in addition it served the 
crucial function of bringing de Gaulle on side. The General was wary of 
being perceived as the leader of a military and white supremacist coup, 
but if the mass of ordinary Europeans and Algerians were spontane-
ously and genuinely united in calling for his aid, then he might well be 
able to cross the Rubicon in answer to such a call of the ‘nation’.8
A key issue that was debated endlessly by contemporaries, and sub-
sequently by historians, was whether the ‘fraternisation’ was indeed 
a spontaneous expression of the popular will. Journalists and other 
eye-witnesses present in the Forum were deeply divided on this issue: 
on the one hand, as will be seen, there were those who claimed that 
the army had coerced many Algerians who were brought in by lorry to 
the parades, or that the women who unveiled were prostitutes and the 
dregs of the slums. Opposed to this was the claim that an extraordinary 
and electric fervour had swept through the crowd of Europeans and 
Algerians, an emotional outpouring of joy and optimism that signalled 
an end to the bloody divisions, and the powerful solidarity of the two 
peoples as they faced the future together. Typical of this highly charged 
impact is the claim of Colonel Jacques Romain-Desfossés that he, like 
all his comrades, was swept away: ‘This immense fl ood of the crowd of 
Europeans and Muslims fraternally intermingled had something fantas-
tic about it’. He would never forget, ‘the deeply moving emotion that 
seized hold of me’.9 Dr Sangline also would always remember with deep 
emotion the joy of the crowds in the Forum, ‘where the crowd formed 
an immense chain of friendship, each person linking arms with his 
neighbour, all mixed together: Europeans, Muslims, civilians, soldiers, 
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men, women, children and adults. A glittering ant-heap, bright colours 
on the long, unfurled banners, thousands of fl ags. It was truly a joy to 
be alive!’10 The peculiar psychodrama was frequently likened to that 
of 4 August 1789 when representatives of the National Assembly, in a 
strange and intoxicated atmosphere, voluntarily renounced the seigneu-
rial rights and privileges of the Ancien Régime. It may be the case that 
many pieds-noirs and a signifi cant number of Algerians who favoured 
French control, such as the harkis and conservative war veterans, were 
swept by a wave of euphoria or by a willing suspension of disbelief in 
their wish to grab at the hope of peace after four years of bloodshed. But 
although historians like Jean Lacouture and Alistair Horne have seen 
‘fraternisation’ as ‘authentic’ or ‘genuine’,11 in itself perhaps a testament 
to the skill of the Fifth Bureau, the events were indeed closely orches-
trated by the military. It was crucial to the whole strategy of the army 
that its role be kept secret, otherwise the objective of demonstrating 
popular ‘spontaneity’ would have imploded, and this is why the events 
continue to be wrapped in some mystery because the Fifth Bureau was 
so keen to cover its tracks. The potent myth of ‘fraternisation’ was far 
too politically important to be picked apart and discredited.12
The Fifth Bureau and the 16 May ‘fraternisation’
Although the main interest of this study is in the emancipation of 
Algerian women, it is useful to examine the all-male ‘fraternisation’ 
ceremonies of 16 May, before moving on to the symbolic unveiling on 
17–18 May, because of the light that it sheds on the organisation of the 
psychological warfare offensive. The Forum demonstration of 16 May 
did not consist, as often claimed, of Algerians spontaneously pouring 
down into the square from the neighbouring Casbah, but of a highly 
theatrical and ritualised procession of groups of medalled war veterans, 
boy scouts and girls carrying tri-coloured bouquets of fl owers, delega-
tions from different parts of the city and suburbs carrying banners and 
fl ags; and marching bands, which as they arrived were marshalled by 
loudspeaker instructions.
In a sense there was nothing new about the demonstration: colonial 
Algeria, even before the war, sustained a rich culture of public ceremoni-
als and parades, often centred on war memorials, which in part refl ected 
a pieds-noirs overcompensation, a symbolic assertion, of an insecure 
French national identity. But as an examination of the Algerian press 
reveals, with the arrival of a huge army presence that almost equalled 
the total European population, and the militarisation of civilian life, 
there was an endless round of parading, offi cial presentations of prizes, 
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speech making and martial music in every town and outpost, presided 
over by generals, colonels, their wives and Algerian bachagas. The 
army was constantly organising such events with military precision, but 
where ‘13 May’ differed was in the scale and complexity of the events 
and, given their crucial political importance, the intervention of the 
Fifth Bureau to ensure the right media and propaganda impacts.
The key personnel involved in planning the Forum events were 
Colonel Charles Lacheroy, the leading theorist of psychological warfare 
who was placed in charge of press/media affairs by the CSP on 13–14 
May; Colonel Michel Goussault, head of the Fifth Bureau for the 10th 
Military Region (Algeria) and patron of Jean Servier; Colonel Jean 
Gardes, soon to succeed Goussault as head of the Fifth Bureau; Colonel 
Roger Trinquier, parachute commander and specialist in urban counter-
insurgency; Captain Paul-Alain Léger, expert in ‘dirty tricks’ operations; 
and Captain Sirvent.13
The propaganda techniques of the Fifth Bureau will be examined 
later (chapter 4), but here it can be noted that the training programmes 
of the schools or centres of psychological warfare in Paris and Algeria, 
such as Arzew which formed over 7,000 offi cers, included methods 
for the indoctrination of crowds. The army was particularly interested 
in contemporary theories of ‘brain-washing’, crowd psychology and 
behaviourism by which conditioned refl exes could be implanted into the 
popular masses. One of the ‘bibles’ or key references here was Chakotin’s 
The Rape of the Masses (1939), by a leading Russian microbiologist and 
pupil of Pavlov, who had studied and witnessed at fi rst hand the crowd 
propaganda techniques of the Russian Revolution and Nazi Germany. 
Chakotin believed that there was a true scientifi c technique of crowd 
conditioning based on four instincts (of struggle, nutrition, sexuality 
and maternity) and that 90 per cent of the population could be infl u-
enced, not by rational data or argument, but by ‘senso-propaganda’ 
that played on the emotions through repetition. Central to Chakotin’s 
experience of Russia and Nazi Germany was the extent to which such 
manipulation of the masses was achieved by vast rallies or spectacles, 
like those at Nuremberg, in which a key role was played by marching 
uniformed men, fl ags, bands, symbols (the Swastika), slogans and ‘the 
formidable technical equipment afforded by the modern state’.14 The 
Fifth Bureau had no hesitation in adapting ‘totalitarian’ techniques, 
and at Arzew and Paris instructors taught offi cers scientifi c methods 
for organising mass rallies, including ‘son et lumière’, the diffusion of 
psychologically tested slogans on banners and placards, the types and 
duration of music (Arabic and military), mobile public address systems, 
‘by appealing not to our intelligence, but to our instincts and common 
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sense’.15 Such methods were deployed by the army not only in urban 
centres, but also in the isolated interior during mass ceremonies (rallie-
ment) when dissident populations or sections of tribes passed over to 
the French side in elaborate ceremonials of surrender. As the Villatoux’s 
note, by 1957 the Fifth Bureau saw such psychological actions, ‘as the 
miraculous solution capable of fi nally achieving the real and lasting pac-
ifi cation of the country’,16 and this explains in part the centrality of the 
Forum parades during the journées of ‘13 May’ which can be  considered 
as a form of ralliement.
How did the Fifth Bureau get Algerian men to assemble on 16 May 
for the displays of ‘fraternisation’? In part this was achieved through 
Algerian ex-servicemen’s associations, highly conservative and pro-
French organisations that were patronised by the army and provided with 
various rewards in the shape of club buildings (Dar el Askri), employ-
ment, pensions and handouts (medals, blankets, food).17 It was Auguste 
Arnould, head of the Comité d’entente des Anciens Combattants, who 
made a loudspeaker appeal on 16 May to link arms and ‘to create the 
chain of friendship’ between Europeans and Algerians.18 A second 
element in the mobilisation was provided by a highly sophisticated 
system, created by Trinquier during the ‘Battle of Algiers’, for the total 
control of the Algiers population: the city was divided up into arrondis-
sements, blocks (îlots) and individual buildings and at each level the 
army appointed European ‘ultras’ and pro-French Algerian informers to 
spy on the population and report on FLN suspects.19 The Dispositive de 
protection urbaine (DPU), which derived from Nazi and Soviet models 
of urban control,20 constituted an armed and parallel police of about 
7,500 men, and it was they who coerced unwilling Algerians to swell 
the ranks of the ‘fraternisation’ parades. Trinquier had already proved 
his ability to mobilise, via the DUP, both Algerians and Europeans in an 
impressive joint Forum demonstration on 11 November 1957, and this 
well-oiled and tested machine was put into action on 14–15 May.
Trinquier, and his close aid Léger, depended primarily on Captain 
Sirvent of the 9th Zouave Company, which was stationed at the Palais 
Klein to control the FLN fortress of the Casbah, to orchestrate the fi rst 
‘fraternisation’ demonstration. Sirvent, a pied-noir born in Algiers, 
became a teacher at a school in the Casbah at the end of the Second 
World War, and gained an intimate knowledge of ‘his’ people and Arab 
dialect.21 On 14 May General Petit, a key Gaullist conspirator who liaised 
between Paris and Algiers, called Sirvent to the General Government, 
emphasised the crucial political importance of gaining Algerian support 
for the coup and to bring de Gaulle to power, and asked if he could 
organise this through, ‘the Muslim elites, the leaders who were able to 
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pull the mass of the population into the movement’ under the banner of 
full equality and Soustelle’s old mantra of ‘integration’.22
The following day Trinquier, concerned that the ‘revolution’ was 
losing impetus23 and, meeting opposition in the Oran, Kabyle and 
Constantine regions, relayed a similar order to Léger and Sirvent to 
organise a demonstration through the DUP and specifi ed the precise 
slogans to be used on the banners.24 On the night of 15 May Sirvent 
called all the Algerian Casbah heads of street units (chefs d’îlot) to a 
meeting, some 280 men, whom he addressed in Arabic: ‘This is the big 
revolution. We are all equal, all French . . . we will provide you with 
fl ags and placards. So you will be demonstrating like and alongside the 
Europeans!’. The Algerians, hesitant and frightened that they would 
be exposed to attack by ‘ultra’ Europeans, were promised protection 
by armed Muslim militias (the bleu de chauffe) and they then elected 
to form their own Casbah Comité de Salut Public headed by Fahrès, 
an ex-FLN militant and technician of Radio-Alger, who next day was 
to make a speech at the Forum of fealty to France on behalf of the 
Casbah CSP.25 Throughout the night of 15–16 May Sirvant’s HQ was 
a hive of activity as Zouave soldiers and the wives of the îlots bosses 
sewed and painted banners and placards with the chosen slogans, ‘The 
Casbah replies: all present’ and ‘We are French, and we wish to stay 
French’.
As the march set off on the afternoon of 16 July, Sirvent ordered that 
not a single uniformed French soldier be present so as to sustain the 
necessary illusion of an authentic and spontaneous Algerian movement. 
However, not all Algerians on the demonstration were the euphoric and 
joyful participants that the army claimed and at least three observers, the 
protestant Pasteur André Trocmé, active within the international pacifi st 
movement the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Albert-Paul 
Lentin, and Léon-Etienne Duval, Archbishop of Algiers, reported inci-
dents of coercion by the armed DUP which rounded up Algerian men 
and forced them into lorries using various forms of intimidation, includ-
ing confi scation of their identity cards that would only be returned after 
the parade. Only a few hundred men gave way to such pressure and 
most of the prefabricated banners remained unused.26
Unveiling ceremonies of 17–18 May
The 16 May demonstration was undoubtedly a huge success for the Fifth 
Bureau, and made a major impact on the national and world media, but 
this ‘fraternisation’ was signifi cantly an all-male affair, as was illustrated 
by one of the army leafl ets showing a turbaned Algerian carrying a 
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 tri-colour fl ag and holding hands with a European under the slogan, ‘A 
single heart, a single fl ag: all French! In an Algérie française’.27
How exactly the Fifth Bureau then passed on to the far more novel 
and daring plan to up the stakes by extending the movement to include 
women remains unclear, but the initiative did not originate here but 
had an earlier history. The most likely candidate as initiator is Colonel 
Goussault, head of the Fifth Bureau in Algiers, who had already 
played a key role in the elaboration of female emancipation strate-
gies, including Servier’s Operation Pilot during 1957.28 Army propa-
gandists had undoubtedly initiated a media campaign on this theme, 
and in particular against the veil, as early as the summer of 1957. In 
July 1957 Radio-Alger broadcast in both Arabic and Kabyle editions 
of the programme Magazine de la femme the thoughts of a Muslim 
presenter called ‘Nadira’ in which she excoriated the veil and called 
for the emancipation of Algerian women. It seems highly likely that 
the broadcast by ‘Nadira’ to her Muslim sisters, as well as the letters 
of listeners that were read out, were scripted by psychological warfare 
offi cers, as were similar broadcasts to Algerian women after 13 May 
1958 (see chapter 4).29
2 ‘Fraternisation’ propaganda leafl et, journées of ‘13 May’ 1958 
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The Fifth Bureau was already engaged in a clandestine propaganda 
campaign against the veil in mid-1957, concurrent with Servier’s 
Operation Pilot and the fi rst working party on the revision of the Code 
of Personal Status (May–June). The campaign for unveiling began to 
peak in the weeks immediately before the 13 May coup. On 8 April 
a group of seventy-fi ve women from the Casbah sent a petition to the 
head of Radio Casbah expressing satisfaction at the broadcasts on 
emancipation within the context of an ‘Algérie Nouvelle et Française’. 
In order, they claimed, ‘that the Muslim woman becomes a modern, civi-
lised woman, it is necessary that she builds a plan for the future like the 
French woman and in order to achieve this each Muslim woman must 
remove the veil or the cachabia that smothers her, that impedes her in her 
work, or during her education, . . . and which above all else deprives her 
of her liberty and imprisons her between four walls’. The veil was not 
prescribed, they claimed, by the Koran, only by reactionary parents. The 
road to modernity and a better future was now open and, ‘alongside the 
Muslim woman Algeria will live and remain French without the veil in 
Peace and Liberty’.30 This petition, which may have been circulated by 
one of the offi cers of the Section administrative urbaine (SAU) who had 
set up women’s circles, asked that the veil be banned. General Massu, 
in forwarding this letter to General Allard and Salan’s cabinet, noted 
that surveys of public opinion had shown that young Muslim women 
‘wish to enjoy greater liberty’ and would follow the side in the war that 
fi rst led them towards, ‘a modern concept of existence. The suppression 
of the veil will mark an important step in this direction . . . It seems to 
me absolutely necessary that the order for “unveiling” should be given 
now fi rmly and unambiguously’.31 The same Casbah letter was used by 
a Muslim councillor, the cadi Mohammed Benhoura, during a speech he 
made to the Administrative Commission of the Department of Algiers 
on 7 May, as a sign of the urgent need for Algeria to follow the revo-
lutionary movement for the liberation of women sweeping through the 
Maghreb, notably in Tunisia and Morocco.32
Before looking more closely at the unveiling ceremonies it is neces-
sary to place these elaborate and propagandistic performances within 
the context of the ‘sociological’ meaning and uses of the veil in Algerian 
society, as opposed to stereotypical and Orientalist constructions. 
Historico-anthropological studies of veiling throughout the Muslim 
world demonstrates, in contrast to western Orientalist stereotypes of 
a uniform or homogeneous dress-code, a huge range of constantly 
evolving designs and practices that vary from country to country, and 
within states from one region to another, from urban to rural contexts, 
according to ethnic, cultural and class background. In general, peasant 
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or nomadic women in rural societies, particularly among the Berber 
mountain peoples, tended not to wear the haïk and face veil (hadjar) of 
urban society (on the latter see illustration 4, p. 130).
Part of the reason for this is that peasant women engaged in very 
heavy manual labour (collecting wood, transporting water) and such an 
encumbering garment was not practical. But more importantly, villages 
like those of Kabylia, constituted quasi-fortifi ed communities which 
‘foreigners’ would not enter, or only rarely under close supervision and 
surveillance by male inhabitants, and so women could move about in 
public spaces relatively freely without running the dangers of contacts 
that might bring dishonour. The physical layout of the village, of groups 
of houses, shared courtyards and lanes, was a refl ection of extended 
family and lineage structures,33 and the only males that women would 
meet, within the confi nes of the spaces they habitually moved within, 
were close relatives. All inhabitants of the village, male and female, as 
part of a community based on blood ties, understood almost intuitively 
the unwritten rules that regulated gender roles, segregation and honour: 
so for example, males would make sure that they were not near the path 
that women took each day, at certain fi xed times, to carry water from 
the fountain or spring.
Veiling, as throughout the Mediterranean world, was historically a 
feature of urban society.34 A number of factors came into play: fi rstly, 
veiling was in the town a mark of social status, a symbol of the relative 
wealth of the trader, shopkeeper or offi cial and the fact that his wife did 
not work. In contrast to the rural peasantry, very few urban women would 
engage in any kind of labour outside the fortress of the household, and 
if they did this was generally seen as an indication of extremely low and 
even immoral status. Secondly, urban public spaces almost inevitably pre-
sented far greater danger from contact with every type of stranger, males 
who were not restrained by the powerful lineage codes of the village and 
for whom, in the classic double-standard of societies of honour, seduction 
of women belonging to exogamous ‘other males’ was fair play. In general 
any woman of the lower classes who did not veil would be regarded as a 
prostitute, or run the risk of being treated as such.
The distinction between unveiled-rural and veiled-urban societies 
represents a useful, but overly simple, model, and tends to obscure 
the way in which each individual would alter or adapt her dress code 
according to the context in which she found herself. In the bigger cities 
of the northern littoral like Algiers, Oran and Bône there was signifi cant 
spatial segregation between predominantly European zones, and the 
poorer ‘ghettoised’ sectors, the old Casbah, the tenement slums and 
shantytowns or villages nègres of the Muslim population. A minority of 
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older working women and younger évoluées women who might travel 
daily on foot or bus between the Muslim quarter, where they lived 
with their families, and the European commercial centre, where they 
might work as cleaners and secretaries or attend lycée classes, would 
often wear the haïk within the home streets in which they were known 
to neighbours, and then remove it in the more anonymous space of 
the European city.35 Since the haïk was a very light and simple wrap 
around piece of cloth, women could wear under it western style cloth-
ing. However, for a far larger number of urban Algerian women who 
lived in extreme poverty the simple and cheap but elegant haïk had the 
advantage of enabling them to go into public spaces or into the centre of 
Algiers with some self-respect, and despite the fact that the clothing they 
wore underneath was often ragged and patched. Captain L. P. Fauque, 
an army expert on Muslim society, wrote:
The veil is a mark of respectability and to leave the house without it is for 
some equivalent to going out undressed and to be exposed to the wound-
ing jeers of men. Every girl who goes unveiled is considered in popular and 
traditionalist milieu as a girl of light reputation who risks not being able to 
fi nd a husband . . . This urban custom comes into play, when populations 
are brought together, in relation to strangers from outside the homogene-
ous group. Thus in the resettlement camp of Aïn-Mimoun (Kenchela) the 
women stay hidden away and only appear outside when veiled whereas 
before, in the douar, they moved about freely inside the hamlet (mechta) 
with their faces uncovered. The veil is also sometimes the only decent 
piece of attire that can conceal their thread-bare clothing’.36
In general terms the process of modernisation and urbanisation 
during the twentieth century, fuelled by the crisis in rural society which 
accelerated internal migration to the towns, increased the numbers of 
women who changed to wearing the veil. An increase in veiling was also 
a response to the conquest and penetration of Europeans into Algerian 
society, a way in which indigenous peoples could express their separa-
tion and cultural resistance from an invasive infi del (roumi) presence. 
Radical female segregation and seclusion remained a paramount value 
in post-Second World War Algeria, and even the minority of better 
educated or more progressive nationalist families found it extremely 
diffi cult to defy such conventions (see chapter 1). Any attempt by the 
military government to conduct a campaign against the veil was likely to 
arouse a hornet’s nest of opposition, not only among pro-independence 
nationalists, but also among the conservative religious authorities and 
Algerian elites that the French needed to keep on side.
Part of the answer to this apparently high-risk strategy can be found 
in the considerable historical precedents available to the Fifth Bureau 
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of unveiling campaigns. As the history of Orientalism shows, the image 
of the veil has for centuries served Christian Europe or the west as the 
crucial symbol of the ‘otherness’, the perceived archaic and barbaric 
nature, of Islamic society.37 The great advantage of the veil to European 
propagandists is that it offered such a highly visible and even dramatic 
symbol of the totality of a ‘barbaric’ and anti-modern Islamic social, 
political and cultural order, a potent signifi er or convenient short-hand 
for a wider fi eld of gendered practices, from seclusion and arranged 
marriage, to polygamy and sexual violence. In contemporary European 
society the veil has continued to serve this function, as can be seen for 
example in the case of the French headscarves controversy that has 
raged in fi ts and starts since 1989.38 The archives of both the civilian 
and military administrations in Algiers during 1957–58 show that the 
experts on Muslim affairs were fully aware of the precedents for organ-
ised or ritualised unveiling as a keystone of authoritarian modernisation 
campaigns in Turkey, Iran, Soviet Central Asia, Morocco and elsewhere 
from the 1920s onwards. Mass unveiling demonstrations had taken 
place in Egypt (1923), Uzbekistan (1927), Syria (1942), Lebanon (1944) 
and elsewhere.
Closer to home was a major debate on women and the veil in Tunisia 
during 1929–30. On 8 January 1929 the Socialist Club organised a 
meeting to discuss the status of Tunisian women during which Mrs 
Menchari dramatically removed her veil at the podium. Bourguiba, the 
future president, opposed this stance and argued that reform of Tunisian 
society was impossible as long as colonial domination remained, and 
that in the meantime the veil should continue as a defensive expression 
of national identity.39 Bourguiba’s position here was similar to that of 
the future FLN which saw the true emancipation of Algerian women less 
as an integral component of the liberation struggle than as a something 
that would be achieved by post-colonial liberation. The following year 
Al-Tahir Al-Haddad published Our Woman in the Law and in Society 
(1930), which caused outrage in conservative circles for its argument 
that emancipation was compatible with a correct reading of the Koran 
and Islamic tradition. Al-Haddad made a violent attack on the veil 
which was, he argued, not imposed by the Koran and which he likened 
to ‘the muzzle used to prevent dogs from biting’, and ‘the concrete proof 
of man’s basic belief that women are essentially immoral’.40
Psychological warfare offi cers in 1957–58 also referred frequently to 
the highly mediatised unveiling of Lalla Aïcha, the daughter of the King 
of Morocco. On 11 April 1947 the young princess made a famous speech 
from a balcony in Tangiers city square to thousands of women in which 
she aligned herself with the nationalist movement and spoke of the need 
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for women to become educated and to assume a role as full participants 
in Moroccan society as a condition of a national ‘renaissance’. According 
to one eye-witness, this was ‘the fi rst time, in the history of Islam, either 
in the East or the West, that a great woman from a great imperial family 
dared to tear off her veil in public’.41 This format of young women from 
aristocratic families unveiling and addressing crowds from public bal-
conies was to be reproduced by the army in the major towns of Algeria 
during May 1958. What drew the Fifth Bureau towards such precedents 
was that it showed how Muslim societies had themselves attempted to 
engage in internal reform and to ban the veil, a development that was fre-
quently used by army propagandists to show that emancipation was per-
fectly compatible with Islam and was not merely a dangerous ‘western’ 
agenda imposed by secular or Christian powers.
By far the closest parallel to the French reforming agenda in Algeria 
was that of the Soviet Union in Central Asia between 1919 and 1929, 
when a highly secular and revolutionary power attempted, within 
a colonial context, to use a drive for the emancipation of Muslim 
women as a means to penetrate and control Islamic-tribal societies 
that were extremely resistant to any ‘civilising mission’.42 Experts in 
the Fifth Bureau did not refer explicitly to Central Asia but, bitter anti-
 communists and anti-Marxists to a man, they were unlikely to have 
publicised any affi liation to a Soviet model. However, Islamic experts in 
the Algerian administration were very interested in the Soviet experience 
and, as has been seen (chapter 2) Soustelle’s adviser Vincent Monteil had 
made a close study of Central Asia. The most well-known aspect of the 
Soviet emancipation drive, reported widely in the international press, 
was the great processions of thousands of Muslim women in Uzbekistan 
that began in March 1927. The columns, organised by party offi cials 
and guarded by militiamen, surged through the urban centres and, 
fi red up by female orators, revolutionary songs and music, proceeded 
to the en masse burning of the veil or to the forced unveiling of richer, 
conservative women.43 It seems likely that Fifth Bureau specialists, who 
were so intrigued by totalitarian methods of crowd control, drew their 
inspiration for the highly theatrical ‘fraternisation’ parades of 17–18 
May from the Soviet Union. As Borrmans notes, the iconoclastic image 
of the burning veil was also diffused in popular culture through The Fall 
of the Veil of the celebrated singer al-Zahâwî:
Tear off your veil, O daughter of Iraq
Unveil yourself, since life demands a profound change
Tear it up; thrown it without delay into the fi re
Since for you it provides a misleading protection.44
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Elaborate unveiling rituals were organised by the army in separate 
events on the 17 and 18 of May. On the evening of the 17 May Jacques 
Soustelle, after his dramatic clandestine escape from France, appeared 
on the balcony of the General Government before the ecstatic crowds of 
the Forum. As a leading Resistance member and Gaullist, as well as an 
ex-Governor who had come to embrace the cause of Algérie française, 
he symbolised the temporary, but crucial, alliance between the extreme-
right-wing settler movements and the Gaullist plotters. The atmosphere 
of the crowd was one of huge elation at the prospect of Algeria remain-
ing French, and it was in this context that the Fifth Bureau organised, at 
short notice, a daring mise en scène of veil burning.
As darkness descended, a group of about twelve young Algerian 
women, guarded by harkis, burned their veils inside the protective iron 
gates of the General Government. The army photographer Daudu took 
nine pictures of the scene, which he called a ‘symbolic auto-da-fé’, which 
show a group of apprehensive girls aged about fourteen to sixteen being 
encouraged by two older Algerian women dressed in a European style 
and an elegant European woman, probably the wife of General Salan.45
Their identity remains unknown, but it seems likely that these young 
3 Young women at the Forum prepare to burn their veils, 17 May 1958
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women had been recruited from a lycée or typing pool, and Trocmé 
identifi ed them as ‘a bit more évoluées’. The little evidence that does 
exist on the identity of young women who played a prominent role in 
unveiling rituals supports the idea that they were from well-educated, 
relatively well-off and Francophile family backgrounds, as in the case of 
Monique Améziane at Constantine, Malika Massu at Blida (see below), 
or the lycée-educated Kebtani, later a deputy, who with other Algerian 
women removed her veil on 16 May 1958 at the behest of General 
Gandoet in the theatre of Sétif.46 Immediately after the veil burning a 
delegation from the group went to join Soustelle and Generals Salan and 
Massu on the balcony of the General Government.
Salan made use of this fi rst ‘fraternisation’ of women to persuade Paris 
that a vast movement of support for continuing French power was sweep-
ing spontaneously through the Algerian population: in a telegram to the 
Minister of Defence he claimed, ‘I stress the exceptional patriotic fervour 
of the crowds that reveals an extraordinary revolution in attitude in the 
sense of a total spiritual fusion of the two communities . . . Yesterday 
evening groups of Muslim women burned their veils of their own accord, 
saying, “Today we are French!”’. Salan went on to describe as ‘absolutely 
deceitful’ the claims of some Prefects who were hostile to the coup that 
demonstrations were being orchestrated by the army when they were evi-
dently spontaneous.47 It was of crucial political importance to the Gaullist 
plotters that metropolitan and international opinion be convinced of the 
authenticity of the popular Algerian support for Algérie française.
However, the veil burning incident of 17 May quickly became viewed 
by the army leaders and their advisers as a far too radical and provoca-
tive act which threatened to alienate Muslim opinion. General Massu 
in particular was much infl uenced by his wife who, deeply engaged in 
social work with Algerian women, had a much more informed and sensi-
tive understanding of their culture. ‘Several passionarias’, noted General 
Massu later, concealing his own involvement in the ritual, ‘several 
infl amed women burned in the Forum this symbol of their “servitude” 
. . . but they were not the most representative or thoughtful of women 
[. . .] Always this taste for the theatrical, for the scandalous, but for 
Algerian women obsessed with tradition, this gesture was shocking’.48
However, the burning incident was quickly overlaid by a massive and 
far more widely reported unveiling demonstration on Sunday 18 May. In 
a highly elaborate and theatrical event large groups of women represent-
ing and carrying banners from all the main Muslim shantytowns and 
quarters of the Algiers region, including towns as far away as Chiffalo, 
Ménerville and Castiglione (modern day Khemisti Port, Thenia and 
Bou Ismail), some thirty miles distant.49 The groups marched through 
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the dense crowds of applauding Europeans into the open space inside 
the railings of the General Government where they were welcomed by a 
military band, lined up and exhorted to remove their veils.
Outside the railings some European women, under the amazed eye 
of pieds-noirs onlookers, unveiled some of their Algerian ‘sisters’50 who 
said in Arabic, ‘It’s good, it’s good, you are right my sister, you are right, 
thank-you, thank-you’.51 Who were these women, and how were they 
organised? From the 15 May onwards the army moved rapidly to estab-
lish local CSP in every commune in the Algiers area, and the most active 
role in this creation of a ‘parallel’ revolutionary government was taken 
by the offi cers of the SAU who, in most instances, had been operating 
from the Spring of 1957 to built up contacts with the local population.52 
The SAU/CSP were in an excellent position to mobilise local women for 
the demonstration of 18 May, as can be shown by two of the most active 
groups from Ménerville and the Cité Mahiéddine. Women organised by 
ex-servicemen of the Ménerville CSP, quite possibly the wives of politi-
cal activists, had spent the morning dying three haïks red, white and 
blue, so as to form a huge tri-colour fl ag that was presented to Soustelle 
and hung from the balcony of the General Government.53
4 Arrival of women demonstrators at the Forum, 18 May 1958
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Even more prominent was the role of women from the Cité Mahiéddine, 
a dense central bidonville of 10,000 people, many of them dockers’ fami-
lies,54 where Captain de Germiny had headed the SAU since March 1957. 
De Germiny, in a report on the ‘psycho-political methods’ employed to 
rebuild contact with the population after the violent Battle of Algiers, 
noted the establishment of what was an early example of a women’s 
circle or ‘club’, in a ‘a pleasant location where young girls and young 
women from the Cité Mahiéddine can meet to look at encyclopaedias or 
journals. Also here, radio, television, and twice a week cinema shows, 
attract an ever increasing public’.55 Such an early phase of social work 
with Muslim women prepared the way for their mobilisation during the 
unveiling ceremonies of 18 May,56 and one of their number, who had 
rather unusually been selected onto the local CSP, was delegated to make 
a speech from the balcony of the General Government, a moment that 
received enormous coverage in the international press. Algerian women, 
she said through the microphones, were aware of the aid that they had 
been receiving from the army over recent months: ‘We are aware of how 
far our traditional dress, our reclusive existence, are factors that sepa-
rate us from our French sisters of a different religion to ours. We wish 
5 Banners of the women demonstrators at the Forum, 18 May 1958
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to engage fully in the route to modernity and to profi t from the exciting 
epoch which Algeria is currently traversing to accelerate our progress’.57 
Switching from French into Arabic she then called on her ‘sisters’ to 
remove their veils, ‘the barrier between two communities’, and then 
led the vast crowd of 100,000 people into singing the Marseillaise.58 
Some women followed this appeal with trepidation and lowered their 
face veils, although trying to cover their face with their hands, and were 
encouraged and applauded by the European crowds.59
The Algiers ‘fraternisation’ of 17–18 May was seen as such a huge 
success by the Fifth Bureau that it rapidly co-ordinated plans for similar 
‘revolutionary’ parades to be organised throughout towns and villages 
across Algeria, an attempt to consolidate the military coup that had met 
strong resistance from Prefects and some generals in Kabylia, Oran and 
Constantine. On 20 May the Fifth Bureau sent out an urgent telex to 
commanders of the three army corps (Algiers, Oran, Constantine):
BEFORE SUCCESS ALREADY RECORDED PARTICIPATION MUSLIM 
WOMEN IN DEMONSTRATIONS OF NATIONAL REGENERATION 
– PRIMO – SUPPORT TO MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION 
FEMALE POPULATION FROM ALL BACKGROUNDS IN ALL 
MASS DEMONSTRATIONS – STOP SECUNDO – ENCOURAGE 
PARTICIPATION OF UNVEILED MUSLIM WOMEN THROUGH 
APPLAUSE AND SIGNS OF SUPPORT – STOP. TERTIO – PREPARE 
ALL MOBILE MEDICO-SOCIAL TEAMS TO CREATE IMMEDIATELY 
WOMEN’S CIRCLES BRINGING TOGETHER EUROPEANS AND 
MUSLIMS – STOP AND END.60
The order was for the ‘spontaneous’ wave of emancipation to be 
extended throughout Algeria through organisations working at the 
local level, including the SAS, the EMSI, the newly created Committees 
of Public Safety and a secretly planned Organisation de l’action civique 
(OAC) which was to establish a ‘total’ control of population through an 
extension of Trinquier’s DUP system to all towns and villages.61
In the interior the army coercion or manipulation of crowds was even 
more evident than in Algiers, and the military placed pressure on each 
SAS during what became known as Operation Lorry to organise trucks 
that would carry a minimum of twenty people from each village to a 
local rally. This contributed to a little known crisis in the ranks of the 
SAS, who saw this use of force as counterproductive and ruining several 
months’ work, and seventy-fi ve to eighty recalcitrant offi cers were 
removed and some of them sent back to France.62 How these orders 
fi ltered down to isolated villages in the South-Oranais was recounted by 
a journalist for Elle magazine: two Muslim soldiers went in a jeep round 
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all the scattered douars with an order from the local army Captain for 
a mass meeting next day. Several hundred silent men and a thousand 
women, highly excited by rumours of the Algiers ‘fraternisation’, were 
addressed by a widow who ‘spontaneously’ seized the microphone: ‘In 
an instant, this woman electrifi ed the audience. Without a veil, she faced 
up to the crowd, and with a stentorian voice spoke of peace’. All Muslim 
women, she said, were to become like their French sisters, and some 
women then unveiled themselves accompanied by shrill ululations.63 An 
EMSI assistant, Ginette Thévenin-Copin, recounts how her company 
located in the Soummam valley received orders by radio on the eve of 18 
May to organise a convoy of villagers to a rally in Sidi-Aïch. Thévenin-
Copin and her colleagues spent the night making impromptu banners 
with white cloth and paints. Next day, ‘Muslims arrive spontaneously 
from all the surrounding douars’, and Thévenin-Copin was pleased to 
see large numbers of women of all ages present: ‘it was a revelation, 
the fi rst time since my arrival there that I saw the smiling, open faces 
of women: a moment worth waiting for that opened the door to hope, 
their optimism to see a better life one day’.64
However, the most elaborate ceremonials of unveiling, which made 
the biggest impact through the media, took place in a series of massive 
demonstrations organised by the army in the major towns from 18 
May onwards. In particular the leaders of the military coup (Soustelle, 
Salan, Massu, Allard) and other generals and dignitaries, transported 
by helicopter, engaged in a lighting tour of Orléansville, Mostaganem, 
Blida, Boufarik, Oran, Philippeville, Bône, Sétif, Constantine, Tizi-
Ouzou and Biskra between the 18 and 28 May. On each occasion an 
almost identical and theatrical mise en scène took place: groups of veiled 
women marched in mass parades through the streets alongside medalled 
Algerian ex-servicemen associations and harkis to the traditional loca-
tions of offi cial ceremonial (central squares, town halls, war memorials). 
On arrival young female delegates, dressed either in a modern European 
style or with haïks, shared the rostrum or balconies with the generals and 
dignitaries and presented them with bouquets, before making speeches 
in favour of emancipation and casting their veils to the crowds.
Two of these parades, at Constantine (26 May) and Blida (28 May), 
are particularly revealing of the military structuring of these events. 
On Monday 26 May Soustelle, Dr Sid Cara and Generals Noguez, 
Gilles and Dulac made a rapid tour of ‘fraternisation’ demonstrations 
in Biskra, Bône and Constantine. In Constantine a young woman, 
Monique Améziane, read a prepared speech from the imposing balcony 
of the theatre, the headquarters of the CSP: ‘I stand before you in a veil. 
But the defi nitive emancipation of Muslim women is on its way. Also, in 
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a symbolic gesture, I wish to open the way to our new existence so that 
fi nally we can stand equal with our sisters of every confession’.
She then ‘spontaneously’ tore off her face veil and haïk and threw it to 
the crowd below, where several women followed suit and ululated.65
Monique Améziane was an eighteen-year-old lycée student, the 
daughter of a wealthy and pro-French bachaga who in April 1955 had 
fl ed to Paris since he feared assassination by the FLN.66 In his absence the 
farm, managed by his son Mouloud, was used by the FLN as a support 
base until it was seized by parachutists on about 20 April 1958 and 
turned into what was to become the most infamous torture centre of the 
Algerian War.67 On 8 May Mouloud was arrested and tortured by the 
army at the farm. Two weeks later army offi cers, who had been unable 
to fi nd any Muslim women to lead the unveiling ceremony, came to 
fi nd Monique Améziane at her lycée: her co-operation, they said, would 
save the life of her brother and guarantee her ability to take the bac-
calaureate exams. For the demonstration on 26 May a seamstress fi tted 
Monique Améziane in Marianne style, with a blue dress and a tri-colour 
rosette, over which she wore a veil and haïk for the fi rst time in her life. 
6 Monique Améziane reading the ‘emancipation’ text from the balcony of the 
Constantine theatre, 26 May 1958
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Immediately after the demonstration she was taken to the farm to see 
her imprisoned brother who was released the following day.68 The grim 
contradictions of the emancipation policy is shown by the fact that this 
was symbolised by Monique Améziane bedecked in classic republican 
and French revolutionary style while other women of Constantine, like 
Djamila Guellal and Zéléïkha Boukadoum, were subjected to torture 
and sexual degradation on the family farm that carried her name.69
The biggest propaganda coup of the army during the Constantine 
demonstration of 26 May was, however, a speech that Sheikh Lakhdari 
made alongside Monique Améziane just before her unveiling. Abdelali 
ben Ahmed Lakhdari, a religious leader of national and international 
importance, had been educated at the Zitouna university in Tunis before 
becoming in 1949 imam of the Sidi Kittani mosque and director of the 
médersa al-Kittania of Constantine, a centre that rivalled the famous 
neighbouring Ulema institute of Ben Badis.70 French intelligence reports 
noted his ‘certain loyalty’ and he was cultivated by the government, like 
so many conservative religious leaders, through honorifi c rewards like the 
Légion d’honneur and material benefi ts, including inscription on the offi -
cial list which provided him with free funding for the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Documents seized on an FLN militant killed in Constantine on 20 August 
1955 showed that Lakhdari was condemned to death for, ‘collaboration 
with the enemy, opposition to the revolution, a fi rst class traitor and ren-
egade to his country and religion’. Twice during 1956–57 Lakhdari sought 
refuge over the border in Cairo and Libya.71 A 1959 government telegram 
noted: ‘his very considerable infl uence in Muslim milieu at national level 
and has incessantly shown favourable feelings for our cause’.72
In his speech Lakhdari praised France and the freedom of religious 
practice under its governance. In the drive for renovation in Algeria 
Muslim women had a special role: ‘Know well, O woman, that the time 
has come for you to play your role in the history of the New Algeria! 
[. . .] God has said, “Women have the same rights and obligations as 
men”’. You are not ‘a being who can be bought and sold . . . This 
imaginary and over-blown veil has nothing in common with the Muslim 
faith’.73 This speech provided a considerable boost to the army propa-
gandists: it was important to be able convince Algerians that women’s 
emancipation was not part of a political agenda imposed by an atheistic 
colonial power, but was supported by Algerian religious leaders and 
compatible with the Koran. The journalist André Seguin recognised the 
importance of the speech by, ‘one of the highest placed religious authori-
ties in North Africa and the Muslim world’,74 and in following years 
Lakhdari’s speech was to be constantly quoted in emancipation propa-
ganda, on the radio and in government tracts.75 In late 1958 the imam 
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was also consulted by the government, along with other infl uential 
religious leaders, on the crucial reform of women’s legal status (statut 
personnel) (chapter 8).
The second provincial ‘fraternisation’ rally of particular interest was 
that at Blida, to the south of Algiers, on 28 May when Generals Massu 
and Desjours took the podium before 30,000 demonstrators. During the 
usual orchestrated events, which included a fl y-past of jets in a cross of 
Lorraine formation, a tiny fi fteen-year-old girl called Malika ‘spontane-
ously’ forced an entry onto the stage and read to the microphone: ‘I, I 
love the French . . . We are all united behind the Army and have sworn 
to fi ght to the end for Algeria and France to live together’.76 Malika 
came from a relatively privileged and deeply pro-French family: she 
had received an education up to the school leaving certifi cate (CEP), 
her father was a foreman on a colon farm, and four of her brothers 
were serving in the French army, including two in parachute regiments. 
The Massus adopted Malika, an act that established a trend among 
other senior offi cers, and served as a symbol, the General claimed, for 
the principle of integration declared in the Forum during ‘13 May’.77 
Malika also played a part in the emancipation movement as a speaker 
for the Mouvement de solidarité féminine (MSF).78 By ‘integration’ it 
would appear, however, that General and Madame Massu meant assimi-
lation since they raised Malika as a Catholic rather than as a Muslim,79 
and as will be seen later emancipation did indeed involve the attempted 
social and cultural transformation of Algerians into Europeans.
How the FLN and the Algerian population, and in particular women, 
responded to the overall army emancipation campaign will be treated in 
chapters 9 and 10, but here I look at the more specifi c reactions to the 
‘13 May’ unveiling parades. There is some evidence from intelligence 
reports that the FLN leadership was disconcerted by the ‘fraternisa-
tion’ demonstrations,80 which threatened to win over many Algerians, 
to impact on international opinion, and to bring de Gaulle, a formida-
ble opponent, onto the side of the conspirators. The FLN newspaper 
El Moudjahid, in an article ‘Operation “Fraternisation”’ of 29 May, 
noted that although de Gaulle claimed to be impressed, the parades 
constituted a pure ‘mise en scène’ ‘orchestrated with science and cyni-
cism by a leading specialist in psychological action’, Colonel Lacheroy. 
On the 18 May it was the SAU that had forced women to come to the 
Forum: not the hundreds announced by the press, but ‘in fact twenty 
veiled women who were forced to attend by the military or their stupid 
war veteran husbands who obey orders. And there they timidly half-
opened their veils, while here and there one could see several cleaning 
ladies fi rmly fl anked by their European employers or by “patriotic” 
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social assistants’.81 El Moudjahid had a limited, clandestine circulation, 
so more important to FLN counter-propaganda were broadcasts from 
Morocco (La Voix de l’Algérie libre) and from Tunisia (La Voix de 
l’Algérie soeur) that detailed how demonstrators in Constantine, Bône, 
Algiers, Oran and elsewhere had been coerced and rounded up into 
army vehicles.82
What was the social, political and class background of the women on 
the unveiling demonstrations and how numerous were they? In general 
two categories of women can be distinguished: fi rstly relatively poor and 
illiterate women from the bidonvilles and slum enclaves of the city, who 
were most readily manipulated by the SAU and women’s circles and who 
provided the main mass of the contingents that marched in procession 
into the Forum and other town centres. Secondly, the much smaller con-
tingent of more educated, younger evoluées who can be categorised as 
radical modernisers or militants who provided the leadership for the fi rst 
group and made the key speeches. El Moudjahid pointed mainly to the 
presence of the fi rst group, domestic servants (fatmas), or cleaning ladies 
of the General Government and prostitutes.83 The widespread claim of a 
deliberate recruitment of prostitutes probably refl ects more a propaganda 
bias than any reality,84 but some undoubtedly were domestic servants, of 
whom there were from 12 to 20,000 in the city, by far the largest category 
of employment for Algerian women in Algiers (70 to 80 per cent).85 The 
dominant Algerian ideology was that women should not enter the labour 
market, but remain within the home raising children, a keen point of 
male honour since employment threatened to breach domestic seclusion, 
and those women who did have to work from necessity because they 
were single, repudiated or widows, what Willy Jansen calls aptly ‘women 
without men’, constituted a ‘dangerous’ or liminal category since they 
threatened to escape from male control of their sexuality.86
The most interesting and richest source of information on the mental 
universe of these poor, single women is provided by Caroline Brac de la 
Perrière’s oral history project based on interviews with domestic serv-
ants. Firstly, it is interesting to note that fi ve of the twenty women in 
the case study did not normally wear the veil at all, mainly because as 
single women they enjoyed a degree of independence and escaped the 
pressure of husbands or the wider kin group to conform. For example, 
Mme F., who was separated from her husband at this time and described 
herself laughingly in an interview as ‘free’ did not wear the veil, includ-
ing when she went with friends to see the events in the Forum, although 
she did wear it later when she returned to live with her husband, ‘to 
avoid trouble’.87 The most common practice, as for the great majority 
of Algerian women in the city, was for the domestics to wear the veil in 
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public spaces as they travelled from their homes in the bidonvilles to 
their place of work, where once indoors it was immediately removed.88 
Many Algerians, once they had crossed from ‘Arab’ zones into the 
highly segregated streets of the European quarters of the city, either the 
commercial centre or the bourgeois residential areas of the ‘heights’, 
would remove the haïk and stow it away in their handbag.89
What was perceived by Fanon and the fi lm-maker Gillo Pontecorvo 
as a revolutionary innovation of women in the Battle of Algiers, the 
‘cross-dressing’ into a European style so as to pass weapons through 
the parachutist check-points, was the extension of a current practice of 
Muslim women in the urban environment. Malika Ighilhariz, a courier, 
describes how the FLN provided her with a big American car:
I was to be seen getting out of the car, dressed like a French woman; I went 
into a building where I put on my veil and small face veil, then came out 
veiled and went down to the Casbah. I deposited what I had to hand over 
and picked up whatever had to be taken out from the Casbah, messages, 
weapons. And played the same game in reverse. In the corridor of a build-
ing I removed the veil, retouched my lipstick, put on my glasses, I came 
out and got back into my fi ne car.90
In the European areas the women were protected by a certain anonymity, 
and could escape the attention of neighbours and kin or were protected 
from the verbal condemnation and physical violence of other Algerians 
and might even ‘pass’ as Europeans: as A. N., who lived in as a servant, 
noted, ‘I did not wear the veil, no problem. Besides, I did not live in an 
Arab quarter so I had no problem at all’. In only one instance, that of 
Mme K. Z., is there evidence of a domestic coming under pressure from 
her employer to attend the Forum events, notably during de Gaulle’s visit 
on 4 June, but she detested the General for killing 40,000 Algerians at 
Sétif and only pretended that she had been to the rally. Some Algerian 
women who participated in the unveiling campaign, noted K. Z., were 
said to have been bribed with semolina.91 On one occasion she had passed 
weapons for the FLN hidden under her veil and on another occasion she 
was in a house raided by the army when she exacted a mocking revenge: 
a female agent was brought in to search all the women, ‘I said: “Yes”. 
I removed the veil, the scarf, I was going to take everything off. “Stop, 
stop”. I said, “no, no, I’m getting undressed”. “Stop, stop”. Everyone 
laughed’. K. Z. illustrates an awareness of the complex, instrumental 
and ludic uses of the veil and expressed her resistance to the army unveil-
ing campaign by pushing the act to an absurd level of total nudity.92
Such evidence provides a small but valuable window into the complex 
universe and dress codes of Algerian women for whom the veil could 
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assume a whole range of styles, of meanings, of bodily expression and 
symbolism. As David Macey notes, the haïk is subject to modifi cation: 
it can be made of cotton, silk or artifi cial fi bre; be held around the body 
or face in different ways; and ‘her sisters recognize an individual by 
the way she holds herself and wears her haïk; Algerian men learn to do 
the same’.93 All the French press, radio and offi cial accounts refer to 
‘unveiling’ as if it involved a single and uniform act, the discarding of 
one, often indeterminate, item of clothing. However, Algerian women 
wore both a small, triangular face-covering (hadjar) held in place by 
elastic, and the lose haïk wrapped round the body and over the head, 
and the many hundreds of press photographs taken during the ‘frat-
ernisation’ ceremonies show those who paraded into the Forum and 
squares engaged in a variety of highly expressive acts: some slipped the 
haïk round their shoulders, but retained the face veil, some removed the 
veil, but clutched the haïk or put their hands in front so as to conceal 
their face, others lowered both veil and haïk to shoulder level, while a 
very small number removed the haïk entirely. But the great majority of 
the veiled women who paraded into the Forum and elsewhere did not 
engage in any uncovering whatsoever, including most of the women 
delegates from Mahiéddine that appeared on the balcony of the General 
Government alongside Soustelle on 18 May.94 Frequently the Algerian 
press was so keen to record the success of the campaign that some 
photographs of massed ranks of marching or assembled women, all of 
them entirely covered up, carried captions in total contradiction with 
the visual evidence: ‘they were all unveiled’ or the reader was reas-
sured, ‘note that later these demonstrators all unveiled themselves’.95 
Observers also noted that of the women who did, under the pressure of 
the moment, lower their veil or haïk, many were seen to replace them 
as soon after the event as possible. In general, the unveiling ceremoni-
als, contrary to the impression given by the media, did not initiate a 
 dramatic and lasting transformation of veiling practices.
If Algerian women were reluctant to unveil, this has been usually 
ascribed to religio-cultural factors and the psychological shock of expo-
sure that was subjectively experienced as a form of gross nudity. As the 
psychiatrist Fanon noted, ‘The veil protects, reassures, isolates . . . The 
unveiled body seems to escape control, to fall to pieces. The feeling of 
being badly dressed, even of being naked . . . A horrifying sensation 
of disintegration’.96 But for many women this was more than a state 
of mind since they really were ‘badly dressed’. The haïk, a kind of cheap 
uniform, enabled destitute women to move in public with some degree 
of self-confi dence when their undergarments were worn, patched and, 
by European standards, even indecent. At the mass unveiling of 18 May 
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in the Forum women shouted, ‘Give us clothes so that we can dress like 
our European sisters!’ and the next day the radio appealed to European 
women to take their second-hand clothing to local police stations for 
Muslim women who wanted to abandon their traditional costume.97
A far more immediate and dangerous political reality also underlay 
this reticence. Low-status women who moved about unveiled in public 
spaces were morally suspect and generally equated with prostitutes, but 
such condemnation was massively reinforced during the course of the 
war since wearing European dress was associated with anti-national reli-
gious apostasy and, even more dangerously, as a sign of working directly 
with Europeans.98 The policy of the FLN nationalists was to drive a 
wedge between the European and Algerian communities through strike 
actions, boycotts (alcohol, tobacco), destruction of schools and creation 
of a parallel ‘state’ structure or OPA (FLN law courts and justice, social 
services) so as to block any attempt by French reformist programmes to 
build links, and retain infl uence over, the population. For any Muslim 
woman to be seen anywhere near to, or associated with, Europeans, the 
army or government institutions, was to run the risk of being regarded 
as a potential collaborator and spy. Mme F., a domestic, was forced to 
travel to work in an army lorry, ‘I did not like this since I was afraid 
that the others on seeing me with them would think that I was passing 
on information’, and when her son was rushed to a military hospital 
this was ‘annoying because they could think I was an informer’.99 Mme 
B., a Europeanised Kabyle Protestant who did not wear the veil, was 
treated at work by others with derision as an apostate (‘m’tournia’), 
‘They criticized me a lot because I went out without a veil’. This became 
particularly threatening when she travelled from the European into the 
Algerian urban zones: ‘I went down with a neighbour into the Arab 
quarter, we went together because of my European looks [for protec-
tion]. I suffered because they thought I was Spanish; they spoke in 
Arabic, I replied in French. There were some who asked why then did 
I speak Kabyle’.100 In the street passers by said to Mme F., who did not 
wear the haïk, ‘Why have you removed your veil? Are you becoming 
French?’.101 This could potentially become very dangerous and as the 
spiral of violence deepened after 1954 Algerian women were frequently 
accosted and badly assaulted on their way to or from their European 
workplace. The FLN ordered women to stop working for Europeans, 
although the ALN commander Azzedine stated that offi cially they were 
tolerant of the poor who were reliant on this income and even recruited 
some domestics as informers on European activities.102
In general very poor and needy women who worked for Europeans 
were left undisturbed by the FLN, but it was quite a different matter 
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for such a strata to join the mass of the haïk-clad ranks that paraded 
through town centres. A report of the French secret service (SDECE) 
noted that the heads of Wilaya V (Oran region) had sent out an order 
banning any participation in ‘fraternisation’ parades and to oppose the 
‘“pseudo evolution of the Muslim women” and to forbid in the name of 
religion participation in all demonstrations . . . According to the FLN 
the Muslim women who had participated in demonstrations with their 
faces uncovered, had been forcibly unveiled by French soldiers’. Three 
hundred grenades were to be sent into the urban centres to increase com-
mando attacks.103 Captain Bernhardt, the head of the SAU of Belcourt 
and a keen advocate of psychological action, in a detailed report on the 
events of May, noted that eighty lorries and seven cars had been used by 
the SAU to transport ex-servicemen and 300 women to the Forum on 
18 May, while another 500 women had attended the demonstration to 
greet de Gaulle on 4 June. He was enthusiastic about the joyful atmos-
phere and dancing among the women at these events, ‘despite the threats 
and insults that several young trouble-makers showered on the women’, 
mainly unemployed and turbulent youths aged eighteen to twenty-fi ve. 
Attempts had been made to combat this through the formation of two 
auto-defence groups who were currently helping the SAU to ‘purge the 
quarter’. Most women, claimed Bernhardt with the usual exaggerated 
optimism of army reports, wished for ‘progress but the male reaction is 
violent and paralyses their desire for change by threats of divorce, some 
instances of which have already been put into effect’.104 The sense of 
this is ambiguous, but would seem to point to husbands who were angry 
because the protesting women had drawn down the ire of the national-
ist community and threatened their own honour and position as males 
that were expected to keep ‘their females in order’. Overall, it can be 
seen that for lower-class women to participate in army demonstrations 
was a quite risky thing to do and, although the FLN would not seek to 
assassinate them (it recognised that these illiterate women were victims 
of coercion), most women would seek to avoid involvement or, in the 
last resort, to cling to their veils and to conceal their identity.
Finally, turning to the second but much smaller category of more 
proactive and radical modernisers, it can be seen that they were in a far 
more vulnerable position because of their higher level of visibility, more 
prominent leadership and unambiguous political embrace of the French 
cause. The so-called évoluées constituted an elite strata, characteristi-
cally young women aged from about sixteen to thirty, well-educated by 
Algerian standards and from relatively well-off families, who could fall 
into two opposing camps according to differing circumstances: militant 
idealists who supported either the struggle for national independence 
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or its radical opposite, assimilation into western culture. Teenage girls 
who ended up on opposite sides often began by sharing a similar French 
culture and wish for progress towards a future modern society in which 
women would enjoy equality and cast aside the most conservative fea-
tures of Muslim patriarchal oppression (see chapter 1 on young UDMA 
militants). The origins of this divide can be found in differing family 
backgrounds: on the one hand were young women from well-off fami-
lies whose interests were wedded to those of the French because they 
benefi ted in various ways from rewards or employment by the colonial 
state (functionaries in the central and local government, secondary and 
higher level teachers, employees of large companies, etc.), and on the 
other, the families of small shop keepers and businessmen who sustained 
a ‘traditional’ Arab cultural nationalism and had little economic stake 
in the colonial regime. For the pro-French radical liberation of women 
would be achieved through integration, a total embrace of republican 
secularism and western civilisation, while for the nationalists this goal 
would be achieved through revolutionary liberation from colonialism 
and a newly independent order.
This division manifested itself during the unveiling campaign of 
May 1958. As has been seen, Monique Améziane, the daughter of a 
wealthy pro-French bachaga, got caught in the cross-fi re: on returning 
to her lycée after her notable unveiling and speech from the balcony 
of the Constantine Theatre, she was praised by French pupils, ‘but the 
young Muslim girls tore her Gaffi ot dictionary’. Her father wrote in a 
panic to criticise his wife for allowing this to happen: ‘You have signed 
the death warrant of my daughter’, but she was saved from possible 
assassination because local people knew that she had been coerced.105 
Monique Améziane was more of an exception, since the army found 
many other young évoluées, mostly coming from wealthy families that 
were protected by their location within the bourgeois European areas 
of the city, or the largely European-dominated sectors of local govern-
ment and business, who were prepared to engage with a fl amboyant and 
‘revolutionary’ zeal in attacking the perceived medieval symbols of reli-
gious oppression. A journalist described a characteristic manifestation 
of the radical modernisers during the ‘fraternisation’ parade at Boufarik 
on 19 May, ‘Young girls dressed in European style took the tribunal 
by assault and came to shake Soustelle’s hand!’.106 These évoluées, 
noted Fanon, along with the ex-servicemen, ‘are the shock troops 
instructed to destroy the cultural resistance of a colonised land’.107 The 
photographs taken during the burning of veils on the night of 17 May, 
perhaps the most provocative iconoclastic act, show the leadership role 
of two slightly older Algerian women, distinguished by their more chic 
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European dress, encouraging the girls to throw haïks onto the fl ames 
(see illustration 3, p. 128). Behind the group in the shadows is a heavily 
armed harki guard.
An older and less headstrong group of évoluées was symbolised by 
the three Algerian women who were elected as deputies to the national 
assembly in November 1958, Nafi ssa Sid Cara, Rebiha Kebtani and 
Khedira Bouabsa: a proclamation issued by Wilaya II in 1959 warned 
against these unveiled women, ‘and similar traitors to religion and the 
father-land’, depraved beings who haunted dance halls and cabarets, and 
asked that names of such collaborators be handed to FLN militants.108 
The radical supporters of France were potentially far more at risk from 
the FLN than the illiterate women who took part anonymously in the 
parades: the wish for revenge ran high, and when the ALN army fi nally 
occupied Algiers at independence in July–August 1962 the soldiers, in a 
climate redolent of the 1944 Liberation when women accused of collab-
orationism or sleeping with Germans were subjected to public humilia-
tion, engaged in a hunt for unveiled women, the ‘girls of 13 May’, and 
‘girls of the paras’.109
In an opposite camp to the pro-French activists were the young 
nationalist évoluées who responded to the unveiling campaign by 
leaping to the defence of Muslim dress codes and cultural-religious 
identity that needed to be saved from the depredations of western secu-
larism. During the baccalaureate exams in June 1958 female students 
wore the veil, something never seen before and in defi ance of an offi cial 
ban.110 The FLN claimed that more Algerian women were now wearing 
the veil in the street as a symbol of patriotism,111 but such an instru-
mentalisation of the veil could, in this instance, only have applied to 
the very small number of urban women who had previously not worn 
the haïk. The inverse relationship is provided by Monique Améziane, 
forced by the army to wear a haïk for the fi rst time, so that she could 
participate in an orchestrated unveiling. Fanon pointed to such forms 
of symbolic resistance in relation to the Moroccan nationalist move-
ment in which women began to wear black instead of traditional white 
veils, but he seems to have had an inkling that such a defensive cultural 
agenda in Algeria might reinforce conservative social and cultural 
practices112 and impede the revolutionary transformation of gender 
roles that he hoped to see develop under the impact of the struggle for 
independence, a foreboding that proved tragically correct (see chapters 
10 and 11).
In conclusion, how far were the army-led unveiling parades of May 
1958 a success? Despite the evident orchestration, there appear to have 
been many high-level offi cers and politicians who were bowled over 
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by the events and referred to them in an emotionally charged and even 
quasi-religious language as a ‘miracle’ or ‘resurrection’. Fanon refers to 
Europeans who were ‘overexcited’ and evoked a psychology of ‘conver-
sion’ to explain the climate of euphoria.113 This derived in part from the 
feeling of relief that four years of war would end in both reconciliation 
and preservation of Algérie française, as well as from the neo-fascist 
and fundamentalist (intégriste) Catholic convictions of the plotters 
that the French nation had been rescued from the moral and politi-
cal decadence of the Fourth Republic. Commander Cogniet, an expert 
on psychological warfare, wrote, ‘it is Christ who is coming and who 
demands this liberty, demands this equality, who calls to the Roman 
citizens that . . . men are brothers, and it is this that the revolutionaries 
call Fraternity’.114
But the most crucial political impact of all was that ‘fraternisation’ 
should serve to persuade de Gaulle to ‘offer his services’ as saviour at 
the moment when the plotters were very much at risk of failure and 
being arrested by the Pfl imlin government. De Gaulle did not wish to be 
associated with a military coup that would damage his democratic cre-
dentials, whereas a huge, populist appeal by both settlers and Algerians 
could provide the needed legitimacy for an extra-parliamentary seizure 
of power. The General had little time for the theory of psychological 
warfare or ‘integration’,115 and he frequently asked trusted army offi c-
ers whether ‘fraternisation’ was indeed spontaneous and genuine. They 
assured him that it was, and this was enough to persuade the General to 
come on board: during his famous speech in the Algiers Forum on 4 June 
he said, ‘I know what has happened here . . . I can see that the route you 
have opened in Algeria is that of renewal and fraternity’.116 De Gaulle, 
desperate to end his years in the political wilderness, was opportunely 
affected by a willing suspension of disbelief, but once ensconced in power 
he wished to break away from the hold of the army and so reopened the 
question in his entourage on 28 June: ‘It is advisable to verify if these 
demonstrations, moving as they were, really correspond with the deeper 
feelings of the Muslim masses’.117 But for the army command in Algeria 
and for Colonels Lacheroy, Goussault and Trinquier, the ideologues of 
the Fifth Bureau, there was no stepping back and the journées of 13 May 
immediately gave a massive impetus to a ‘reconquest’ of the Muslim 
population as signalled by a directive sent by Salan to all civil and mili-
tary authorities throughout Algeria on 2 June.118 Central to this was the 
emancipation of Algerian women and the next chapters investigate three 
aspects of this ‘strategy of contact’, the role of propaganda and the mass 
media, of the urban-based MSF, and of the EMSI teams in the rural 
outback (bled).
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4
The propaganda offensive and the 
strategy of contact
The French army faced a major problem in its campaign of emancipa-
tion, how to reach out to the mass of over four million women, 98 per 
cent of whom were illiterate and scattered over the surface of a huge ter-
ritory in villages or secluded settlements that were hours away by foot 
or donkey from the nearest roads. As we have seen (chapter 2) during 
1957 Operation Pilot tested integrated methods of psychological action 
in the bled under the direction of itinerant propaganda offi cers, utilising 
tracts, slogans, loud-speaker lorries, mobile cinemas and other means of 
communication. This, and two further chapters, examine in more detail 
three key dimensions of the accelerating attempts at bridge-building, a 
‘strategy of contact’: fi rstly, this chapter looks at the role of mass media 
communication (print, fi lm and radio) which was developed centrally 
by the government and military to reach women across the entire geo-
graphical space of Algeria. This is followed by chapter 5 on the role of 
the MSF, local associations that operated mainly in the big cities and the 
smaller, European-dominated provincial towns; and chapter 7 on the 
mobile welfare teams (EMSI), which provided the main form of contact 
in the rural interior. This does not exhaust all of the multifarious ways in 
which the French attempted to transmit their ideas to the female popula-
tion, but provides a fairly comprehensive picture of the overall strate-
gies deployed by the colonial power.1 Three questions can be asked of 
this propaganda offensive: what techniques or methods were deployed 
to maximise communication? What does the content tell us about the 
ideological message and the underlying model of emancipation that 
was diffused? And, lastly, did the propaganda have any lasting effect on 
Algerian women?
By the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954 the French military had 
a long established theory and practice of propaganda as a necessary 
component of modern warfare. The First World War (1914–18) and 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 had ushered in the age of ‘total war’ 
and the standard military perception that the outcome of international 
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confl ict rested as much on the civilian populations that sustained war 
economies (now subject to direct attack, bombing and demoralising 
propaganda), as on the strength of regular armies. The growth of new 
forms of mass media, particularly fi lm and radio, greatly increased the 
ability of states to develop powerful forms of propaganda that aimed 
covertly to alter or manipulate mass attitudes, frequently through non-
rational processes (use of symbols, manipulation of emotions and preju-
dice).2 The French state, like most western powers, had since the First 
World War established its own specialised organisations, mainly within 
the Ministry of Defence, to study, research and test methods of psycho-
logical warfare.3 The French army, in its bid to counter the FLN and to 
win the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the indigenous population, 
was thus able to draw upon a well-established ‘science’ of communi-
cation theory. The adaptation of psychological warfare to the specifi c 
conditions of the Algerian theatre, in which the Fifth Bureau (1957–60) 
played a dominant role, drew upon or merged two major contemporary 
currents of thinking. On the one hand there existed a sophisticated body 
of academic communication research, pioneered and fi nanced by the US 
military after 1945, a fi eld of psychological warfare that was linked to 
a multitude of social science programmes in social psychology, psephol-
ogy, advertising, journalism, market research, behaviourism, radio and 
television studies and other related disciplines.4 Such research was of 
considerable interest to the Fifth Bureau since it held out the promise 
of refi ning techniques that would shape the attitudes of target groups 
(in this instance women) by identifying their social characteristics, and 
testing and refi ning various propaganda techniques through effects 
research, opinion surveys, questionnaires and statistical analysis.
The second infl uence sprang from the context of the Cold War. 
During the early 1950s the Korean War had given rise to a ‘brain-wash-
ing’ panic in the west that ‘Oriental’ communism had found the means 
to assert a total control over the human mind using Pavlovian tech-
niques.5 Many French offi cers of the Fifth Bureau in Algeria had passed 
through the Vietcong retraining camps in 1954 and were impressed by 
such methods of psychological indoctrination.6 The 1950s was an era in 
which behaviourist theories, which would today be viewed as crude or 
overly simplistic, held wide currency, and this translated into an accept-
ance among many propaganda specialists that it was certainly possible, 
using correct scientifi c techniques, to imprint upon, or transform, the 
mind-set of Algerian people so as to achieve a compliant psychology.7
The organisation of psychological warfare went through various 
complex changes in the course of the confl ict, but the most important 
phase (with which this study is mainly concerned) corresponded with 
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the period of domination by the powerful Fifth Bureau between its 
inception in early 1957 and its disbandment in February 1960. The 
Bureau consisted of a central body in the État-Major (HQ) of the 10th 
Army (10th Région Militaire) in Algiers, under the dual guidance of 
Colonel Lacheroy and Goussault, and later of Colonel Gardes, and 
which had three operational sections: Études, which studied doctrine 
and the key themes, aims and objectives, to be transmitted via action 
plans to the various army units; Action, which was concerned with 
media production, information and the methods of transmission (press, 
radio, fi lm); and Relations nationales, which liaised with the national 
and international media.8 In August 1957 the Minister of the Interior, 
Bourgès-Maunory, a keen advocate of psychological warfare, ordered 
that Fifth Bureau offi cers be attached to each of the three Army corps 
(Oran, Algiers, Constantine), and within the corps down as far as the 
battalion or sector level.9 The tentacular Fifth Bureau came to consti-
tute an extremely infl uential and quasi-autonomous ‘parallel hierarchy’ 
manned by the equivalent of Soviet political commissars, doctrinaire 
exponents of revolutionary warfare who infi ltrated into every level of 
the armed forces.
While the governments in Paris and Algiers made the key decisions as 
to which propaganda campaigns were to be launched, in line with major 
political initiatives, the Fifth Bureau HQ undertook to research, develop 
and produce fi lms, photographs, radio broadcasts, press releases and 
other media material, or to issue directives to the offi cers attached to 
the different levels of command on the style and manner of propaganda 
to be implemented at local level. To give just one example, the Fifth 
Bureau, infl uenced by behaviourist theory on conditioned refl exes and 
psychological imprinting, ascribed a particular importance to repeti-
tive slogans which it tested on Algerians, since, it was claimed, ‘the 
Muslim has different reactions from that of the European’, according to 
age, background and other criteria. The key slogans were then relayed 
throughout the Fifth Bureau network to be used in leafl ets, posters, 
banners and painted on road-side walls.10 Such psychological testing of 
propaganda even extended to culture-specifi c theories of colour symbol-
ism: for example, it was believed that Islamic tradition associated green 
with positive attributes (peace, happiness), while yellow was rather dis-
liked, and the voting ballots for the referendum of September 1958 were 
printed white for a ‘Yes’ to de Gaulle, and violet, ‘the colour of death’, 
for a ‘No’.11
However, it would be a mistake to accept the claims to ‘scientifi c’ 
methodology and professionalism at face value. There is much evidence 
to show that the senior ‘experts’ of the Fifth Bureau, all males and with 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   154 21/7/09   12:16:19
 The propaganda offensive and the strategy of contact 155
long careers as army offi cers, held extremely doctrinaire opinions about 
revolutionary warfare, ‘Orientalist’ and male Eurocentric views of 
Algerian women, and had, in many instances, a shallow and quite ama-
teurish knowledge of propaganda theory and research. For example, 
the major school of psychological warfare at Arzew, which between 
October 1957 and September 1959 trained 7,172 offi cers, was directed 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Bruges, and later by Colonel de Maison Rouge, 
neither of whom had any expertise in psychological warfare and had to 
undertake a crash-course reading of Jung, Mao Tse-tung, Marx, Lenin, 
Chakotin and other ‘classics’.12 Servier was highly scathing of the work 
of Bureau offi cers in the fi eld which he likened to ‘a mediocre publicity 
campaign mounted by amateurs full of good intentions’, and few of the 
specialists that ran the Fifth Bureau could even speak Arabic or Berber 
and had to depend on interpreters.13
The task of developing forms of communication that could reach all 
Algerian women presented a formidable challenge. The 1954 census 
counted a total of 4,880,800 females, of which 83.65 per cent lived 
in rural areas, in most instances scattered over a huge landmass and 
located in isolated douars that were without electricity and road links. 
Yet it was particularly important to the army propaganda offensive 
that it reach into the bled since this contained not only the majority of 
women, but also the terrain in which the guerrilla forces of the ALN 
had their major support base. The overall level of female illiteracy was 
98 per cent, and while attempts were made in the 1950s to rapidly 
expand basic education for girls, in 1954 only 10.7 per cent received 
any form of primary schooling. This meant that the army was faced 
with the problem of how to infl uence or persuade a female population 
that had an extremely low level of political education, no understanding 
of abstract western concepts (such as the meaning of ‘democracy’), and 
were unable to read newspapers, posters and leafl ets. Algerian women 
lived in an intensely oral and visual culture in which the main sources 
of daily information about the outside world derived primarily from the 
spoken word and rumour.
During 1960–61 the French government carried out a sophisticated 
survey, based on statistical analysis of a questionnaire, in an attempt to 
gauge the different channels through which Algerian women received 
political information, so that the army could more effectively use those 
methods of communication likely to reach the ‘target’ audience. The 
study, which was carried out by the Laboratoire des sciences humaines 
appliquées (LSHA) based in Algiers, although completed late in the 
war, provides an insight into mass media communication and Muslim 
women. The LSHA was established under the control of the Comité 
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d’action scientifi que de défense nationale (CASD) in Paris following an 
exploratory meeting of leading academics at the General Government in 
March 1960 under the chairmanship of General Guérin.14 Guérin noted 
that a key objective of the initiative was to ‘better inform the popula-
tion of the bled’, and the LSHA that undertook this task, which was 
created in October 1960, employed a small staff of trained academic 
psychologists. Among various projects carried out into the ‘penetration 
and effectiveness of information in the Muslim milieu’ was a survey of 
Algerian women that was to be based on 1,500 questionnaires carried 
out by fi fty EMSI interviewers across Algeria and which were synthe-
sised in August 1961 in a report, Étude sur l’information en milieu 
musulmane féminine.15
The report indicated a number of methodological weaknesses in the 
collection of the data and its analysis that was indicative of the problems 
of ‘psychological profi ling’ of the female population. Firstly, the LSHA 
was dependent on the assistance of fi fty EMSI teams to provide thirty 
questionnaire returns each, but the welfare assistants were not neces-
sarily very well equipped to carry out this task and only 1,016 forms, 
rather than the 1,500 questionnaires planned, were actually returned. 
Of these 198 could not be utilised, leaving 818 forms. But the statistical 
analysis for these 818 women aged fi fteen to eighty-fi ve years revealed 
a very high percentage of blanks or ‘non-returns’ (NR) in relation to 
specifi c questions: for example in reply to the question, ‘Do you read the 
newspaper or have it read to you?’, about a half (46.3 per cent) made 
no reply. The director, Lacavalerie, was much exercised by this problem, 
since the statistics could be greatly falsifi ed, and initially he tried to sepa-
rate out, but without success, those women who did not reply since they 
were ignorant, from those who refused because they were suspicious 
or hostile towards the French. The EMSI were asked to make a note as 
to whether they thought each woman was favourable towards France, 
indifferent, distrustful or hostile, and some 30 per cent were placed in 
the last two categories of ‘distrustful’ or ‘hostile’.16 That about a third 
of women were negative or hostile towards the exercise is high, if we 
keep in mind that those questioned would have almost certainly been 
those in the ‘pacifi ed’ zones who were best known to the EMSI and had 
volunteered to attend the women’s circles regularly.
As will be seen later (chapter 6) there is a mass of evidence, from 
army reports and autobiographical accounts, of the extent to which 
enquiries by the French were met by an almost impenetrable wall of 
silence that became known as attentisme. For the Algerian population 
in general, the best form of self-defence when threatened from both 
sides, by the army and the FLN, was not to disclose one’s personal 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   156 21/7/09   12:16:19
 The propaganda offensive and the strategy of contact 157
position. But in addition, the silence of women was reinforced by deeply 
entrenched cultural values: it was held reprehensible for them to speak 
at all in the presence of strangers or males, and certainly not on ‘politi-
cal’ issues that were a male preserve. Reticence was not necessarily only 
an expression of a colonial power relationship, of women who were ter-
rifi ed by the questions posed by an occupying force that often deployed 
extreme force or repressive violence: Hélène Vandevelde-Daillière, in 
a very similar opinion poll carried out in post-independence Algeria a 
decade later, found it very diffi cult to gain access to women, and when 
she did so was met with a high level of non-replies and of resistance.17 
A third of rural women (30 per cent), Vandevelde-Daillière found, 
thought politics was not the business of women, and another 26 per 
cent that politics ‘served no purpose’; only 11 per cent ever discussed 
politics with somebody they knew, 39 per cent never did so, while 50 
per cent refused or failed to answer the question.18 The extraordinary 
diffi culty faced by the French army in trying to assess the opinions of 
Algerian women thus arose from a complex of factors, including seclu-
sion in the domestic space, male honour and sensitivity to any attempt 
to approach their wives and daughters, fear of the occupying forces, 
refusal to answer questions relating to the public sphere controlled by 
males, and a high level of ignorance arising from illiteracy and isolation 
from the outside universe of information, political events and current 
affairs.
Despite these diffi culties, the 1961 investigators concluded that the 
data returned still provided useful information as to the general trends in 
media communication. Firstly, the survey confi rmed that print sources, 
including newspapers, whether read directly by the literate or read by 
them to the illiterate, constituted a minor channel of information. Under 
10 per cent of rural women in the sample received news in this way, as 
opposed to the two outstanding means by which information was dif-
fused, the radio and oral communication through social networks. Some 
42.4 per cent of rural women listened to the radio one or more times 
a week, while about a half preferred to exchange information through 
social converse. The intensely oral and aural nature of Algerian culture 
refl ected both the high level of illiteracy, as well as the traditional forms 
of female associational life, based on women’s networks, gatherings in 
the Turkish baths (hamam) or at various family-based social functions 
(weddings, circumcision, Aïd, local pilgrimages) in which local news, 
story telling and the exchange of information played a key role.
The report showed that reading of newspapers and listening to radio 
was frequently not an individual and private act, but a group activ-
ity. Newspapers, for example, which were relatively expensive, were 
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frequently read out aloud by those who were literate to a wider kin or 
social circle. This was also true of the radio as is shown in table 2.
Since information was transmitted within a group setting, this meant 
that it was not simply received by each individual in an unmediated way, 
but was subjected to intense debate and evaluation by kin, neighbours 
and local leaders. As Daniel Lerner found in a not dissimilar situation 
in the Turkish village of Balgati in 1950, a wealthy and conservative 
headman who owned the only radio ceremoniously played the news 
to a select group and afterwards subjected it to a commentary.19 Since 
access to the media occurred within the ambit of the extended family 
or kin group, it would seem highly likely that information was both 
selected and shared upon the basis of pre-existing group loyalties. 
Michel Launay, as an anti-war conscript, went every Saturday evening 
to listen to the nationalist Voix de l’Algérie libre in the family of his 
friend Mazouzi.20 Fanon emphasised the collective nature and group 
mediation of listening to the radio, ‘The old resistance to intra-familial 
contact disintegrated and one can see in a douar family groups of 
fathers, mothers and daughters elbow-to-elbow gazing at the face of 
the radio in the expectation of Voix de l’Algérie’.21 As the 1961 study 
concluded, what was more important than the ‘raw data’ of news items 
received by radio or newspapers, was the ‘transformation’ or interpreta-
tion of the information within the social circle. However, the majority 
of women showed little understanding of politics, of abstract concepts 
like ‘democracy’ or the signifi cance of expressing their voice through the 
ballot box. The report found that in its present form information tended 
to be adapted to the needs of the minority of educated women, while its 
penetration among the mass of illiterate women was feeble, and among 
rural women preference was shown for radio transmissions of popular 
music and songs (55.2 per cent) than for news items (14.6 per cent). A 
decade later members of Vandevelde-Daillière’s team found a similar 
Table 2: Social practices of listening to radio broadcasts (%)
Where do you listen to the radio?
Men All women Rural women
At home 38.2 38.0 28.2
At a neighbours or friends 14.2 25.7 28.1
Public or collective radio  8.2  4.5  6.7
No reply 39.4 37.8 38.0
Source: SHAT 1H2463, Étude sur l’information en milieu musulmane 
féminine (1961), Appendix K.
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situation, particularly in rural areas and shantytowns, where many 
women had absolutely no access to radio, newspapers or other sources, 
and responses in reply to questions ranged from, ‘do not understand 
what is being said to them’ to showed ‘inertia and total indifference’: 
‘For these women there is a total ignorance of the world outside the 
family, the world of public affairs’.22
However, the French army, as well as Franz Fanon and the FLN, 
were quite right to see radio as the most powerful instrument for reach-
ing out to an illiterate audience that was isolated and scattered over a 
huge and diffi cult terrain. But before examining the content of the radio 
programmes that were specifi cally designed for women, we take a look 
at the propaganda use of fi lm which provided another powerful, visual 
means for reaching an uneducated audience: as General Jacquier noted 
in November1960, ‘The fi lm is, along with the radio, the most effective 
means of communication that we have in our action upon the Muslim 
population’.23
Film and photographic propaganda
In the half-century before the outbreak of the Algerian War there had 
been a signifi cant production of commercial, long métrages fi lms shot 
on location in the Maghreb. Most popular were exotic Orientalist genre 
fi lms located in the desert or Arab souks in which typically a European 
beauty, captured by a lascivious sheikh, was rescued by the French hero 
from a harem: cinema goers to Yasmina (1926), for example, were 
promised ‘all the magic of the Orient, all the sensuous display of the 
harem, all the voluptuous lyricism of its captives, the precious fl owers of 
an enchanted hot-house’.24 However, while this production is of interest 
for what it may tell us about the stereotypical perceptions of Algerian 
women that many French soldiers brought with them to North Africa, 
what I am concerned with here are the short documentary or news items 
fi lmed by the army for, or about, Muslim women during 1954–62.
The Service cinématographiques des armées (SCA), founded in August 
1946, centralised both photographic and fi lm production and diffusion 
for the Algerian armed forces from its HQ in the Martimprey barracks 
in central Algiers.25 The SCA included a team of professional army pho-
tographers and cameramen who were sent out daily to cover key events, 
such as the Forum demonstrations, or to cover particular propaganda 
themes, of which a favourite was the heroic medical work of EMSI teams 
in the bled and the ‘modernisation’ of Muslim women. Photographic fi lm 
was rushed daily from the ‘fi eld’ by plane, helicopter, van or train to the 
SCA laboratory for development and rapid diffusion to the various press 
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agencies of the Ministry of Defence and the Fifth Bureau, and by daily 
plane to Paris for distribution to the national and international press 
agencies like Keystone and International.26 Documentary fi lms, printed 
in multiple copies, were likewise distributed to French television and to 
commercial cinema companies or, internally within the army, in both 
French and Arab-language versions, via the Fifth Bureaux  hierarchy to 
army units and mobile propaganda teams (CHPT).
The Fifth Bureau exercised a close control over the themes or subjects 
that were to be emphasised, including various aspects of women’s eman-
cipation, but also those topics to be avoided, such as ‘the systematic 
destruction of douars or villages’, heavy artillery and tank shelling, ‘shan-
tytowns, poverty-stricken quarters, houses in ruin’, and ‘slovenly, hirsute 
soldiers’.27 A censorship committee exercised a control, not always with 
success, over the commercial fi lms shown in Algerian cinemas, and 
among examples of those which raised concern was the Resistance fi lm 
La Bataille du Rail (1945) in which railway workers sabotaged a Nazi 
troop train and which, after its projection in Bouira in November 1956, 
was thought to have triggered FLN attacks on the Algiers–Constantine 
line.28 Also banned was Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959), perhaps seen 
as creating opposition to the nuclear test programme in the Sahara, and 
the cowboy fi lm L’Homme de San Carlos (USA: Walk the Proud Land, 
1956) in which an Apache reservation moved away from submission to 
the US army towards peace and autonomy.29 Egyptian Arab-language 
fi lms were of particular concern to the French since they conveyed the 
spirit of Arab nationalism and depicted a ‘modern and prosperous 
country’ to the disadvantage of colonial Algeria.30 Psychological warfare 
offi cers were concerned that Egypt might offer an image of modernity, 
particularly in the female sphere of domesticity, that demonstrated how 
the Arab state could reach levels of consumer prosperity well in advance 
of colonial France. One report noted how a fi lm broadcast on television, 
‘gives an extremely fl attering idea of the standard of living of Egyptians 
that one sees living “à l’américaine”. Ultra-modern interiors, luxurious 
cars, etc. . . . giving an impression obviously in contradiction with the 
real way of life of the Egyptian people’.31 By 1956 over 250 Egyptian 
fi lms had been granted import licences for screening in the thousand 
cinemas across Algeria but, despite a blanket ban imposed in 1958, 
the army was unable to stop them reaching a wide popular audience. 
Egypt retaliated by producing Djamila Bouhired, an account of the 
FLN terrorist bomber and heroine who was captured by the French, 
tortured and sentenced to execution. A further blow for anti-colonial 
fi lm- making was struck when fi fteen Algerian trainees at a French fi lm 
school defected to Tunisia to work with the FLN.32
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Once a week the head of the SCA, Captain Rouy, met in a briefi ng 
meeting with the head of the Fifth Bureau to agree on the appropri-
ate themes to be covered by the SCA fi lm unit, and during the course 
of 1957 attention turned increasingly to the making of documentaries 
that illustrated the emerging emancipation strategy and which could be 
shown to audiences of Algerian women to convince them of the benefi ts 
of ‘modernisation’. For example, a SCA unit was sent in August 1957 
to the heart of the Operation Pilot pacifi cation programme in the Bou 
Maad area to photograph the new EMSI teams at work (see illustration 
1, p. 96). The journalists described the primary purpose of the teams as 
‘the penetration of the Muslim feminine cell and child-care training’, 
disclosing the primary intelligence function of the operation as much as 
its social welfare purpose.33
In July 1957 the SCA also produced a three-minute documentary, 
Nurses of the Bled, which showed the new mixed EMSI teams of young 
European and Algerian women at work, symbols of ‘fraternisation’, 
heroic self-sacrifi ce and medical progress. The opening scene of the fi lm 
showed villagers living in squalor and hunger, and the narrator empha-
sised that these were the conditions faced by people living under the 
control of the FLN before the French army arrived to liberate them from 
terrorism and poverty: ‘The young women of Algeria and the Metropolis 
have agreed to be “harnessed” to this tremendous task with courage and 
faith’. The EMSI was then shown departing every day on foot, by horse 
or army helicopter to the most isolated villages that could not be reached 
by road, and where the care for children and the sick established a new 
trust with the population. During subsequent visits to the same villages 
men, women and children were shown pressing round in greeting: ‘Here, 
a warm and sympathetic friendship is created . . . here the smiles of all 
the little children of Algeria who will keep for ever the memory of these 
young women from the Metropolis and Algeria, a symbol of French 
solidarity’.34 The months after the events of ‘13 May’ 1958 was espe-
cially productive in documentaries about the process of unveiling, the 
general emancipation of Algerian women, and the campaign to persuade 
them to exercise their new right to vote in the September referendum 
and National Assembly elections of November. The SCA produced 500 
prints of ‘A Full French Citizen’, 600 of ‘Vote Yes’, and a range of other 
titles that included ‘How to Vote’, ‘The Arab Woman of the Bled’, ‘The 
Falling Veil’, and ‘Woman, Blessing of God’.35
The Algerian government was fully aware of the crucial importance 
of this photographic and fi lm propaganda in the battle for interna-
tional public opinion. The SCA was highly successful in its distribu-
tion of free images that were passed via major agencies in such a way 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   161 21/7/09   12:16:19
162 Burning the veil
that they carried credits such as Keystone or Agence France-Presse, so 
that their military source was concealed, ‘to avoid giving the impres-
sion that information had been orchestrated’.36 The SCA was proud to 
claim that between 50 and 75 per cent of global press, TV and cinema 
images during the Algerian War, unknown to the public, originated with 
army journalists. A particularly prominent part of this propaganda was 
devoted to the EMSI, since images of blond young nurses bathing or 
inoculating Algerian babies while smiling and grateful peasant mothers 
looked on neatly encapsulated a multitude of messages: the peaceful 
nature of colonial rule, the enthusiastic acceptance of the Algerian popu-
lace, the love and self-sacrifi ce of the French, the warm inter-communal 
relations of both sides, liberation from backwardness and squalor, and 
the building of a new society (see illustration 1, p. 96).
The head of the SCA, Captain Rouy, pressed for the 1957 docu-
mentary Nurses of the Bled to be completed as quickly as possible so 
that it could reach commercial cinemas in metropolitan France and be 
dispatched to New York in time for a coming session of the UN which 
was about to debate the Algerian War.37 An important production and 
distribution role was played by the private company Tangent Films in 
ensuring that French propaganda fi lms of the Algerian War, most of 
them illustrating the civilising process of ‘pacifi cation’, reached a wide 
American audience.38 One of these productions, The Falling Veil (c. 
1960), showed de Gaulle arousing Muslim women from their mental 
torpor, so that they were ‘electrifi ed’ into liberating themselves from 
patriarchal oppression, and able to achieve progress towards modern 
civilisation that was illustrated, notes Matthew Connelly, by French 
women taking ‘their Algerian counterparts in hand to hat shops and 
post offi ces, enacting practices of modernity for their protégés to 
mimic’.39 This propaganda battle for American public opinion was to 
prove of crucial long-term importance since the eventual termination of 
the war, and the withdrawal of the French, came about as much through 
pressures exerted by international diplomacy, and in particular by the 
USA and the UN, as it did from FLN guerrilla warfare.40
How did fi lms reach the domestic audience of Algerian women, and 
what kind of infl uence, if any, did they have? The colonial government 
had used the Ciné-bus from 1943 onwards to show offi cial fi lms in the 
more isolated regions of the colony,41 but such methods were greatly 
expanded during the course of the war. Films were distributed by the 
SCA to army units and the SAS/SAU, which had some 400 projectors, 
to show to local audiences in village halls, women’s circles and other 
venues. In addition specialised propaganda units, the CHPT, copied in 
1956 from American Loudspeaker and Leafl et Companies, began to 
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deploy mobile cinemas, including a type of screen (cinéma jour) that 
could be viewed in the open air during daylight.42
SCA reports during 1957 show an increasing ambition to reach audi-
ences of Algerian women, in line with the centrally directed campaign 
of emancipation. In December 1957 it noted that during the previous 
year Algerian attendance at army-mounted fi lm shows had doubled and, 
‘among these spectators we can now count numerous Muslim women, 
a happy portent for the evolution of these women and for the whole of 
Algeria’.43 A tour by a Ciné-bus unit in the Department of Mostaganem 
in October 1957 had in ten shows attracted an audience of 19,150, of 
which 8,600 were Muslim women, and it was thought that women were 
being drawn in increasing numbers by fi lms.44
There is little evidence as to the impact of such documentary fi lms but 
relatively high attendances may have refl ected the novelty and entertain-
ment value for women who had, in many instances, never seen a fi lm in 
their life. Certainly the army liked to use fi lm-shows, frequently includ-
ing Hollywood cartoons, as a means of drawing in a female audience 
that could then be subjected to speeches by EMSI and other women 
propagandists. Jean Servier and his commando associates cried with 
laughter at the seriousness of a captain seeking their advice on the advis-
ability of showing an English-language version of Donald Duck to the 
villagers of Tifra in Kabylia: implying that the psychological warfare 
units revealed an absurd lack of understanding of the potential audi-
ence.45 But in general women, who watched fi lms in segregated sessions 
with their children, seem to have been enthusiastic, even if, as the wife of 
an SAS offi cer noted, they understood nothing and reacted with nervous 
laughter to occasional romantic scenes and kissing.46 The soldiers who 
manned the CHPT rarely had any knowledge of Arab or Berber dialect, 
and were in little position to judge whether the messages were suited to 
the culture of the audience. Music that was played over loudspeakers 
from disks was sometimes more suited to a brothel, and Monique Eoche-
Duval notes that, ‘the words of the songs and the music was a little bit 
too suggestive in this land where the men would not listen to such things 
in the presence of their wives’.47 General Crépin, in a directive which 
ordered the projection of a new SCA fi lm, Femmes, throughout Algeria, 
remarked that it was diffi cult for such short documentaries to suit the 
tastes and the complexity of different types of audience that varied 
from one region to another, and in this instance, where ‘the female rural 
milieu has only a very vague idea of the way of life in the town’.48
Such evidence would seem to indicate that cinema propaganda was 
not so professionally produced to match the needs of respective female 
audiences as the Fifth Bureau often liked to claim. The overall impact 
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on attitudes or political opinion may have been quite superfi cial, but in 
addition the FLN political cells (OPA) certainly encouraged people not to 
attend fi lm shows or, in some instances, to actively disrupt proceedings. 
In 1957 one projection by a Ciné-bus was disrupted by youths, some 
of whom were arrested, and by the audience whistling, while in 1959 
another screening was sabotaged by the cutting of electricity cables. 
It was reported from pro-FLN villages that no women would attend 
screenings,49 while Captain Montaner of the SAU of Clos-Salembier 
(Algiers) recorded during July 1958 that the cinema hall he had organ-
ised was stoned by turbulent youths.50 As always the effectiveness of 
propaganda has to be gauged against the local political background, 
and in most instances the allegiances of women were determined not 
by individual choice but by the political colouring and solidarity of the 
extended family, kin or village group to which they belonged.
Radio: the ‘battle of the airways’
From the First World War down to the age of satellite TV, radio broad-
casting represented the single most powerful instrument in the armoury 
of state propaganda. During war-time it had the advantage of diffus-
ing messages very rapidly across a national space, penetrating across 
borders or globally to reach into the privacy of the home of an ‘enemy’ 
population. It was a source of information that governments found 
particularly diffi cult to control or police. During the inter-war period 
most advanced states established powerful, short-wave transmitters 
that could broadcast to global audiences: France, for example, estab-
lished the Poste Colonial in 1931 which by 1938 was broadcasting in 
thirty languages. The full propaganda potential of radio was not lost 
on General de Gaulle whose political career as national leader of the 
French Resistance was founded on his famous appeal from London on 
18 June 1940.
In 1959 Frantz Fanon published his famous essay, ‘Here is the 
Voice of Algeria’, in which he argued that radio, particularly in the 
form of the new, portable transistor, represented a revolutionary tool 
for the nationalist movement.51 Fanon argued that until the War of 
Independence Radio-Alger was a ‘transmission belt for the colonial 
power’ and was produced for a predominantly European settler audi-
ence, who owned some 95 per cent of all radio sets.52 This colonialist 
hegemony was, however, challenged increasingly by neighbouring Arab 
nationalist stations and in particular by the Voix des Arabes, transmit-
ted from Nasser’s Egypt, which supported the Algerian struggle from its 
very inception.53 But, for Fanon, the most dramatic and revolutionary 
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potential of radio was realised during 1956 when the FLN was given 
a voice by Moroccan and Tunisian stations, notably the Tunis-based 
La Voix de l’Algérie arabe soeur, and fi nally in December with its own 
transmission, Radio de l’Algérie libre et combattante. For Fanon, the 
Algerian masses which had previously shunned Radio-Algers and radio-
listening in general as a form of penetration of alien European cultural-
imperialism into the very heart of the Muslim family, now fl ocked to 
gain access to the radio as a source of information that shattered French 
propaganda and blanket control over the media, and also became in its 
own right an act of resistance. Immediately Algerians rushed to buy-up 
every new and second-hand radio they could lay their hands on and 
Algerians apprenticed to European radio-electricians began to open 
their own workshops.54
The French government was confronted with the diffi cult problem 
of responding to this threat to its previous tight censorship and control 
of news media. Historically, the growth of radio war propaganda had 
confronted modern states with a dilemma: attempts to capture or reach 
‘home’ audiences was very much dependent on the mass ownership 
or availability of radio sets, but such a proliferation might also enable 
the public to tune-in to ‘dangerous’ overseas or clandestine air-waves. 
Despite the drawbacks, the Nazis had been so convinced of the enor-
mous propaganda potential of radio that they encouraged the manu-
facture of millions of cheap, mass-produced sets, the Volksempfänger 
(‘people’s receiver’) so that by late 1939 over 70 per cent of households 
owned one.55 The French army had experimented with radio propa-
ganda in 1951 during the war in Vietnam but had abandoned the idea 
because of the paucity of receivers among the population, even among 
the Viet Minh elite.56 In Algeria the total number of offi cially registered 
sets increased by 41 per cent from 418,325 in May 1958 to 590,782 in 
late 1960, in part due to the rapid spread of the new transistor radios, 
and between a sixth and a third of Algerians may have owned a set by 
1960.57
The French government was well-informed of the pro-FLN prop-
aganda being transmitted across the borders, mainly through the 
Groupement des contrôles radioélectriques (GCR) located at Fort du 
Mont-Valérien in the Paris suburb of Suresnes and its Algerian listen-
ing posts. The GCR produced a daily Bulletin d’écoutes générales with 
transcriptions of key intercepts.58 One response to the growing volume 
of pro-FLN broadcasts was to engage in the technically diffi cult and 
expensive process of jamming, which seems to have only succeeded in 
part,59 and the FLN Voix de l’Algérie libre responded by constantly 
changing wave-length.60 The government also tried to restrict the sale of 
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radios and batteries to Algerians by the decrees of 16 and 20 December 
1957, particularly the light and portable transistor which was ideal for 
the isolated areas without electricity, while the army during its opera-
tions tried to seize or destroy as many sets as possible.61 But this only 
succeeded in creating a black market in radio equipment, including a 
cross-border trade organised by the maquis.62 The government seems 
to have recognised that it was impossible to prevent Algerian access to 
the radio, and moreover such a policy was counterproductive since it 
stopped people listening to offi cial propaganda broadcasts. As the 1961 
LSHA survey showed (see above), half of all women listened to the 
radio once or more a week, and this was regarded as by far the single 
most important source of information, particularly for the great mass of 
illiterate women in the bled. An alternative strategy considered by the 
Fifth Bureau, reminiscent of the German practice, was to mass produce 
a cheap standard radio that could then be widely installed in SAS, SAU, 
village halls, women’s circles, youth clubs and other locations where 
group listening would be under the control of local offi cials, settlers and 
army offi cers.63
7 Women knitting and listening to the radio in the MSF circle of Palestro, 
January 1959
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But the FLN OPA appears to have organised its own listening circles 
or group reception of nationalist transmissions and Zohra Drif, in her 
1957 plan for a clandestine network of FLN women’s cells in Algiers, 
included group discussion of the political situation based on listening to 
Radio-Tunis, Rabat or Radio Algérie Libre.64
The ethnologist Jean Servier appears to have been among the fi rst to 
have commented on the considerable interest shown by Algerian women 
in listening to the radio, in particular the Kabyle-language broadcasts 
of Radio-Alger.65 In May 1957 General Noiret, commander of the 
Constantine region, undoubtedly aware of the newly emerging agenda 
on women, forwarded a report of the local Renseignements généraux 
(RG) which commented on the great popularity of Paris Arab-language 
broadcasts, particularly ‘the latest songs’, ‘listener’s letters’, cultural 
programmes and ‘those that relate to the life of Muslim women, the 
emancipation of the Arab woman and the evolution of customs’. A 
radio ‘referendum’ on the wearing of the face veil (hadjar) had aroused 
much interest among young women, ‘among whom the desire for eman-
cipation is very great and who begin to speak of equality of attitudes’. 
The RG’s view was that much attention should be given to the organi-
sation of radio transmissions to women: ‘Besides the fact that these 
broadcasts could turn young Arabs away from listening to xenophobic 
and racist Arab radio, they are of a nature to accelerate the evolution 
of the Muslim woman and via her of Arab society as a whole towards 
previously unknown forms of liberalism’.66 This current of thinking 
was followed up during the summer of 1957 by Radio-Alger in its Arab 
and Kabyle versions of the Magazine de la femme, which welcomed 
a listener’s debate on the veil and emancipation through its popular 
speaker, called ‘Nadira’. But it was above all the events of ‘13 May’ that 
was to give an enormous boost to radio propaganda, a key component 
of the wider campaign of emancipation that was accelerated throughout 
Algeria.
The remaining section of this chapter looks at the content of a partic-
ularly important weekly programme, the Magazine social de la femme,67 
which was broadcast by Radio-Alger from early August to December 
1958 in league with the newly formed MSF led by Lucienne Salan and 
Suzanne Massu.68 One of the fi rst acts of the army conspirators on 
13 May was to seize the building of Radio-Alger, an almost standard 
move in any modern coup. On the 17 May, the day on which veils 
were burned in the Forum, Massu, inspired by the heady atmosphere 
of ‘fraternisation’, claims to have gone on the spur of the moment into 
the radio station where she used her rank to demand of the parachutist 
guard an immediate access to the studios to make a spontaneous radio 
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appeal. In the transmission she called on all women to come to her aid 
to ensure that the joyful fl ame of love and reconciliation demonstrated 
in the Forum should be nurtured by a nation-wide women’s movement, 
‘This, my sisters, is our affair. Help me, come to me: this is Suzanne 
Massu in Algiers and I appeal to your assistance’.69
This appeal gave rise to the creation of the MSF, which will be exam-
ined in the following chapter, but what can be noted here is the consid-
erable potential of radio to the emancipation movement, and this was 
soon to be translated into the regular broadcasts of the Magazine social 
de la femme. The Magazine, a fi fteen-minute programme broadcast 
every Thursday and Sunday morning at 7.15 am in French, and repeated 
the same day at 6.60 pm in demotic Arabic, ran for eighteen weeks 
until its closure on the recall of General Salan and his wife to France in 
December 1958. After several weeks the programme began to assume 
a regular format which consisted of fi ve elements, a four minute edito-
rial presented by leading members of the MSF, medical advice (billet 
de docteur), brief news items mainly relating to charitable activities of 
the MSF, letters from listeners, and, most interesting of all, a popular 
address to Algerian women by ‘Lalla Safi ya’.
Mme Salan, as a highly active president of the MSF, exercised a tight 
control over the programme and it was she and her advisers in the 
General Government who decided on the theme of each week’s editorial 
and approached the wives of leading generals, offi cers or functionaries 
to speak to these topics. Among those who participated in the editori-
als were, in addition to Salan herself, the wives of Generals Massu, 
Réthoré, Saint-Hillier and Jouhaud, Mme Goussault (wife of the head 
of the Fifth Bureau), and Mme de Marie, wife of the head of Salan’s 
cabinet. Suzanne Massu, for example, on 11 August under the title 
‘Croisade de l’amitié’ spoke of the inter-faith solidarity of Christian, 
Muslim and Jewish women who were able to meet now in the women’s 
circles of the MSF, ‘activities include meetings of friendship, country 
picnics, group walks, seaside excursions, infant nurseries’, where in 
spite of language differences they could speak ‘the eternal language of 
women’. In contrast to the world of men, of politics and confl ict, ‘our 
weapon is the sewing machine’.
Other editorials addressed social issues, such as high unemployment, 
poor housing, the cess-pit anarchy of the bidonvilles, and solutions 
that promised to improve the quality of life for Algerian women, such 
as vocational training, the work of the Centres sociaux, schooling for 
girls, and new building programmes, solutions that were ‘revolutionary 
and effective’. However, the key issues that were repeatedly addressed 
throughout 1958 related to the government campaign on the two most 
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important planks in the emancipation movement: fi rstly, to persuade 
Muslim women to exercise their right to vote for the very fi rst time in the 
referendum of 28 September and the legislative elections of November 
1958, and secondly, to persuade women of the fundamental importance 
of a reform of the personal status law. These issues are examined more 
closely in chapter 8, but briefl y it can be noted how the dominant radio 
discourse was one that emphasised the necessary struggle by Algerian 
women to escape from a medieval and oppressive past. Mme Goussault, 
in her editorial on ‘Algeria in 1830’, re-iterated a standard discourse used 
by colonial ideologues to legitimate both the conquest of Algeria, and 
the need for an enduring French presence. Goussault dwelt on the misery 
and backwardness of Algeria before the arrival of the French, the bloody 
tribal confl icts, cruel Turkish despotism, crushing taxes, piracy, general 
fi lth, lack of any hospitals and other ‘odious abuses’ that only France was 
able to abolish. Under the benefi cent hand of France Algerian women 
could now emerge into the full light of modernity, an era marked by a 
high standard of living, good housing, clothing, food and health care 
for themselves and their children, self-fulfi lment through education and 
leisure, and full economic and political equality with European women. 
Such a bountiful future could only be achieved under the governance 
of France and the almost superhuman and all-loving father fi gure, de 
Gaulle. As Mme Salan claimed in another editorial, only by voting ‘Yes’ 
for de Gaulle could a ‘pacifi c revolution’ be achieved: ‘What a radiant 
future is promised for an Algeria that fi nds itself integrated and united 
with the Motherland, benefi ting from the economic riches, the cultural 
treasures and techniques that are the fruit and inheritance preciously 
accumulated by France through the centuries’. To abstain from voting 
was to ‘betray the Fatherland that has cherished you, it is to prepare the 
victory of the separatists and of international Communism’.
Other programmes approached the well-worn theme of unveiling, 
which was then linked by speakers to other issues of personal rights, 
polygamy, forced marriage and repudiation. Particular importance was 
attached to re-assuring Muslim women that reform of the personal 
status law, or exercising the vote, was not against their religion, but had 
already been addressed by other Islamic states, including Turkey under 
Mustapha Kemal, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and more recently Tunisia 
and Morocco. Frequent mention was made of the speech of the eminent 
religious leader Sheikh Lakhdari in Constantine on 26 May 1958 (see 
chapter 3). Princess Lalla Aïcha of Morocco and the ‘beautiful Soraya’, 
wife of the Shah of Persia, were held up as examples of royal women 
who had adopted reform, and Algerian women were encouraged to 
demonstrate that they too could be proud to embrace modernity. It was 
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frequently suggested, in a discourse that must have sounded surreal to 
Algerian women living in shantytown slums, army resettlement camps 
and isolated douars without roads, running water or electricity, that 
they too could aspire to become the equal of their French sisters who 
historically had also to fi ght to achieve their rights and now enjoyed 
equality with men, able to, ‘to go out, to engage in sport, to follow 
university courses, to become doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, or direc-
tors of industrial or commercial enterprises’. The radio, as did the MSF 
women’s weekly magazine Femmes nouvelles, held up powerful role 
models of modernity, from champion rock-climbers and swimmers, to 
atomic scientists, fi lm stars and princesses.70 A series of Arab-language 
broadcasts, Voter Oui, c’est assurer l’emancipation de la femme musul-
mane, informed Algerian women that their vote placed them on the 
same level as, ‘a great scholar, a great writer or a great engineer. Such as 
Jacqueline Auriol, the fastest woman pilot in the world’.71 The French 
propagandists, unwittingly or not, were here following very much in 
the footsteps of an earlier tradition of middle-class Arab feminism and 
nationalism, particularly in Egypt, which centred on the life narratives 
of exemplary ‘famous women’, including non-Muslim subjects like Joan 
of Arc, Catherine the Great of Russia, Queen Victoria, George Sand and 
the American astronomer Maria Mitchell.72
Possibly the most effective part of the Magazine was the regular 
broadcast by ‘Lalla Safi ya’, who presented herself as a simple and 
uneducated woman of the people who shared the tribulations and 
concerns of her ‘sister’ Algerians: ‘I’, she claimed, ‘I am only a poor, 
ignorant woman’. In contrast to the more formal style of the editorials 
by elite European women, which were intended as much for a settler 
as an Algerian audience, this supposed mother of six addressed herself 
to illiterate Muslim women in a close personal and even affectionate 
way and larded her talks with popular aphorisms or religious epithets 
(Inch’ Allah!). However, ‘Lalla Safi ya’ was certainly a fi ction and radio 
actresses played her role reading from scripts that were prepared by psy-
chological warfare specialists.73 Such concealment was a standard tool 
of propagandists since revelation of the true identity of the organisation 
lying behind the message would create an immediate disbelief or doubt 
in the audience.
‘Lalla Safi ya’ developed themes identical to those of the editorials 
(the role of education, the importance of the vote, reform of the per-
sonal status law, unveiling), but her message was packaged in a simple, 
but more subtle and user-friendly format. The style of the populist 
broadcast can be illustrated by that of 14 September 1958 on the theme 
of ‘progress’ in which Lalla argued against religious conservatism. 
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Addressing herself to her ‘dear sisters’, she remarked that some of you 
will ask what is the point, ‘All is in the hand of God!’: to such religious 
fatalism she replied that we also are religious, respect our ancestors and 
visit their tombs, ‘We also, we obey Islam . . . But Islam is a religion that 
is worth the effort: – The Proverb says: “Fasten your camel, and have 
trust in God”’. How can we possibly turn the clock back and live like 
our ancestors, she asked: ‘In order to do that would we, the women, not 
have to destroy the mechanical mills and bring the hand mill back into 
every house? – Do we have to smash the water pipes and the fountains 
to go, as we did in the past, to fetch water at the spring? Do we have to 
burn down the hospitals and schools?’.
Lalla claimed to be won over to change by the example of her young 
and progressive (but fi ctitious) daughter. At one time Lalla had been 
backward and tried to stop her going to school, but she was now 
happy and enthusiastic to encourage her daughter: so listeners should 
do likewise with their sons and daughters and they would be richly 
rewarded, ‘Inch’ Allah!’. In a broadcast on the veil (21 September) 
Lalla again used her daughter as a foil, a symbol of progress, and noted 
that she herself has not worn a veil for two years since, ‘When I saw 
my daughter so happy to go out without a veil, I wanted to do like 
her’. Much of her advice was couched in a sensible, pragmatic and non-
doctrinaire way: thus it was impossible to lead an active life dressed in 
the haïk: ‘To come and go in the town, to cross the road in the middle 
of the automobiles, to see well, to hear, to carry a parcel, you must, I 
can assure you, be dressed like a French woman. The habit is quickly 
learned!’. Women of the Aurès or Sahara had never worn the veil, 
but did that make them any the less Muslims? And how were they to 
manage veiled, ‘to go and fetch water at the spring or well?’. In other 
programmes ‘Lalla Safi ya’ reported her arguments with her fi ctitious 
grandmother, who initially refused to vote, or her conservative friend 
Malika who claimed that according to the Koran men were superior to 
women whose role it was to obey and remain within the home. Lalla, 
through kindly argument, won both of them over to her side: women 
should not ‘remain like an animal that men can sell or buy . . . like an 
old, blind horse that has to work the water-wheel’, and the Prophet 
had declared, ‘All the faithful are brothers’. In a programme on 30 
November, a few weeks before the Magazine de la femme was closed 
down, Lalla announced that she was off to join an SAS in the interior 
as a social worker dedicated to the welfare of mothers and children. So 
‘dear friends of the bled’ might in the future be able to recognise Lalla 
by her ‘sympathetic voice’ as she moved anonymously among them, no 
fi ction but a living reality.
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The ‘Lalla Safi ya’ broadcast, with its use of simple characterisation, its 
direct appeal to ordinary Algerian women through the voice of a warm 
and personable ‘sister’, shows how the army was able to invent more 
plausible and possibly successful propaganda. As the LSHA survey of 
1961 indicated, at least half of all Muslim women listened to the radio 
one or more times a week, so a considerable number were likely to have 
listened to the Magazine or similar French propaganda transmissions. 
Today, even under the most sophisticated laboratory conditions, it is 
notoriously diffi cult to measure the impact of the mass media in chang-
ing basic attitudes or opinions, and the effectiveness of French propa-
ganda cannot be conclusively assessed. Frantz Fanon, through what 
David Macey has called his ‘revolutionary romanticism’, entertained an 
exaggerated radical optimism as to the potential of pro-independence 
radio to forge a new Algerian national and political consciousness: but 
the overall impact of French army propaganda was probably even less 
than that of the FLN. It should be kept in mind that listening to the 
radio was frequently a group or quasi-public process that was mediated 
by other women, kin and villagers and where there existed support for 
the FLN, or deep hostility to the occupying armed forces, French propa-
ganda would have been either subjected to withering criticism, switched 
off or re-tuned to nationalist wavelengths. Algerian women listening 
at home were also highly selective as to what they chose to hear, and 
French research showed that the majority of women (59.3 per cent) 
preferred to listen to music and songs, rather than to news or current 
affairs (18.6 per cent).74 It seems unlikely that French radio broadcasts 
had any transformative effect on the emancipation of Algerian women, 
although the spread of the transistor radio into the isolated villages of 
the interior, in the absence of other means of mass communication, 
undoubtedly provided them with an important window on the rapidly 
changing events of the War of Independence.
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The Mouvement de solidarité féminine: 
army wives and domesticating the 
‘native’
The campaign by the French army for the emancipation of Algerian 
women offered to displace the ‘traditional’ Muslim family and gender 
roles by a particular western model of the couple and companionate 
marriage. It is particularly signifi cant that this model was rarely refl ected 
upon or recognised by the French as a specifi c cultural and social form, 
but accepted in an automatic and unquestioning way, as ‘natural’ and 
proper. It was precisely this unrefl ective agenda that provided Europeans 
with the overpowering sense of self-confi dence about the inherent supe-
riority of European life-styles that constituted the mission civilisatrice. 
While many of the hard-working and dedicated European women who 
tended to Algerian babies and women in the bled saw their role as bring-
ing humanitarian relief and medicine to a neglected population (treat-
ment of trachoma, inoculation, sterilisation of wounds), such aid was 
not just about scientifi c intervention, but was generally an integral part 
of a wider set of complex values, beliefs and actions that involved an 
attempt to form Muslim women in a particular mould.
During the last two decades there has been much research on the 
process of ‘domesticating the empire’, the methods by which British, 
Dutch, Portuguese and French imperial regimes attempted to intervene 
in, regulate or remake indigenous family life in its own image.1 This 
chapter aims, in part, to investigate the overt and implicit meanings of 
the model of family life, companionate marriage and gender roles that 
underpinned the emancipation campaign. The paternalistic origins of 
domesticity are complex and varied from one colony to another, but 
one key source of interventionism can be traced back to late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in western Europe when social imperial-
ists, eugenicists and welfare reformers, concerned by the ‘racial degen-
eration’ of the proletariat in urban slums, were concerned to educate 
working-class women into scientifi c methods of hygiene, diet, child-care 
and household management that would guarantee the fi tness of infants 
and husbands.
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Intrinsic to social imperialism and Christian welfare was a petit-
 bourgeois class model of family life that emphasised particular moral 
and disciplinary virtues, such as cleanliness, teetotalism, saving of 
money, rational use of limited resources, punctuality and self-help.2 The 
metropolitan model of charitable and state intervention in the sphere of 
the family could be readily exported and adapted to the colonial context, 
particularly as the categories of class and ‘race’ were interchangeable, 
the European inhabitants of slums being viewed by the middle-class as 
African savages in urban jungles that required missionary and police 
intervention. Omnia Shakry has shown how metropolitan national-
ist discourses on mothering and child rearing infl uenced the forms of 
Egyptian middle-class feminism that emerged in the early twentieth 
century. Just as with European social imperialism, Egyptian feminists 
viewed the education of girls and women, the ending of superstitious 
practices and the inculcation of a science of home-management, hygiene 
and child-care as a national duty, the key to future progress and eventual 
independence.3 A similar evolution appeared among Iranian women 
nationalists: the opening of two girls schools in Tehran was celebrated 
in 1909 in the following terms: ‘in the future, every household is headed 
by a learned lady who knows household management, child rearing, 
sewing, cooking and cleaning and from whose breast the milk of love 
of the homeland will be fed to infants so that they shall be deserving of 
[national] service and sacrifi ce’.4
By the early 1900s it was a truism throughout the educated classes 
of the Middle East that the roots of national regeneration lay with the 
education and modernisation of women, but Algeria followed a very 
different path until the Second World War. Firstly, Algeria lacked a suf-
fi ciently large and dynamic Muslim urban middle class to support an 
elite women’s movement of the kind to be found in Turkey, Egypt and 
Iran.5 The discourse that presented the educated mother as the national 
saviour was not taken up by Algerian women and made their own, but 
was captured after the 1920s by the male-dominated Ulema which, 
while acknowledging the importance of the education of girls, gener-
ally harnessed this to a conservative defence of Islamic family values. In 
addition between 1900 and 1945 women in settler society, unlike their 
metropolitan counterparts, showed very little interest in reaching out a 
hand to help ‘regenerate’ or modernise the Algerian family: on the con-
trary most believed that Muslim women should be left in an uneducated 
and ‘primitive’ condition where they offered less of a competitive threat. 
After 1900 the main drive towards a progressive welfare agenda on 
Algerian women and the family came not from inside the colony, from 
settlers or Muslim women, but from metropolitan writers like Georges 
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Vabran of the Musée Social who argued that European women were 
best suited to take on the diffi cult task of gaining access to native homes, 
since ‘Only the hand of a woman can lift the veil which protects Muslim 
women’, and to organise lessons in hygiene and home economics.6 The 
French feminist, Hubertine Auclert, who lived in Algeria between 1888 
and 1892, also believed that assimilation should be achieved through 
European women penetrating into the secluded space of the Muslim 
home so as to offer a progressive cultural model.
However, such reformist ideas appear to have made almost no 
impact in the fi rst half of the twentieth century, and it was only after 
the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 and the arrival of many hundreds 
of wives of army offi cers and administrators that this model of female 
interventionism became dramatically activated. Army wives brought 
with them a range of experience that encouraged their intervention in 
an emancipation agenda. Firstly, only the wives of senior offi cers and 
certain types of female army personnel (mainly nurses) were allowed 
to serve with active forces overseas, and it was precisely this category 
of women who played the key role in forming the MSF. The leaders, 
Lucienne Salan and Suzanne Massu, had both served as professional 
nurses in the Resistance,7 and belonged to the cohort of young women 
who before and during the Second World War had participated in the 
‘home front’ training programmes of the Union des femmes de France, 
which included stretcher bearing, automobile driving and mechanics, 
and defence against gas attack.8
After 1945 this experience was carried into the French colonies, most 
notably during the war in Indochina, where both Massu and Salan had 
served as military nurses. The French forces in Vietnam developed a 
programme of welfare work with indigenous women, and after 1954 
this experience was brought into Algeria. It was French policy in Africa, 
Indochina and elsewhere to encourage wives of the military and colo-
nial service to volunteer for welfare work with native women since they 
had unique access and, surrounded by servants, had the free time to do 
so.9 In Lebanon and Syria during the French mandate the colonial civic 
order was highly paternalist and the wives of high commissioners, such 
as Madam Catroux, played a prominent role as the patrons of women’s 
associations and glamorous charity balls, or by visiting hospitals, soup 
kitchens and clinics.10 In a strongly hierarchical organisation like that 
of the French army women, in marrying offi cers, were as ‘incorporated 
wives’, expected to share closely in their husband’s occupational iden-
tity and culture and in many instances to represent the human face of 
the military to the outside world through offi cial functions, welfare 
work and ceremonials.11 The wives of generals and colonels in Algeria, 
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through charitable work with poor Muslim women and children, were 
thus fulfi lling a traditional function,12 and the wife of the Algerian gov-
ernor, as part of her quasi-offi cial functions, would also invite selected 
wives of the Algerian elite to receptions or undertake various benevolent 
functions that were well-publicised in the colonial press.13 It was this 
long practice of involvement by colonial and military elites in charitable 
work, and which typically deployed a discourse of universal sisterhood 
as wives and mothers, that prepared the ground for the MSF initiative. 
Although the leaders of the MSF held quite conservative values they 
were mostly newly arrived in Algeria, did not share the racist atti-
tudes towards Muslim women to be found among the pieds-noirs, and 
tended to support the bourgeois ideals of the post-Liberation Gaullist 
women’s movement: Lucienne Salan, for example, had close links with 
Hélène Lefaucheux, the most infl uential representative of this reformist 
current.
As we have seen (chapter 3), the events of ‘13 May’ and the success-
ful ‘fraternisation’ movement in the Forum led within days to a major 
drive by the joint military-civilian government headed by General Salan 
to accelerate the emancipation of Muslim women. On the 17 May 
Suzanne Massu made a radio-appeal to all her European and Algerian 
‘sisters’ that led to the creation of the MSF.14 The basic idea behind the 
MSF was that European women should take the initiative in forming 
hundreds of local clubs or associations which would attract women 
from the Muslim, Jewish and Christian communities into shared social 
and cultural activities, reach over religious and political divisions, and 
unite all women in a common purpose as wives, mothers and agents 
of progress. Through direct personal contact in local clubs ‘backward’ 
native women, it was thought, would emulate or absorb through a kind 
of osmosis the superior moral and domestic behaviour of Europeans. 
The hierarchical structure of the new organisation closely matched the 
system of army ranks so that the position of each member matched the 
status of their husbands. Both Lucienne Salan and Suzanne Massu, as 
wives of the top commanders, were addressed directly, and in the media, 
as ‘madame la général’ or ‘mon commandant’, and army wives were 
keen to assert a ‘correct’ hierarchy in their own relations, following the 
dictum ‘they carry the stripes of their husbands’.
Although both Salan and Massu claimed that the MSF was a purely 
voluntary and charitable organisation established through the sponta-
neous enthusiasm of European women, in reality it was another tool 
of military operations and mainly funded by the army. The MSF was 
founded on the secret initiative of the Fifth Bureau as part of its psy-
chological warfare strategy, and a number of army initiatives during 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   181 21/7/09   12:16:20
182 Burning the veil
1957 prepared the way for the new organisation. In 1957 the Bureau 
had already begun to establish local women’s circles like one reported in 
early July: ‘a women’s circle has been opened in Algiers where Muslims 
and Christians can freely exchange their points of view so as to know 
and understand one another better. From these contacts can be drawn 
precious lessons on the methods to be used to hasten, as smoothly as 
possible, the emancipation of Algerian women’.15 Some of the newly 
founded SAU in Algiers, such as those in the Cité Mahiéddine and 
Belcourt under Captains de Germiny and Bernhardt, began to establish 
women’s clubs during 1957.16 During this time Suzanne Massu assumed 
a particularly proactive role in this sphere and, after visiting and study-
ing the work of the Centres sociaux, she established welfare assistance 
for orphaned street boys (yaouleds) many of whom were refugees from 
the war zones in the interior. The fi rst Centre jeunesse was established 
at Bab-el-Oued in March 1957, funded by 20 million francs ‘given’ by 
General Massu to his wife, and located in a building and with full-time 
male personnel supplied by his État-major.17 Suzanne Massu’s daily 
presence, along with the wife of General Navarro, soon attracted a fl ood 
of Algerian women who were desperate to obtain information about 
their husbands, sons or brothers who had ‘disappeared’ or been arrested 
by the army during the violent Battle of Algiers. Through this contact the 
Centre quickly developed a role of welfare assistance to women, includ-
ing the project ‘Home knitting’ (tricot à domicile) through which poor 
Muslim women earned income through a domestic knitting industry 
that supplied clothing to various outlets, including department stores. 
The ambiguity of the altruistic role of Mme Massu was highlighted by 
the fact that she provided welfare assistance to women and children 
who were the immediate victims of the massive repression, torture and 
murder infl icted by the parachutist regiments under the command of her 
husband.18
Although General Massu claimed disingenuously, ‘No political move 
lay behind the beginning of this organisation [MSF] which rose in 
response to a simple human need’,19 there is evidence as to the way in 
which the Fifth Bureau began to manipulate women’s circles to its own 
ends. In August 1957 Madame Tournemine, the wife of an offi cer, began 
to pioneer a women’s circle in the small settler township of Héliopolis 
near Guelma (examined below) and this appeared so successful to the 
commander of the sector, Colonel Bravelet, that he gave army backing 
to an experimental action during which Algerian women were sum-
moned by army loudspeaker vehicles and coerced to attend a foun-
dation meeting in the local school-yard. Cinema shows were used to 
attract them to the weekly meetings and women, he claimed, seemed to 
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be growing in confi dence as shown by rising attendance and a quarter of 
them unveiled spontaneously during sessions.20
In October 1957 the head of the Fifth Bureau in Constantine reported 
to Algiers on the activities of Thérèse Godet who, under the aegis of 
the metropolitan based Union nationale des associations familiales 
(UNAF),21 had organised numerous women’s groups in douars in 
which European instructors, mainly the daughters of settlers, and 
Muslim women were trained by Godet as teachers of domestic skills. 
This project proved so successful that Godet was planning to extend it 
to the departments of Oran and Algiers. This private initiative, which 
claimed to be apolitical and non-confessional, was funded by the French 
UNAF and by small grants from the Prefecture of Constantine, but 
had no links to the army. The army report went on to recommend that 
the Constantine organisation be secretly lured into co-operating with 
the military through the inducement of 20 million francs to fi nance the 
cash-strapped programme and to achieve a process of ‘convergence’: 
‘We know from a reliable source that the UNAF would agree to dis-
cretely link its actions to those of pacifi cation and to allow us to exer-
cise an effective control over the political and psychological activities 
of its Training Centres, if the Civil and Military authorities provide the 
aid which it needs’.22 That the Fifth Bureau was seeking to manipulate 
such a prestigious institution as the UNAF indicates the extent to which 
covert operations was penetrating into the civil sphere of the state.
Thus by the time of the events of ‘13 May’ the army was already 
well on the way to exploring the potential of women’s circles as part 
of its strategy of contact and intelligence gathering. The radio appeal 
of Suzanne Massu on 17 May evoked a large response from European 
women who wished to participate in the exciting ‘revolutionary’ move-
ment that was unfolding and, with the assistance of Jacqueline de La 
Hoog, the wife of an oil executive, a foundation meeting was held on 
20 May at which 200 welfare assistants were present.23 The very same 
day Colonel Goussault sent an urgent telex to the regional army com-
manders, ‘to create immediately women’s circles that bring together 
Europeans and Muslims’, which confi rms the close links between the 
Fifth Bureau and the creation of the MSF.24
Within days the nascent MSF was almost wrecked by a power 
struggle between Suzanne Massu and Lucienne Salan for control of 
the organisation. Overtly this clash was about military hierarchy and 
protocol: the imperious Salan, as wife of the head of both the armed 
forces and government of Algeria, was not prepared to accept a position 
within the MSF below Massu, the wife of a mere Général de brigade.25 
Superfi cially this problem was resolved by the creation of a structure 
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that placed Salan as president and head of the Central Committee, while 
Massu was president of one of the three regional committees (Algiers), 
along with the wives of Generals Réthoré (Oran) and Olié (Constantine). 
Under the surface the confl ict rumbled on until in October 1958 Massu 
tried to block Salan’s attempts to control or interfere with the Algiers 
regional committee by establishing her own legal statute, for which she 
was accused by Salan of threatening to split the MSF and creating ‘a 
disastrous malaise among all the women’.26
The dispute between Salan and Massu refl ected in part a clash of 
two strong personalities, but at the same time is revealing of a number 
of tensions and contradictions within the MSF organisation. Elizabeth 
Thompson has analysed the way in which a paternalist form of chari-
table welfare in the Lebanese and Syrian mandates during the 1920s 
gradually gave way to a ‘colonial welfare state’ in which Arab citizens 
no longer received benefi ts as a ‘gift’ but as a basic right, providing a 
powerful impetus to the eventual recognition of full political rights.27 
But in Algeria a peculiar hybrid situation continued, a mixing of chari-
table and state welfare functions, of which the MSF was symptomatic. 
One of the peculiarities of the situation in Algeria, as General Salan 
and the army assumed increasing control over civil government, was 
that the demarcation between military command and budgets and civil 
rule became increasingly confused and inextricably intertwined. This 
situation is illustrated most clearly by the mobile welfare teams (EMSI) 
which were pay-rolled by the civil authority (Prefectures), but being 
desperately short of funds, of vehicles, buildings and materials were 
almost totally dependent on the good will of local commanders to make 
these available. One of the most extraordinary, and under-researched, 
features of the Algerian War is the way in which all the organisations 
which worked on the ground to bring welfare to women and children, 
from the SAS/SAU to the EMSI and MSF, were literally reduced to forms 
of scavenging and make-shift fi xing, to get hold of or commandeer 
scarce resources from doors and cement, to second-hand clothing, soap, 
bed linen, tents and food supplies.28 Since, particularly in the bled, the 
army frequently constituted the only meaningful governmental structure 
on the ground and, with its huge budget allocations, monopolised most 
resources, the ability of women’s welfare organisations to function effec-
tively depended on the skill with which they could gain the patronage of 
local or centrally placed army commanders.
The wives of the senior generals, and in particular Salan and Massu, 
were ideally placed to infl uence their husbands, each of whom directly 
controlled massive resources on the ground, from army vehicles and 
drivers to stocks of materials. The ambitious Lucienne Salan had no 
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hesitation in playing a forward political role in the Algerian crisis and 
intervened directly to act alongside her husband and to advise him, as 
head of government, during the events of ‘13 May’.29 Through this 
intervention she gained immediate and privileged access to the civil 
and military apparatus in the General Government which was care-
fully managed by Jacques de Mari, a senior administrator (chargée 
de mission) in General Salan’s cabinet, while de Mari’s wife served as 
the general secretary to Salan as head of the MSF Central Committee. 
However, Suzanne Massu, who claimed to be ‘totally apolitical’, was 
incensed by Lucienne Salan’s imperious style of control of the MSF and 
her diktat as to how all funds were to be spent, including those of the 
regional Algiers committee that Massu presided over.
This tension led Lucienne Salan, in a rather extraordinary move, to 
set up a quite separate private bank account for her personal ‘social 
welfare fund’ into which she got General Salan’s cabinet to divert half 
of government relief funding. The single biggest government grant to 
the MSF in November 1958 of 60 million francs came from funds that 
were allocated in the budget for emergency relief to the poor (Chapters 
203–42 of Section D of the Budget), but diverting this from its proper 
use caused considerable anxiety to the head of the Civil Cabinet, General 
Hubert, who noted that he was already short of funds to alleviate the 
desperate situation of the population in regroupement camps and the 
victims of recent catastrophic fl oods.30 Thirty million francs diverted 
from the emergency relief fund was thus paid into Lucienne Salan’s 
private account and then disbursed by her, often to needy Europeans 
as much as to Algerians, according to her own whim and in a way that 
always presented it to the public as a personal gift (à titre personnel) 
from her private resources.31
Salan was thus able to bring to her position as ‘fi rst lady’ in Algeria a 
highly paternalistic and traditional style as an aristocratic dispenser of 
charity. From June to December 1958 she undertook an exhausting itin-
erary, constantly visiting with a team of assistants and army personnel, 
schools, hospitals, crèches, SAU centres and women’s groups in Algiers 
or going out on tour into the provinces. Always welcomed in formal 
ceremonies by local commanders, dignitaries, mayors, their wives and 
little girls offering bouquets of fl owers, Salan confi rmed her personal 
status and power as a benefactor through handing out to poor Algerians 
an endless stream of blankets, clothing, sweets and foodstuffs.32 But 
Suzanne Massu, who was described by journalists as the antithesis of 
the elegant and elitist Salan, always down-to-earth, dressed in a Prisunic 
dress and sandals, had little interest in fashion and was inspired by a 
more populist approach and a social conscience that was rooted in her 
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strong Catholic faith.33 Massu, in a barely disguised and barbed attack 
on Salan’s style of dispensing charity, told the press, ‘You know, I am 
not a “pretty lady”, wife of a prefect or colonel, who is going to bring 
sweets to the ordinary soldiers in the army hospitals. charity, pity, 
gives me the horrors!’34
Behind the scenes the differing approaches of Salan and Massu to the 
work and role of the MSF was fought out over the crucial issue of mem-
bership. In the early weeks of the MSF Suzanne Massu had set member-
ship fees of ‘adherents’ at a nominal 100 Francs, probably to be inclusive 
of the poorest Algerian women, but Lucienne Salan and her military 
advisers tried to raise this in July 1958 since, ‘we risk being infi ltrated by 
undesirable elements’,35 a not ungrounded fear since the FLN had given 
instructions for its female supporters to infi ltrate the women’s organisa-
tions.36 Despite these differences, however, Suzanne Massu was equally 
dependent on military aid. She, along with members of the Algiers 
regional committee, represented a ‘counter team’ to that of Lucienne 
Salan, and through the attaché Captain Pasquelin gained access to the 
resources of General Massu’s regional État-major. As the latter noted, in 
spite of the enthusiasm of the MSF women, ‘only the army can provide 
the framework and the “means” to set up such an organisation’.37 Why 
did the MSF organisers cling on to a style of welfare work that pre-
sented a public image of entirely voluntary or charitable assistance to 
Algerian women, when in reality this was only made possible through 
army resources and as an extension of the military apparatus? Firstly, 
most army wives, along with many other women on the colonial side 
of the confl ict, created a protective false consciousness in relation to the 
violent nature of the war being fought by the French forces. The destruc-
tive and inhuman aspects of French intervention, which were there for 
all to see, were dealt with by a whole complex of psychological tricks, of 
self-denial and wilful blindness. Here there was a fundamental refusal to 
acknowledge the possibility of illegal or morally unacceptable forms of 
army violence and, most crucially, to enter into any debate of the issue: 
for Suzanne Massu this blocking out was sustained through the myth of 
a water-tight division between the political sphere, controlled by males, 
a zone in which she refused to ‘intervene’, and the autonomous sphere 
of women’s voluntary work inspired by spiritual and Christian values: 
as such there existed a radical dissociation between the grim reality of 
the war being waged by the army (and her husband), and her own social 
work: ‘the weapon of us women is the sewing machine’.38 The feminisa-
tion of welfare relief, which was expressed by a discourse that empha-
sised the maternal instincts and self-sacrifi cing role of European women, 
a kind of ‘Florence Nightingale’ symbolism, served a very powerful 
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propaganda and media role in humanising what was a bloody colonial 
war. But in order to sustain this image the army was happy to conceal 
the fact that it funded this welfare work and, through the Fifth Bureau, 
determined the key propaganda campaigns in which it engaged.
What kind of support did the MSF fi nd among European women as 
it tried to expand its organisation across Algeria? At the top levels we 
fi nd that the list of key women involved in the MSF refl ected a roll-call 
of the names of generals and colonels and undoubtedly for any senior 
army wife not to have participated would have been regarded within 
elite army circles with opprobrium. In late 1958 Lucienne Salan decided 
to built up her private charitable fund through a standard letter sent to 
the directors and presidents of all major private companies in Algiers: 
in this she noted that the movement of ‘13 May’ and ‘fraternisation’ 
imposed on them an, ‘imperious duty’, and ‘it is essential that your 
spouse devotes part of her spare time to a circle of the Action Sociale 
et de Solidarité Féminine’.39 Non-participation could perhaps be inter-
preted as a signal of political disaffection from the ‘revolutionary’ 
movement and even have had negative implications for their husband’s 
career. But, sometimes we gain a glimpse of women who seem to have 
got involved with the MSF because of a genuine concern for the plight of 
Algerian women: for example, Mme Delignette, wife of a doctor in the 
small township of Rabelais, decided to set up a circle in October 1958 
since she had accompanied her husband in his tours of duty in the rural 
zones and witnessed the terrible poverty and suffering of the Algerian 
women.40 It seems likely that many ‘incorporated wives’ in Algeria, like 
those in the British colonies, were glad to throw themselves with energy 
into welfare work with the ‘natives’ because of the ennui that many of 
them faced in their daily lives when a supply of low-paid servants allevi-
ated even the need for domestic work, or because they were located in 
the small townships and army posts of the bled.41
However, given that far more European women in Algeria were of 
settler rather than metropolitan French origin it was noticeable how far 
the former were under-represented in the overall MSF organisation. As 
Captain Bernhardt of the Belcourt SAU noted, after the ‘fraternisation’ 
parades, ‘the impetus of Muslims towards France has not been matched 
by the impetus of Europeans towards Muslims. The young women 
who have responded to the appeal of Madame Massu are the wives of 
offi cers and engineers, foreigners to the country. The locals have not 
responded’.42 The EMSI reported frequently on the lack of support for 
MSF circles: thus from Palestro, ‘European women: one word sums 
them up – indifference. The emancipation of Muslim women is of abso-
lutely no interest to them’.43 This, as will be seen, was in part because 
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a signifi cant percentage of colonial-born women came from a ‘poor 
white’ or lower-middle class background and had little inspiration to get 
involved in such an elitist movement as the MLF and, more signifi cantly, 
because they shared the racial values of a highly segregationist colonial 
society.44 By contrast the ‘incorporated wives’ of army commanders, 
colonial offi cials and businessmen were largely metropolitan French in 
origin and so, as recent arrivals in Algeria, brought with them into the 
colony more liberal perceptions of both women’s and ‘native’ rights. The 
MSF leaders, along with army offi cers in general, shared a jaundiced 
view of settlers as racist, egocentric beings who, through their defence 
of entrenched privileges and a failure to recognise and accept the need 
for economic and social reform for Algerians, threatened to undermine 
a progressive agenda that held the only chance of  maintaining Algérie 
française.
This is signifi cant since, if we are to understand the values that 
underlay the model of female Algerian emancipation promulgated by 
the MSF, it is necessary to look for the origins of this more in the social 
and political experience of women in mainland France than in the con-
servative colonial milieu.45 There is not space here to give a full analysis 
of the post-war women’s movement in France, but suffi ce it to say that 
in general the majority of women active in the MSF were moulded or 
infl uenced by a conservative and predominantly Catholic culture that 
emphasised the ‘natural’ role of women as mothers, wives and guard-
ians of the home.46 The ‘familial feminism’ sustained by the MSF was 
one of domesticity (child rearing, cuisine, hygiene) that refl ected the 
contemporary bourgeois ideology in mainland France.47
This linkage to the metropolitan context is also shown by the close 
links that the MSF leadership established with the main women’s organ-
isations in France, particularly with the Conseil national des femmes 
françaises (CNFF) and its president, Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux. The 
CNFF, founded in 1901, federated numerous associations of women’s 
organisations, and represented the opinion of a largely privileged, 
middle-class constituency which campaigned for a moderate reformist 
agenda which, after the fi nal winning of the vote in 1944–45, included 
the advancement of women in numerous domains of education, civic 
rights, health, family life, employment and political education.48 As 
has been seen (chapter 1), Lefaucheux, in her position as French del-
egate to the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women, had a key role 
in the international movement for political and legal rights, and as 
president of the CNFF (1954–64) and of the Conseil international des 
femmes from 1957 to 1963, supported the post-‘13 May’ campaign for 
the emancipation of Algerian women. Lucienne Salan corresponded 
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regularly with Lefaucheux, and the latter welcomed a delegation of 
twenty Algerian and European girls sent by the MSF to participate in 
the 14 July parade in Paris, before heading an exchange visit of twenty 
French girls to Algeria.49 The MSF affi liated to the CNFF, and Salan 
and Lefaucheux liaised on a number of issues, most signifi cantly on the 
campaign to extend the vote to Algerian Muslim women in the referen-
dum of 28 September 1958. They also, behind the scenes, planned the 
move to stand three Algerian women in the parliamentary elections of 
November.50 One of those duly elected deputy was Nafi ssa Sid-Cara, 
later president of the MSF, who was soon promoted to Secretary of 
State in the Gaullist government and for whom Lefaucheux acted as 
Chef de cabinet and close collaborator during the meetings of the 1959 
 commission to revise the personal status law.51
The role of the MSF in the campaign to extend the vote to Muslim 
women and to reform the law on personnel status will be explored later 
(chapter 8): the concluding part of this chapter examines in more detail 
the local function of the circles and the problems of contact which they 
faced. By May 1959 the MSF claimed to have organised 438 circles,52 
but many of those in the bled, in the absence of European settlers, had a 
brief and rudimentary existence or were organised primarily by the EMSI 
teams (chapter 7). So the effective MSF circles were largely an urban 
phenomenon, located in the large cities of the northern literal or in the 
scatter of smaller provincial centres like Aumale, Bouira and Relizane in 
which their were enough women, the wives of offi cers, administrators 
and professional cadres, to support and sustain the organisation. Three 
circles, Héliopolis, Rio-Salado and Palissy, for which there exists a rich 
body of material, have been selected as case-studies to illustrate the 
inner workings of the local MSF.
An early experiment: the women’s circle of Héliopolis, 1957–58
Colonel Bravelet, commander of the Guelma sector and a keen advo-
cate of emancipation, was impressed by the work of Mme Tournemine, 
the wife of an offi cer, in creating two circles in the small townships of 
Héliopolis and Guelaa Bou Sba.53 Just before Tournemine returned to 
France, Bravelet persuaded her to write down the detail of the methods 
she had developed between August 1957 and June 1958 to make contact 
with Muslim women, so that this could serve as a model for future 
grass-roots action. The document she produced, Action psychologique 
féminine, is interesting for the inside detail it provides of how European 
women set about the task of establishing contact with Muslim women in 
the interior, and is revealing of the highly paternalistic and manipulative 
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attitudes towards those seen as child-like and suggestible creatures who 
required authoritarian direction.54
Tournemine, rather in the way of an amateur ethnologist or mission-
ary, outlined a series of progressive steps by which European women 
could enter into contact with Algerian women and manipulate and 
pressurise them to attend regular meetings. Firstly, working either with 
medical teams or alone, the European was to win the initial trust of 
native women through providing health care for them and their chil-
dren, and to gain entry to the jealously guarded private world of the 
home and family:
Use the occasion of this health care to go to their home, without ever 
forcing your way into their huts, which they will usually not refuse.
 Don’t be surprised by anything (the place, smell, fi lth, darkness, smoke, 
primitive tools or utensils). Nothing should put you out; copy right away 
their way of doing things; sit on the ground or on a bench, drink coffee 
just as it is offered.
 Respect their customs and modesty; gently but fi rmly brush aside their 
superstitions and their false sense of shame (the dirty amulets of the 
babies, poultices of rotten leaves on wounds, women refusing to undress 
for an injection or medical examination, etc.).
During the initial contact in the home the European should consolidate 
her infl uence through praise of the women’s children, clothes and uten-
sils and by gifts of sugar, coffee, medicines or sweets for the children. 
‘Before satisfying their heart and soul with kind words and good advice, 
you must fi rst fi ll the stomach and fl atter the coquetry of the women 
. . . They really understand nothing except when it concerns their affec-
tions, their children, their coquetry or vanity’. After an initial contact 
the European should begin to assert a series of escalating demands, the 
fi rst of which was to insist that women were properly clean and washed 
before any care was provided. If they should resist they were to be ostra-
cised, ‘walk past their hut without stopping, stay deaf to their appeals 
. . . “I prefer to go to see the neighbour”’, and if they tried to cheat, ‘get 
very angry’.
When trust had been established the next step was to gather the 
women into the fi rst meeting, which needed to be segregated in a closed 
space if husbands were to allow their wives to attend. The women 
should be put at their ease by inviting them to breast feed their babies, 
then speak for ten minutes to express your sincere friendship, explain 
that meetings were for French women of all faiths to unite, and that we 
all have much to learn from each other. What particularly intrigued the 
Algerian women, she noted, was if you talked of your own family and 
showed personal photographs. The initial meetings would be attended 
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mainly by older, often widowed women who were able to do so since 
they presented little threat to deeply held values of honour, and these 
infl uential matriarchs should be cultivated so that in time they would 
permit the young women (a particular goal of action), such as daughters 
and daughters-in-law to attend, ‘while still acting as strict chaperon’.
Particular attention was given by Tournemine to veiling and the tactics 
for its gradual abandonment. At a fi rst meeting the veil should be allowed 
to pass, but at the second, ‘invite the women to lower their “haïk” on the 
pretext that you cannot recognise them, that you cannot speak to “eyes” 
but only to “friendly faces”. To remain “veiled” is a sign of distrust’. If 
by the third meeting some continued to wear the haïk they were to be 
ridiculed by the European holding a veil to her own face, or bluntly told 
that only the very old and sick could do so: ‘If one or another persists, 
pretend not to know her, do not speak to her. She will not resist for 
long’. Then gradually the women should be persuaded to go as a group 
unveiled in public and, ‘two months later they will fi nd it  completely 
normal to go out into the street unveiled, even on their own’.
Tournemine showed a particular concern, common to the traditions 
of colonial administration, that the European must always retain psy-
chological mastery and infallibility over the ‘native’, since any sign of 
weakness could open a dangerous chink in the armour-plating of French 
hegemony. Thus the discussions in the circle should appear a free and 
open dialogue but, in reality, ‘you must always dominate, direct the 
discussion, while seeming not to do so, with much sympathy and under-
standing’. If the Algerians asked a question she was unable to answer 
it was imperative not to appear to lie or deceive while remaining in the 
driving seat, ‘say that you are going to look into this question in depth 
. . . The best means to never fi nd yourself inferior to them is to never lie 
. . . Appear in their eyes very strong and sure of yourself. Never give the 
impression of being afraid and, from time to time, set out to prove it . . . 
do not hesitate to appear very strict on occasions’. For example, it was 
often diffi cult to retain order when women pressed around during the 
distribution of food and clothing, ‘call on the soldiers, which is nearly 
always necessary, and whom they are frightened of’. Until this point 
in the text the relationship between Tournemine and the Algerians of 
Héliopolis, for all its patronising force, appears to be an intimate face-
to-face encounter between women alone in a courtyard or cactus enclo-
sure, but suddenly we become aware of the wider power relationship 
and context of this encounter. The authority of Mme Tournemine rested 
less perhaps, as she claimed, on her strong personality and moral force 
as an inherently superior European woman and more on the reality of 
military presence and coercion.
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Most of the accounts by European women of their work in the MSF 
circles or EMSI teams presents a discourse in which their relationship to 
Algerian ‘sisters’ is an immediate friendly and moral bonding based on a 
shared universal identity as women and mothers, while the ever-present 
retinue of army bodyguards and interpreters is not mentioned at all and 
rendered invisible. Now and again the façade drops to reveal the under-
lying power relationship, as in an account by the EMSI worker Ginette 
Thévenin-Copin of passing in the countryside a man riding on a donkey, 
followed by his exhausted wife on foot carrying a huge load of sticks. ‘I 
ordered the husband to get off the donkey, freed the women of her heavy 
load, and advised the husband, who did not seem to appreciate my inter-
vention, to put the pile of wood on the back of the animal’. It seems that 
the courageous young woman had single-handedly confronted what she 
called obnoxious ‘ancestral customs’, but then we become aware almost 
coincidentally of another presence: ‘it was then that the young soldier 
who was given the order to escort me said, “Pitchounette, perhaps you 
should not have done that, you have made yourself an enemy”’.55 The 
‘writing out’ of the military underpinning of MSF actions was neces-
sary to retain the illusion of a humanistic and progressive agenda in 
which the conversion of Muslim women must appear to be carried out 
with their full and voluntary assent since coercion would betray the 
 fundamental values to which the civilising mission laid claim.
Evidence of this ambiguity, one that underlay all social welfare during 
the war, can be found in the confi dential reports of Captain Schlumberger 
who organised a tour by Lucienne Salan through western Algeria in 
September 1958 to address rallies of both European and Muslim women 
to found or participate in MSF circles. At each location visited the Fifth 
Bureau would try and gather as many local Muslim women as possible, 
and then using loud-speaker lorries attempt to ‘heat up’ (chauffées) the 
enthusiasm of audiences, before they were addressed by Lucienne Salan, 
followed by distributions of clothing, condensed milk and blankets. 
Many thousands of these women were located in army resettlement 
camps and were living in tents. At Marbot Schlumberger noted, ‘A 
timid welcome. Appearance of poverty and mediocre health conditions 
– lack of milk and water’; at Pont de Caïd, ‘A hundred women giving 
a rather strained applause appear anxious: many of these families have 
been recently subject to regroupement and are without milk or food’; at 
Nedromah, ‘The women appear to be intimidated and frightened’.56 The 
question of the harsh conditions faced by rural women will be explored 
in more detail in the next chapter, but in relation to the everyday opera-
tions of the women’s circles it can be noted that even where European 
volunteers (or EMSI) were highly dedicated and inspired by genuine and 
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altruistic concern for the plight of Algerian women the relationship was 
always embedded in, or underscored by, the more or less visible presence 
of the colonial power and its armed might.
The MSF circles of Rio-Salado and Palissy
The local circles which have left the most detailed record were located 
in the Oran region, where the dense settler population in the prosper-
ous, wine-growing areas created optimum conditions for volunteer 
work by European women in small towns that bore a striking resem-
blance to the traditional agro-villages of Provence or Languedoc. The 
following account is based on the circle of Rio-Salado (today El Malah), 
situated sixty kilometres to the west of Oran, which prided itself on the 
being the fi nest in Algeria, and Palissy (Sidi-Khaled), a few miles to the 
south-west of the garrison town of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, HQ of the Foreign 
Legion.57
Of the two the MSF circle of Rio-Salado operated on the largest and 
most elaborate scale. At a foundation meeting held in the town hall on 
10 June 1958, attended by fi fty European women under Mme Rethoré, 
wife of the General in command of the Oran region and president of the 
MSF region, a multi-faith CAS was established headed by Odette Bour 
and three vice-presidents representing the Muslim, Christian and Jewish 
communities. Over the next year, this dynamic and well-endowed group 
found accommodation fi rst in a temporary building, the children’s 
nursery, and later in a permanent centre that it was able to buy with the 
assistance of local wine producers.
The CAS quickly set about investigating the social conditions and 
needs of local Muslim women by sending out teams of volunteers to 
visit them in their homes. This appears to have been the fi rst time that 
the women settlers of Rio-Salado, who lived in a highly segregated 
society, gained direct experience of the mass poverty that existed on 
their doorstep. Many of the townships that developed from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards in the Oran region had a bi-polar structure, 
with the settlers inhabiting the European administrative and commercial 
centre, and the Muslim population segregated in peripheral ghettoes 
or shantytowns commonly known as villages nègres. From the 1930s 
onwards, with the deepening crisis of Algerian rural society under the 
impact of colonialism, many thousands began to migrate to the villages 
nègres to scratch a living as day-labourers, a process that accelerated 
dramatically during the war.58
Although the archives of the Rio-Salado circle make no mention 
of it, the ‘village’ of Sidi-Saïd disguised the existence of a centre de 
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regroupement (see chapter 6), into which thousands of peasants from 
outlying farms had been forced by the army which destroyed their 
homes.59 Michel Launay, who studied the area directly, discovered 
that within the prosperous wine-growing arrondissement of Ain-
Témouchent in which Rio-Salado was located, the colons faced a 
problem of labour recruitment or demands for higher wages, which 
arose from FLN and trade union pressures, including total withdrawal 
of labour and strikes. The colons supported the mass resettlement of 
outlying peasantry into camps in order to undermine the FLN, and to 
create huge reserves of cheap labour, ‘disciplined’ by the army, on the 
door-step of each European township.60 By the later stages of the war, 
women and children within the camps constituted a particularly large 
pool of low-waged seasonal labour. Between 1956 and 1960 the French 
army decimated the population of younger males of working age in the 
arrondissement of Témouchent, some 5,000 men in a total population 
of 116,000, and this had left an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 widows and 
many more orphans.61 The desperately poor women in the camps and 
‘new villages’ like Sidi-Saïd, particularly since their husbands were dead 
or absent in the FLN, were forced to work, especially during the intense 
phase of seasonal grape-picking (vendange). The colons were glad to be 
able to tap into the pool of female and child labour, especially since they 
constituted a more docile work force that could be paid below the legal 
minimum wage for men.62
In October 1958 the Rio-Salado MSF organised one of the numerous 
petitions sent to de Gaulle for a reform of the law on female personal 
status (see chapter 8), and among the 837 women who ‘signed’ it (816 
of them by fi nger-print indicating 97.6 per cent illiteracy), were many 
from Sidi-Saïd who were categorised as widows and agricultural labour-
ers.63 Launay’s study suggests that the desperately poor inhabitants of 
the ‘village’ shared a culture of poverty that was marked by the ecstatic 
rituals, dancing, feasting (Ouahda) and hashish smoking of the Sufi  and 
marabout sect of the Aïssaoua: forms of populist hysteria and release 
that tended to oppose the more austere puritanism of the neighbouring 
douar of Messaada, a centre of Ulema culture and FLN activism.64 The 
European women of the Rio-Salado Committee, on fi rst ‘discovering’ 
the quarter of Sidi-Saïd, inhabited by over 4,000 Muslims located a 
kilometre from the colonial centre, seem to have been shocked by the 
conditions which they found: ‘During our daily visits to the douar, and 
in the Muslim quartier of the town, we discovered a frightening number 
of widows or abandoned women each with four or fi ve children in 
their care’.65 The MSF Committee soon began to recognise the crucial 
need for single Muslim women with children to work, most of them 
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as agricultural labourers, and to facilitate this established a crèche for 
150 children, an initiative which proved especially timely for the grape-
picking season. The local viticulteurs were generous towards a crèche 
project that supported their interests as employers by facilitating access 
to a large pool of cheap female labour, and they provided the funds to 
buy a permanent building to house it.66 But once the intense seasonal 
need for vendange labour was over many women were once again unem-
ployed and, to help alleviate this, the MSF opened a carpet-weaving and 
ceramics atelier that provided some income for twenty women.67 The 
MSF committee of Palissy was exercised by similar social concerns and 
its president, Mme Husson, reported the need to:
Get employers to recognise that a minimal basic wage exists (domestic 
staff) . . . To accept the dignity of each family by guaranteed work for the 
men, and for widows and abandoned mothers. Improvement of housing 
conditions, water supply, electricity, and heating. Guarantee of daily 
work (harvesting, the vendange, and pruning vines provide insuffi cient 
income).
Overall the MSFs of Rio-Salado and Palissy could do little to amelio-
rate the fundamental problems of mass underemployment and endemic 
poverty. The level of job-creation barely scratched the surface: the carpet 
atelier of Rio-Salado could only employ a tiny fraction, below 2.3 per 
cent of the 837 women with which they had most contact, while at Palissy 
the local Foreign Legion battalion provided only intermittent relief work 
for men on various public works schemes. In addition there is evidence 
that the call for intervention and reform in the job market, such as respect 
for a minimum wage, was coming largely from women like Husson who 
as recent arrivals from France were regarded as outsiders, while the local 
pieds-noirs community was deeply opposed to any move to challenge its 
entrenched social, economic and political domination.68 Settler identity 
was created and sustained by the founding myth of a heroic ancestry that 
as pioneers had cleared the ‘uninhabited’ malarial scrublands and swamps 
of northern Algeria single-handed and transformed it into an agrarian 
paradise: nothing was owed to the primitive and nomadic Algerian tribes 
that were incapable of unlocking such wealth.69
In Pallisy, after an initial surge in interest, European women quickly 
dropped away and Husson virtually ended up running the circle 
single-handed: she noted ‘the lack of European ladies that can serve as 
instructors is a major defi ciency’, while the idea for a crèche had to be 
abandoned. A collection for second-hand clothing in August so that 
Muslim children could return to school raised nothing at all, while 
a further appeal by the Mayor (president of the délégation spéciale) 
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Champtassint, as well as an army loud-speaker lorry, for funds or 
materials led to ‘nothing’. The Europeans of Pallisy appear to have 
turned their back on the MSF, or treated it with open hostility, and 
Champtassint, who supported the organisation, advised Husson not to 
make any further appeals for money or gifts in kind.70 The Pallisy MSF 
would clearly have collapsed without the support of the civilian authori-
ties and the army, which supplied some funds, materials, interpreters, 
cinema fi lms, EMSI/ASSRA assistants and other back-up.
At Rio-Salado, where the Committee enjoyed greater local backing, a 
second line of attack on the poverty of women was achieved through a 
classic, but well-policed, system of charitable relief. European members 
visited the homes of the indigent on a daily basis and established a 
dossier (fi ches) that recorded family information, social and economic 
position, and cross-checked or verifi ed this with identity cards and their 
employers: a system that must have caused much apprehension for most 
Algerians, and certainly for the FLN which, correctly, sensed an exten-
sion of army intelligence. The bigger colon employers in the Oran region, 
like the Spanish caciques and latifundia lords of Sicily, held almost feudal 
powers of granting or withholding employment that created a climate of 
fear among the ‘deferential’ workers of the region. In some instances the 
MSF gave advice to women and directed them towards the social secu-
rity, doctors or pharmacies, but material aid (wheat, semolina, clothing, 
milk) was only provided to ‘non-indigent’ women facing a temporary 
need. This would suggest that the Committee operated a screening 
policy through which, as in Victorian England, only the ‘deserving 
poor’ were to be helped, those Algerians that had the moral qualities to 
achieve self-improvement.71 Most astonishing of all was a report of the 
MSF that the main benefi ciaries of welfare were not Muslim women at 
all, but Europeans who received 80 per cent of all aid.
The standard activity which most of the circles across Algeria organ-
ised consisted of ouvroirs, sewing and knitting groups, in which women 
of the three communities could converse and break down the barriers 
of segregation, while at the same time engaging in useful employment 
(see illustration 7, p. 166). At Rio-Salado the women, ‘while knitting’, 
exchanged cooking recipes, while building trust between ‘women of 
different races and customs’. As has been seen for Héliopolis, a central 
idea was that Algerian women would absorb a progressive model of 
behaviour from their western ‘sisters’: the opening of the Pallisy ouvroir 
in the village hall was attended by 130 Muslim women with their babies 
where, ‘A dozen European ladies made good use of their experience and 
generously dispensed useful advice to their Muslim sisters’. The organis-
ers tried to increase attendance at such meetings through various forms 
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of light entertainment, including cinema shows provided by the army, 
singing of popular songs, or listening to the radio or carefully selected 
gramophone records (at Pallisy carefully selected ‘records of children’s 
songs’). A key objective was to reach out to the generation of girls or 
young women who were seen as more receptive to western infl uences. 
But as reported in Héliopolis and other locations, the MSF encountered 
initial problems with sessions being monopolised by more conservative 
and older women in order to protect the seclusion and honour of the 
young. At Pallisy it was reported that matriarchs, ‘come along for the 
pleasure of getting out, but refuse to learn to sew. It seems they wish to 
represent the family so that the girls, young women or daughters-in-law 
remain at home’.
At Rio-Salado a basic schooling was established for 150 young 
women who were taught some French and arithmetic, but most signifi -
cantly the essential European values of domesticity, hygiene and moral-
ity (politeness, correct behaviour). ‘The less evolved benefi t from advice 
relating to domestic life (lessons in cookery, cutting, dress-making, knit-
ting)’, and making clothing, ‘a skirt, a baby vest, a brassiere’72 or ‘dress’, 
was itself a means to draw girls away from indigenous towards western 
styles of dress. The national woman’s magazine of the MSF, Femmes 
nouvelles, contained endless images of the latest Paris fashions, such as 
‘the Winter 58 collection’,73 but instead of such styles being beyond the 
reach of its Muslim readers, they were encouraged to make their own 
dresses using the cut-out patterns provided in the magazine.74 At Rio-
Salado the success of this process of modernisation was quickly seen in 
a transformation of everyday comportment, in ‘the good dress-sense of 
the young girls’, ‘their correct welcome, the care taken with their clean-
liness, even their coquetry’, and their personal hygiene (cleaning teeth 
daily) and table manners. The Femmes nouvelles conveyed a similar 
message on how young women should learn ‘the secrets of elegance’ by 
knowing not only how to choose a dress or hat and appear chic, but 
also to learn an appropriate body language, how to stand properly or 
sit elegantly not with legs apart: ‘an art in itself’. At Pallisy the MSF 
entertained identical objectives through, ‘lessons in hygiene, cleanli-
ness, baby-care, morality, solidarity, the sense of duty, family life, and 
life in society’. Trivial as much of this may seem, as Norbert Elias and 
others have shown, the historical development of manners has been 
the very hallmark of the European concept of civilité or ‘civilisation’ 
(eating with knives and forks, use of the handkerchief) as opposed to 
the uncouth world of the barbarian or savage.75 The MSF circles were 
thus engaged not only in attempts to remove the veil, but also in the 
far more complex processes of inculcating a total savoir faire, a set of 
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manners and cultural bearings that revealed an assimilationist rather 
than integrationist agenda.
A second type of MSF activity, sometimes referred to as causeries, 
consisted of much larger weekly public meetings of women (and men 
separately), in which the presidents of the local circles, usually assisted 
by a team of interpreters, EMSI or local dignitaries such as the Mayor 
or army commander, addressed wider and more political issues, such 
as anti-veiling, the campaign for women to register and vote in the 28 
September referendum, and for reform of the law of personal status. An 
unusually detailed and revealing insight into the political operations of 
the Pallisy MSF is provided by a meticulous daily log, signifi cantly given 
the military title of a Journal de marche, kept by its President Madame 
J. Husson who, like Massu and Salan, had served in 1944 as an army 
nurse or PFAT. Husson constantly liaised with the commanding offi cers 
of the Foreign Legion based a few miles away in Sidi-Bel-Abbès. Much 
of this routine exchange concerned quite pragmatic issues of material or 
organisational aid for the cash-strapped MSF, such as the provision of 
a radio set or gramophone, old army shirts to be reused in the ouvroir, 
cinema projections, supply of army interpreters and small cash grants.
Husson’s journal provides evidence of the way in which the local 
Fifth Bureau exercised a direct control over the political activities and 
themes of the MSF. On 1 September Husson contacted Commander 
Hallo to gain clarifi cation of how the MSF Committee was to receive 
its instructions under the new post-coup ‘revolutionary’ framework 
of the CSP. Hallo replied that the local CSP, which should operate in 
parallel with the MSF Committee and support the same aims, normally 
received its orders from the Fifth Bureau, and a female member of the 
CSP should be delegated to regularly attend meetings of the Pallisy 
committee and serve as liaison. In reality most of the liaison seems to 
have been undertaken by Sous-Lieutenant Collin of the Fifth Bureau 
who was delegated to this role, and one archival photograph shows 
Collin deep in conversation with Husson, the Mayor Champtassint and 
his wife.76 For the most important political gatherings a senior offi cer, 
usually Commandant Grandidier, would share the MSF platform at 
public meetings and address the Algerian women. Husson, who could 
only address the Algerian women in French, was always accompanied 
by an offi cial translator, and in most instances this was again a service 
provided by the Fifth Bureau (Lieutenant Roche).
In the Journal de marche Husson reports on an important foundation 
meeting on 6 August to persuade the Algerians of Pallisy to support the 
infant MSF. This appeal, which was organised by the Fifth Bureau, took 
place in separate sessions for men and women. Because adult males 
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exercised close control over the behaviour and honour of women, and 
whether they would be allowed to attend MSF meetings, it was of crucial 
importance to win them over fi rst.77 At 11 am on the 6 August the men, 
fi rst drawn in by a short fi lm, were then addressed by Husson: ‘My 
friends, I thank you all for agreeing to help me in the diffi cult task that 
has been entrusted to me’, and afterwards, she claimed, they applauded 
and pressed round to ‘show their joy at having been understood’. A 
Fifth Bureau offi cer then replied in Arabic to questions the men might 
have about wages, social security payments and other issues. Husson 
then welcomed the Algerian women in a separate session at 5 pm:
I love you all.
I wish to help you progress.
I wish to turn you into complete women, truly happy and new women.
I am your sister, accept me! And love me like I love you already.
She was able to reassure them, following the meeting of that morning, 
that husbands and brothers would be supportive (‘they all understood 
me’), and then tea was served for everyone to get to know each other.
In a causerie on 4 September Husson spoke at length on the topic 
of the veil. By then, she claimed, twenty young local girls had shown 
a deep desire for ‘evolution’ and demonstrated this by permanently 
discarding their veils and handing them to Husson for safe keeping in 
the town hall, possibly a tactic encouraged to prevent families forcing 
them to retain the haïk. Husson praised this act of courage and asked 
all the girls and mothers present to do likewise in a collective unveiling. 
The president then supported this by arguing that neither the Koran 
nor Islamic religious leaders insisted on the wearing of the veil, and that 
Algeria, compared to Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and other Muslim states, 
was the last bastion of this practice. There was no shame in showing 
one’s face,78 and in moving into the public sphere to assert their rights 
as Frenchwomen, just as did the wife of President Coty who despite her 
public functions remained in high esteem.
It is diffi cult to penetrate through the glowing and self-congratulatory 
discourse of Husson, as of all leading fi gures in the MSF movement, to 
gauge how Algerian women participants viewed the circles or whether 
their ideas and behaviour were modifi ed.79 But at an important indoor 
meeting of the MSF at Palissy on 25 September to organise the immi-
nent referendum vote a photo-journalist on the stage clearly caught the 
segregated audience of unveiled women by surprise and the instinctive 
reaction shown to the camera fl ash by the rows of startled and anxious 
women, apart from the normally unveiled and smiling young girls, was 
to swing in unison away from the camera and to clutch their haïks to 
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their face. This would suggest that the MSF in Pallisy made little, if any, 
impact on the wearing of the veil. But in addition there is evidence of 
political resistance by Muslim women to MSF action in the townships 
of Rio-Salado and Pallisy.
In May 1959 General Gambiez, commander of the Oran region, after 
a visit to the MSF of Rio-Salado, supported the request of Mme Bour 
for an increase in the government grant from half to twenty million 
francs: ‘a rich work of fraternity has been pursued in depth . . . and in 
this radiant commune there is no longer any place for the OPA’.80 While 
it was the case that ‘pacifi cation’ was most successful in Oranie and pro-
vided the best conditions in Algeria for European women to organise the 
circles, even in these areas of massive settler presence the Algerian popu-
lation showed signs of deep, if attentiste resistance. Bour reported that 
due to the ‘events’ her group was not able to extend its activities beyond 
the town suburbs, suggesting a degree of insecurity in the surrounding 
countryside. FLN resistance simmered in the area and undoubtedly 
infl uenced local Muslim women, most of whom never attended any 
form of meeting, or, even when they did, could be secretly opposed to its 
objectives (as with the older women who attended to impede or control 
its effects), or drawn by a variety of motives from an interest in fi lm 
shows, to the handouts of semolina and clothing. The FLN had a real, if 
clandestine, presence inside the township: for example, Husson reported 
in August 1958 that the local mosque had been closed down by the army 
for several months as a ‘disciplinary sanction’. Two soldiers were usually 
placed to guard MSF Committee meetings, and on the eve of the impor-
tant referendum vote on 28 September the FLN carried out an attack in 
which one sentry was severely wounded. At a big meeting of the MSF 
on 9 October the commander asked the Algerian women if they had any 
requests, and one had the courage to ask that General de Gaulle should 
liberate their men who had been arrested two days earlier in relation to 
the attack. The commander, clearly angered by this, and responding in 
‘severe terms’, remarked that three or four terrorists had penetrated into 
Pallisy, ‘guided by the inhabitants of the village’, and several suspects 
had been arrested and ‘confessed’. The women had voted in the refer-
endum to stay French, but this was, he said, in contradiction with the 
attack: ‘If you ask to stay French, you do not become accomplices of the 
bandits (fellaghas); you do not engage in a double game’. In the referen-
dum the 234 Algerian women of Pallisy who had voted returned a 100 
per cent ‘Yes’ for de Gaulle, but concealed beneath this apparently total 
and unanimous support for the French government one has the sense of 
a deep, if usually un-stated, hostility to the MSF which, as will be seen 
later, only began to surface openly from the end of 1959.
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In conclusion it can be noted that the comparative study of empire 
tends to show that there was nothing particularly unusual about the 
French approach to carrying out welfare work with indigenous Algerian 
women during the period from 1957 to 1962. To date historians have 
examined most closely the situation in the British African colonies, and 
this work shows a range of welfare interventions by European women 
from the 1920s onwards that included, for example, training in mother-
craft, hygiene, diet and domestic sciences that bore a striking resemblance 
to the MSF and EMSI initiatives.81 In the case of the British colonies like 
Nigeria and Ghana, in which there was a relatively peaceful transition 
to independence, feminist historians have, in spite of their strictures 
about Eurocentric interventions in ‘native’ domestic culture, provided a 
sympathetic and positive picture of the considerable contribution that 
European women made towards achieving progress for women and 
preparation for a post-independence society. The role of metropolitan 
French women in the running of the colonial empire has received little 
attention from historians,82 but as has been seen the tragedy in Algeria 
arose from the fact that similar forms of welfare intervention that in a 
‘normal’ peacetime context might have been welcomed by all sides as 
part of a progressive agenda, was radically distorted and ‘corrupted’ 
by the military who hitched it to the purposes of ‘pacifi cation’. A few 
professional women social workers, as in the Centres sociaux, resisted 
this perversion of the welfare function, but more generally European 
women seem to have leant themselves to this process. As we will see in 
chapters 6 and 7, the irresolvable contradictions between emancipation 
and military violence became most evident in the work of the women’s 
welfare teams, the EMSI, in the peasant and nomadic societies located 
in the vast and sparsely inhabited interior.
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Military ‘pacifi cation’ and the women of 
Bordj Okhriss
So far the study of the MSF has centred mainly on grass-roots emancipa-
tion processes in urban society, but in many ways the French attempt to 
elaborate a strategy of contact was even more important in the isolated 
high plains and mountains of the interior since this is where 80 per cent 
of the population lived and in which the ALN maquis found its local 
support. This terrain provided an excellent base for the insurgents, 
zones that were almost impenetrable to modern armed forces, and in 
which the guerrilla fi ghters, knowledgeable of every sheep-track, cave 
and gully, could move with ease and quickly melt away to avoid any 
pursuing commandos. A fundamental problem for the army in the zones 
of pacifi cation was how to engage in actions that would destroy guer-
rilla bands, their bases and logistical support within the local peasant 
community, with all its attendant violence, and simultaneously win the 
population over to supporting the French political order through pro-
viding them with security, schools, medical centres, roads and a ‘higher 
order’ of progress and civilisation than the ‘bandits’ could ever offer. 
Algerian peasant women found themselves, as have women universally 
in so many theatres of war from Palestine to Vietnam, caught in the 
eye of the storm and in order to understand the diffi culties facing the 
EMSI teams, their success or failure in winning over the inhabitants (see 
chapter 7), it is necessary fi rst to take into account the context of insecu-
rity, the accompanying and contradictory violence of the armed forces, 
with which they were inevitably associated.
The historian faces little shortage of evidence, from participant 
memoirs of combatants to extensive archive sources, to establish the 
general features of military operations and their impact on local Algerian 
civil populations. What is singularly lacking, and diffi cult to research, 
are fi rst-hand accounts by Algerian peasant women of their experi-
ences of the war and how they related, if at all, to the attempts by the 
French to extend an emancipation agenda to them.1 Did Muslim women 
welcome or oppose the French initiative and how did this vary across 
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class, between for example those from an educated bourgeoisie and illit-
erate peasantry; across the complex map of Algerian space by urban and 
rural or regional affi liation; and through time, as the fortunes of each 
side ebbed and fl owed?2 Amrane, using the offi cial data of registered 
women militants, has been able to provide important statistical insights, 
but what is needed here is more in-depth, qualitative information on the 
mental universe of female combatants and ‘sympathisers’. Of the few 
interviews that have been carried out with Algerian women about their 
experience of the war, the majority have been with educated women of 
urban origin, and very few indeed have been with rural women, most 
of whom were illiterate and have left little if any record.3 In the absence 
of a detailed ethnography or oral history of the war,4 one of the most 
potent, alternative sources of information lies in the evidence of the 
many thousands of photographs that were taken of peasant women in 
the bled that recorded their contact with, and reactions to, the French 
army and administration and the various agencies, like the EMSI, that 
were designed to assist in their emancipation.
The most famous war photographs that relate specifi cally to Algerian 
women in the bled were taken by the young conscript Marc Garanger in 
1960–61. Garanger, an unoffi cial regimental photographer, based with 
his army unit in the isolated village of Bordj Okhriss 120 kilometres to 
the south-east of Algiers, was ordered by his commander to take identity-
card photographs of some 2,000 men and women located in the villages 
and resettlement camps of Aïn Terzine, Bordj Okhriss, le Mesdour, le 
Meghnine, S’Bara and Souk el Khrémis.5 While on home-leave in 1961 
Garanger, with the aid of FLN sympathiser Robert Barrat, was able to 
go clandestinely into Switzerland with his photographs and six por-
traits of women appeared in the Illustré Suisse with a text by Charles-
Henri Favrod with the basic message, ‘here is what France is doing in 
Algeria’.6 From the very beginning the photographs, like several other 
iconic images of Garanger such as that of the captured FLN commander 
Ahmed Bencherif, were associated with a pro-FLN and anti-war posi-
tion. In 1966 the images of women, reformatted from cropped ‘pass-
port’ size to more aesthetic waist-length portraits, gained the prestigious 
Niepce Prize, and in the following years were exhibited world-wide and 
fi nally published in 1982 as Femmes Algériennes 1960.7
The women of Bordj Okhriss were coerced by the army to remove 
their veils in order to have their photographs taken and the images have 
been widely interpreted, including by Garanger himself, as a symbol of 
the inherent violence of colonial domination and war, and capturing 
the moment when the women expressed their angry defi ance and proud 
dignity before the eye of the invasive camera.
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In each village the population was summoned by the offi cer of the army 
post. It was the faces of the women which impressed me so much. They 
had no choice in the matter. They were under the obligation to unveil and 
to let themselves be photographed. They had to sit outside on a stool in 
front of the white wall of a mechta. I was on the receiving end of their 
point-blank stares, fi rst witness to their silent and smouldering protest. I 
wish [in these photographs] to bear witness to them.8
Some of the women resisted having their photograph taken and one of 
them, Yamina Boukaf, told Garanger in 2004, ‘I remember very well the 
day the photos were taken. If I am not among them, it’s because I didn’t 
want to do it. When we had to go, I pretended to be ill’.9 In later years 
Garanger elaborated further on the conditions under which the photo-
graphs were taken: ‘I was circled by armed soldiers to take the shots. The 
response of the women to the act of aggression against them is visible in 
each of their expressions’.10 In the light of such comment, the dynamics 
of the situation begins to shift: as with numerous French accounts of 
contact with Algerian women, as with the EMSI and MSF in general in 
 8 Woman unveiled for identity photograph, Bordj Okhriss 1960. The tattoos 
indicate that the local Arabophone people still carried the trace of their 
original Berber culture
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which the presence of the military is occluded, we are suddenly made 
aware of the fact that each Algerian women is seated facing not only a 
lens, but also a line of armed soldiers. Similarly, no matter how peace-
ful and caring may seem the myriad depictions of EMSI nurses tending 
to Algerian babies and their mothers, French welfare intervention was 
always under the immediate or imminent sign of the gun, and no matter 
how much the Europeans protested it, the relationship could never be 
one of equality.
In 2004 Garanger was able to return to Bordj Okhriss for the fi rst 
time in over forty years and to locate and meet several of the surviving 
women, including Cherid Barkaoun, one of the two wives of the sil-
versmith of Bordj Okhriss. Here another detail emerges: the women of 
Bordj Okhriss, like most of those in rural Algeria, did not wear a face-veil 
but, if they wished to protect themselves from the gaze of a stranger, they 
could draw the loose haïk together with their hand. The conditions under 
which the haïk was removed were not determined by Garanger with the 
soldiers as a silent guard, but by the direct intervention of an offi cer:
In the beginning the women lowered their veil [haïk] which they draped 
over their shoulders, but kept their head-scarf. Immediately the offi cer 
demanded that they take this off too. This was a terrible humiliation 
for these women, to appear with uncovered hair in front of the French 
 9 Zohra Gacem, Bordj Okhriss, holding the identity photograph taken 
forty-four years earlier by Marc Garanger
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soldiers. Some literally looked at me to kill. Above all most of them 
expressed an incredible distress. This is the case here, as with Cherid 
Barkaoun. Her look tells us all about the drama she was experiencing at 
this moment.11
The identity photographs were ordered by the army command in 
a climate that was suffused with sneering contempt and racism for 
Algerian women: when Garanger placed the prints on the desk of a 
captain in the Aumale HQ, he called out to other offi cers, ‘Come and 
see, come and see how ugly they are! Come and see these baboons, just 
like monkeys!’12
The Femmes algériennes sequence provides powerful visual evidence 
of the nature of the interrelationship between the occupying French 
forces and peasant women. Here, what may appear to be a relatively 
low-key and mundane event encapsulates the climate of coercion and 
fear under which Algerian women lived constantly. Disempowered and 
voiceless, they were still able to express an inner resistance, or to use 
Marnia Lazreg’s phrase, ‘the eloquence of silence’, a defi ance and sense 
of integrity and honour that no humiliations could breach.
 10 Cherid Barkaoun, one of the two wives of the silversmith of Bordj 
Okhriss, expressing her distress
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The images of Femmes algériennes have been widely discussed and 
analysed, but mainly from a literary and deconstructionist angle that 
deploys critical theory to interpret the structure and meaning of the 
‘gaze’.13 However, there exists a danger in failing to provide a careful 
reading of these images that places them in a historical, sociological or 
anthropological context. The failure to examine the background encour-
ages a largely subjective approach in which the author is able, in some 
magical way, to tell us what the silent women looking at the camera 
are thinking and feeling.14 Subjectivity is here often grounded in the 
assumption that Algerian women and French forces were locked into a 
self-evident confl ictual opposition, a Manichean relationship between 
two homogeneous blocks, the oppressor and the oppressed. Algerian 
women universally hate and resist all things French, while all Europeans 
are part of the same, undifferentiated block of colonial oppressors. The 
problem with this, apart from the tendency to caricature, is to engage in 
an over-simplifying and reductionist approach that fails to note what is 
most interesting about the situation, the extraordinary complexity and 
internal divisions of the local society in which these women lived, and 
the often ambiguous relationship of Algerian peasants to the occupier. 
For example, Garanger took a number of photographs of the local 
harkis who fought with the French army, including intimate domestic 
scenes with their wives and children, and these women would also have 
been among those who had their identity photographs taken.15 They 
also may have objected to having their photographs taken, in breach of 
the code of female honour, but their attitude to the armed forces is likely 
to have been quite different since their safety from FLN assassination 
depended on the protection of the French. That the relationship between 
peasant women and the French was not always one of unmitigated hos-
tility is captured in another sequence of photographs that Garanger was 
able to take of women inside their homes, usually a forbidden (haram) 
space, since he was able to accompany a team of female welfare assist-
ants who had already established a basis of trust.16 Among these domes-
tic scenes are intimate portraits of women, smiling and relaxed as they 
breast-fed their babies, wove or prepared food.17
A further level of complication in the taking of these identity photo-
graphs is that, although described vaguely as intended for policing pur-
poses, and therefore as part of the apparatus of control and repression, 
they had also a more benign function. As will be seen in chapter 8, the 
French administration faced considerable diffi culty in implementing its 
emancipation agenda because of the failure, especially in isolated rural 
areas, to register births, marriages and deaths, and to constitute a civil 
register (état civil). The diffi culty in identifying women then carried a 
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number of negative consequences when it came to the implementation 
of various rights, including from September 1958 onwards the right to 
vote, the granting of family allowances, and the application of the 1959 
marriage law which included checks by offi cials to ensure brides were 
above the new minimum age of fi fteen years. The senior civil servant 
André Jacomet in December 1959 ordered a crash programme of reg-
istration, especially of women, and in September 1960 the Sub-Prefect 
of Aumale was co-ordinating major census operations in Bordj Okhriss 
and the surrounding resettlement camps.18 While identity cards were 
used to control movements of people they were also, and this is a typical 
contradiction of the war, a necessary part of trying to extend reforms 
and to create a functioning civil society.
The remaining part of this chapter sets out to move beyond the 
identity-card sequence, which has often been treated in isolation from 
the context in which the photographs were taken, by looking at the 
larger oeuvre of Marc Garanger, which consists of over 10,000 photo-
graphs that provide an outstanding and sympathetic record of both the 
daily life of the conscripts, as well as of the local Algerian community.19 
This record is unusual since not only was Garanger a professional 
 11 Smiling woman breast-feeding her baby, Bordj Okhriss 1960
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   215 21/7/09   12:16:22
216 Burning the veil
photographer who was left free to wander through the villages, but 
unlike most army photographers who were dispatched daily to cover 
specifi c military operations and events right across Algeria, the corpus 
provides an in-depth view into the life of one locale, a rural war zone 
that experienced the full brunt of confl ict as well as welfare reformism 
and emancipation. A second source of information about Bordj Okhriss 
can be found in the extensive army and civil archives for this area.20 The 
overall aim here is not so much to engage in a close critical examination 
of Garanger’s oeuvre but to use the region in which he was located as 
a case-study, a starting point, from which to illustrate the diffi cult and 
often violent conditions faced by Algerian rural populations during 
the so-called ‘pacifi cation’. It is with these conditions in mind that we 
then move on in chapter 7 to look more closely at the diffi culties faced 
by the strategy of contact, and in particular the EMSI teams that were 
 operating in zones of continuous violence, destruction and uprooting.
The military sector of Aumale21 to which Garanger was posted in 
early March 1960 covered a huge area of high and impenetrable moun-
tainous terrain, which towards Aumale sloped into the grain-farming 
region of the High Plains, and further south, the arid and treeless wastes 
of the Saharan fringe. Away from the main highways, much of the 
settled or semi-nomadic peasantry lived in dispersed farms (mechtas) or 
douars that could only be reached by mule along small dirt tracks, until 
the army, using bulldozers and corvée labour, began to blast strategic 
routes to supply military posts and control the interior.22 This huge 
zone, larger than the county of Norfolk, was, apart from the small 
towns of Aumale and Aïn Bessem, almost completely devoid of settlers, 
and in the quartier of Aïn Terzine in which Garanger was located, there 
were only ten civilian Europeans for an Algerian population of 14,000. 
Historically, through the early twentieth century, the pieds-noirs farmers 
had deserted the bled for the towns and, after 1954, because of FLN 
raids on isolated farms,23 this evacuation had accelerated further, so that 
by 1961 the tiny colonial population of the Aumale sector (2,328) was 
cooped up in the townships, outnumbered by a largely hostile Algerian 
population of 210,978. In this situation, redolent of a fragile American 
frontier society constantly endangered by turbulent Indian tribes, by far 
the biggest European presence (4,400 men) was that of the army.24
In this zone of low and unreliable rainfall and poor soils the great 
mass of the peasantry scratched a bare living from cereal and livestock, 
using primitive farming techniques, and the army reported that ‘eighty-
fi ve per cent of the population live in poverty on an average annual 
income of 200 new francs’.25 The men at Aïn Terzine faced seasonal 
unemployment for most of the year and, after the intensive labour of 
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the harvest, in which many worked as day-labourers or share-croppers 
(khammès) for bigger Algerian landowners, many were either hired by 
the SAS for relief work on road and housing construction or migrated 
towards Algiers and France.26 After a century of neglect by the colonial 
government the rural population of Aumale was almost devoid of any 
supportive investment or infrastructure, including basic medical provi-
sion and schools. For the whole sector of 200,000 people there were 
only fi ve civilian doctors in 1960, and before 1954 in the vast arid 
tracts of the south and mountain zones some inhabitants had never 
seen a European.27 One SAS offi cer reported, ‘No health centre, no 
civilian doctor, no technical assistant, no nurses, no welfare assistants, 
and isolation because of the insecure roads (Masqueray) or distance 
(Maginot)’, areas in which neither civilian nor military doctors were 
prepared to go and work.28
The endemic poverty and underdevelopment of the peasant and pas-
toral societies of the Aumale sector was in most respects quite typical of 
the deep rural crisis to be found across the mountainous zones of north-
ern Algeria.29 Such colonial exploitation and grinding poverty provided 
good conditions for the spread of the nationalist movement after 1945,30 
but Aïn Terzine was to play a particularly important strategic role 
throughout the War of Independence since the impenetrable mountain 
zone immediately to the north, the Forest of Bordj Okhriss, and to the 
south, the hilly Bougadouen, provided a refuge for the maquis of both 
the ALN and the opposing MNA. ALN units, in particular the hundred-
man Katiba 611, carried out constant attacks into the plains, cutting 
telegraph posts, laying siege to army posts, and ambushing patrols and 
road convoys, but their most important function was to provide secure 
resting places, food and local guides for long-distance columns bringing 
weapons and equipment from Tunisia via the Saharan fringes to supply 
the important Wilaya IV (Algiers) and Wilaya III (Great Kabylia) to 
the north. An army report noted: ‘A cross-roads too for the rebels who 
profi t from the strips of wooded and mountainous terrain to maintain 
their communications between the Ouarsensis and the Bibans chain, and 
to supply Wilaya III with livestock from the high plateaux’.31 During 
early May 1958 army intelligence tracked a convoy of 160 porters car-
rying arms supplies (a mortar, machine guns, rifl es, ammunition) as it 
moved from the south through the Bordj Okhriss Forest towards Haizer 
in the Kabyle mountains to the north: by the 4 June the French army had 
attacked this unit and killed ninety-eight men.32
By late 1957 the ALN maquis, having won a long and bloody civil war 
to defeat the MNA in this region,33 was at the height of its military power 
and it was at this stage that General de Maison Rouge, who had gained a 
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reputation for the successful pacifi cation of the Aïn-Témouchent region 
in Oranie, was appointed commander of Aumale. The crucial strategic 
importance of the sector was fully recognised by him as a cross-roads, ‘a 
veritable nerve-centre between the Mitidja, Kabylia and the Constantine 
region’, and General Allard on appointing Maison Rouge in January 
1958 instructed him, ‘Your mission is to cut Algeria in two between 
the Blida Atlas and the High Plateaux. If you succeed the rebellion will 
not be able to survive in the Algiers region’.34 This explains why Bordj 
Okhriss, sitting astride the FLN transit corridor and with a powerful 
maquis in the hills above, was the centre of intense military operations 
that impacted constantly on the lives of the local people.
Women and the maquis35
During 1955–56 the FLN began to recruit both qualifi ed and trainee 
nurses from the towns to go into the maquis to provide crucial medical 
care for wounded men in make-shift hospitals concealed in forest huts 
and caves. This professional core was expanded during 1957 through 
the arrival of lycée and university students, many of them fl eeing the 
towns to escape arrest by the army after the student strike of May 1956 
and the Battle of Algiers. These young women, the moudjahidates, led 
an extremely harsh and dangerous life,36 and as army operations pen-
etrated deeper into the mountains after 1958 they were, along with their 
ALN units, forced into interminable marches at night to avoid detection 
or encirclement. Often hungry, living in caves, lean-to shelters and holes 
in the ground, infested with lice, facing extremes of hot and freezing 
or rainy weather, the maquisards showed extraordinary resilience in 
tending severely wounded soldiers and, often short of medicine and 
equipment, improvising splints, herbal remedies, treatment of gangrene 
and amputations without anaesthetics or penicillin.
Equal, if not more important, to the ability of the ALN forces to 
survive in the bled was the day-to-day support provided by local peasant 
or nomadic women. When ALN units, which were almost constantly on 
the move, arrived in an isolated mountain village or desert encampment, 
the local women would volunteer (or be coerced) to improvise and cook 
for dozens of men in a situation where they and their children faced des-
perate poverty and food shortages.37 In addition the peasantry washed 
clothes, kept guard, provided shelter, carried messages and arms, and 
transported supplies into the mountains from the markets, shops and 
FLN depots of the towns in the plains. As one interviewee told Amrane, 
with typical brevity and self-effacement: ‘I was a moussebila: I carried 
weapons, I washed the clothes, did the cooking, collected money, and 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   218 21/7/09   12:16:23
 Military ‘pacifi cation’ and the women of Bordj Okhriss 219
reported any intelligence’.38 A maquisarde recalled, ‘The women of the 
hamlets helped us. All the hard work, it was them that did it: they milled 
the wheat, rolled the couscous, and made the bread. When we arrived 
exhausted, they had prepared the meal . . . They suffered . . . We, we 
could escape when the soldiers came and we were armed, we could 
defend ourselves’.39
The ‘domestic’ and invisible gendered work of the local civilian 
moussebilate and ‘sympathisers’, which was vital to the ALN maquis, 
went largely unreported in post-war Algerian histories and autobiogra-
phies by men who recorded their own heroic fi ghting deeds, and yet the 
peasant women and their children were far more exposed to the puni-
tive violence of the French army, including burning of houses and rape, 
than the younger, celibate and mobile men and women of the ALN. In 
areas like Bordj Okhriss in which the confl ict between French army and 
nationalist forces was most intense and long-lasting a high percentage 
of the able-bodied, married men deserted the villages in order to join the 
maquis, to escape forced recruitment into MNA bands, to avoid con-
stant army and FLN harassment, or to fi nd work in the cities of Algeria 
and France. The ALN, cut-off in the mountains by the army, became 
increasingly dependent on the liaison and support of communities of 
women: as a Kabyle peasant noted, ‘There are only women left in the 
village . . . The women have stayed behind; if the women had gone there 
would be no-one left to feed the fi ghters (fellaghas)’.40
Small numbers of moudjahidate operated in the ALN maquis in 
the Aumale sector, and in the mountains between Bordj Okhriss and 
Bouira.41 For example, army intelligence which constantly monitored 
the movements of ALN Commando 322–1 through the Forest of Bordj 
Okhriss during 1960 reported the creation of a new HQ camp for 
twenty men and one woman nurse, along with various food and clothing 
caches.42 The special French Commando units (Commando de chasse), 
like the ‘Kimono 11’, sometimes found women in ALN fi ghting units in 
the area,43 but far more important was the extensive supply role played 
by women living within the villages like Aïn Terzine and Bordj Okhriss. 
The OPA, the FLN clandestine political network, penetrated deep and 
silently into the social fabric of the townships of Bordj Okhriss and 
Mesdour44 and was able to infi ltrate militants into the main French civil-
ian and military institutions: for example, three town councillors were 
reported to be acting as FLN collectors in early 1960 and Gestraoui, a 
sergeant in the Mesdour harka, was arrested for FLN collaboration and 
was photographed by Garanger along with his family at the moment of 
their deportation.45 The battalion at Aïn Terzine deployed exceptional, 
but standardised, forms of violence to extract information from captured 
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ALN fi ghters or arrested militants. When men were intercepted during 
operations in the mountains or zones interdites they were often beaten on 
the spot,46 and while key suspects were whisked away for interrogation, 
other less ‘valuable’ fi ghters were killed under the guise of the infamous 
wood collection fatigues (corvée de bois) or ‘shot in escape’.47 Despite 
constant surveillance, numerous arrests and torture by intelligence offi c-
ers (OR), army reports reveal deep frustration at the ability of the FLN 
cells to recover and reorganise no matter how harsh the repression.
As the peasant population was uprooted and moved from the isolated 
mountain zones into camps, so the maquis became increasingly depend-
ent on food supplies that fi ltered in from the douars and markets in the 
valleys below. The important weekly market at Bordj Okhriss, attended 
by up to 2,000 traders who came in from miles around on foot or by 
mule and horse, was closely policed by the SAS soldiers (maghzen) to 
prevent foodstuffs reaching the ALN. A report noted the need to sup-
press, ‘the small-scale and un-monitored dealing in the douars. The pop-
ulation must be brought to make its acquisitions only with the retailers 
established in the markets and village centres, surveillance allowing us to 
detect if the purchases exceed the needs of the family’.48 But an army map 
showed that Bordj Okhriss continued in late 1959 to be the main supply 
centre for three maquis bases in the mountains to the north, north-west 
and south.49 Much of the provision supply into the mountains was 
effected by local women, and the sector commander laid down plans in 
November 1960 to intercept aid reaching the ALN from the re-settlement 
camps: ‘control of the night-time isolation of these New Villages, control 
over food supplies being taken by inhabitants of the village, especially 
women’, into the interior (bled).50 Commando units in the Aumale sector 
were constantly intercepting mule trains moving into the mountains, 
often accompanied by women, some of whom were married or related to 
ALN fi ghters, who fl ed on sight or were arrested.51 ALN units operated 
by establishing carefully hidden supply caches of arms and food scattered 
over several square miles between which they constantly moved, and as 
French commandos led by Algerian trackers located and destroyed the 
depots they found evidence of the sophistication of the support network, 
tons of potatoes, fl our, tinned goods (sardines, peas), coffee, oil, con-
densed milk, type-writers, transistor radios, medicines and clothing, 
some of which had been made by local women.52
Women, ‘pacifi cation’ and military violence
The women of the Aumale sector, as in so many other parts of Algeria, 
were closely implicated in the activities of the FLN and as the level of 
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army repression deepened after 1957 many of them, in the absence 
of males, began to exercise a degree of initiative and independence 
of action through ‘man’s work’ that had traditionally been denied to 
them by a conservative, patriarchal society.53 Algerian peasant women, 
playing such a key (but often ‘invisible’) role, became victims of army 
repression on a vast scale. It is necessary to grasp the nature and scale of 
such violence in order to begin to understand the diffi culties that welfare 
and medical teams, and particularly the EMSI, faced in trying to elabo-
rate programmes that would reach out to a constituency traumatised 
by war. The following section examines two kinds of violence, fi rst the 
direct impact of the French army on civilian populations in the zones of 
combat, and second the more insidious but destructive process of reset-
tlement (regroupement) that uprooted and dismantled peasant society.
Violence impinged deeply on the lives of women in the bled in many 
forms, including through the enormous mortality rate of husbands, sons 
and brothers. During 1958 some 70 per cent of all major operations 
in the Aumale sector were concentrated in Bordj Okhriss and the area 
to the south (Bougaouden) and here, between 1 January 1958 and 1 
October 1959, the army killed 1,870 ‘rebels’ and captured or wounded 
1,847.54 Certainly a good number of those killed in the ALN would have 
originated from outside the area,55 but the offi cial fi gures fail to include 
many of those men, including locals, who were summarily executed in 
large numbers. Some army commanders in the area regularly displayed 
dead fi ghters on the bonnets of army vehicles and forced terrorised vil-
lagers to fi le past the corpses as an ‘exemplary lesson’.56 The Kabyle 
writer Mouloud Feraoun describes scenes where, after mass killings by 
the army, distraught women, ‘are wandering on the national highway, 
crying with despair and anger. There is not one single man alive in the 
village . . . In Azouza, there are no longer enough men for the funerals: 
the local women have to perform that chore’.57 The ethnologist Camille 
Lacoste-Dujardin has recorded through the songs and oral traditions of 
women in the Ifl issen tribe of Kabylia the trace of the long-term trauma 
following massive destruction and death, the suffering, ‘of a depth that 
was until now unrecognised and which will leave them profoundly 
marked for ever’.58 The scale of the military repression in the Ifl issen 
was refl ected, a decade later, in a demographic catastrophe: of the young 
men aged twenty to thirty-fi ve in 1956, 41 per cent had been killed, 
adult women outnumbered men by over two to one, and traditional 
patriarchal families were radically dislocated, many households being 
now headed by single widows.
From 1956 onwards, as the army became increasingly aware of the 
direct involvement of Algerian women in the guerrilla, so attitudes 
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changed from ‘gentlemanly’ respect for the ‘weaker sex’ towards treat-
ing women with the same brutal violence as men, including summary 
execution, systematic torture and rape. The most frequent occasion for 
brutal treatment of entire civilian populations arose during major army 
operations in the more isolated mountainous areas, the zones interdites, 
in which the maquis forces were based. In May 1955 General Parlange, 
the commander of the Aurès region, issued a directive by which any 
rebel act of sabotage or attack would have, ‘as a consequence the collec-
tive responsibility of the nearest douar’, a policy that was extended to all 
Algeria in July.59 During operations that involved major clashes with the 
ALN the army regularly destroyed mountain villages by fi re, explosives 
and bulldozer, both as a reprisal and to force inhabitants, suspected 
of supporting ALN forces, to fl ee into the plains. There are endless 
accounts, like the following, which is typical of reprisal operation:
On the hillside I saw the advance of army sections into eleven villages indi-
cated by columns of smoke rising from the farm-houses, mills and shacks 
as they caught fi re. The next day the villages were positively plundered: 
not only did the units live off the land, but the shops were systematically 
raided, money stolen, the goods smashed, etc. The women were all herded 
together in order to place pressure on the men; they could not even go out 
to relieve themselves. While this was going on the men from whom one 
wished to extract denunciations were put to the ‘question’ [tortured].60
The reference here to using women as an instrument to place pressure 
on Algerian males leads to the issue of rape, a widespread practice by 
the French army that was long concealed on both sides, by ex-soldiers, 
the army authorities, women victims and the FLN. The occultation 
in French society of sexual violence during the war, a practice that 
most radically contradicted the self-proclaimed ‘civilising mission’ 
of the army, changed dramatically after 2000 following the revela-
tions by Louisette Ighilahriz of the implication of senior commanders, 
including General Massu, in her rape,61 the extraordinary Mohamed 
Garne affair,62 and the publication of Raphaëlle Branche’s La Torture 
et l’armée (2001).63 Branche has established the widespread nature of 
rape, usually a collective act, used as an expression of power, humili-
ation and revenge against Muslim Algerian society in its most essen-
tial values based on female honour and purity of descent: ‘through 
the woman, assaulted, sexually abused, raped, the soldiers got to her 
family, her village, and all the circles to which she belonged, right down 
to the last of them, the Algerian people’.64 Algerian men, often forced 
to look on, were humiliated in their most sacred role as protectors of 
women.65 On occasions French soldiers took trophy photographs of 
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their exploits in a standard pose that consisted of two mates ‘sharing’ 
a naked woman who stands like a prisoner between the two men.66 
While the extent of rape varied from one locale to another (some offi c-
ers would not tolerate such criminal abuse, while others were permis-
sive or turned a blind eye), it was generalised and certainly existed at 
Bordj Okhriss as elsewhere. Jean-Louis Gérard, who was attached to 
the intelligence unit at Aïn Terzine notes that in January 1960 the OR 
organised a ‘routine patrol . . . so that the lads could unwind’, and 
although he was opposed to what was going on, admitted that on one 
occasion, ‘I mounted guard outside while the others carried on their 
dirty work!’67 Jean-Paul Meurisse, a friend of Garanger’s at Bordj 
Okhriss, recounts how he arrived one day at Meghnine, ‘The boss was 
waiting . . . with a dozen women next to him. “My lieutenant, you 
choose”, he said. I was staggered. My predecessor had assumed a droit 
de seigneur’.68 A photograph of Marc Garanger shows an old woman 
wiping tears from her face at the door of the army post of Le Taguedine 
where she had come to complain to the commander de Mollans about 
the rape of her daughter.69
 12 An old woman protests to Commander de Mollans at the rape of her 
daughter by French soldiers
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   223 21/7/09   12:16:23
224 Burning the veil
‘Bernard X’ who operated with the Commando de chasse K11 just 
to the south of Bordj Okhriss notes that although their captain strictly 
banned such violence, on occasions a gendarme and SAS offi cer accom-
panied the unit because of complaints of ‘exactions’, and during an 
operation the commandos were astonished to see a terrifi ed woman 
and her two daughters appear, ‘their faces were covered with mud 
and blood, which gave them the appearance of spectres . . . it was to 
protect her daughters from eventual violence by the soldiers’.70 This was 
undoubtedly a form of magical protection and mothers’ traditionally 
left their new-born babies dirty in order to ward off the evil eye.71
Rape, although not constituting a system of ethnic ‘pollution’ and geno-
cide as during the Balkan war, led to many unwanted pregnancies. Feraoun 
reported how during major operations the army behaved as if they were in 
a ‘free brothel’: at Aït Idir, ‘only twelve women are willing to admit that 
they were raped’, while people have ‘counted fi fty-six bastards in a village 
of the Béni-Ouacifs’.72 In some instances abortions were carried out, but 
some women were able to stand strong against the enormous weight of 
male values of lineage and honour and insisted on keeping and raising the 
children. Mimi Ben Mohamed, a senior nurse who worked in a maquis 
near Palestro, to the north-west of Aïn Terzine, remarks that when they 
raised the issue of rape and pregnancies with the Commander Si Lakhdar, 
his suggestion was to kill the babies. ‘“No, that’s impossible”, objected the 
nurses, “we cannot kill the innocent. The kids have nothing to do with it, 
neither do the women since they were taken by force” . . . and in effect the 
women did not do it, but kept all these children. The fathers did not want 
to have these children, but eventually they kept them’.73
While army brutality against women assumed direct and overt forms, 
such as bombing of villages with napalm, rape and killings, a less direct 
but more generalised form of violence arose from the policy of popula-
tion regroupement. This highly destructive uprooting of the peasantry 
needs to be understood within the wider context of the process of ‘pacifi -
cation’. As was seen in chapter 2 the Operation Pilot experiment in the 
Dahra tested the pacifi cation of isolated rural zones controlled by the 
ALN in a series of stages and proved so successful that from late 1957 it 
was extended into other areas of Algeria. Under the impulse of General 
Challe, army strategists further refi ned the Pilot model into a standard 
four-stage process for the ‘reconquest’ of ‘rotten’ zones.74 This involved a 
fi rst phase of intense military action against the ALN maquis using huge 
sweep operations and newly formed Commandos de chasses, mobile 
units that included harki trackers that pursued the enemy night-and-day 
inside the zone interdite or free-fi re areas. In a second phase, the inhabit-
ants of the mountainous interior were to be evacuated by force, their 
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villages destroyed, and resettled in militarised camps protected by army 
posts. Third, once removed from FLN pressure and terror, the popula-
tion in the camps would fi nd the confi dence to establish their own armed 
auto-defence units and to provide an increasing fl ow of intelligence about 
ALN networks and collaborators. When security had reached a safe level 
in a particular area, now designated a ‘quartier de pacifi cation’, the army 
could reduce its presence and move on to repeat the process in an adjacent 
rebel zone. Finally, the ALN would have been virtually destroyed and the 
army could hand over security to the SAS and their maghzen guards, 
and simultaneously engage in economic and social welfare programmes, 
including the EMSI, women’s circles and female emancipation.75 At the 
core of the pacifi cation programme was the mass resettlement of the rural 
population into camps, a process aimed to achieve, according to the 
Maoist dictum, the ‘draining of the swamp’ so that the guerrillas would 
no longer move around like fi sh in water, but be left stranded from their 
support base. By the end of the war three million people, up to half of the 
rural Algerian population, had been uprooted and had either fl ed to 
urban shantytowns or been confi ned in vast, soulless camps surrounded 
by barbed-wire and look-out towers, where many starved.76
This standard strategy was implemented by General de Maison 
Rouge in the Aumale sector after January 1958. In a key briefi ng to the 
Prime Minister during his offi cial tour to Aumale in February 1959, 
Maison Rouge noted that the rich agricultural valley near Bouira had 
been chosen as a ‘pilot priority zone’, and this was now well advanced 
through resettlement. Having procured this area, pacifi cation was now 
being extended southwards into the Aumale sector, fi rst to the quartier 
of La Baraque, and then on towards Aïn Terzine where ‘the forest of 
the Oued Okhriss to the East [of Aumale], classifi ed as a zone interdite, 
and the termination of the mountain chain of the Bibans and Monts du 
Hodna, constitutes a zone of communication with Tunisia that is crucial 
to the rebels . . . Search and destroy operations are necessary here in 
1959, but also the total regroupement of the population which is the 
only means to deny the rebels’ food supply and shelter’.77
The ‘rolling’ programme of the Challe juggernaut that marched 
through Algeria from west to east through 1959 to 1961 came to focus 
its attention specifi cally on the quartier of Aïn Terzine during 1959: a 
new Commando de chasse ‘Kimono 13’ was formed and based here 
in March to destroy the last remnants of the ALN in the hills above78 
and a programme of resettlement was accelerated. During the year 
between June 1959 and June 1960 a sequence of camps was planned 
by the Algiers architect Bouvet in the Aïn Terzine quartier at Mesdour, 
Guetrini, Souk el Khémis, de Mettane, Tagdid, Bordj Okhriss, Tarfa, 
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S’Bara and Meghnine.79 The number of camps in the Aumale sector, or 
what were now called ‘New Villages’, increased rapidly from twenty-
fi ve centres in March 1959, housing 931 families, to sixty-seven centres 
in November 1960, and the objective was to fi nally house 60 per cent of 
the population in this way.80
As early as May 1957 the SAS of Bordj Okhriss had reported that 
the inhabitants, living in dispersed settlements, were so exhausted by 
the constant raiding by opposed nationalist forces (MNA, ALN) seizing 
men, livestock, money and food supplies, that they were demanding 
return of their confi scated guns to mount an auto-defence against men 
from the north, the ‘Kabyles’. The SAS expressed the ambiguity of the 
position in June 1957, ‘the peasants wish to be protected by the army, 
but do not seem to want to openly take sides against the HLL [hors-
la-lois or bandits]’.81 By 1959 senior offi cers in Aumale were reading 
in a far more doctrinaire way the confusion and desperation of the 
peasantry as a sign of their moving to the French side and actively 
supporting regroupement: thus in November 1959, the Aumale com-
mander noted, ‘the population hopes more and more for peace and is 
very favourable to the regroupements in the New Villages. They are 
working hard and courageously to build them and one can assert that 
where a good preparation has been undertaken on the material and 
psychological plane, a real social transformation is under way’.82 The 
thinking of the military was that camps would not only isolate the FLN 
from its support base in the local population, but also by concentrating 
the peasantry in quasi-urban centres with shops, schools, dispensaries 
and electricity would have a transformative function in modernising 
the culture and mentality of Algerian women and their families, a 
 pre-requisite of emancipation.
Nowhere in the extensive army documentation for Aumale and Bordj 
Okhriss is there any mention of local Algerian opposition to regroupe-
ments. For one signifi cant incident on 20 May 1960 the battalion log 
states laconically, ‘CCAS: removal work ROUABAS’,83 and if it was 
not for Garanger’s photographs this moment of resistance would have 
remained meaningless or passed into oblivion. The inhabitants of the 
douar of Rouabas at Aïn Terzine had just been informed of a deci-
sion to resettle them in the camp of Meghnine or Bordj Okhriss, and 
all the men, including village elders, marched in a fi le to complain to 
the Commander de Mollans, who ordered a ‘half-track’ machine-gun 
(CCAS) to halt their advance.84
The photographs show that the protest was an all-male affair, entirely 
in keeping with this patriarchal society in which men were the sole polit-
ical actors, yet for the ‘invisible’ women of Aïn Terzine regroupement 
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would have carried particularly tragic consequences, not only in the 
direct form of deepening hunger and illness, infant mortality and mate-
rial poverty, but through the destruction of the home, a deeply religious 
and magical space that in Algerian tradition ‘belonged’ to women, and 
its replacement by a sterile western form that disrupted customary prac-
tices and symbols.85 The elders negotiated with de Mollans: ‘What you 
are doing is inhuman. You are deporting us. We cannot cultivate our 
land. What are we going to live on?’, who replied, ‘I understand your 
situation and I am sorry. But I can’t do anything: it’s an order from the 
colonel’. But Garanger knew this was completely untrue, de Mollans 
personally made this decision because he felt insulted by the night-time 
movement of the FLN among the Rouabas fraction, ‘under his very 
windows’.86 From the beginning forces in the maquis had recognised the 
danger of such regroupments to its own support base, and in September 
1957 the MNA was trying to force families that had fl ed to Bordj 
Okhriss for safety to return to their farms.87
There is a considerable body of evidence which shows that the 
uprooting of the peasantry and the ‘fi xing’ down of pastoral nomads 
carried particularly devastating implications for women and children 
throughout Algeria. The inhabitants of entire douars were forcibly 
 13 A machine-gun ‘half-track’ blocking the advance of a column of 
men come to protest against the imminent resettlement of the douar of 
Rouabas
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removed from their ancestral lands by the army and their houses were 
burned down or demolished.88
Often this was carried out by the military without any prior planning 
and construction of reception centres, so that the refugees were dumped 
in virtual prison camps. Commander Florentin of the Inspection géné-
rale des regroupements, in a devastating critique of resettlement, noted: 
‘The population fl ees empty-handed and a human avalanche streams 
towards the valleys that are under the control of the army but where 
nothing has been prepared to receive them . . . The people are penned 
behind barbed-wire around a small, neo-burgrave style fortress’.89
In the ‘temporary centres’ the inhabitants, often parked behind 
barbed-wire entanglements, lived in tents or bivouacs until the army 
could fi nd the materials and deploy refugee labour to build more perma-
nent houses.90 The new locations, often far removed from the village of 
origin now in zones interdites, meant that the peasants were unable to 
work their fi elds or herd livestock, and the population began to suffer 
from serious malnutrition, disease and catastrophic infant mortality. On 
average in camps with over 1,000 people one infant died every two days, 
14 Aerial view of peasant houses destroyed by the French army during 
resettlement in the region of Bordj Okhriss
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mainly from malnutrition, and on a visit to one centre Michel Rocard, 
the future Prime Minister, remarked to an offi cer that he seemed not too 
upset when a baby died in his arms, ‘He replied, “Monsieur, this is the 
fourth in three days”’.91 The SAS offi cer of Bordj Okhriss reported on 
‘the deplorable health conditions in the regroupement of Mesdour’ and 
other centres, and the high incidence of typhoid, tuberculosis and other 
diseases.92 The standard houses designed for the settlements were too 
small and lacked in insulation, boiling in summer and freezing at night 
or in winter, and they were placed in geometrical grids that reproduced 
the soulless layout of military barracks.93
Deprived of their traditional economic base as farmers and herders 
the inhabitants of the camps were reduced to desperate poverty, and 
a demoralising dependency on army handouts of food, clothing and 
blankets. General Parlange, who headed the camp inspectorate, spoke 
of a veritable ‘burned-earth’ policy, and of a radical dislocation of tra-
ditional family structures and a process of turning people into tramps 
(clochardisation):the traditional social hierarchies are over-turned, and 
the taste for work, when it existed, disappears since it is easy to become 
a client of the Public Assistance. In brief, moral degradation, encouraged 
by over-crowding, accelerates and threatens to become generalised . . . 
the means to engage in farming are abandoned, with fi elds too distant, 
15 Aerial view of the military resettlement camp of Mesdour, north-east of 
Bordj Okhriss
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pack animals lost or sold; it’s total ruin and the uprooted settle down with 
 fatalism into a life of poverty.94
Garanger’s identity photographs were taken in the newly founded 
settlement camps, and the subjects constituted a virtual refugee 
population that had been dramatically uprooted. The attitude of each 
individual can only be guessed at, but the overall context was one of 
ambiguity towards an occupying force that offered on the one hand 
some degree of protection, medical aid and food, and on the other 
was destroying their homes and an existing way of life, and complicit 
in extreme brutality, rape and murder. On rare occasions even the 
command acknowledged the impossible contradictions of such a war: 
as General de Maison Rouge told the Prime Minister in February 
1959, to crush the FLN networks (OPA) would require a long process, 
‘and requires a hardening of methods towards the population which is 
in contradiction with the policy of détente undertaken since the month 
of May [1958]’.95
Civil war, insecurity and attentisme
This fi nal section aims to show that peasant women were not faced with 
a simple choice of allegiance to one of two sides, the ALN or the French 
army, but by the extraordinary ambiguities and contradictory pressures 
of civil war. The apparent ‘silence’ of women was not only an expression 
of ignorance, illiteracy and seclusion, but also of a family or clan-based 
omerta. The French attempts to emancipate women, to extend a strategy 
of contact to the bled, was faced not only with problems of language 
and communication, but also with impenetrable forms of defensive 
silence behind which lay concealed the ‘hidden transcript’ of peasants 
skilled in the arts of verbal resistance.96
That the confl ict in Algeria was as much a civil war as a war of decolo-
nisation is highlighted by the fact that the 200,000 Algerian soldiers and 
auxiliaries (supplétifs) fi ghting on the French side greatly outnumbered 
the 50,000 men in the ALN.97 As Mohand Hamoumou notes, the reason 
why some Algerians joined the French forces and others the FLN cannot 
in many instances be understood through the ideological decisions of 
these individuals, by ‘a “political” grid’, but rather by ‘local contingen-
cies’, such as blood-feuds between local families, tribal allegiances and 
disputes over property.98 Stathis Kalyvas has analysed the intimacy of 
civil war violence, how in small-scale, face-to-face social settings the 
tensions and confl icts of peacetime (disputes over land, livestock, mar-
riage alliances, insults and honour) that were normally mediated and 
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settled, now became the basis of denunciation that unleashed deadly 
force, and pitted neighbour against neighbour.99
At the outbreak of the Algerian War on 1 November 1954, the major 
nationalist movement was the MNA led by Messali Hadj. It took the 
FLN until late 1957, after a long and bloody internecine battle for 
power, to assert its dominance. However, the situation was unusually 
complex in the region of Bordj Okhriss since, until the end of the war in 
1962 this continued to lie on the frontier between the MNA, a predomi-
nantly ‘Arab’ movement that continued to survive as a powerful force 
entrenched within Wilaya VI to the south of Aumale, and the ALN that 
fi ltered southwards from its Kabyle stronghold to the north. The French 
secret services provided funding, arms and equipment to a number of 
MNA groups in the south led by Bellounis,100 Si Cherif and Rabah 
Benaissi who, acting more like freebooting war lords than regular sol-
diers, engaged in cattle raiding, forced recruitment and other depreda-
tions. For example, a Bellounis force of fi fty to sixty men surrounded the 
mechta of Sidi-Abdelkader on 25 January 1958 and seized ten men as 
recruits, along with a large stock of cows, goats, sheep and mules; ‘They 
then rounded on the women whom they thrashed, in the absence of their 
husbands’.101 The Bellounist force, secretly funded by the French from 
May 1957 until July 1958, placed constant pressure on the population 
of the Bordj Okhriss area for money, supplies and recruits.102 Although 
Bellounis, who proved recalcitrant to French control, was fi nally tracked 
down and killed by the army on 14 July 1958, the bands of Si Cherif 
and the ex-Bellounist Benaissi continued to operate until at least 1961. 
General de Maison Rouge, who had turned against Bellounis in May 
1958,103 was by early 1959 facing the same problems with Si Cherif: as 
he informed Michel Debré during his tour of inspection, ‘But with 800 
men in arms, living like rebel bands whose exactions are very diffi cult 
and never entirely preventable, he is the cause of incessant problems. In 
fact he operates more often for himself than for France and often acts 
outside the bounds of legality’.104 Ex-MNA guerrillas were constantly 
disbanding or rallying to join the French army as harkis, or crossing 
over to the ALN side. So anarchic and confused was the situation in 
the Aumale sector, with an incessant ebb-and-fl ow of MNA and ALN 
units, that it became increasingly diffi cult for both the French and local 
populations to distinguish one side from the other. By the summer and 
autumn of 1959 the SAS of Maginot reported that the French-backed 
forces of Si Cherif was running amok, engaging in rape, kidnapping and 
drunken violence: ‘it is certain that the FLN benefi ts from the support 
of the population which has suffered too much from the violence of the 
Djich without the latter ever being brought to account’.105
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The peasants of Bordj Okhriss were caught in a complex and paralys-
ing web of confl icting interests: they faced not simply a split between 
the French occupier and Algerian nationalists, but a triangle of MNA, 
ALN and French-harki forces. Both the MNA and the FLN demanded, 
on pain of death, monthly payments, food supplies and male fi ghters, 
a burden that impoverished peasants could barely sustain, while the 
French threatened to arrest, torture and even liquidate anybody who 
did so. The state of confusion and paralysis affecting the peasants was 
described by the SAS offi cer for Bordj Okhriss when on 11 May 1957 
1,200 people crowded onto the market place to express their predica-
ment to the French authorities: ‘The population, without protection, 
abandoned to the violence of the rebels, no longer know what to think 
and the differences of opinion and action that daily are becoming more 
intense inside the ranks of the nationalist movements leaves them facing 
a situation that they no longer understand’.106 The offi cer saw the 
opportunity here for the villagers to move over to the French side and to 
set up an auto-defence force that would enable them to stand up against 
both MNA and ALN, but this hope was constantly frustrated by a deep 
‘mutual mistrust’ and what was generally referred to as a psychology 
of attentisme. By 1960 the situation had barely improved, and the SAS 
reported that the FLN was locked into major confl ict with the MNA 
infi ltrating into Bordj Okhriss from the south, ‘but the different organi-
sations are so closely intermingled that it is often diffi cult to identify 
them. Overall the population of these regions is disconcerted and pulls 
back further into itself’.107
The term attentisme is not easily translated: for the French authorities 
this was often used in a conventional sense of a ‘wait and see policy’, 
that during a long war in which it was unclear which side would be the 
ultimate victor, it was wise to hedge one’s bets by retaining a certain 
neutrality and by not becoming too closely associated with one side or 
the other.108 But attentisme, a refusal to declare one’s hand, had a far 
more potent logic: in small and isolated communities like Aïn Terzine 
and Bordj Okhriss in which everybody knew everyone else, the total 
networks of family, fraction and other kin alliances, and in which it was 
impossible to move or carry out the smallest transaction without being 
observed, the best chances of survival from MNA or FLN gunmen or 
harkis violence was to remain silent. The climate of distrust and fear 
was accentuated by the fact that each side cultivated informers, among 
them the grocer of Rouabah, Saadi Riah, who tried to survive ALN 
and French pressures by supplying both with information. Garanger 
describes him less as a collaborator than a poor victim: ‘He was quite 
simply trapped by this war. His behaviour was typical of local notables, 
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carried away on a storm that was beyond them, on which they had no 
grip, and who desperately tried to protect their interests, those of their 
relatives and of their village or hamlet’.109
The journal of Mouloud Feraoun provides a rare insight into the 
mechanisms of attentisme in Kabyle village society: the writer, able 
only to confi de to his diary, expresses a Kafkaesque climate of paranoia 
in which neighbours were unsure of who might be acting as informer 
for FLN or army, and who may be falsely denouncing another to settle 
scores for old quarrels over land and honour. In April 1957 Feraoun was 
told by an old man how he was travelling on a bus which was stopped 
by the army: everyone was ordered out and a local informer pointed men 
out. ‘My God, I was afraid. He could have pointed his fi nger towards 
me. He had reasons to. Last year, his father sold me a mortgaged fi eld. 
I sued him and won. And last year I beat up their shepherd when he let 
his herd damage my young fi g trees. Yes, I beat him up. And I won my 
suit. That young recruit could have avenged himself using the army, 
and I was afraid’.110 The people, noted Feraoun, ‘have nothing to say 
to one another’ but pass by and ‘hastily exchange a weary and mean-
ingless greeting . . . It is as if each person feels trapped and sealed in an 
airtight bell jar’. The streets are empty, but ‘there are shadows moving 
about . . . Given this situation, you must trust no one, because words 
misunderstood are often misinterpreted’, like the old woman fi ned for 
a hasty comment, or Hocine’s sister-in-law executed because she spoke 
‘ill of them’.111
In the Aïn Terzine quartier the same forces were at work: the SAS 
and intelligence offi cers continually expressed their frustration with the 
attentisme of the population, estimated at 70 per cent in 1959,112 and 
their inability to uncover what was going on under the surface of local 
society. The better-off avoid talking, ‘they sit on the fence and continue 
to give promises to both sides’, or the people are ‘thrown off balance 
and fall back even more on themselves’, and Algerians told SAS offi cers 
what they want to hear so they produced radically different versions of 
‘the deepest thoughts of the population’.113 In places the archive pro-
vides a hint of the internal splintering at work. In November 1956 three 
men of the Ouadi family of Bordj Okhriss were assassinated by either 
the MNA or FLN, and the following year another member was threat-
ened by a money collector in the market who said, ‘You are crazy. I saw 
the rebels yesterday evening and I spoke to them about you (the Ouadi) 
– You can be allowed to go back home by paying 100 or 150,000 Frs. 
This is nothing compared to what you own (your farm is worth nearly 
two millions). – Anyway France is the loser and will abandon you – You 
will then see what position you fi nd yourself in’. Not surprisingly the 
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Ouadi appear to have sought safety by joining the SAS maghzen and 
in July 1960 this included two soldiers from the family.114 It was not 
uncommon for extended families to have men fi ghting on both sides, and 
in some instances having a foot in both camps was a deliberate group 
insurance policy against the unpredictable outcome of the war.115
To conclude, with the background knowledge of the situation in 
Bordj Okhriss, it can be seen why the response of Muslim women to the 
French presence was so complex and diffi cult to decode. Some of the 
women who faced Garanger’s lens had husbands, brothers or sons who 
were in the maquis, or who had been arrested, imprisoned or killed by 
the army. Others, like the young woman from Mesdour on the cover of 
Femmes algériennes, had had their villages destroyed and been moved 
behind the barbed wire entanglements of the resettlement camps. Others 
again were members of families or clan groups that had tried to fi nd 
protection with the army, and the men had joined the harkis or formed 
self-defence groups.116 At least one woman physically resisted being 
photographed and some are glaring defi antly at the camera, while other 
young women have dressed up elaborately in their most precious pos-
sessions, huge silver broaches and gold-coin necklaces. But for all the 
nuances of position, for the women of Bordj Okhriss, as throughout 
Algeria, the French army represented a dangerous and powerful force 
associated with mass destruction, brutality and rape. As will be seen 
in the next chapter, the central contradiction facing the EMSI teams 
was how to gain the trust of Algerian women and to bring them social 
progress and emancipation when they themselves were part of an army 
that had destroyed their villages and driven them into refugee camps. In 
a situation in which being seen to converse or associate with the armed 
forces risked attracting the counter-violence of the FLN, most women 
sought to maintain a safe distance from the welfare teams. Also since the 
outcome of the war remained uncertain or, from early 1960 onwards, a 
French retreat became more likely, then it was rational to remain disen-
gaged from either side or to maintain an attentiste position so as to be 
able to opt eventually as the winning side became evident.
Notes
 1 This is a wider theoretical issue addressed constantly by historians of colo-
nialism, ethnographers and ‘subaltern studies’: on Algerian women specifi -
cally see ‘Decolonizing Feminism’ in Lazreg, Eloquence, 6–19.
 2 The only attempt to analyse the geographical variations in female militancy 
is Djamila Amrane, ‘Répartition géographique des militantes de la guerre de 
libération nationale (Algérie, 1954–1962)’, AWAL, 8 (1991), 1–19.
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 3 There is a strong bias in oral history research towards the representation 
of more educated militants of urban origin; as with the eighty-eight women 
interviewed by Amrane, Les Femmes algériennes; of the twenty-six inter-
views in Amrane-Minne, Des femmes, only four (15 per cent) were with 
women from a rural or peasant background. There are valuable interviews 
with working women by Brac de la Perrière, Derrière les Héros, but these 
were confi ned to urban Algiers. Research has yet to be carried out among 
the hundreds of thousands of ‘ordinary’ women in the bled and urban 
shantytowns as to their experience of the war and attitude towards the 
French presence and emancipation agenda. The best insight we have into 
the condition and experience of peasant women during the war is provided 
by the oral history research of the ethnographer Camille Lacoste-Dujardin, 
particularly ‘La Guerre vécue par les Ifl issen’, in Opération ‘Oiseau Bleu’. 
 4 In spite of the immense volume of research and publication on the Algerian 
War, there still exists a noticeable absence of an adequate social history: a 
lack that refl ects a complex of factors, from the past refusal of the Algerian 
government to allow fi eldwork, extreme insecurity during the recent civil 
war, and the refusal of many to talk about a confl ict that left deep scars. 
 5 The army unit of Garanger was based at Aïn Terzine a few miles outside the 
main township and market centre of Bordj Okhriss: I have used the latter 
to refer in general to the area. Garanger was appointed by the commander 
at Aïn Terzine, de Mollans, as his personal but unoffi cial photographer and 
was frequently taken by helicopter during operations into the zone interdite, 
with the aim of increasing the colonels standing with army superiors. De 
Mollans, who strutted about with a riding crop, was proud of action photo-
graphs of ALN captives, which he referred to as, ‘my hunting scenes’: Marc 
Garanger, Marc Garanger: Retour en Algérie (Paris: Atlantica, 2007), 6.
 6 Marc Garanger, Femmes algériennes 1960 [c. 1989] (Anglet: Atlantica, 
2002), 122.
 7 Femmes algériennes 1960, fi rst published by Éditions Contrejour in 1982, 
used a selection of fi fty-fi ve portraits of women from the many hundreds 
that were taken.
 8 Garanger, Femmes algériennes, 1. Marc Garanger, sensitive to the charge 
of complicity in military force, insists that he was never in the position of 
the offi cial army photographers like Marc Flamand whose heroic images 
of Bigeard’s parachutists placed him fi rmly on the side of the occupying 
forces. Most of the 10,000 to 20,000 images were taken by Garanger in his 
spare-time in Bordj Okhriss and are a testament to, and an expression of, 
his personal opposition to the war: ‘I had only one idea in mind: to shoot 
the maximum of pictures to show the reality of life for Algerians and what a 
colonial war was like’, Garanger, Retour, 6. Even when photographs had a 
more ‘offi cial’ status they expressed a subversive intent, as with his famous 
image of the captured ALN commander Ahmed Bencherif taken under 
order of the commander to be printed on an anti-FLN leafl et, but which 
was rejected because ‘he perceived a message that was opposed to the one he 
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wanted to make’, a striking portrait of a proud and defi ant leader, Retour, 
7; La Guerre d’Algérie vue par un appelé du contingent (Paris: Seuil, 1984), 
16–17.
 9 Garanger, Retour, 53. 
10 Marc Garanger, with text by Leïla Sebbar, Femmes des Hauts-Plateaux. 
Algérie 1960 (Paris: La Boîte à Documents, 1990), 7.
11 Garanger, Retour, 13. The 2004 images were fi rst published in a special 
edition of Le Monde, 28 October 2004, to commemorate the fortieth anni-
versary of the end of the Algerian War. For Garanger the warm reception 
that he found in 2004 among the people of Bordj Okhriss, including some 
of the women he had portrayed in 1960, was an emotional and personal 
affi rmation: one of them, Zohra Gacem, was excited to see her photograph, 
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The mobile socio-medical teams (EMSI): 
making contact with peasant society
The army faced a particularly daunting task in its ambition to create 
a strategy of contact, which would enable it to penetrate into the lives 
of the great mass of Algerian women that inhabited the interior. Here, 
as chapter 6 has shown, conditions were particularly adverse to such a 
project due to a combination of poverty, illiteracy and isolation, com-
bined with forms of military action that alienated rural communities. 
The key instrument of contact that was developed during Operation 
Pilot and then extended to the rest of Algeria from late 1957 onwards 
was the mobile socio-medical teams (EMSI).1 It was widely recognised 
that any strategy of contact, in order to breach the traditional protective 
carapace of gender segregation, would have to be carried out by women 
agents and an examination of the organisation of these teams, their 
methods and experience in the bled, is revealing of the relative success 
and failure of the army in achieving one of its key goals.
The new organisation was established in late 1957 under the direc-
tion of Mme Maugé, a formidable character, who had had a long expe-
rience as a military nurse during the campaign to repress the revolt in 
Madagascar (1947), and was then promoted major for her leadership 
skills in the crash-training of some 900 young women for service with 
the army in Indochina.2 The initial backbone of the EMSI was consti-
tuted by some forty-fi ve volunteers from the army ranks (PFAT), many 
of whom had considerable experience during operations in Indochina 
and elsewhere and were habituated to military life. But the majority 
were young civilian women recruited by a radio and press campaign 
in France and Algeria, and who came from a diversity of backgrounds. 
While some women brought to the task a prior experience of nursing, 
fi rst-aid or welfare work, this was not a requirement, and the regulations 
for the new ASSRA, as each individual in the teams was known, simply 
required applicants to be aged eighteen to thirty-fi ve years, physically 
fi t, educated up to school leaving certifi cate level (CEP) and of good 
morals.3 Many of these women appear to have been highly idealistic, 
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inspired by an ambition to undertake some form of humanitarian work, 
or by the opportunity to exchange the tedium of secretarial life for one 
of adventure. But most were ill-prepared for the Spartan existence, 
hardship, danger and daunting medical and welfare work which they 
faced in the bled.4
The new recruits, on arrival in Algiers, were passed at breakneck 
speed through a month-long training programme which included ele-
ments of basic nursing and midwifery, child-care, Arab language, the 
history and sociology of Muslim society, the role of the EMSI in relation 
to the ‘evolution of the Muslim woman’, the rudiments of Muslim law 
and how to settle local disputes (chicayas).5 This fi rst course, like others 
that followed later, was not simply pragmatic but included a heavily 
ideological component: for example, the introduction to psychological 
warfare was taught by Commander Cogniet, an offi cer who held the 
most extreme far-right Catholic and ultra-nationalist vision of a global 
crusade against communism.6 The European trainees were then allo-
cated to an army sector that had achieved a degree of ‘pacifi cation’ and 
relative security against FLN attacks. Often after a long journey by train 
and jeep they were abruptly pitched into the intensely all-male universe 
of the military post where they came under the orders of the commander 
and the offi cer of the Fifth Bureau.
The general function of the ASSRA was to support the mobile army 
doctors (AMG) as they travelled through outlying villages to provide 
emergency aid to the isolated peasant population, particularly during 
mass campaigns against trachoma. But in particular, each newly arriving 
ASSRA was allocated – usually on the advice of the Fifth Bureau – three 
or four outlying villages or douars on which the assistant was expected 
to concentrate her effort over a period of several months, building a 
relationship of trust with the local women through the provision of 
baby-care, lessons in hygiene, medical aid (baby milk, antibiotics, band-
ages), and women’s circles (ouvroirs) that through knitting, sewing and 
entertainment, such as radio and cinema, aided weekly contact and 
social relations. The key idea underlying the intervention was that each 
European ASSRA would be expected to win over the local women, and 
be able to locate and recruit one or two young Muslim women of suffi -
cient skill and potential to train ‘on the job’ as ASSRA. Each EMSI, gen-
erally a mixed team of one European and one or two Algerians, was thus 
formed over a period of time in each locality, and once it had achieved 
a solid basis of support through ‘in depth work’, the EMSI leader was 
supposed to move on and restart the process in another group of douars 
so that the process of emancipation could spread gradually throughout 
a sector.
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Thérèse Vieillefon, posted to a resettlement camp, almost certainly 
Mesdour or Bordj Okhriss, described in a letter the typical conditions 
faced by a young ASSRA on fi rst arrival:
I am quite alone, but I think that soon I will fi nd an assistant from among 
the population. The inhabitants are very poor and hungry. Since the 
departure of the rebels they can move about freely and come to the weekly 
market every Tuesday. The women are very fearful as well as the children 
that I fi nd diffi cult to get near. But one has to proceed cautiously and I 
am certain that when they understand why I want to see them, I will win 
their trust.7
Marie-Clothilde Robilliard, in a similar vein, reported:
I started to work as of yesterday. And I am quite disconcerted. It’s so dif-
ferent from working in a hospital where you have to run about all day 
long, that I don’t know how to adapt to the work of making relations, 
chatting with the women, laughing and dawdling. And I think I need some 
time to adapt to this way of life. However, I already have a lot of sympathy 
and friendship towards these women in their lost and dusty villages. But I 
am truly very concerned not to be able to speak their language yet.
But she was thankful not to be housed, like some ASSRA, in a tent.8
How successful the new ASSRA was in establishing links to the 
local population and in creating an EMSI team depended partly on her 
personal qualities and organisational skills in overcoming numerous 
problems, including shortage of buildings, basic materials and money, 
and partly on the degree of active support received from the sector 
commander who controlled the key resources, including allocation of 
transport, accommodation and support personnel. Although sector 
commanders received orders from Algiers to provide full assistance to 
the EMSI, clearly some senior offi cers regarded the presence of young 
women as a tiresome diversion from their role of combating the FLN,9 
although others were enthusiastic and called for an increase in their 
numbers.10
The formation of the EMSI was relatively slow at fi rst, but then accel-
erated rapidly after the events of 13 May 1958 when Salan gave the 
teams a key role in orchestrating ‘fraternisation’ campaigns in the bled.11 
By August 1960 there were 171 EMSI units, sixty-three in Oranie, sixty 
in the Algerois, and forty-eight in the Constantinois regions. These 
were made up from 315 ASSRA, of whom eighty were Europeans from 
metropolitan France, ninety-four pieds-noirs, and 141 Muslim women, 
reinforced by forty army personnel (PFAT).12 Ryme Seferdjeli notes a 
further increase in the number of teams to a peak of 223 in February 
1961,13 but the number of qualifi ed ASSRA remained static at 315, and 
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any growth was achieved through the accelerated recruitment of some 
230 harkettes, young assistants lacking in even the rudimentary train-
ing of the ASSRA and who received lower levels of pay.14 This ‘water-
ing down’ of the composition of the EMSI refl ected, as will be seen, a 
 deepening crisis of recruitment in the fi nal stages of the war.
In the assessment of the work of the EMSI it is necessary to make a 
distinction between the glowing image presented by the French media 
and offi cial army propaganda, and the underlying reality. Dealing with 
the fi rst of these, the presentation of the ASSRA as ‘blue-eyed’ and 
fl axen-haired angels, self-sacrifi cing Florence Nightingale fi gures who 
brought succour to the oppressed Algerian people, is in itself of more 
than passing interest: the publicity surrounding the EMSI was of almost 
as much importance to the Fifth Bureau as their welfare achievements. 
As has been seen (chapter 4), the SCA played a key role in the promo-
tion of the EMSI, and had already produced the documentary fi lm, 
Nurses of the Bled as early as July 1957 during Operation Pilot. The 
Fifth Bureau also orchestrated the collective visits of the national and 
international press in minute detail and among the favoured scenes that 
journalists were whisked away by car and helicopter into the bled to 
witness were teams of white-coated EMSI weighing and bathing infants 
(see illustration 1, p. 96).
Typical of the numerous reports in women’s and Catholic journals, 
was one in Elle magazine of a visit in October 1958 to a commune in the 
Sud-Oranais where Thérèse Durand, with her assistant Guermina, were 
photographed bathing thirty Algerian babies; a report followed by an 
appeal for readers to send in baby clothes and toys.15 But the doyenne 
of the propagandists was the popular Catholic journalist and writer, 
Christiane Fournier, who had already written on the heroic exploits of the 
French army in Indo-China. Mme Maugé, who knew Fournier, encour-
aged her to write a book on the EMSI and also persuaded her superior 
Colonel Gardes, head of the Fifth Bureau, to organise her visit to Algeria 
and to provide eight photographs for the publication.16 Les EMSI, des 
fi lles commes çà!, with a Preface by General Challe who was currently 
directing the brutal Operation Jumelles, is suffused in a religious bathos, 
in which the EMSI were likened to the twelve disciples who, ‘regener-
ated the world because they believed that love is stronger than hatred’. 
The self-sacrifi cing EMSI were presented as the fi nest fl ower of idealistic 
French youth, by contrast with the decadent beat generation of Paris, 
‘the cheats, always on the pull, all those stars of the dissolute life’.17 
Maugé, no doubt with the full backing of Colonel Gardes, was tireless 
in her attempts to promote the book during trips to Paris in September 
1959, as well as through book fairs, press conferences, and radio and 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   248 21/7/09   12:16:25
 The mobile socio-medical teams (EMSI) 249
television interviews with Fournier. The media impacts were taken suf-
fi ciently seriously by the FLN to inspire it to attack Fournier on the Voix 
des Arabes of Radio Cairo in December 1959: ‘your dirty book on the 
EMSI can only contain lies, racist talk, nasty quarrels, propaganda and 
services on behalf of French psychological actions in Algeria’.18
Political and propaganda functions
How correct was the FLN in its assertion that the EMSI constituted a 
key part of the psychological warfare strategy? Firstly, the EMSI were 
directly controlled by the Fifth Bureau, and its successor from early 1960 
the Third Bureau, and Mme Maugé, from her offi ce within the General 
Government, liaised constantly with her superior Colonel Gardes who 
was located in the same building. The EMSI teams in the bled were also 
answerable to the parallel hierarchy of the Fifth Bureau and its offi cers 
who were attached to commanders at the local sector level. In general 
it is possible to recognise a division of labour between Maugé and her 
assistants, who were given some independence of action in the day-to-
day running of the organisation, and the Fifth Bureau, which occasion-
ally interceded via classifi ed directives to defi ne key lines of action and 
political objectives. At the local level the Fifth Bureau offi cer kept an eye 
on the EMSI in relation to the political impacts of their work, required 
that EMSI action plans be submitted to him,19 and guided strategic 
decisions, such as which particular douars offered the best political and 
social conditions to be selected as a target for ‘in-depth work’.20
The single most important directive which defi ned the purpose of 
the EMSI, Action sur les milieux féminins en Algérie, was issued by 
the État-major, signed by the Commander in Chief General Challe, 
on 27 March 1960.21 Directive 257, offered a detailed refl ection on 
the work of the EMSI, ‘the fruit of three years experience throughout 
Algeria’. The key role of the teams was to make contact with ‘the femi-
nine milieu’, and to demonstrate ‘in a concrete way the modern future 
that France holds out to them . . . Our mission is to transform Algeria 
to enable her population, in particular the population of Muslim 
women, to make the easy transition to the formation of a modern 
civilisation’. The fundamental, long-term objective of the EMSI was 
seen as essentially transformative, and in the widest sense educative, a 
process by which Algerian women could be gradually liberated from 
the constraints of conservative religious and customary practices that 
gave ‘to Muslim society its immobility and sclerotic character’. But the 
directive was at pains to note that women, far from being the power-
less, oppressed creatures as was widely believed, in reality were not 
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submissive within the privacy of the household circle but held very real 
power and respect, and it was by building on this base that women 
needed to expand their infl uence into the public social and political 
sphere as full citizens and voters. It was recognised that such a trans-
formation of deeply engrained attitudes would require a long time-
scale, even several generations, and this acknowledgement confi rmed a 
deeper shift in the army command away from the naive ‘revolutionary’ 
agenda of 1958 that had believed in a dramatic utopian conversion of 
Muslim women to modernity.
Directive 257 showed an unmistakable prioritisation of intelligence 
and repressive goals over those of welfare reform; refl ecting on three 
years of EMSI activity, it warned: ‘The principal pit-fall to be avoided 
is to allow the EMSI to become absorbed by its medico-social work 
without moving on to its true task’. The welfare and medical support 
provided by the teams was primarily a means not an end. It was through 
this initial aid, such as baby-care, that the EMSI could persuade Muslim 
women to emerge from the seclusion of the home and make contact, 
and which enabled the EMSI to identify potential political ‘leaders’ who 
could gradually be trained to run the women’s organisation enabling the 
European team leaders to eventually move on to other villages. To this 
end it was recommended that the EMSI begin to withdraw from ‘the 
direct practice of medical and social matters’, which could be handed 
over to army doctors, the SAS or other agencies, to concentrate on the 
formation of the women’s circle, in which a transformative model of 
modernisation and the ‘new woman’ could be offered. ‘It is the circle 
that provides the education which in the end is the true mission of the 
EMSI’.
The instrumental and subsidiary purposes of welfare and social work 
to a political agenda was made quite clear by the army command. 
Colonel Gardes, head of the Fifth Bureau, in a general letter to the EMSI 
in October 1959, beseeched them not to get too emotionally bound up 
with their humanitarian work: ‘I ask you to understand the importance 
of this and not to be dictated to only by your heart, to be drawn there 
where a child cries, or where a woman calls on your help; do not forget 
that your action goes beyond the question of medicine or hygiene and 
that you must win the support of the total body of women entrusted 
to you for the cause that we are fi ghting for, that of a France united 
across the two shores of the Mediterranean’.22 Directive 257 implied 
that the over-emphasis on good works would simply encourage a supine 
dependency on hand-outs without any transformative élan, ‘her natural 
tendency to passivity without encouraging a sense of effort or social 
dynamism’.
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The more overtly political agenda of the EMSI operations can be rec-
ognised in a number of areas and in the following analysis this has been 
divided into four aspects: the promotion of a model of western femi-
ninity and domesticity, the use of standardised propaganda directives 
(fi ches) in the local circles, the provision of intelligence, and the cam-
paign for the fi rst ever vote by Algerian women in September 1958.
One of the key roles of the EMSI was to offer, both through example 
and lesson, a model of western modernity that Muslim women could 
be led to admire and emulate. As Commander Cogniet remarked in a 
message to the EMSI, ‘Do not forget that for “your women” you are 
France!’.23 Each individual ASSRA was expected to offer, through her 
everyday behaviour, comportment, language, style of dress, moral tenor, 
generosity of spirit, diligence and fortitude, a role model to all young 
Muslim women. When women were recruited as ASSRA, one of the key 
factors that was taken into account was the moral behaviour of the can-
didates and, in the Muslim case, their degree of receptivity to western 
styles of dress and behaviour. Mme Maugé, and the EMSI departmental 
leaders, exercised a constant and often draconian surveillance over the 
behaviour of the ASSRA, including directives that they were to act in 
a seemly way and, for example, not to smoke in public or wear shorts 
which were both seen as objectionable to Muslims.24
A particularly thorny issue was presented by the fact that the ASSRA 
were often the only young and single European women with whom 
male soldiers, starved of female company, had any daily contact. Almost 
inevitably many relationships developed and, although these often 
ended in marriage, there existed numerous ‘immoral’ liaisons, includ-
ing one instance of a colonel who retained an ASSRA as his mistress. 
Commanders were concerned that the local population might mistake 
the harkettes for the prostitutes of the mobile army brothels, the Bordel 
mobile de campagne (BCM), so that, noted one memorandum, ‘it is 
unthinkable that a father will open his doors or allow any contact with 
his daughters, or a husband with his wife. We cannot think of a worse 
caricature of the emancipation of the Algerian woman’.25 A signifi cant 
number of ASSRA were regularly dismissed from the teams on the 
grounds of ‘indiscipline’.26
The young Muslim women who were cultivated by the EMSI for 
potential recruitment as ASSRA were keenly watched and assessed for 
the extent to which they conformed to a western model of femininity. 
Afsaneh Najmabadi has shown, in the case of Iran at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, how complex was the transition from marriage 
as a procreative contract, in which the wife was selected neither for 
love nor sexual passion but for the begetting of offspring, to a romantic 
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contract in which women were now required to invest affection in the 
husband.27 However, far from representing an unambiguous emancipa-
tion from segregation and oppression, the change towards unveiling, 
and the life of the companionate couple, required a re-education and 
disciplining of the body, including how to comport oneself so as to 
remain chaste in public spaces. If women were now to take on the duty 
of educating the future nation, then they in turn had to undergo an 
education that would make them the rational managers of the house-
hold, adept in the science of cooking, sewing and child-care, as well 
as acquiring a moral behaviour that was linked to a healthy body and 
sport.28 Although in the case of Algeria we are looking at changes some 
sixty years later and in a rather different context, the modernisation of 
peasant women rather than of educated elites, Najmabadi’s insights help 
to understand the enormity of the transformational process underlying 
the EMSI emancipation programme.
An EMSI circular noted that young Muslim trainees should for several 
months undergo a ‘kind of “detribalisation”’ by which they would be 
enabled to sever their ties to the bed-rock of local custom and family tra-
dition through the milieu of the EMSI acting as a surrogate ‘family’:29 at 
Kerrata, for example, fi ve women groomed for the EMSI were expected 
to abandon the veil and to live ‘totally as Europeans’.30 Among a series 
of evaluation reports on whether trainees should be accepted as ASSRA 
or not, was one for Fatima Be.*,31 who had worked for several years 
with a doctor in Oran and spoke French: ‘Has learned excellent habits 
of cleanliness and hygiene. A convinced partisan of the evolution of the 
Muslim woman: takes particular care of her appearance and dresses 
with taste . . . serves as an example for the women and young girls of 
the village’. Likewise Fatima H.* and Zohra K.* both spoke French, 
were ‘convinced partisans of the evolution of women’, understood ‘the 
modern principles of cleanliness and hygiene’ and showed no hesitation 
in abandoning the haïk for a track suit when teaching physical educa-
tion to Muslim girls. By contrast Fatma Bo.* was to be rejected, since 
she ‘provided a bad example through her undisciplined character, her 
frivolous conduct, and morality which leaves much to be desired’.32
Although, as has been seen, the ‘revolution’ of May 1958 espoused 
a political model of ‘integration’, of full equality between Europeans 
and Algerians while claiming to respect the religious and cultural iden-
tity of the latter, underlying EMSI practice was a powerful Eurocentric 
and assimilationist agenda. The EMSI habitus operated through a dis-
ciplining process, involving for example advice on the modest use of 
make-up, a ‘correct’ dress sense, and a certain bodily comportment and 
language, as well as of deference and politeness to superiors, a model 
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that essentially derived from the conservative and largely catholic petit-
bourgeois values of the EMSI hierarchy.33 The esprit de corps cultivated 
by the organisation, especially evident during training programmes, was 
like that of an English girls’ boarding school, bound together by a chaste 
self-discipline and healthy sporting enthusiasm.
The EMSI ranks, perhaps hardly surprising for so many young and 
single European women, was also suffused with a highly romantic 
atmosphere, in which the aspiration was to fi nd a prince charming, most 
often in the ranks of the army, to marry, quit work and settle down to 
raise children. Implicit in this aspiration was a model of the couple and 
nuclear family based on sentiment that was placed in sharp contrast to 
the supposed loveless world of the Muslim arranged marriage. Ginette 
Thévenot, like many ASSRA, encouraged her women’s circle to create 
panels of selected photographs on particular themes of modernity: one 
of these panels titled ‘La Femme dans le monde’, consisted of various 
pictures of famous women which Thévenot carefully selected and cut 
from magazines, making sure they were suitably modest, ‘worthy of 
example’, and not from among ‘the proliferation of little stars who give 
rise to scandal’. Held up here as the ideal model was the recent mar-
riage of the Shah of Persia with Farah Diba, everyone being aware of 
‘this marvellous fairy story . . . that races the imagination into a world 
of dreams’.34 Sometimes the young Muslim ASSRA missed the nuance: 
Ourida Rahmani wrote to the EMSI magazine Toubiba, ‘I will continue 
with my efforts to turn my women into “B.B’s”’ [Brigitte Bardot’s], 
which received the acid comment from Maugé, ‘NO! Let B.B. take 
care of being an international French star: as for you be – and make 
of your women – an ordinary little French lady’.35 The women’s maga-
zine Femmes nouvelles, which was circulated through the MSF-EMSI 
network, carried serialised romances adapted to a Muslim readership: 
thus in one typical story the heroine, Zina, after much inner turmoil 
rejects an arranged marriage and fi nally falls into the arms of her true 
love, Mahmoud.36 Following on from the reform of the personal status 
law in February 1959 (see chapter 8), local EMSI correspondence 
constantly referred with great enthusiasm to the instances of Muslim 
couples now getting married by free choice, in civil ceremonies before 
French offi cials, and in a European dress style.
The second political aspect of EMSI work to be considered related to 
the use of what today would be termed ‘teaching packs’, standardised 
recommended programmes (fi ches) that were produced by the Fifth 
Bureau on the basis of the experience of ASSRA during Operation 
Pilot.37 These were identical in many ways to the step-by-step proce-
dures recommended by the MSF in making initial contact and stabilising 
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relations with Algerian women in the douar, primarily through lessons 
on hygiene and child-care, but were far more overtly political in context. 
Each separate lesson, following the practical introduction (prise de 
contact) to groups of Muslim women, had a section on ‘Propaganda’ 
which related specifi cally to the FLN as an enemy that harmed the inter-
ests of women and their children.
The ‘rebels’ were presented in the fi che as a blood-thirsty and destruc-
tive force that abducted their men-folk or savagely cut their throats, 
leaving women to carry the burden of supporting the household on their 
own. The FLN seized their money, depriving their children of food, 
to buy arms that were turned against the people. They also destroyed 
schools, leaving their children un-educated, whereas France was the 
builder of schools, lycées, houses, dams and factories.
In short, ‘We know, like you, that the bandits have brought nothing 
but suffering. Such demons, beings who are against God, against religion, 
can bring no good . . . it is in the end you who suffer most from the rebel-
lion’. The underlying objective of the fi ches was to encourage women to 
16 Army propaganda leafl et to ‘Algerian Women’, distributed at Bordj 
Okhriss 1957: ‘The barbaric rebellion means for you: a home without a man, 
fear, poverty, and hungry children’
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‘rally’ to France, by encouraging them to denounce any FLN activists in 
their midst, or by bringing their infl uence to bear on men in the village; 
‘If among you there are wives, mothers or sisters whose husbands, sons 
or brothers have gone into the maquis, you can tell them to return home. 
France is generous and knows how to pardon those who have not spilt 
blood or committed crimes, but have simply been led astray by false 
shepherds. Here are the authorisations: get these to them’.
It is not clear to what extent EMSI teams utilised such fi ches or 
assumed an overtly political function in practice. Accounts by ASSRA, 
predominantly European women, of their activities reveals a quite 
extraordinary ability to blank out, or a failure to recognise, any form 
of involvement in counter-insurgency or repressive operations that 
carried negative implications for the Algerian people and for women 
in particular. For example, Reine Bellin provided an account of her 
direct observer participation, along with other ASSRA volunteers, in 
Operation Jumelles in the Kabyles mountains, one of the most brutal 
and massive ‘steam-roller’ army operations of the entire war. For Bellin, 
this adventure assumed the proportions of an exhilarating camping 
trip, ‘the tins of rations shared with the soldiers; the evening, chatting 
in the dark on our air-beds . . . bursts of laughter . . . We astonished 
the Legionnaires by climbing at mid-day at the same speed as them’.38 
Typical is the almost total absence of any self-refl ection on the ultimate 
purposes of such action, apart from the throwaway line of arriving by 
goat tracks in villages, ‘to fi nd a happy and trusting population since 
freed from terror’.39 The EMSI maintained a highly gendered self-image 
in which their own function was purely one of humanitarian aid and 
nurturing (hence the predominance of images of Algerian babies and 
small children being washed, clothed and fed) while ‘politics’ belonged 
to the male sphere of military superiors and was accepted without 
 question or was not ‘our concern’.
However, the Fifth Bureau and army commanders frequently expressed 
high hopes that the EMSI, through their ability to reach over to peasant 
women and penetrate the previously impermeable fortress of the Muslim 
family, would provide important intelligence. But undoubtedly many 
ASSRA were plunged into a daily round of welfare in which they could 
readily neglect the more ‘political’ aspects of their role, to the annoyance 
of the Fifth Bureau.40 Colonel Gardes noted that commanders needed to 
be reminded that the EMSI was created, ‘solely within the framework of 
the riposte to revolutionary warfare with the mission of taking in hand the 
population of Muslim women’, and to detect, and keep the army authori-
ties informed, of ‘the currents of opinion among women’.41 Undoubtedly 
some EMSI were able to provide commanders and intelligence offi cers 
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with a check on the degree of collaboration or resistance which they 
faced in the douars that they visited regularly, and in some instances 
where hostility was particularly entrenched this information could lead 
to the forced removal of particular families or entire villages into reset-
tlement camps.42 However, overall the key political function of the EMSI 
was achieved indirectly, through the attempted conversion of Algerian 
women to a model of westernised emancipation that would lead them to 
aspire to enter the portals of modernity that, it was claimed, could only be 
 guaranteed by their support for de Gaulle and Algérie française.
Finally, the more overtly political function of the EMSI can be illus-
trated in their central role in preparing Algerian women to exercise the 
vote for the fi rst time during the referendum of 28 September 1958. 
This subject, along with the reform of the personal status law, will be 
examined in the following chapter, but the particular role of the EMSI 
is considered here in what was one of their most signifi cant political 
interventions during their fi rst year of existence. The referendum was a 
major test for the Gaullist government to demonstrate to international 
opinion that it carried the support of Algerian women, but in order to 
achieve this ambition it needed to persuade the mass of illiterate women, 
who were lacking in any form of political education or experience of 
voting, fi rst to enrol on the electoral register, then to turn out en masse 
on the day, and fi nally to exercise their vote ‘correctly’. In the interior 
of Algeria the EMSI teams, with their Arab and Berber speaking ASSRA 
and assistant harkettes, provided a crucial instrument in this task. Many 
men, bound by traditional codes of honour and strict female segrega-
tion, were deeply hostile to their wives and daughters voting since they 
feared, often as a result of FLN counter-propaganda, that they would 
be forced to unveil or be exposed to the prying eye of strangers. In July 
1958 Salan’s cabinet sent out orders for the preparation of ‘special 
bureaux staffed by female personnel’ so that women could be registered 
‘without any reluctance’ and likewise for segregated polling stations on 
the day, ‘protected from public gaze’.43
The MSF, through its circles in the urban centres and an intense radio 
campaign,44 as well as the EMSI set out to engage in a crash civic educa-
tion of Algerian women.45 An example of this is provided by the MSF of 
Palissy when its president, Mme Husson, addressed a special meeting of 
150 Algerian women. To illustrate the choice between a ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
vote she held up, ‘a magnifi cent piece of nylon lace and said, “you can 
see it’s very beautiful and you would love to have some on a skirt”’ (the 
audience replies ‘Yes’). She then compared it to a ‘torn and ragged cloth’, 
asking which would they prefer? ‘Yes, the pretty lace, that is FRANCE, 
in all its richness and opulence’. But to choose the rag was to stay in 
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poverty, renounce emancipation, reject the opportunity to become like 
European women and, ‘was to agree with the bandits and with foreign 
powers’. A week later the Pallisy MSF, three days before the referendum, 
held a further mass meeting of 200 Algerian women at which an EMSI 
team demonstrated voting procedure, the use of voting slips (white for 
‘Yes’ and purple for ‘No’), and an Algerian ASSRA harangued the crowd 
in Arabic as to why they should vote ‘Yes’: ‘God created men and women, 
without any distinction of race or religion’.46 What is striking about this 
is not only the condescending and infantile treatment of Algerian women, 
but also the extent to which the military authorities interfered directly in 
the electoral procedure to ensure a ‘Yes’ vote.47 On the day of the election 
MSF and EMSI personnel not only assisted Algerian women at the voting 
stations, but helped them in selecting the ‘Yes’ voting slips.
The EMSI and Algerian resistance
From the external offi cial and media accounts of the EMSI, highly 
publicised in fi lms, photographs, radio broadcasts and newspapers, one 
would gain the impression of an effi cient, trouble-free organisation, 
impressive in its humanity and scope. But the reality was somewhat dif-
ferent, and this concluding section examines fi rst the inherent weakness 
and incapacity of the organisation, and secondly the extent to which the 
propaganda drive met resistance from the Algerian peasantry.
Firstly the EMSI organisation was severely hampered by a lack of 
funding and access to adequate material resources (vehicles, accommo-
dation, medical supplies). A series of quarterly reports from the Army 
Corps in Oran complained constantly about the fundamental lack of 
budgetary and material allocations to enable commanders to assist the 
EMSI within their sectors, complaints that appear to have gone largely 
unheeded.48 On occasions the work of EMSI teams threatened to grind 
to a halt. A regional organiser, Mme Fourcade, reported that they 
were expected to ‘do everything with nothing’, while the ASSRA were 
demanding payment of the danger bonus they had been promised.49 The 
EMSI of the Constantine region, who were on the payroll of the civil 
administration and not the army, were so frustrated by the long delays 
in back pay that they invaded the cabinet of the Prefect to confront him 
in person.50 The EMSI, along with the SAS, spent much of their time 
begging or trying to lay their hands on materials controlled by various 
military organisations, from bricks and cement to clothing, milk and 
paper. It is diffi cult to know if this penury represented a basic strain in 
the overall military budget, which by 1959 was absorbing 20 per cent 
of the total state budget,51 and/or the refl ection of a fundamental lack 
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of commitment within the echelons of the military-governmental appa-
ratus to treating action sociale as a priority. Certainly there were many 
reports that commented on the failure of sector commanders to provide 
adequate support to the small EMSI teams that found themselves 
abandoned and left to their own devices without proper hierarchical 
supervision.
A second, pragmatic weakness of the EMSI was that their overall 
number was far too low to make a signifi cant impact on the huge number 
of Algerian peasantry. The main target of EMSI action was young women 
in the age group fi fteen to thirty-fi ve, because they were viewed as most 
susceptible to modernisation, while older women (adjouzat) were much 
disliked by the Fifth Bureau since they were stout defenders of religious 
custom, carried much power within the household, and were less open 
to French infl uence. The authorities calculated that two million women 
aged fi fteen to thirty-fi ve were served by some 300 ASSRA, an average 
of 6,000–7,000 women per assistant.52 But in reality when EMSI teams 
arrived to give medical aid in isolated villages, in which the population 
was normally devoid of access to any kind of modern medical help, they 
were swamped by huge crowds, not only of women, but also babies, 
children and elderly men.53 In the Oranie, where the number of EMSI 
was ‘insuffi cient for the area and size of population’, the command was 
seeking in 1960 to double the 110 ASSRA.54
The army, concerned that the EMSI would spread themselves too 
thinly and try to cover too large a population, recommended that no 
team should take on more than three centres (douars or resettlement 
camps) and 1,500 to 3,000 women at any one time and visit them regu-
larly. Moreover, within each centre the women’s circle was to contain no 
more than thirty to fi fty young women, the optimum number for getting 
to know, identify and train the core of volunteers to take over the future 
running of the group when the EMSI moved on.55 In reality it often 
proved diffi cult for the EMSI to make regular contact with isolated vil-
lages spread over an enormous area of diffi cult and dangerous terrain: 
Thévenin-Copin, for example, could only reach one douar at a time 
by travelling out with the weekly military convoy, so that it took one 
month to make a complete round of the sector.56 In general the EMSI 
appear to have been unable to achieve the ‘in-depth work’ expected of 
them and the Oran army corps reported as late as April 1961 that most 
ASSRA still stuck to pragmatic tasks such as knitting and, ‘neglected the 
question of information and moral and civic education’.57 Most worry-
ing perhaps for the army was the failure of the EMSI to set in motion 
a multiplier effect, to train autonomous and self-governing Algerian 
women’s circles: it was ‘very diffi cult to locate in the mass of women the 
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leaders and organisers capable of continuing and extending the work set 
into motion by the teams’.58
Thirdly, the army faced considerable diffi culty not only in recruiting 
able ASSRA but also in retaining them. ASSRA were required to have 
a minimum educational qualifi cation at the standard of the primary 
school leaving certifi cate (CEP), and of the 306 enrolled in November 
1961, 78 per cent (238 women) had the CEP or equivalent, 17 percent 
(fi fty-three) the higher brevet, and 5 per cent (fi fteen), of which none 
were Algerians, the baccalaureate.59 Particularly important to the entire 
EMSI project, but rarely acknowledged, was the crucial need for each 
team to contain at least one Algerian ASSRA who could communi-
cate with Arab or Berber-speaking women, act as interpreters to the 
European team leaders, and who were sensitive to the complex religious 
and cultural values of the population. The problem was that very few 
young Algerian women had the desired level of French and education to 
CEP level, and those who did came from a petit-bourgeois, urban class 
of shop-keepers, teachers, white collar workers and professionals that 
provided a natural constituency for the nationalist movement.
This may explain in part why such an extraordinarily large number of 
Muslim ASSRA were recruited from FLN militants who were captured 
and then ‘turned’. Quite typical of this process was the recommenda-
tion of Captain Ricart to employ as ASSRA two captured FLN women 
being held by the Détachement opérationnel de protection: one Bahia 
L.*, twenty-three years old, was a former secretary to the Sub-Prefect 
of Sebdou, and the second, Tedjania Y.*, eighteen years, was former 
secretary to Bouazza, political commissar of Douar Sidi-Boumédienne. 
Ricart said these two intelligent women, who had been educated at the 
college for girls in Tlemcen, were ‘full of goodwill’ and had only worked 
for the FLN under threat. If handed over to the courts they would be 
defi nitively lost to the army, while they could provide valuable aid as 
ASSRA.60
There are numerous accounts of this kind in the press: an almost 
standard practice of the army was to introduce journalists visiting the 
interior to the ASSRA who, it was claimed, provided a living witness of 
young Muslim women who had been cruelly or treacherously recruited 
by the FLN through force, often used as sex objects, or who had joined 
the maquis in desperation to escape forced marriage. These ASSRA 
provided proof of the abhorrent oppression of women by the national-
ists, while within the EMSI ranks they found both freedom and a fulfi l-
ment of their deepest desire to gain access to an enlightened modernity. 
Christiane Fournier told the story of Aziza who, after escaping to the 
maquis to avoid forced marriage with an old man, was captured by the 
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French army and offered a place with the EMSI: whisked away from the 
djebel to the capital she was entranced by visions of a future that could 
be hers, ‘Aziza opened her eyes full of wonder on the shop-windows of 
Algiers . . . The young girls, their blond hair falling on their shoulders, 
resting on the arms of the boys they had chosen to love’.61
Despite the highly propagandist construction of these accounts, they 
were not entirely fi ctitious, and many dozens of ex-FLN women were 
recruited into the EMSI. As has been seen (chapter 2) such a policy of 
conversion had been started by Jean Servier during Operation Pilot, and 
by August 1959 Colonel Gardes was planning to establish a permanent 
centre run by PFAT that would retrain up to thirty ex-FLN militants at 
a time.62 The danger of such a policy is that the army risked integrating 
into the EMSI women who were hostile to the logic of ‘pacifi cation’ or 
were even covert agents that had penetrated into the ranks of the ASSRA 
under FLN orders. Many of the Muslim ASSRA, far from showing the 
deep bonds of ‘fraternisation’ with their European sisters depicted by 
Thévenin-Copin and Fournier, often revealed signs of fractious resist-
ance: at Saint-Charles several ASSRA were asked, or forced, to resign 
since they objected to sharing quarters with their European comrades, 
and had fallen under the infl uence of one, Samira, ‘who by her anti-
French intrigues creates much damage wherever she goes’.63 That 
ASSRA often felt themselves discriminated against was not surprising: 
one general recommended that recruitment of Jewish women as ASSRA 
was to be avoided, while General Bertron favoured Christian ASSRA 
and when EMSI teams arrived ‘he had acquired decent rooms for the 
Europeans while the Muslim women had to put up with  makeshift 
accommodation’.64
By September 1958 there were already signs of disquiet that recruit-
ment of ex-FLN women was enabling suspect elements to enter the 
EMSI ranks and a senior organiser, Mlle Desfretiere recommended that 
it was important to prevent, ‘the women who were taken during mili-
tary operations, or who themselves sought safety with the soldiers, from 
automatically joining the EMSI’. She attached to her report an intelli-
gence fi le on an ex-rebel (Aziza B.*) who had joined the EMSI at Bordj-
Menaïel in March and qualifi ed as an ASSRA in June 1958 and asked 
for an urgent investigation of her weekly visits to a male contact in 
Algiers.65 The fear that the FLN was deliberately planting its militants, 
or trying to win over ASSRA, was well founded. In September 1961, 
for example, it was reported from the Oranais that the FLN was openly 
soliciting ASSRA and two of them were arrested for collusion.66
Former EMSI note that the local FLN tried to make contact with 
Muslim ASSRA to win them over, and teams had to be vigilant that 
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women did not pass medicines to the maquis. One response to FLN 
pressure threatening to compromise individual ASSRA was to move 
them quickly to an entirely different sector.67
Evidence of the infi ltration of an active FLN militant can be found 
in a report of the SAU offi cer for the Bas Casbah in 1959 relating to 
Zoubida Belkebir, aged twenty-two years, currently seeking qualifi ca-
tion as an ASSRA or attaché feminine with the SAS. Belkebir, who 
had ‘strong nationalist or pro-FLN sentiments’, came from a family of 
dedicated militants. Four brothers and a brother-in-law were currently 
in the maquis, while another brother-in-law, Si Ali or Sid Ali, a land-
owner at Boufarik, had been a high-level FLN organiser in the Sahel, 
before his escape via France to Spain, Morocco and Tunisia. Zoubida 
had been arrested during the early stages of the Battle of Algiers in 
1957 and ‘interrogated quite energetically’ (i.e. tortured) before depart-
ing for Morocco, where she worked as a nurse with the nationalist Dr 
Bendouali and resided with her brother-in-law, Sid Ali. During 1959 
Zoubida went to the French consulate to apply for a visa, dressed for the 
occasion with veil and cachabia, although she normally wore European 
clothing, and then returned to Algiers where she presented herself as an 
aspirant ASSRA.68
In general it can be concluded that the 140- to 200-odd young Algerian 
women who, at any one moment, served as ASSRA during 1958–62, 
were not uniformly dedicated supporters of Algérie française, as offi cial 
propaganda suggested. Some appear to have become disillusioned with 
the racism they faced in the ranks of the army, others became uncertain 
and worried about their position as French withdrawal became a pos-
sibility from late 1959 onwards, shifted from a pro-French to pro-FLN 
position, or were actively recruited or infi ltrated into the EMSI by the 
FLN. These signs of disillusionment with, or hostility to, French opera-
tions is signifi cant, since the Muslim ASSRA with their knowledge of 
French, Arabic and Berber dialect, of local social and cultural mores, 
and sensitivity to the universe of Algerian women and of family rela-
tions, offered the greatest potential to implement a strategy of contact. 
The type of young women from which the ASSRA were recruited, aged 
eighteen to about thirty, literate in French, educated to at least CEP 
standard, constituted a tiny urban class and a potentially invaluable 
but scarce political resource that both FLN and the French govern-
ment competed for as potential cadres. This pivotal group, an elite of 
Francophone women from the urban lower middle-class or old urban 
families that had traditionally served the French state (cadis, bachagas, 
army offi cers), were deeply attracted to a vision of modernity that could, 
according to their families’ political culture, be realised either through 
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the promise of emancipation and integration into French civilisation (a 
universe portrayed by the glamour of Parisian teenage life and romantic 
love) or through dedication to a nationalist struggle that would liberate 
women, although in some often undefi ned way, through independence.
Undoubtedly many ASSRA, as portrayed by propaganda and the media, 
in nailing their colours to the French mast, became extremely enthusiastic 
and militant missionaries in the task of converting their Algerian ‘sisters’ 
and winning them away from the stifl ing traditions of female oppression 
and segregation. But the environment of French modernity was one in 
which pro-nationalist women also found themselves completely at ease. 
The entire class of French speaking and educated young women occupied 
an ambiguous and even volatile position, and this explains in part the 
ease with which they could pass from FLN ranks to the EMSI, and back 
again. For the Fifth Bureau and the leaders of the EMSI this began to 
cast an atmosphere of doubt and insecurity over the reliability of Muslim 
ASSRA in their crucial task of bridging over to local Algerian women. 
The European ASSRA, with a few exceptions, had little if any linguistic 
competence in Arabic or Berber, and were hugely dependent not only on 
Algerian ASSRA as interpreters and intermediaries, but also on the accu-
racy of translation and whether nuances of meaning and tonal infl ection 
might conceal or not messages of disapproval or resistance. Even the for-
midable Mme Maugé, director of the EMSI, could fi nd herself frustrated 
and on uncertain ground: during a tour of inspection of two resettlement 
camps she was met by many poorly clothed women and dirty children, 
‘The army Muslim interpreter used by me did not seem to translate faith-
fully the words of the population, nor my own for that matter’.69 But of 
course she was unable to be certain, and therein lay the deep insecurity of 
the whole ‘pacifi cation’ endeavour.
This leads in to the question of the kind of reception that the EMSI 
teams met when they began to make contact with isolated rural 
populations. Thévenin-Copin claims that, after an initial timidity, she 
invariably received a warm and generous welcome from peasant women 
wherever she went.70 The archives reveal a rather different picture, and 
in general two separate, but often interrelated, forms of village hostil-
ity and resistance can be identifi ed: fi rstly, a socio-religious and cultural 
opposition, and secondly, a nationalist inspired political resistance. 
Looking at these in turn, it can be noted that for many, if not the great 
majority of, women attachment to customary family and gender roles, 
including arranged marriage and seclusion, was a sacrosanct tradition 
legitimated by religion and custom, an internalised system of values 
rather than forms of practice simply imposed by external male author-
ity and force. Indeed, married women, as the educators of children (in 
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the widest sense) and guardians of the sacred space of the household, 
were widely regarded as the transmitters of core identity. This is why the 
EMSI were keen to try and marginalise or exclude the older adjouzat 
from the women’s circles.
However, in most areas the core of socio-religious opposition to the 
EMSI came from the men who were deeply anxious about any agenda 
for emancipation and continued to hold the whip hand as to whether 
wives and daughters could leave the house to attend EMSI or MSF 
activities. EMSI teams working in the Kabyle mountains to the north of 
Bouira described their reception in some villages as warm and positive, 
and in others quite cold, particularly on the part of men like those of 
Guendoue who remained distant and were ‘somewhat fi erce, spoke very 
little, and did not say what they thought of the situation’. Elsewhere they 
made some progress and after a diffi cult fi rst contact, ‘the population 
approaches us readily’, except for Tassala, inhabited by a traditional, 
conservative religious elite, ‘a marabout village, where the men are all 
very religious and do not like their wives to leave the house, even to go 
to the ouvroir’.71 Directive 257 in a section ‘Action on men’ noted that 
past attempts to change the status of women through a radical agenda 
rather than by a gradual evolution had produced a justifi able and 
‘perfectly understandable’ opposition among men. It recommended a 
sensitive management of local male feelings since it was crucial to bring 
on-side men who provided a ‘lever’ for change.72 But in many areas, as 
in Eastern Oranie in April 1960, it was reported that EMSI teams were 
making little impact despite frequent visits because of the sheer grind-
ing poverty and illiteracy of the inhabitants: ‘The mentality of Muslim 
women remains on the whole very primitive’, and despite much work, 
‘poverty, the passivity inherent in the milieu, and male dominance, 
impedes and even blocks this timid evolution’.73
The depth of socio-cultural resistance to the EMSI agenda was not nec-
essarily political and was shared right across the populace, often regard-
less of whether they were pro-French or nationalists. This embedded 
nature of popular attachment to traditional familial and gender struc-
tures is illustrated by the fact that the EMSI frequently faced diffi culty 
in persuading the wives and daughters of police or army auxiliaries, an 
almost natural constituency under the direct wing of the army, to attend 
meetings or circles. One inspector of the EMSI reported the diffi culty of 
penetrating, ‘the female milieu of the local Muslim (FSNA) authorities, 
the Moghaznis and Harkis, which instead of giving an example of such 
evolution, are a hindrance to this action’.74 However, the FLN undoubt-
edly made its presence felt in organising resistance to the EMSI at village 
level through its clandestine political network (OPA).
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The FLN at the higher level, as has been seen, organised opposition to 
the emancipation strategy of the army through its radio broadcasts and 
by orders to threaten or attack the MSF and EMSI. In some instances 
the FLN mounted direct attacks on ASSRA on leave,75 and killed them: 
Thévenin-Copin records the death of at least nine women by assassina-
tion.76 After the death of four ASSRA in an ambush in the Ghribs in 
January 1961 the army reported an undeniable demoralisation in the 
EMSI ranks.77 But the widest impact of FLN opposition, which varied 
enormously in intensity from one region or village to another, was to 
create a generalised boycott of the circles. In general the FLN did not 
discipline or threaten women who received material aid from the EMSI 
or SAS, a procedure which would have been highly counterproductive 
given the wretched conditions faced by the peasantry (lack of medical 
aid, food and clothing) and the fact that such French supplies were also 
channelled to the FLN maquis, but it did challenge those who showed 
too keen an attachment and association with the French. Typical of 
many army reports were those from Baraki, where the EMSI team faced 
great diffi culty in establishing contact with women, ‘it seems that a 
clandestine OPA is the cause of this reluctance’, or in Oranie where an 
OPA operated at village level, ‘in which women often played an active 
role’. At La Baraque near Aumale, ‘where one day the women of the 
Circle refused care and tea on the order of the rebels – There is certainly 
an OPA operating here’.78 Quite typical here was both the uncertainty 
of the EMSI, as well as of the intelligence offi cers, to know whether the 
FLN was active or not in particular villages, and their powerlessness to 
do anything about it. As the army reported from the western Oranais, 
a clear stagnation or regression in the work of the EMSI in rural areas, 
‘seems due to the pressure or orders of the milieu under the infl uence of 
the rebels, thus to causes that the ASSRA have a mission to neutralise 
but which, it has to be said, escapes their control’.79
The fi nal point to note is that the work of the EMSI, as of the MSF, 
became increasingly diffi cult as the end of the war drew in sight. 
Although by 1959 the FLN had signifi cantly lost the military battle 
(but not the war itself), there were growing indications of a deep shift 
in Algerian popular opinion, a new-found self-confi dence that took 
the form of an increasing willingness openly to defy or challenge the 
army and French authorities. One SAS reported in June 1961 a sudden 
increase in hostility towards welfare assistants who had previously been 
well received: ‘during the course of their visits to the douars our social 
teams have noticed a very clear deterioration in the ambiance and hostile 
comments have been made to us in certain bidonvilles, especially at 
Staouéli and Zéralda that have always given us an excellent reception’.80 
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Following de Gaulle’s speech of September 1959 the Algerian national-
ists were aware of the growing signs of a possible French retreat, and 
began to sense that the settler population was nervous and running 
scared. The real turning point in nationalist self-confi dence (see chapter 
10) was marked by the journées of December 1960 in Algiers, when the 
populace was prepared openly to chant nationalist slogans during street 
demonstrations.81
This deeper shift carried serious implications for the EMSI. Firstly, 
it became increasingly diffi cult for the organisation to retain or recruit 
both able European and Algerian women. Under ‘normal’ conditions 
there was already a high level of turn-over among the ASSRA, and 
between November 1957 and September 1960 some 43 per cent, 235 
women out of 557 recruits, had left.82 Many young women failed 
to cope with the Spartan and demanding conditions that they faced, 
others were removed for various failings, while there was a considerable 
‘leakage’ of those who got married, invariably to French soldiers.83 This 
instability of personnel meant that individual ASSRA were just build-
ing up experience of the job on the ground, when they departed to be 
replaced by novices who had to begin all over again.
The problem of recruitment deteriorated further as uncertainty about 
the outcome of the war deepened. This anxiety became particularly 
evident among the Algerian ASSRA, since they had far more to lose: if 
the war terminated in an FLN victory they risked becoming the target 
of nationalist vengeance. Moreover, as any sign of association with the 
French authorities became increasingly risky or worrying, the families 
and relatives of ASSRA placed pressure on the young women to cut their 
ties to the army since this might tarnish and endanger the family group 
as a whole in the eyes of the nationalists. Numerous reports during 
1960–61 comment on the growing diffi culty of recruiting Algerian 
ASSRA and of demoralisation in the EMSI ranks, ‘due in particular 
to the pressure of comrades and neighbours who reproach them for 
working “with the soldiers”’.84 In Oranie in July 1961 EMSI teams 
were met with a hail of stones at Saint-Denis-du-Sig, Bedeau, Oran and 
Aïn-Témouchent.85 In this deteriorating situation the army was forced 
to increase dramatically the number of inexperienced harkette recruits 
and to cut back on the size of EMSI teams.86
With the dramatic radicalisation of overt popular nationalism from 
the end of 1960, there were growing signs of women’s resistance inside 
the EMSI circles. Algerian women were passing from an earlier phase 
(1957–59) during which they generally remained mute in the immedi-
ate presence of SAS, MSF and EMSI personnel, in a situation in which 
silence was the best form of defence, of not disclosing one’s true opinions 
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while gaining access to the material resources of the army, to a phase 
(1960–62) in which resistance could be expressed openly and often with 
impunity. In the towns, in particular Algiers, Algerian women attending 
the circles began to talk openly of independence ‘as if it was already 
an accomplished fact’, younger women aged sixteen to twenty were 
particularly fractious, ‘oversensitive and quarrelsome’, and they made 
it quite clear that they were unprepared to be subjected to any more 
propaganda and that their motive in attending circles was purely mate-
rial and instrumental.87 ‘The Muslim female population, especially in 
the douars, is more interested in the small and immediate material ben-
efi ts to be gained from contacts, from these meetings, than by the ideas 
of social emancipation that one tries to teach them’.88 As the balance of 
forces tipped remorselessly in favour of the nationalists, so the work of 
the EMSI became increasingly untenable and inspections by senior army 
offi cers reveal their own deepening demoralisation and a growing recog-
nition that the MSF and ASSRA actions had been superfi cial and never 
achieved the effective and durable transformation of Muslim women 
that had been optimistically claimed in earlier years.
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The battle over the personal status law of 
19591
Of the different measures taken by the French government for the 
advancement and emancipation of Algerian women none was poten-
tially more important than the 1959 reform of marriage and family law 
(statut personnel). It is no co-incidence that throughout the Muslim 
world during the last hundred years political battles over reform and 
modernisation have inevitably been framed in relation to the legal 
position and rights of women. The structure of the family cell consti-
tuted the fundamental bedrock of the total socio-political order that 
determined everything from socialisation of children, gender relations, 
property ownership and economic activity, to social networks and polit-
ical power. While some attempts to transform the position of women 
involved long-term change, most notably access to education, others, 
including the personal status law, leant themselves more readily to inter-
ventionism and attempts to bring about or impose radical transforma-
tion from ‘above’. This explains why the French moves to reform family 
law proved to be such an extremely sensitive issue. Most Algerians, 
whether supporting the FLN or the French side, were not in principle 
opposed to women receiving education, training, improved health 
care or even the vote, since at the end of the day such change could be 
absorbed without altering the fundamental ground rules and shape of 
the religio-social order: but interference with the regulation of family 
life was perceived, across political and class lines, as a dangerous and 
subversive innovation. Why then did the French choose to undertake 
such a reform at so inopportune a moment when, embroiled in a seem-
ingly endless colonial war, it threatened to alienate all sectors of public 
opinion and to strengthen FLN support?
As has been seen (chapter 2) by early 1957 the head of the Algiers 
government, Robert Lacoste, in the light of the Tunisian and Moroccan 
reforms of family law, was acutely aware of the extent to which the 
colony was lagging behind the times and how this threatened to under-
mine claims of Algérie française, before the court of international 
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opinion, to an enlightened and progressive stance. Lacoste had in early 
1957 quietly established a working party under Simoneau to draft a new 
code but this, after consultation with the Prefects, was shelved. Lacoste 
was surrounded by European specialists on native customs and Islamic 
law, advisers from the affaires indigènes, judges and professors of law, 
who upheld a highly conservative consensus or tacit alliance with the 
offi cial-backed religious leaders (imams) and lawyers (cadis), that no 
major changes to Islamic law would be implemented by non-Muslim 
French secularists.2
The colonial government was traditionally attuned to the danger of 
religious inspired revolt and the French security services kept a constant 
watch on religious leaders and the confraternities, which still retained 
considerable popular support, as potential fomenters of anti-French 
discord and ‘fanaticism’.3 The crucial strategic political importance of 
the statute was that throughout the twentieth century the government 
had been able to deny citizenship and full equality to Algerians as long 
as they retained their statut personnel, a legal status as Muslims. It was 
argued by colonial ideologues that it was precisely because Algerians 
clung to un-Christian traditions such as polygamy, child-marriage and 
other barbaric customs that they could not enter into the French cité. 
But, in a kind of perverse collusion, conservative Algerian religious and 
political leaders, locked out from full citizenship and equality, erected 
the statut personnel as the true fortress of national identity, a counter-
weight to exclusion. Religious leaders not only fought tooth-and-nail 
to defend the statute from secular subversion, but defi ned core Muslim 
identity in terms of the sacrosanct family structure: as the reformist 
Ulema Lamine Lamoudi claimed, ‘It represents our traditions, our 
customs and our beliefs. This regards three principal issues: marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance’.4 Fundamentally European Islamic experts and 
advisers, as well as the elite of offi cial religious leaders, both had a career 
investment as highly trained conservative exegetes of the most abstruse 
details of Muslim law and supported the status quo or a ‘gender pact’ in 
relation to the family code.
The advice given by the Prefects on the proposed 1957 law veered on 
the side of caution, and Lacoste was not prepared to stir up a hornets’ 
nest that would benefi t the FLN (chapter 2). But the events of 13 May 
1958 brought to the fore the dynamic and radical colonels of the Fifth 
Bureau who were fully prepared, in a climate of heady excitement, and 
encouraged by the impact of women’s ‘fraternisation’, to implement a 
‘revolutionary’ transformation of the marriage code. The propaganda 
drive against the veil during 1957, along with the success of Operation 
Pilot, had created a high level of confi dence in an emancipation agenda, 
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and the generals were concerned to seize the initiative before the FLN, 
which was discovered to be laying its own plans for a new women’s 
organisation. However, even the colonels proceeded with caution on the 
delicate issue of personal status and the Salan-led government took the 
decision to prepare the way for such a radical initiative by fi rst extend-
ing the vote to Algerian women in the referendum of 28 September 
1958. The thinking behind this was to test the degree of support among 
Algerian women for the new Gaullist regime and, once their political 
‘maturity’ and reliability had been demonstrated, the government would 
then proceed immediately to the next phase, legal reform of the statute. 
Since the two-phase project for the vote and legal reform were closely 
interrelated this chapter looks briefl y at the fi rst before examining the 
marriage code in more detail.
Algerian women and the franchise
Algerian women had, in principle, gained the right to vote, along with 
European women, by the Organic Law of 20 September 1947, but as 
has been seen (chapter 1) this right was in effect blocked by a carefully 
constructed fi xing of the system of dual assemblies. As late as January 
1958 a report on Le Droit de vote de la femme musulmane algérienne 
asked if it was possible any longer to maintain the exclusion of half the 
population from political life when it was in sharp contradiction with 
the French policy of integration.5 But the thought of adding 1,900,300 
voters to the electorate further primed the deep fears of Europeans of 
being politically inundated by a large and rapidly increasing Algerian 
population. The report fell back on three reasons to justify continu-
ing exclusion: the mass of illiterate women, unable to read a leafl et or 
voting slip, could not make a rational or informed decision; no vote 
could be freely exercised because of the control and interference by male 
relatives; and it would not be possible to verify the identity of veiled 
women at the voting stations. It concluded with the standard formula 
of colonial government in resisting the extension of political rights to 
natives: such enfranchisement should come after the long-term educa-
tion and evolution of women would make them fi t to enter the portals 
of democracy. This typical line of thinking was dramatically swept aside 
after 13 May 1958.
On 27 June 1958 General Salan, who held full military and civilian 
power in Algeria, ordered the enrolment of all Algerian women on the 
electoral registers,6 and from 8 July onwards the government orches-
trated a major propaganda drive so that women would both register 
in time and turn out in force at the referendum to express support for 
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de Gaulle and Algérie française.7 For Salan the goal was not only to 
win the ‘Yes’ vote but also to maximise the number of women on the 
electoral rolls and of participation so as to demonstrate to the world 
that Muslim women were fully prepared to integrate and to engage as 
citizens in the political process.8 This concerted campaign for registra-
tion and the ‘Yes’ vote was carried out at local level with the aid of the 
MSF and EMSI, as well as through radio broadcasts and the distribution 
of specially made fi lms such as ‘Vote Yes’ and ‘How to Vote’.9 Lucienne 
Salan, the quasi-offi cial voice of her husband, dedicated a signifi cant 
part of the weekly broadcasts of her MSF, the Magazine social de la 
femme, to the coming election (chapter 4), and in addition there was a 
special Operation Referendum which included twenty-eight French and 
Arabic transmissions over a four-week period. The latter placed par-
ticular emphasis on the extent to which the franchise represented both 
a pathway to progress and material prosperity and a form of empower-
ment that placed Muslim women on the same plane as men as well as 
the most outstanding fi gureheads of French womanhood and modernity, 
scientists, lawyers, doctors and aeronauts. Every woman was a ‘human 
being just as worthy, as intelligent, and as respectable as men’.10 The 
propaganda signifi cantly framed the vote in terms of the full equality 
of Algerian women in all spheres of education, employment and civic 
rights, and carried an implicit signal: if they could demonstrate their 
political maturity via the ballot box, the door would rapidly be opened 
to the next phase, the reform of the personal status law. One radio 
broadcast announced, ‘To vote is a duty, a duty that gives you rights. No 
abstentions on Sunday. Tomorrow the life of the emancipated woman 
begins’.11
The referendum of 28 September was regarded as an outstanding 
triumph by the colonial government since, despite FLN intimidation, 
an extraordinarily high percentage of Algerian women turned out to the 
poll to help infl ate the overall 80 per cent in favour of the all-important 
‘Yes’ vote.
General Massu in a letter to Salan noted with satisfaction the unex-
pectedly high women’s vote in favour of the referendum: Muslim women 
had, ‘seized hold of their chance with alacrity: the movement for eman-
cipation is well under way, it is advisable to make best use of this’.12
Although the high vote gave a green light to the reform of the mar-
riage code, it is important not to interpret it, as did many French, as a 
mass rejection by women of the FLN and nationalism. The concerted 
propaganda campaign of the Algiers government and military for a ‘Yes’ 
vote undoubtedly constituted systematic electoral gerrymandering on a 
vast scale: for example, the colour purple was chosen for ‘No’ voting 
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slips because of its negative associations in Muslim culture and electors 
brought in by army lorry were forced to show the unused ‘No’ ballot 
slip after the vote.13 The FLN provisional government (GPRA) lodged 
a complaint with the UN and later, after the legislative elections of 30 
November, opposition candidates brought the issue to the Conseil con-
stitutionnel which, against all the evidence, validated the elections for 
the fi rst parliament of the Fifth Republic.14
If Algerian women showed enthusiasm on the day, this seems to have 
related as much to the excitement of a festive opportunity to meet up 
with other women, or because of the attraction of food, clothing, soap 
and blankets usually handed out on such army-led mobilisations. In 
some areas, particularly in Oranie and Mitidja, the big colons estate-
owners told their workers, especially the women who supplied seasonal 
labour, how to vote, and in some communes like that of Pallisy this led 
to a 100 per cent ‘Yes’ vote.15 But of most importance, the great majority 
of women were both illiterate (96 per cent) and lacking in any political 
education, and appear to have had little political awareness or under-
standing of why they were voting, apart from being lured by propaganda 
17 Algerian women voting for the fi rst time, referendum of 28 September 
1958
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of a virtual paradise of riches tomorrow or giving expression to hopes 
for a quick resolution of the war and a return to peace.16 As one EMSI 
reported of later cantonal elections in 1959: ‘They [Algerian woman] 
absolutely don’t understand the signifi cance of this vote and ask the men 
of their family what they need to say . . . In general, women have little 
interest in the vote and mainly wanted advice on hygiene and care . . . 
They did what we asked them to do [on the vote]’.17
The initial and superfi cial enthusiasm shown during the referendum 
appears to have rapidly evaporated in later elections, and already by 
the legislatives of 30 November 1958 Captain Montaner of the SAU 
of Clos-Salembier noted a higher level of abstention for women than 
men. Female turnout at the La Redoute voting station was down from 
82 per cent in the September referendum to 60 per cent, while absten-
tions were much higher in the areas of conventional housing, where 
about 45 per cent of women voted, than in the shantytowns (75 per 
cent).18 This would suggest that the big turn-out for the referendum of 
28 September in the shantytowns was largely an expression of the politi-
cal ignorance and ‘culture of poverty’ of those who had recently arrived 
as refugees from the interior, who Montaner described as ‘a mass that 
is easy to manage, to organise, to convince and to attach to us’, as 
opposed to the relatively better-off and politically aware population 
of longer urban standing. The inhabitants of the bidonvilles, he noted, 
showed little interest in politics: their main concern was to fi nd employ-
ment and decent housing, ‘an obsession with this population that lives 
in dire poverty’.19 This class basis to the voting patterns of Algerian 
women is confi rmed by the turnout for the referendum in Tlemcen 
where the better educated bourgeois women, strong FLN supporters, 
abstained, while women from the poor quarters of the city turned out 
 enthusiastically in force.20
However, the acclaimed success of the referendum undoubtedly 
opened the way to an immediate campaign to reform the family code. 
Behind the scenes the authorities had begun to explore the possibility of 
a new reform as early as June 1958. On 14 June General Massu wrote to 
Salan suggesting the urgency of sustaining the momentum generated by 
the revolutionary events of ‘13 May’ and the integration strategy by the 
suppression of the statut personnel and its replacement by the French 
civil code. Such a ‘Spectacular measure’ would create ‘in the Muslim 
masses a deeper psychological shock than even the 13 of May’.21 Salan 
then instructed M. Villeneuve, deputy director of political affairs, to 
investigate the issue and provide a written report.22 Villeneuve, pos-
sibly the most infl uential of the senior administrative advisers on the 
reform of family law, had already in July 1957 produced a report in 
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which he made clear his conservative stance, which refl ected that of the 
Algerian civil service, and warned against tampering with the religious 
status quo.23 He warned that the detailed reform project prepared by 
the working party under Simoneau in 1957 (see chapter 2), was far 
too radical, and represented an incursion of the French civil code that 
was, ‘a profound assault on the Muslim personal status’. Villeneuve 
was ringing the warning bells of an Islamic revolt: at the very least it 
would be necessary to consult Muslim religious leaders and theologians 
so that the initiative would not appear as an imposition by secularists 
on Koranic law, but he noted that earlier changes to family law (as with 
the Kabyle law of 1930–31) had little impact on behaviour because of 
the backwardness of women. What was required for a code to have any 
impact was ‘an exceptional campaign of female education’ and a prior 
evolution of the family cell towards a conjugal model of modernity. 
The observation was sound, but it also fell squarely into the traditional 
mechanisms of the colonial elite in which political advance for Algerians 
was to be delayed into some distant and nebulous future. In Paris such 
doubts were received by René Brouillet with some concern, particularly 
the prospect of a reform of the personal status law generating opposi-
tion that could be seized on by the FLN, and he decided to consult de 
Gaulle on the matter.24
The reform of the personal status law
Following the military coup in Algiers of 13 May, de Gaulle became 
Prime Minister on 1 June and swiftly moved to lay the foundations of 
the new Fifth Republic. A great deal is known about the way in which 
the emancipation programme was quickly expanded by the Algiers mili-
tary government of Salan, and the work of Frantz Fanon has tended to 
reinforce a general perception of unveiling and reform as the singular 
work of ‘revolutionary’ colonels. This view has tended to obscure or 
neglect the position of de Gaulle in relation to the question of Algerian 
women, a silence that is all the more puzzling when it is kept in mind 
that the peak in the expansion of the emancipation process came during 
the fi rst year of the new Gaullist government.
De Gaulle’s views on emancipation need to be understood within 
the context of his overall policy on Algeria, but the latter continues 
to divide historians because of the general’s penchant for secrecy and 
Delphic ambiguity. The Minister of Public Works, Robert Buron, for 
example, was none the clearer about de Gaulle’s intentions on Algeria 
eighteen months after his return to power, asking himself, ‘where 
then is the prince of equivocation leading us?’.25 Julian Jackson has 
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identifi ed three schools of thought among historians: fi rst that de 
Gaulle, before coming to power in 1958, had already decided to work 
towards Algerian autonomy; second that he was intent on keeping 
Algeria (hence the accelerated investment of the Constantine Plan and 
the Challe offensive); and third, that he preferred some form of ‘asso-
ciation’ or union with France. Jackson’s support for the third position 
has its attraction: during a fi rst phase of government that lasted from 
June 1958 until early 1960, although de Gaulle was still feeling his way, 
his basic impulse was to retain French links to, or control over, Algeria 
even if it should eventually gain a degree of self-government, not unlike 
that of a British dominion. But ideally France would negotiate such a 
union from a position of strength, hence the need to consolidate military 
victory and a ‘Third Force’ strategy that would organise a moderate 
Algerian ‘nationalist’ movement to counter the FLN, with which France 
could then negotiate a peace that would guarantee its economic, oil and 
strategic interests. This is why de Gaulle essentially continued with the 
policies of Lacoste and Salan, with their contradictory mix of repres-
sion (the Challe offensive) and reformism (Constantine Plan), and in 
the case of Algerian women de Gaulle was inclined to push ahead with 
emancipation in so far as it would help to win over the Algerian people 
to such ‘association’ and simultaneously assist the social and political 
modernisation of a future state that could provide a dynamic partner in 
union with France.
However, de Gaulle held racist views that were incompatible with 
Soustelle’s ‘integration’: he told Alain Peyrefi tte that Muslims, with their 
turbans and djellabas, were clearly not French and, like oil and water, 
the two could never mix:
Arabs are Arabs, the French are French. Do you think that the French 
body politic can absorb ten million Muslims, who tomorrow will be 
twenty million and then forty? If we undertake integration, if all the Arabs 
and Berbers of Algeria are considered French, how could we stop them 
coming to live in the metropolis where the standard of living is so much 
higher? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises 
but Colombey-les-Deux Mosquées.26
De Gaulle, in promoting the emancipation of Algerian women, fi rst 
through the franchise and then by reform of the personal status law, 
clearly carried none of the illusions of Algérie française radicals that 
Europeans and Muslims could meld through ‘fraternisation’ into a new 
and egalitarian nation. But, as has been seen (chapter 3), the events of 
‘13 May’ had been so orchestrated by the Fifth Bureau as to persuade 
the hesitant General that he did indeed have a popular mandate from 
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the will of the people, the settlers and Muslims united. De Gaulle had his 
private doubts about the genuine nature of ‘fraternisation’, but in public 
he was quite prepared to exercise a willing suspension of disbelief since 
this ‘revolutionary’ pseudo-élan served his own interests in returning to 
power through a ‘democratic coup’.
Perhaps the single most signifi cant but well-concealed component 
of de Gaulle’s overall Algerian policy in his fi rst eighteen months of 
power was the gradual reassertion of the authority of the Paris govern-
ment over the generals in Algiers who had assumed virtual autonomy, 
a process that was symbolised by the eventual removal of Salan, Massu 
and Challe and the insertion of his own place-men, including Delouvrier. 
Although by early 1960 de Gaulle had taken a number of steps to under-
mine the political power-base of the generals in Algeria, including the 
order for all army offi cers to be withdrawn from the Committees of 
Public Safety and the dissolution of the Fifth Bureau in January 1960, 
this staged ‘containment’ of army political power did not necessarily 
involve a U-turn or change of direction in the policies adopted by the 
militarised Algiers government: the issue at stake was one of the locus of 
sovereign power, not of specifi c agendas.
From the moment that de Gaulle became head of government in June 
1958 he showed himself willing, on the specifi c question of emancipa-
tion of women, to comply with the pressure of Salan and the ‘13 of 
May’ Algiers radicals to maintain this ‘revolutionary’ agenda. Indeed, 
contrary to expectation, de Gaulle was prepared to accept a major 
reform of the statute even when this was opposed by some of his own 
advisers, including Delouvrier. But underlying this apparent agreement 
between Salan and de Gaulle was the fatal ‘misunderstanding’ between 
settlers and the General that was symbolised by his notorious, ‘I under-
stand you’ (‘Je vous ai compris’) speech: whereas Salan and Soustelle 
regarded emancipation as a key to the survival of Algérie française, de 
Gaulle secretly saw it as a means to assist the modernisation of a future 
‘partner’ or semi-autonomous ‘associate’ state.
On his return to power during his famous speech in Algiers on 4 
June de Gaulle announced elections in a single electoral college, and the 
registration of Algerian women was offi cially announced a month later. 
It was rather fi tting that the General, who had fi rst pronounced on the 
future franchise of all French women in Algiers on 24 March 1944,27 
should now, in the same city, provide this as a ‘gift’ to Muslim women. 
De Gaulle was probably reassured that this would not open the fl ood-
gates to FLN power by the comforting fact that women in France had 
since 1947 used their new voting rights to reinforce the conservative 
parties against the communists and socialists. However, the family code 
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was a rather more delicate matter, and while the General’s Paris advisers 
on this issue (Brouillet, Tricot, Lenoir) seem to have hesitated through 
August and September, the generals in Algeria took a far more proactive 
role in persuading de Gaulle to take this step.
The Salan campaign to reform the personal status law
Immediately after the resounding success of the women’s vote in the 
referendum of 28 September General Salan sent a telegram to de 
Gaulle noting that the ‘massive participation of Muslim women’ had 
given a green light to the next stage of emancipation. ‘Their sponta-
neous support for the new order proposed to them must inspire the 
government’ to pursue a new ordinance on the personal status law.28 
Simultaneously Lucienne Salan as president of the MSF, undoubtedly 
with the support of her husband and the Fifth Bureau, orchestrated a 
propaganda campaign to persuade de Gaulle and public opinion of the 
urgency of a new family code. On 2 October Lucienne Salan wrote a 
long and legally sophisticated letter to de Gaulle, insisting that the mass 
‘Yes’ vote by Algerian women had demonstrated their wish to remain 
French.29 During her recent tour, she recounted, of the Algerian prov-
inces as president of the MSF, Algerian women had spontaneously and 
unanimously expressed their wish to modernise.30 In the name of the 
MSF she submitted to the General a range of recommendations that 
should be put into effect as quickly as possible and accompanied by ‘a 
psychological offensive’. The reform should include obligatory educa-
tion for all girls which would in turn lead them to abandon the veil, 
‘which constitutes the symbol of isolation, seclusion, and enslavement’. 
But most central was a reform of the marriage code, which should 
include a minimum age for marriage, suppression of marriage enforced 
by the father or guardian (droit de jebr), suppression of polygamy, and 
an end to unilateral repudiation by husbands.
Two days later the central committee of the MSF, under the presidency 
of Lucienne Salan, sent to women’s circles throughout Algeria a model 
petition requesting de Gaulle to implement reforming measures.31 The 
petitions in French and Arabic provide a fascinating insight into the 
grass-roots campaign of the MSF and the response of many thousands 
of illiterate Algerian women. Many neatly typed petitions were evidently 
drawn up by the European leaders of the MSF circles or by ASSRA, 
and then read out to mass meetings of Algerian women who, in most 
instances, ‘signed’ with a fi ngerprint.32 These tend to refl ect the stand-
ardised set of both legal and social welfare demands circulated in the 
model petition: a request for reform of the marriage code, particularly 
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in relation to repudiation and marriage before the mayor; the extension 
of full welfare rights, especially family allowances, on a par with those 
already enjoyed by Europeans; and the provision of decent housing and 
regular employment for their husbands. But other petitions, often written 
by Muslim women with biros in school exercise books in broken French, 
were more individualised and refl ected the hopes and aspirations of the 
more educated young Algerian women in the circles. For example, Dalila 
Benached of Hammam-bou-Hadjar, noted, ‘I am proud to have voted 
with my Muslim sisters for General de Gaulle’, and was also honoured 
because she was able to read and write and so able to present the petition 
on behalf of all those who had ‘signed’ below with a fi ngerprint:
Our European sisters want to help us to live like them, but to do that we 
must help them to pass the laws to make this possible. Marriage must take 
place before the Mayor [monsieur le maire] so that we can have a family 
registration book (livret de famille), and divorce must be less easy so that 
so many women and children are not left abandoned – our children must 
go to school and learn a trade. We must be better housed so that there 
are no longer six or eight in one room: above all fathers, brothers and 
husbands must understand that we are their equals in life and in the eye 
of the law.
 Also, when there is an inheritance to divide up the boys have the biggest 
share: all their life girls are badly considered.
 We have confi dence in de Gaulle and all my Muslim sisters join me in 
spelling out our gratitude and a full-hearted, thank you.
The petitions, although in part refl ecting an agenda imposed by the 
European leaders of the circles, also give a sense of the injustice Algerian 
women felt towards a repressive system of patriarchal authority and 
their deep hope for a better life, but one which would be implemented 
through the much-admired father fi gure, de Gaulle. Some of the young 
women expressed, above all, a wish to be able to form a free and loving 
relationship with their future husband with whom they could share a 
western style of conjugal equality. The petition from Aïn Farès noted, 
‘We now understand that we are not only slaves in the service of the 
master. Our husbands also understand this. They realise that we are 
their companions, their companions through all the ups and downs of 
life: in joy, in hardship, trouble, and success’. Aïcha Chérif wrote from 
Fornaka to de Gaulle on 12 October in a similar vein:
I hope that you will give us peace. I do not want to be sold like a beast; I 
want to get married according to my own taste with the one I love. I do 
not want my husband to abandon me with the children and to leave me 
in poverty, without assistance. I do not want to be forced to veil, since the 
Good Lord gave us a face that we should not be ashamed to show. When I 
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am big I also want to have trust in my husband and that he lets me do my 
shopping for myself, because if I feel like having a red dress, I don’t want 
to wear a yellow one! . . . Muslim women admire you General, and give 
you their full trust.33
It is striking how far propaganda after ‘13 May’ for the new order was 
centred in thousands of posters, tracts and fi lms on the personal appeal 
and charisma of de Gaulle. Captain Jean Claude Racinet exemplifi ed 
this position in his ‘pacifi cation’ propaganda, ‘I relied on the archetype 
of the Father that’s much more alive in the collective unconscious of 
oriental crowds than in ours. I idealised de Gaulle before my audiences 
. . . We needed a great man’.34 The de Gaulle fi xation was particularly 
prominent in the emancipation campaign and the Fifth Bureau, through 
endless portrayal of the General as the father-fi gure who entered into 
a direct appeal to, and moral relationship with, each Algerian woman, 
believed that such a personalisation of male authority would be in 
rapport with the values of patriarchal society and the Muslim ‘mind’. 
The women’s petitions refl ect this position: some were decorated with 
the tri-colour or pasted in pictures of de Gaulle cut from magazines 
while one from Hammam-bou-Hadjar was drawn up by, ‘I, Talbia 
Kaddour, née Naoum, am a passionate admirer of General de Gaulle. 
At my employers I listen with strong emotion to the BBC. I want to gain 
a better life for my Muslim sisters’. Life was tough for this mother of 
six since her husband was ill, but she looked forward to the improved 
housing promised by de Gaulle, ‘and I know that he always keeps his 
promises’. The women of Hussein-Dey claimed that after their ‘Yes’ vote 
on 28 September, ‘We wish to live with the same rights and duties [as 
men], as the General, so generous and so just, has himself promised us’. 
During the fi rst year of de Gaulle’s presidency, before his relations with 
the ‘ultras’ turned sour, there existed a strong concordance between the 
optimistic faith of the settlers and of some évoluées Muslim women, in 
his image as a strong, autocratic leader and father-fi gure.
How did de Gaulle respond to this campaign? On 3 October de 
Gaulle announced in Constantine an ambitious fi ve-year investment 
plan for the modernisation of the Algerian economy, and such a project 
was clearly concordant with parallel moves to educate and emancipate 
Muslim women. Specialist advisers had been working on various ver-
sions of a draft marriage code from June 1958 onwards, but the key 
message coming through from the Algiers civil administration was a 
warning of the dangers of legislating in the reserved area of Islamic law 
and custom. De Gaulle took note of the repeated claim that it would be 
crucial for the success of any reform that it should be seen by Algerians 
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to have followed consultation with religious authorities and received 
their assent.35 At the cabinet meeting on Algerian affairs (Comité inter-
ministériel) on 15 October, the fi rst one to be held since the triumphant 
referendum vote, de Gaulle announced his decision to consult a delega-
tion of Muslim religious leaders in Paris.36
Having gauged the situation at fi rst hand and received the MSF 
petitions signed by thousands of Algerian women, on 15 November 
de Gaulle sent a key directive to Salan: ‘Following consultation with 
several Algerian leaders, and taking account of petitions that have been 
addressed to me by important Algerian social organisations, I esteem 
that it is advisable to undertake a reform of the personal status of 
Muslim women. This programme must be undertaken with all neces-
sary caution’. A distinguishing feature of the order was the speed and 
urgency with which the reform was to be pursued: a commission of 
Algerian and European experts in Muslim law, building on earlier drafts, 
was to submit its proposals within a month. This project was then to 
be referred to eminent religious authorities for their opinion, and if the 
response was favourable, the government could issue an outline law or 
Ordinance, which it did eventually on 4 February 1959.37 However, the 
government very quickly ran into opposition to the projected reform.
Division in the government ranks
In the four months following de Gaulle’s order to Salan a complex battle 
ensued, behind closed doors and largely unseen by the public, which 
deeply divided the French government and administration, and pitched 
the conservative and the reformist wings of the Algerian elites against 
each other. In order to understand the extreme sensitivity of the personal 
status law, a particularly explosive issue in the context of a colonial war 
in which government could ill-afford to strengthen the FLN by stirring 
up popular resistance and alienating its own ‘natural’ constituency 
among conservative elites, it is useful to look briefl y at the fundamental 
signifi cance of marriage to the basic socio-political and cultural struc-
tures of Algerian society.
Ethnologists and sociologists have demonstrated the extraordinary 
importance of the customary, religious and magical practices, the 
basic ‘ground rules’, that regulated the functioning and reproduction 
of peasant societies in the Mediterranean world.38 In the Maghreb the 
kinship group (extended family, fraction or tribe) constituted, long 
before the emergence of the modern, centralised state, the key social 
organisation for the biological survival of the local society under condi-
tions imposed by a harsh environment in which the durability of the 
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lineage (and the individuals that constituted it) depended on maximis-
ing access to land and livestock, water, food reserves and reproductive 
power.39 As Germaine Tillion showed in her classic work Le Harem et 
les cousins, a crucial mechanism for preventing the long-term erosion of 
the kin group’s land and property through marriage of women to out-
siders (exogamy) was both to restrict their inheritance rights, as well as 
to uphold marriage between couples from the in-group, preferably with 
fi rst cousins.
It is salutary for contemporary western societies, shocked at the per-
ceived ‘primitive’ practices of Muslim familial customs such as arranged 
marriage, to bear in mind that such traditions had evolved over millen-
nia as sophisticated and ‘rational’ systems for survival that depended 
on prioritising the interests of the group over that of the individual. 
In many advanced west European nations, within living memory, the 
Christian peasantry had also regarded arranged marriage as necessary, 
a strategy that could all-too-readily be destroyed by modern individual-
ism and romantic attachment, by rebellious couples carried away by a 
strong sentiment (‘love’) that peasant wisdom likened to a form of dan-
gerous madness since it carried the potential to destroy the long-term 
future survival of the group.40 Crucial, however, to Algerian reactions to 
legal reform was the fact that through many centuries Islam had adapted 
itself to, and sanctifi ed, the underlying ‘ground rules’ that regulated 
marriage strategies. The populace did not oppose legal reform in so far 
as it threatened the rationale of customary regulation that cemented 
the framework of social and economic practice, rules that might be 
extrapolated by the anthropologist, since few consciously recognised 
such a logic: rather they reacted in terms of the religious ideology 
that sanctioned the rules of marriage strategies. As the Algerian jurist 
Mohammed Benhoura remarked in June 1958, ‘the personal status con-
stitutes for Muslims more than something mystical, it is their religion 
itself, and no human force can succeed in making them repudiate it’.41
In the Maghreb, where the Maliki school of law predominated, 
family law contained within itself a model of the social order, a blue-
print or ideal of the family and social relationships.42 Within this system 
marriage did not, as in modern Europe, aim to create a nuclear family 
unit centred on the close bonds between the couple, but was rather a 
contract that gave the husband the right to licit sexual relations but in 
which, even after marriage, his primary allegiance remained to his male 
line, his father, brothers and uncles (agnates). The prime function of 
married women was to produce male heirs to guarantee the lineage, but 
this in turn was associated with a deep masculine anxiety about pater-
nity, the obsessive need to guarantee that offspring were really those of 
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the father, hence the constant regulation of honour, gender segregation, 
bridal virginity and repudiation settlement (idda).43
This system of patriarchal control, in which all key decisions and 
power lay with the men of the kin group, inevitably determined the 
radical subordination of women. The key features of Algerian mar-
riage law and custom on the eve of the 1959 French reform meant that 
young single women, or even pre-pubescent girls, would have a mar-
riage arranged for them by the father or legal guardian (right of jebr).44 
Although in reality the married woman might accrue signifi cant author-
ity and power within the private sphere of the household,45 husbands 
tended to remain emotionally distant from their wives and retained legal 
powers either to contract other, polygamous marriages, or to divorce or 
repudiate her by a simple unilateral and verbal pronouncement (talaq). 
At separation the divorced woman had few rights: the husband could 
legally claim control of children or abandon the wife and offspring 
to their own devices with minimal or no settlement, which meant she 
would return to the care and protection of her natal kin group, or be 
forced into degrading employment. The concern of the government to 
introduce a code, although driven by political considerations to attach 
Algerian women to the French cause, was also inspired by the social and 
welfare problems generated by the abandonment of wives and children. 
While in a recent past the apparent harshness of Islamic law and custom 
was tempered by the stability of the extended patrilocal kin group that 
offered a degree of security and protection to repudiated women, the 
economic crisis in peasant society, the long absence of men as labour 
migrants or FLN fi ghters, and the massive uprooting caused by military 
resettlement, combined to dislocate and erode the traditional support 
function of the natal extended family. This no longer had the means 
to provide shelter and protection to its daughters, tens of thousands of 
which were widowed by the war.
This is a general outline of marriage strategies, but in practice there 
was an enormously complex variation, for example Kabyle (qanoun) 
and Ibadite customary laws that were traditionally guarded by the 
meeting of village elders (djemâa), were different from the Arab zones 
and urban societies that followed the majority Maliki and minority 
Hanafi  legal schools. During the complex process of preparing the new 
marriage code experts in Muslim jurisprudence were appointed to draw 
up a seemingly endless number of draft projects that were subjected to 
microscopic examination by various commissions and working-groups. 
For example, the commission that met on 4–5 December 1958 carried 
out its debate in relation to three entirely different drafts (avant-projet) 
which it dissected and compared to a myriad of precedents, including 
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the standard legal reference in Algerian courts (Code Morand of 1916), 
various laws relating mainly to Kabylia (2 April and 2 May 1930, 19 
May 1931), the recent Tunisian Code (1956) and Moroccan Code 
(1957), and the French Civil Code.46 For our purposes we can move past 
the dazzling and sometimes esoteric refi nements of the debate that took 
place between the Muslim jurists (cadis), European judges and profes-
sors of law that drafted the new legislation,47 and move straight to the 
very concise and lucid text of the Ordinance of 4 February 1959.48
The Ordinance laid down the minimum age at which young women 
(fi fteen years) and men (eighteen years) could contract a marriage, and 
this had to be by the free consent of both spouses who were to appear 
in person before a Muslim judge (cadi) or before the mayor, or other 
offi cer of the état civil.49 The marriage had to be registered and the 
couple issued with a certifi cate and a livret de famille before they could 
celebrate the traditional wedding. The marriage could only be dissolved 
by the decision of a judge at the request of either the husband or the 
wife, who were to appear in person. The judge was also to attempt a 
reconciliation between the couple, before a fi nal act that was to be made 
in the best interest of the children and decided on the level of family 
support to be provided for them and their mother. This simple text, 
which was not retroactive or applicable to existing marriages, by impli-
cation provided an entirely uniform code for all Muslims in Algeria, 
including the Kabyles, but with the exception of Ibadite believers of the 
Sahara. The insistence on the presence of women at both marriage and 
divorce hearings was to end the Islamic practice of them being repre-
sented by a male, and to ensure that they fully agreed to the marriage 
contract or to the form of its dissolution.
The Ordinance of 4 February, for all its apparent simplicity, undoubt-
edly offered a radical change in Muslim family law that was fully on a 
par with the Bourguiba Code on which it was modelled.50 The provi-
sions of the Tunisian legislation, today widely viewed as one of the most 
progressive introduced by a modern Islamic state, was almost identical, 
except for a ban on polygamy. The French legislators excluded polyg-
amy from the act since it was widely recognised that this practice was in 
long-term decline, was largely confi ned to elderly traditionalists in the 
interior, and would gradually disappear of its own accord.51
During the accelerated preparation of the Ordinance de Gaulle’s 
agenda had, however, behind the scenes, run into stiff opposition, from 
both Muslim and European jurists on the commission (5–6 December) 
and then, more surprisingly, from the newly appointed délégué géné-
rale, Paul Delouvrier, who arriving in Algiers in mid-December, quickly 
adopted their cautious or conservative position.
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De Gaulle was aware by mid-November that any attempt to tamper 
with existing marriage and family law carried high risks, and that it was 
essential to calm Muslim opinion by receiving the backing of religious 
notables and theologians. Interested more in the propaganda effects of 
such a consultation process than in any meaningful, open and demo-
cratic debate that might have enabled an opposition voice to be heard, 
the Algiers government drew up a list of suitable clerics or judicial 
experts who were carefully selected for their infl uence and leadership 
role among the populace, as well as for their political loyalty to France. 
One list of thirteen notables to be consulted from across the three regions 
of Algeria included fi ve muphtis, three cadis, two heads of religious con-
fraternities, and the imam head of a large médersa.52 The biographies of 
these eminent religious leaders and jurists shows an elderly elite that had 
a long track record of close association with the colonial power, includ-
ing appointment to various offi cial posts, award of honours (Légion 
d’Honneur), and reception of various gratuities, such as pensions or 
government funding as offi cial delegates on the hadj.53 Among the most 
infl uential of these notables, and in many respects quite typical, were 
Abdelali ben Ahmed Lakhdari, Mohammed ben Bouzar Benhoura and 
Hamza ben Kaddour Boubakeur.
Lakhdari, born in 1905, and a distinguished Arab scholar trained 
at the Zitouna university in Tunisia, was appointed in 1948 director 
of the important médersa of Kittania in Constantine, received govern-
ment funding for the hadj in 1948, 1956 and 1958, was awarded the 
Légion d’Honneur in 1948, and attracted the ire of the FLN, which in 
1955 condemned him to death for ‘collaboration with the enemy’.54 
Lakhdari had made a famous speech in favour of women’s emancipa-
tion during the ‘fraternisation’ parade of 26 May 1958 (see chapter 3), 
a statement that was later extensively quoted by the government in its 
propaganda campaigns. Benhoura (born in 1890) was much decorated 
during the First World War, during which he was imprisoned, and had a 
long career as a Muslim justice from 1911 to 1930. In 1950 he was sent 
by the Ministry of the Interior on a mission to Jerusalem and Jordan, 
and was named in 1957 member of the Algiers regional administrative 
commission and in 1958 to the cabinet of the Minister for Algeria as a 
technical adviser.55
The most infl uential of those consulted was Hamza Boubakeur (born 
1912) who came from a powerful military dynasty (grande famille) 
that had traditionally served France in its conquest of both Algeria and 
Morocco, and which also headed the powerful marabout confedera-
tion of the Ouled Sidi Cheikh. On the outbreak of the insurrection in 
November 1954 he offered to raise an auxiliary force (goum) among his 
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tribesmen to fi ght the ‘rebels’. A highly cultured man, who spoke Arabic, 
German, English and Spanish, he was awarded the Legion d’Honneur 
in 1953, appointed professor of Arabic language in the Lycée Bugeaud, 
then to the infl uential post of rector of the Paris mosque in May 1957 
and member of the Consultative Committee on the Constitution in 
1958.56
It might have been expected that if any body of Muslim notables was 
going to provide the support for the marriage code that the government 
was so keen to procure, it would have been this group of carefully hand-
picked imams, cadis and functionaries. However, the fact that some of 
these establishment fi gures dug in to oppose the project did not bode 
well for the government and pointed towards the potential for a wider 
revolt that could only assist the FLN. This opposition became par-
ticularly clear during the meeting of the Commission of 5–6 December 
1958, which included Boubakeur and three cadis (Bouchrit, Turkarli 
and Benhoura) along with four European legal experts (Raymond 
Charles, Canac, Roussier and Knoertzer).
The commission agreed that the draft prepared and submitted to them 
by the administration was hasty and ill-prepared, that the timetable laid 
down by de Gaulle for completion by 15 December was impossible, and 
the draft reform far too radical. Boubakeur claimed it was based on 
the code of President Bourguiba, whom he regarded as a reprehensible, 
secularised despot, and ‘is absolutely revolutionary in relation to mar-
riage, its effects, and inheritance . . . it represents a complete overturning 
of Muslim law’, an opinion shared by the president, Raymond Charles, 
and by Professor Roussier who was ‘a bit surprised by the brutality 
with which such highly venerated institutions were sabotaged’.57 The 
Commission rejected the government’s draft and then proceeded to 
examine alternatives prepared by two of its own members (Roussier and 
Canac). But by the end of its deliberations the group appears to have 
been less concerned with the detail of the draft code, for example they 
were not opposed to giving women a right of consent to marriage, than 
with a concern that it would lead to a secularisation of marriage through 
marginalisation of the Muslim justices (cadis) and obligatory appearance 
before an offi cer of the state. The debate on the Ordinance became inter-
twined with a parallel project to reform the judicial system by amalga-
mating the cadis with the civil French justices, and it was widely felt by 
the government that the self-interested opposition by Muslim justices to 
the new law arose from the potential loss of income from the excessive 
fees extorted during traditional forms of marriage and repudiation.
An insight into the conservative and misogynous mind-set of the 
religious elite can be found in a long and very detailed critique that 
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Boubakeur had made, probably in July 1958, of the fi rst attempt 
to draft a reform of the personal status law by the 1957 Simoneau 
commission (see chapter 2).58 Firstly, he acknowledged that juridical 
reform should match the overall evolution of society, but was dan-
gerous if it was based on abstract principles or forced the pace of 
change. By abstract principles Boubakeur appears to have meant an 
intellectual importation of a western model of the family, one inspired 
by a ‘half-Christian, half-secular’ sensibility that bore no relationship 
to the culture of the Muslim family. What was to be avoided, he said, 
was an ‘occidental contamination’ since the western family was deeply 
dysfunctional, especially through the role of the woman who showed 
only a superfi cial religious faith and ‘no longer appear to be the ideal 
moving spirit of the home, but a woman more preoccupied with her 
own independence and amusement, who fi nds it diffi cult to support 
the sacrifi ces of motherhood (giving birth, breast feeding, education 
of children)’. Liberal legislation was at the root of a general moral 
decadence, ‘off-handedness, insolence of children, debauchery and an 
unsettled way of life. The beaches, amusement halls, parricide, infan-
ticide, battered children, juvenile delinquency recounted in a sensa-
tionalist way by newspapers, reinforces the idea of a decaying family 
in Europe and a loosening of morals’. By contrast, he claimed, the 
Muslim family showed a remarkable stability, a ‘strong vital energy’, 
that the western model, whether American or Soviet, would endanger. 
In addition, the liberal agenda took no account of the true nature of 
Algerian women whom, it was implied, required the strict regulatory 
framework of Koranic law, since she was ‘generally of an impulsive 
nature, with a relish for intrigue, machinations, and gossip’, and the 
traditional religious authorities most favourable to women had noted, 
‘her fi ckleness, her acid temperament, her extrovert mood swings, her 
tendency to insubordination (nushûz), her hastily formed, absolute 
and irrational decisions’. The Algerian woman, unlike the European, 
was not bound into a conjugal life, but remained attached to her 
family of origin, so that she considered herself to be, ‘in the home 
of her husband rather as if she were in a family hotel’, and presum-
ably lacking in that primordial allegiance to the lineage shared by 
all males (agnates). Boubakeur’s position on the moral decadence of 
western society and the dangers of this working as a Fifth Column to 
subvert Islamic values was indicative of the way in which the reform-
ist message of the Ulema had become generalised among the Algerian 
elites.
To Hamza Boubakeur it seemed folly to engage in such a major 
reform, a ‘gift’ handed down from above that had not been demanded 
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in any way by Algerian women themselves. Secondly, the reform project 
seemed to be offered as a red herring to distract Muslim attention 
from the more pressing issue of the war. Finally, and most crucially, 
Boubakeur raised the frightening agenda of upsetting the visceral 
and blind attachment of the population to its religious practices: a 
‘milieu ferociously attached to its juridico-customary system, inclined 
to an anarchist atavism, subject to the most crazy impulses whenever 
its religion is put in question, prompt to indulge a taste for disorder, 
to provoke discontent that further aggravates the present troubles’. 
Boubakeur clung adamantly to the Malekite tradition of law (fi qh) that 
he feared was being opportunistically combined with a range of alien 
codes and Islamic schools, from Hanefi sm to Bourguiba and the French 
Civil Code, a position that was to be shared a quarter of a century later 
by the legislators of the reactionary family code passed by the Algerian 
parliament in 1984.59
Far more unexpected than Boubakeur’s opposition to the reform 
was that of Paul Delouvrier, the new head of the Algiers government 
appointed by de Gaulle to reassert the authority of Paris over the gener-
als. Delouvrier later, in a signifi cant letter to the Prime Minister on 18 
July 1959, made clear the grounds for his opposition to the Ordinance.60 
Delouvrier recognised that Muslim justices (cadis, bachadels) were 
‘relentless adversaries’ of the reform, as were the classic elites, both from 
traditionalist and modernist (évolués) backgrounds, who responded to 
the pressure and propaganda of the Ulema and the FLN. The elites put 
forward the type of argument that had been voiced by Boubakeur: the 
legislation represented for them an invasion of the secular state into the 
religious fi eld of Islam, there were more important issues to tackle, and 
Algerian women needed to undergo a long-term education and evolu-
tion before being ready for such changes. Delouvrier acknowledged that 
the elite response may have been unrepresentative of the populace since 
there was a real problem in gauging the attitudes of the uneducated 
masses who had no channel through which to express their opinion. 
But in general he viewed the majority of Muslims as mired in a deeply 
entrenched conservative attachment to existing socio-religious values 
and, ‘are prisoners of conformism in the sense that they feel that they 
belong to a religious community in which one cannot transgress the 
taboos without running the risk of a unanimous reprobation’. In addi-
tion the most opportune moment for reform, during the ‘revolutionary’ 
élan of ‘13 May 1958’ when the masses were most receptive, had now 
passed by.61 The one indication of promise arose from the fact that the 
younger generation who represented ‘the Algeria of tomorrow’ were 
showing signs of a break, a ‘mental rupture’, by contrast with adults.
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For the colonial government, behind the potential minefi eld of per-
sonal status law lay the ominous shadow of the nationalists. Delouvrier 
continued in his letter to the Prime Minister: ‘The project for the reform 
of Muslim law is providing a hobby-horse for FLN propaganda. This 
propaganda is spreading insidiously in Algeria and abroad, especially 
through a radio campaign: France is accused of “de-islamisation” and 
of engaging in a “new Crusade against the Crescent”’. The FLN would 
probably make every possible means to use the issue in the coming 
session of the UN.
The response of de Gaulle to the resistance of the Algiers Commission 
(5–6 December), of religious notables, and Delouvrier’s administra-
tion to a meaningful reform of the personal status law, was to simply 
by-pass it by establishing a working party in Paris that drafted the fi nal 
Ordinance without further consultation with Algiers.62 On 2 February 
M. J. Mafart, the director of Delouvrier’s cabinet, could barely contain 
his anger at this fait accompli when he read in the press that the Conseil 
d’État was to examine the fi nal text of the Ordinance the next day. 
In a desperate exchange of telegrams with Paris Delouvrier’s cabinet 
insisted that the new law must not ‘cause any offence to the prescrip-
tions and traditions of Muslim religion’, while emphasising that any 
plans to abolish the role of the cadis would be a mistake.63 When Mafart 
received the text of the revised Ordinance by telegram later that day, 
it confi rmed his worst fears, but it was too late for Delouvrier to do 
 anything about it.64
Boubakeur reacted angrily and more publicly to the leaked news 
that an Ordinance was about to be promulgated without consultation 
with Muslim jurists and General Renucci, who headed the administra-
tive service for the Muslim deputies in parliament, delivered a letter 
of complaint to Michel Debré on 31 January.65 Boubakeur, who held 
considerable political clout as deputy for the Oasis and president of 
the Commission for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Minister of Justice 
Michelet warning of catastrophic consequences for Franco-Algerian 
unity: ‘As a militant supporter of the union and the collaboration of 
French and Muslims, I assess with foreboding the grave effects of this 
measure on Algerian opinion. The discontent of the Muslim masses, the 
irritation of theologians and ministers of religion, the amazement of the 
elites, of men and women, in my opinion merits the greatest attention 
by the government’. He begged Michelet to delay ‘to a more favourable 
date’ a measure seen, ‘not only as a act of bullying, but even more as an 
indication of the de-islamisation of the Muslim conjugal union, a theme 
that runs the danger of fuelling a violent anti-French campaign at a time 
when prudence and caution is more necessary than ever’.66 Michelet 
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took the warning seriously and immediately sought the opinion of 
Nafi ssa Sid Cara, the Prime Minister, and the Public Prosecutors 
(Procureurs Généraux) of Oran, Algiers and Constantine.
At this point it is of interest to consider the use that Salan and the 
Paris government made of three Algerian women, whom it promoted as 
deputies, in order to reinforce the propaganda in favour of legal eman-
cipation. The Ordinance only constituted an outline of the new legisla-
tion and it was the task of a Commission Permanente that fi rst met on 
3 February 1959 to refi ne the detail of the decree of application that 
was fi nally published on 17 September. A prominent role was played 
in this commission by Nafi ssa Sid Cara, a newly appointed junior 
minister, and her close advisor Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux.67 Exactly 
how Sid Cara and the other two Algerian women deputies, Rebiha 
Kebtani and Khedira Bouabsa, were elected to the National Assembly 
on 30 November 1958, and suddenly propelled onto the political stage 
remains clouded in mystery, but the evidence points towards another 
propaganda coup engineered by the Fifth Bureau or other specialists 
in the Algiers administration, operating through Lucienne Salan as 
 president of the MSF.68
Lucienne Salan, during the propaganda drive in preparation for the 
fi rst ever vote by Algerian women on 28 September 1958, was in close 
touch with Lefaucheux who, as a UN representative, was particularly 
well informed on the legal and technical issues involved in the global 
extension of the franchise to ‘Third World’ women. Lefaucheux, as 
president of the CNFF, had publicly intimated to the Gaullist govern-
ment that the ‘wives and mothers’ of France would abstain in the crucial 
elections of the infant Fifth Republic if they were not joined by their 
Algerian ‘sisters’.69 After the triumphant ‘Yes’ vote by Algerian women, 
the MSF leadership began to search among its members for suitable can-
didates to stand in the legislative elections, and Suzanne Massu partici-
pated in numerous electoral meetings to support Sid Cara as a candidate 
for the Alger-Banlieue constituency.70 The election of the three Muslim 
women represented an undoubted propaganda triumph, providing a 
dramatic symbol of the ‘New Algeria’ and of the French commitment 
to emancipation, political integration and equality. The world’s press 
fl ocked to report on the astonishing phenomenon of women who had 
been propelled from apparent ‘seclusion’ into the very public, and male-
dominated, arena of parliamentary debate. Much attention centred on 
the photogenic Rebiha Kebtani, also promoted as the deputy mayor of 
Sétif, who was widely referred to as the Bardot look-alike, the ‘pin up’ 
or ‘the blond Kabyle’, and who made much of her rapid transformation 
from veiled recluse to prominent politician.71
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From the moment that the three women were elected they were immedi-
ately used to promote the programme for the reform of the personal status 
law. It was of particular importance to the government to reassure Algerian 
opinion that the proposals did not present any kind of secular interference 
with religious orthodoxy, and this message was far more convincing when 
directly presented by female Muslims rather than by European spokes-
men.72 But at the same time the government seems to have been nervous 
at the prospect of the deputies, who had little political experience, making 
naive or ill-informed statements, and a decision was made to ensure that 
they were discreetly surrounded by shadowy minders. When the journalist 
Jacques Perrier interviewed Kebtani in her Sétif offi ce his questions were 
frequently fi elded by a kind of male ‘councillor’: ‘At fi rst I thought he was 
some kind of professor given the task of guiding Mme Kebtani in her fi rst 
steps along the often obscure pathways of the administration, but I found 
out that his role was anonymous and rather peculiar’. The adviser seemed 
terrifi ed by her naive or inane comments, such as mention of the infantile 
La Petite Fadette as for long her favourite bedtime reading.
However, government advisers were not always able to control the 
women deputies, and this was to become particularly clear in the case 
of Nafi ssa Sid Cara who was appointed, on the departure of Lucienne 
Salan, as president of the MSF and then appointed by Michel Debré 
on 8 January 1959 as Secrétaire d’État aux Affaires Sociales, the fi rst 
Algerian woman to serve in a French government. Debré’s interest in 
making this unexpected appointment seems to have been largely for 
purposes of window-dressing: as her niece informed Ryme Seferdjeli, 
‘She [Nafi ssa] had the feeling that she had been chosen because of what 
she represented and that she was being used’.73 Sid Cara, for example, 
was introduced by de Gaulle to President Eisenhower during his offi cial 
visit of September 1959 to impress the Americans who had a deeply 
negative view of the colonial war in Algeria, and likewise the glamor-
ous Rebiha Kebtani was sent with a delegation to the UN. However, 
Sid Cara proved to be far tougher than she appeared, and was keen to 
pursue a strong and independent line in government.
It is diffi cult to assess exactly how infl uential Sid Cara was in the 
government commission that drafted the new law,74 but she was able to 
form a strong alliance with Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux who had a solid 
technical knowledge of the complex fi eld of Muslim family law and had 
already participated in June 1957 in the fi rst Simoneau commission to 
prepare a new code.75 In 1957 Lefaucheux had taken a quite radical 
stance on reform, even criticising the Bourguiba Code for not going far 
enough to prevent repudiation,76 and as head of Sid Cara’s cabinet in 
early 1959 she worked with the junior minister to present a draft decree 
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to the parliamentary commission that was convened in Sid Cara’s bureau. 
Sid Cara was keen to transfer the power of conservative Muslim justices 
(cadis) to adjudicate on marriage or divorce proceedings to secular offi c-
ers of the state since it was thought the cadis colluded with the worst 
abuses of arranged marriage, polygamy and repudiation.77 Sid Cara’s 
career through to 14 April 1962 shows her very real determination to 
be far more than a mere fi gure-head and to promote a strong reformist 
agenda that would make a meaningful difference to the lives of ordinary 
women in Algeria, but she lacked the overall political weight to make 
much impact on the Debré government.78 Sid Cara twice threatened res-
ignation during the drafting of the reform of the personal status law but 
the fi nal measure still did not come up to her expectations, nor to those of 
Khedira Bouabsa.79 The FLN regarded Sid Cara as a traitor, a key symbol 
of collaboration with French integration, and several attempts were made 
to assassinate her.80
By July 1959, Delouvrier had admitted defeat on the issue of the new 
personal status law, but the depth and nature of the split in the Gaullist 
ranks is telling of the extreme diffi culty of initiating radical socio-legal 
and religious change in a time of armed confl ict. De Gaulle, in line with 
the Constantine Plan, was determined to push through a rapid mod-
ernisation of the Algerian economy and institutions, and, in his deci-
sion to accelerate a radical reform of Muslim law against conservative 
opposition, shared more with the position of Salan and the ‘revolution-
ary’ generals of ‘13 May’ on emancipation than he did the reservations 
of his placeman, Delouvrier, sent in to exert control over the army.81 
However, as time would tell, Salan and de Gaulle shared a false unity 
of purpose and were looking to identical means to achieve the oppos-
ing goals of Algérie française and Algerian ‘association’ or autonomy. 
By empowering Algerian women and granting them full citizenship, de 
Gaulle ensured that they would eventually participate en masse in the 
referendum of 1 July 1962 that fi nalised Algerian independence.
The 1959 reform of the personal status law and popular Algerian 
reactions
What can we know about Algerian responses to legal reform? The 
archives provide a considerable body of detailed information on this, 
largely because the army and administration were so nervous about the 
political impacts on public opinion and support for the FLN that they 
constantly carried out numerous, detailed investigations of this matter 
through elaborate questionnaires, surveys and reports. The Prime 
Minister, for example, sent a telegram to Delouvrier on 15 February 
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to investigate Muslim reactions to the Ordinance, to which the latter 
replied that an urgent propaganda campaign was required to prepare 
Algerian opinion before the fi nal decree was published in September 
1959.82 The Algiers government sent out 15,000 questionnaires to the 
SAS and EMSI teams on 20 February and the responses were synthe-
sised into 432 local reports and then into a global assessment by the 
Islamic specialist Captain L. P. Fauque in a restricted publication, Stades 
d’évolution de la cellule familiale musulmane d’Algérie.83
In July Delouvrier signed a joint circular with General Challe which 
detailed a massive propaganda offensive by press, radio, fi lm and the 
MSF, EMSI and SAS networks.84 This was to include a ‘black propa-
ganda’ campaign of rumours which targeted the cadis as parasites on 
the people who opposed reform from motives of material self-interest 
and venality, and who attempted to protect their monopoly of the judi-
cial fees and bribes (bakchich) they charged for carrying out marriages 
and divorce.85
During July 1959 the colonial press began to carry numerous articles 
in favour of the Ordinance, like that in the Depêche quotidienne which 
carried interviews with young men and women who as children had 
suffered the consequences of repudiation of their own mothers, headed 
by a large photograph of a sad woman with the caption, ‘The obsessive 
fear of all young women in the suburbs and outskirts: “I do not want 
to be repudiated”’.86 After the decree was published, a further cam-
paign was to take place to persuade Algerians to apply the new code in 
person, particularly through progressive Muslims leading the way by, 
for example, celebrating western style marriages before the mayor. The 
EMSI showed particular enthusiasm in encouraging ‘their girls’, and 
reporting to higher authorities any instances of marriages ‘à la mode de 
Gaulle’.87
In some instances the EMSI reported their success in persuading 
families to abandon projected marriages, because the spouses were too 
young, and the man far too old for the bride or even ill and decrepit.88
How successful was this campaign in favour of emancipation, or did 
the French face the imminent revolt predicted by Boubakeur? During 
1959 there appears to have been very little reaction to the specifi c pro-
posals of the new measure among the great mass of the illiterate urban 
and rural poor who were in no position to know of its existence, let 
alone to assess its technical implications. The law, as is shown later, only 
began to impinge on the lower classes in a direct way from the moment 
that the decree began to be implemented by the courts from late 1959 
onwards. As the Procureur of the Constantine Court of Appeal noted in 
June 1959, ‘The example of the past however allows us to predict that 
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if the new arrangements for marriage and repudiation clash too much 
with the peoples customs or interests, they will ignore them just as they 
have done up to now for all the laws relating to the état civil, without 
invoking for that matter any argument of a religious nature’.89 The 
reports show a strong consensus that the popular masses that made up 
over 90 per cent of Algerian society, ‘an extremely conformist society’, 
clung doggedly to custom. Fauque reported that even labour migrants 
to the big cities and to France who had much direct experience of the 
European way of life, while convinced of the technical and material 
superiority of the west to which they aspired, viewed it as degenerate, 
‘and they are profoundly convinced of the superiority of Muslim values 
over our own’.90
Most older men were anxious about losing their traditional powers 
and feared that giving their offspring a degree of choice in marriage 
would undermine their own long-term security in the family cell, and 
also open the way to moral corruption, the ‘licentiousness of youth’.91 
There was evidence of some support for reform among women, particu-
larly for an end to unilateral repudiation, a very widespread practice 
18 An apprehensive couple getting married in the town-hall of Bordj Okhriss 
after implementation of the 1959 Personal Status law
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described as ‘the great fear’ of married women since it left them and 
their children constantly vulnerable to the whim of husbands. But, in 
general women remained silent in relation to the male sphere of ‘poli-
tics’ and in a society in which 96 per cent of married women were illit-
erate, most of them remained ignorant of the detail of the family code, 
and could not understand the terms of the debate, such as the distinction 
between secularism (laicité) and religious authority.
The FLN was, however, able to appeal directly to the general unease 
relating to the Ordinance on the grounds of both nationalism and 
religion and played on male insecurities by spreading rumours or exag-
gerated fears about the nature of the colonial crusade that threatened 
the very foundations of Algerian society. In November 1959 the com-
mander of the Oran Army Corps reported widespread hostility in his 
region to the new marriage code because of a failure to consult Muslim 
representatives, concern that cadis were to be abolished, and a perceived 
‘de-islamisation’ and erasure of the Arabic language:
The sympathisers of the FLN maintain an attitude that derives more from 
‘tactics’ than a deeply held opinion. Fundamentally won over to a renova-
tion of Islam, they none-the-less exploit, systematically, every initiative of 
France that may seem to clash with the popular conception of Islam and 
of traditional institutions. Denying us the right to innovate or modify, the 
moment is favourable to them to accuse us of ‘provoking a Holy War’.92
An SAU offi cer Captain Bapst noted a similar opportunist reaction of 
men to the family code on religious grounds: ‘Which seems all the more 
suspect since these religious arguments often come from the mouth of 
individuals that have never practised any Koranic prescriptions’.93 But 
overall there was no doubt in the mind of the specialist, Captain Fauque, 
that there existed ‘a profound attachment to the Islamic concept of 
family organisation and this can be interpreted as a defensive reaction 
against the reforms’.94
The reaction of the minority of educated Algerians was more complex 
and divided. The various surveys indicated a degree of support for 
reform of the personal status law among the évolués, mainly the young 
men and women who had received a solid French-language education, 
were deeply infl uenced by French culture, and who in many instances 
had a direct stake in the existing political order through state employ-
ment as secretaries, junior administrators, doctors, school teachers, 
interpreters, clerks and technicians. While the young and mainly celi-
bate modernists undoubtedly expressed a strong preference to be able to 
marry a partner of their choice, to enjoy the life of a conjugal couple ‘à 
la européenne’, and to end the destructive impacts of repudiation, when 
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it came to their own marriage most appear to have reverted to custom. 
Men in particular, while accepting in principle the need for change, 
were reluctant to abandon their privileged position as males, while 
family pressures bore heavily on both men and women to follow tradi-
tion. But most important in the particular conjuncture of war was the 
massive infl uence that the FLN and religious reformists, now united in a 
common front, came to bring upon the educated, urban middle classes, 
who during 1959 began to step back from open or strong advocacy of 
legal emancipation. As Fauque remarked of the évolués, ‘The crisis of 
conscience that agitates the young intellectuals holds them back from 
taking the lead in a movement for the evolution of women’.95
As has been seen (chapter 1) during the decade prior to the War of 
Independence the infl uence of the Ulema reformists had penetrated deep 
into the nationalist movement of Messali Hadj and among the women of 
the Association des femmes musulmanes algériennes. The Ulema, who 
warned against the dangers of western feminism, secularism and moral 
decadence subverting the integrity of the Muslim family, after it had 
rallied to the FLN and moved its key organisers to Tunisia and Morocco 
in September 1957, came to constitute the offi cial religio- cultural voice 
of Algerian nationalism.96 What must have been particularly worrying 
for the French government were signs that the Ulema ideology, as has 
been seen in the case of Boubakeur, was beginning to make deep inroads 
into the politically infl uential class of the Algerian notables and the 
state funded ‘offi cial’ imams and theologians who had down to 1958 
provided a key buttress to French power.97 Between the heady days of 
the revolutionary ‘13 May’ of 1958 and the autumn of 1959 there was 
a deep sea-change in the climate of opinion in Algeria: the optimism of 
‘fraternisation’ and a new dawn for Algérie française quickly evapo-
rated, especially after de Gaulle’s crucial ‘self-determination’ speech of 
16 September 1959. The emerging possibility of a French withdrawal 
impelled many of the Algerian bourgeoisie, who had until then publicly 
backed France, into a prudent silence or attentisme.98 The Procureur 
of Oran noted that, with the exception of Lakhdari, ‘on the part of the 
ministers of religion there exists the most absolute silence. Agents of the 
French administration, they abstain from any comment that could make 
them appear to the rebels as traitors to their cause . . . The well-to-do 
strata of the bourgeoisie are also refractory’.99 Delouvrier informed the 
Prime Minister in July 1959 that the French had lost the initiative on the 
reform and failed to profi t from the élan of ‘13 May’:
On the other hand it is clear that the ‘revolutionary’ climate that followed 
the 13 May 1958 no longer exists today. For a certain time the masses 
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were carried along by their will-power. They are no longer in the recep-
tive state which, at the time, might have welcomed the reforms decided 
by the government in the sensitive area of the personal status law . . . It is 
not surprising then to fi nd at present that the classic ‘elites’ (whether they 
belong to traditionalist society or a milieu évolués) are always very watch-
ful of the moment and also infl uenced by the propaganda and methods of 
pressure of the FLN.100
The French army may have begun to win the military battle against the 
ALN guerrilla, especially with the Challe offensive, but this came at the 
very moment that the battle for hearts and minds was tipping in favour 
of the FLN.
The ‘offi cial’ religious leaders continued to exercise a signifi cant polit-
ical infl uence inside Algeria, particularly through the Friday sermons in 
the mosques, and both the French intelligence services and the FLN kept 
a sharp eye on the ‘fl avour’ of the messages being pronounced.101 The 
French were quite prepared to place pressure on imams who conveyed a 
hostile message, including the closure of mosques. In January 1959, for 
example, General Olié, commander of the army corps in Constantine, 
sent out a directive noting that Ramadan, which was to begin on 11 
March, was a period of religious fervour that the FLN might try to 
exploit as well as, ‘certain religious agents who do not hesitate to exploit 
the crowds of faithful to engage in an unacceptable propaganda against’: 
in consequence sector commanders were to gather intelligence on the 
Friday sermons and, if necessary, send police into the mosques and take 
measures under the Special Powers Act.102 The FLN in turn threatened 
to assassinate those religious leaders who were too proactive in support 
of the authorities. However, in general the ranks of the FLN, far from 
being hostile to the clerisy or espousing a secular form of socialism, 
was suffused with a populist Islamic religiosity.103 For example, in April 
1957, the army captured an internal FLN document near Port-Gueydon 
which ordered that daily prayer should be obligatory for all aged over 
fi fteen, and that Friday prayer (grande prière) should be recited in every 
village.104
Both sides in the war recognised the strategic importance of religion 
in their propaganda campaigns, and this became nowhere more impor-
tant than over the reform of the family code since this was almost uni-
versally recognised as the touch-stone of the Algerian social order and 
of cultural identity. In July 1959 the FLN journal El Moudjahid, closely 
refl ecting the position of the Ulema and Muslim clergy, claimed that the 
French, ‘who moreover are Christian or of the Jewish faith, have dared 
to deliberately attack the Koran, in its essence immutable, and to impose 
on Algerian Muslims by the sword the secular laws of France, and this 
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in the most sacred of matters, namely the statut personnel . . . Koranic 
law is trampled under the feet of French colonialism’.105 The journal 
also denounced the erosion of the power of the cadis, and although 
the Algerian government tried to play on popular dislike of the money 
they engrossed at the expense of the poor, the Muslim justices remained 
very infl uential as ‘the classic intermediaries of Muslim marriage’ and a 
source of opposition to the reform.106 Even those traditional religious 
leaders who were closest to the French expressed a deep repugnance for 
the family code, an opposition that made itself heard through Friday 
prayers and other channels. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Dumas 
reported on a meeting he had with the religious leaders of Bouira on the 
reform, Sheikh Abadallah Djermouni, head of the infl uential Rhamania 
confraternity, the imam of the mosque, and two teachers in the médersa. 
They were totally intransigent in their rejection of the idea that young, 
inexperienced girls could refuse a choice of spouse imposed by her 
parents who had the wisdom and maturity to judge what was the best 
arrangement.107 Overall the considerable investment made by the ‘inte-
grationists’ of Algérie française and the psychological warfare offi cers in 
reform of marriage and family law as a means to win popular support 
either backfi red or, as we shall see next, produced a minimal effect.
Problems of implementing the personal status law
Much of the information from 1959 relates to French surveys of 
Algerian opinion about legal reform, but in many ways the most con-
clusive evidence about the impact of the Ordinance relates to the way 
in which in the long term the population reacted to the actual imple-
mentation of the new regulations by the local authorities, the judiciary 
and the court system. Investigation of judicial change relating to family 
law and Muslim women in general has emphasised the importance of 
moving beyond the legal texts, which some historians have uncritically 
assumed to achieve their objectives by the simple fact of promulgation, 
to explore the way in which legislation, mediated by policing agencies, 
courts and social practices, translated into outcomes.108 In the case of 
Algeria the 1959 Ordinance met strong political resistance from a civil 
society that quietly avoided or sabotaged the new laws for reasons that 
often had less to do with ideology than self-protection from the incur-
sion of a hated regime into the intimate affairs of the family, marriage 
and property. This resistance to modernising French legislation provides 
crucial evidence as to why the newly independent Algerian state failed to 
introduce a progressive reform and emancipation of women after 1962 
(see chapter 11).
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What made resistance possible was the fact that government simply 
lacked the basic bureaucratic apparatus to enforce its provisions, both 
in terms of an état civil (civil register), local administrators and suffi cient 
courts. While historians have often analysed France as a classic exem-
plar of the centralised and bureaucratic state, in the case of Algeria there 
existed an economic and socio-political dualism of space between the 
European-dominated and more advanced urban societies of the north-
ern literal and the under-developed interior (see Introduction). In the 
past, through their political domination of the urban centres, the CPE, 
settlers ensured that state revenue was channelled to the roads, schools, 
hospitals and other infrastructures of the north, while the ‘natives’ of 
the bled were abandoned to their own devices. A tacit quid-pro-quo 
pact seems to have existed between settlers and the local Algerian caïds 
who ‘managed’ the mass of rural poor on behalf of the French, one by 
which colonial government in return for failing to invest in rural society 
would agree not to interfere too much in the traditional way of life of 
the peasantry, including marriage and family arrangements. The French 
presence in the bled became even more tenuous in the half century 
after 1900 as settlers abandoned their farms and migrated in growing 
numbers towards the towns. This ‘bureaucratic vacuum’ suggests that 
the ‘weak’ French state did little to reduce the power of the extended 
family, clans or tribes as alternative poles of authority and allegiance 
to central government.109 During his governorship Soustelle recognised 
the fact of ‘under-administration’ as the fundamental problem facing 
Algeria, but it was beyond the resources of the army to reverse the 
 long-term, accumulated effects of state under-investment in the interior.
One key sign of the absence of a ‘strong’ state in the bled was the 
failure to establish a comprehensive état civil, a civil register of births, 
marriages, divorce and deaths.110 The law of 23 March 1882 which 
regulated registration, including the imposition of a patronymic to 
identify each person, was not extended to all tribes, especially in the 
south, and in many areas families failed to register children at birth.111 
In 1913 it was estimated that there were 100,000 lost souls (omis), 
individuals that had no offi cial existence, and despite various attempts 
to enforce registration, notably by a law of 1925, signifi cantly by 1959 
the situation had got worse and the number of omis had increased to 
about 230,000.112 In 1952 Lucien Fauque reported, ‘For long the French 
administration shrunk back when faced with the practical diffi culties to 
overcome and the inertia of the inhabitants resistant to any census’.113
The reasons why Algerians avoided registration were numerous: the 
key rites de passage, birth, marriage and death, had always been viewed 
as moments of religious and purely private celebration restricted to the 
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family; frequently the offi cers of the state (mayors, justices) whose role 
was to register the acts were far distant; while providing such informa-
tion enabled the state to intrude into the tribe and enforce numerous 
demands, from taxation to military conscription. While non-compliance 
with the état civil could, in principle, be punished with fi nes and prison 
sentences, in practice administrators were reluctant to use such severe 
methods against ignorant peasants and moratoria on those who had 
failed to register were still being extended down to 1950. The key factor 
that worked in the opposite direction after 1945 was the extension of 
state welfare, particularly family benefi ts, to some workers and, since 
claims for child allowance depended on verifi cation of birth certifi cates, 
this encouraged registration with the état civil.114
The problem of under-registration and avoidance of administrative 
policing deepened dramatically during the Algerian War. Local govern-
ment at the level of the communes became increasingly disorganised, 
particularly in the bled, as European mayors fl ed to the coastal cities or 
France to escape FLN assassination, while Algerians were also reluctant 
to be installed as offi cials under Lacoste’s loi-cadre reform.115 Over 200 
Algerians who served as municipal councillors were assassinated,116 and 
the weakening of local government along with its reorganisation after 
1956 seems to have been refl ected in such dilapidation of the civil reg-
isters that the authorities were unable to supply Algerians with copies 
of the birth, marriage and death certifi cates required under the new per-
sonal status law.117 Simultaneously there was a massive dislocation of 
peasant society through regroupement and internal refugee movements 
to the urban shantytowns which made tracking of individuals or fami-
lies diffi cult, while adult males who departed in growing number to the 
cities and France, or into the ranks of the FLN, had every reason to avoid 
identifi cation.118 The senior civil servant, André Jacomet, was shocked 
by the anarchic situation of the état civil and, following detailed reports 
from the senior judges who had to apply the new legislation, realised 
how this radically undermined implementation of the family code, 
particularly in relation to the declarations of marriage and divorce.119 
Jacomet immediately ordered the civil and military authorities to engage 
in a crash programme of registration, particularly of women,120 what he 
called ‘a veritable “hunt” for the disappeared (omis)’, and the identity 
photographs of Marc Garanger taken at Bordj Okhriss in 1960 provide 
visual evidence of this campaign.
It was against this background that the Algiers government quickly 
came to realise that it was faced with enormous problems in enforcing 
the new family code after its publication in September 1959.121 The 
large investigation of marriage practices in March 1959, just prior to 
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any attempt at implementation, estimated that about 15 per cent of mar-
riages in the towns escaped registration, 35 per cent in the rural plains, 
55 per cent in the mountains, and 80 per cent in the insecure zones, and 
among these unrecorded marriages were many relating to pre-pubescent 
girls.122 In other words the further one moved from urban society into 
the interior, the more tenuous French authority became, while inversely 
the local power of the FLN maquis increased along with cultural resist-
ance to the new Ordinance. The problems were particularly pronounced 
among the conservative populations of the vast southern departments of 
the Sahara and Saoura. Here it was reported that so few Muslim courts 
(mahakma) and mayor’s offi ces existed that the inhabitants of places 
like Reggan or Tindouf could be a thousand kilometres distant, and in 
the absence of any forms of public transport it was almost impossible 
to register births, marriages and divorce within a matter of days with 
the état civil as required by the law.123 Religious leaders, noted General 
Pigeot, were also preaching resistance to the law especially, ‘in the zones 
of infl uence of the zaouias as at Kerzaza and Zaouiet Kounta and in 
the localities in which the marabouts hold a great infl uence as in Sali 
and Tamentit’. The inhabitants were so shocked by the requirement for 
women to appear in person to authenticate their assent to marriage, 
a dishonouring exposure of women to other males, that villages were 
asking for marriage ceremonies to take place only at night. General 
Pigeot warned that the authorities could not afford to be infl exible in 
its application of the law, ‘without risking to see fraud spread with 
the complicity of the whole population; it will not be the fi ancée who 
appears before the registry offi cer, but a widow or divorced woman 
wrapped in veils. The propaganda undertaken for the implementation 
of the Ordinance will be made a laughing stock’.
Resistance was not, however, restricted to the deep south: the 
president of the Algiers Court of Appeal reported in the areas of Blida, 
Orléansville, Bouira and elsewhere opposition that was in part religious 
and political, and in part pragmatic relating to the greater bureaucratic 
complexity, higher cost and long procedural delays of marriage and, 
in particular, of divorce.124 Considerable problems were faced among 
the many hundreds of thousands of men who were absent as labour 
migrants in France or in the northern cities, as conscripts in the army, or 
in the ALN forces. Ministry of Justice investigation exposed cases like 
that of Abdelkader Bah who married Habiba Bouklachi in the mahakma 
of Blida on 3 January 1961: but Bah was on this date in Valence, France, 
and the bridegroom was impersonated by his brother.125 Abdelkader 
ben Aberrahmane’s livret de famille registered his marriage on 26 
August 1960 before the mahakma of Alger-Sud, but at the time he was 
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in France: he was replaced at the ceremony by his father, and his wife-
to-be by another woman. Such abuses suggested that some cadi were 
themselves quietly sabotaging the new law, or lax in the verifi cation of 
identity.
A particularly diffi cult problem existed in the case of the clauses on 
divorce since wives could now initiate proceedings against their hus-
bands, including on the grounds of absence that left families with no 
means of support. Many male defendants of a petition could not be 
located or notifi ed of a pending action because they were absent or, even 
if they were found in time, they could not get permission from the armed 
forces or their French employers, risking loss of their job if they travelled 
home.126 The new law facilitated a ‘fast-track’ divorce for the disappear-
ance or long-term absence of the husband so that it could be fi nalised by 
a judge after one month instead of four years. The aim of this so-called 
‘colonialist’ divorce was to drive a wedge between husband and wife,127 
and to undermine the morale of FLN cadres, a tactic that confi rmed the 
analysis of nationalist theorists that psychological warfare was aimed 
at penetrating and subverting the family cell.128 The overall response of 
the FLN was to dissuade Algerians from having any recourse to French 
courts or justices and, as will be seen in the following chapter, it set out 
to establish its own counter-state, état civil, and judicial regulation of 
marriage and divorce.
The weakness of the bureaucracy and état civil in the interior meant 
that many Algerians, as they had always done, simply ignored the law, 
or utilised numerous and well-worn avoidance techniques. A year after 
the introduction of the law it was reported that the number of court-
registered divorces, which had already been low before the act, had 
declined even further.129 This refl ected the avoidance of males shocked 
in their patriarchal sensibilities by the erosion of talaq, the empower-
ment of women, and who were determined to evade the higher costs 
of settlement enforced by the law. The number of marriages contracted 
before the communal offi cial by March 1960, despite the enthusiasm 
of the EMSI for the ‘marriage à la mode de Gaulle’, had registered zero 
instances in some locations, even including major towns like Affreville, 
Relizane, Médéa, Constantine, Bône and Guelma and one Muslim mag-
istrate of Algiers estimated that 60 per cent of all marriages avoided 
state control.130
Although it was widely acknowledged by government offi cials and 
jurists that any legislation of this kind relating to family law would 
inevitably take some while to transform deeply entrenched practices,131 
it was soon apparent that the marriage code was being met by a large-
scale resistance, inertia and, the traditional weapon of the peasantry 
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against the colonial power, feigned ignorance, ‘stupidity’ and silence. As 
it became increasingly evident from early 1960 onwards that the war 
would end with a French withdrawal, the judicial and police authorities 
saw little point in pursuing the strict implementation of such unpopular 
legislation, while many Algerians sensing this imminent defeat of the 
colonial power risked little in openly defying its provisions. In late 1961, 
as OAS violence and anarchy deepened, the Prefect of Oran summarised 
the situation in what was the most ‘pacifi ed’ of the three regions: ‘The 
reform of the personal status of women is less-and-less talked about 
since it has become routine to avoid it. The decree of 17 September 1959 
is hardly applied, either in regard to the agreement of the two parties (of 
the young girl in particular) nor in relation to divorce which has already 
been replaced by unilateral repudiation’.132 After independence in mid-
1962 the new Algerian state was confronted with a society in which a 
widespread culture and practice of non-compliance to marriage legisla-
tion was deeply entrenched. To understand how the post-colonial state 
would react to the issue of women’s rights requires a closer look at the 
history of FLN policies on emancipation during the war, the subject of 
the next chapter.
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The FLN and the role of women during 
the war
The universally held image of women during the Algerian War is 
that, made famous by Frantz Fanon and Pontecorvo’s classic fi lm 
The Battle of Algiers, of Muslim women as heroic resistance fi ghters. 
However, this enduring symbol of ‘Third World’ women confronting 
the might of colonial armies refl ects more the propaganda success of 
the FLN in manipulating the representation of Algerian women than 
any real or enduring transformation of their position or rights. For 
the majority of FLN leaders the ‘woman question’ did not constitute a 
signifi cant issue: the immediate life-and-death business of waging war 
and of national survival was thought to be far too urgent a matter to 
allow energies to be diverted in this direction and women’s equality 
it was thought would be almost automatically achieved through inde-
pendence and liberation from colonialism.1 However, the FLN was 
forced during the course of the war to take a position on women for 
two reasons: fi rstly, women gradually assumed a de facto role in the 
confl ict, playing a major part in urban networks and the maquis as 
gun and bomb carriers, messengers, fund collectors, nurses, look-outs, 
cooks and doctors. Inevitably, as often in time of war, such activities 
presented a challenge to traditional concepts of segregation of the 
sexes, gender and male dominance. Secondly, the FLN was perfectly 
aware that a key intention of the French military in undertaking an 
emancipation agenda was to place the nationalists on the spot, since 
it was calculated that they would be unwilling or unable to respond 
by adopting their own progressive reform, while direct opposition to 
French liberation from custom and patriarchy would expose them 
in the UN and among international opinion as reactionaries. How 
the FLN responded to this dual challenge during the war was to set 
the scene, as will be shown in chapter 11, for the post-independence 
political marginalisation of women and the long-term failure of a 
reform agenda.
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The ad hoc mobilisation of women
The most interesting and dynamic phase of women’s direct engagement in 
the war came during 1955–57, a more open and experimental period that 
carried the promise or potential for a real transformation in gender roles, 
but which was suddenly ‘closed down’ by the FLN leadership from late 
1957 onwards. During this initial phase many thousands of women fi rst 
became engaged in various levels of direct action as fi ghters, nurses, ancil-
laries and providers of logistic support to the ALN. This mobilisation did 
not occur as the result of a central policy decision but emerged in a piece-
meal or ad hoc way in response to the situation that urban and rural male 
combatants found themselves in, for example facing a shortage of trained 
nurses to tend to wounded fi ghters in make-shift fi eld hospitals.2 In 
general terms the FLN attitude towards women was reactive, a pragmatic 
and localised response to the direct presence of women who challenged 
entrenched male misogyny or patriarchy. The ALN commanders of the 
regions (Wilaya), with weak lines of communication to the external pro-
visional government, often showed considerable autonomy of action and 
this was refl ected in quite different localised attitudes to a female presence 
in the maquis, from a relatively progressive and more secular or socialist 
position, to highly traditionalist, religious inspired, patriarchal authori-
tarianism. But the overall climate within the ALN was conservative, a 
refl ection of the values of the male peasantry, and truly radical offi cers 
were very few in number and remained isolated. What glimmering there 
was of more innovative policies or practices on the ground, as in Wilayas 
II (Constantinois) and IV (Algiers),3 was brought to a halt by the central 
decision in late 1957 to withdraw women from the maquis to Tunisia 
and Morocco, and there to reassert a harsh discipline over those who had 
gained a taste of greater freedom and individual autonomy.
In order to understand the reactions of Algerian males to direct 
contact with women militants on the ground, it is helpful to divide the 
latter into two quite different categories, the minority of urban-based 
and usually better-educated commandos (the fi dayate), many of whom 
later escaped to the maquis, and the tens of thousands of anonymous 
peasant women ‘civilians’ in the rural areas (moussebilate) who pro-
vided vital support to the moudjahidines (fi ghters in ALN units).4 These 
two groups will be examined in turn.
The fi dayate: the symbol of the urban warrior
The single most enduring and iconic image associated with the Algerian 
War is of Muslim women in the terrorist networks who transported 
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documents, guns and bombs through the parachutist check-points. 
Today, in a world in which suicide bombings have become almost com-
monplace, it is easy to lose sight of the extent to which the detection 
and arrest of female terrorists from late 1956 onwards caused a shocked 
or astonished response among both French and international public 
opinion.5 Here were veiled women engaging, according to one’s point of 
view, in horrifi c acts of indiscriminate and bloody violence or in deeds 
of heroic bravery that seemed to defy all the stereotypes of Muslim 
women as cloistered and supine creatures totally lacking in willpower 
or autonomy. Did the activities of young female bombers in the streets 
of Algiers mark a turning-point in the assertion of women’s power or 
position in Algerian society?
Firstly, the young women who were carefully selected by Yacef Saadi 
to assist with his terrorist network in the ZAA were recruited in the 
main from known and trusted petit-bourgeois or modest nationalist 
families.6 Many had been educated to lycée level, at a time when only 
one in ten Muslim girls received even primary schooling, and Samia 
Lakhdari and Zohra Drif were university law students and daughters of 
Muslim lawyers (cadis).7 During the fi rst post-Second World War decade 
of an organised women’s movement most individuals were drawn into 
militant activity since they had access to the male-dominated universe 
of political activism by the ‘accident’ of being located within national-
ist family and kin networks (chapter 2) and this pattern continued into 
the War of Independence. Thus Djamila Bouhired was recruited by her 
uncle Mustapha Bouhired, an FLN militant, and Louisette and Malika 
Ighilahriz by their father.8 The young fi dayate certainly were required 
to carry out tasks that broke the conventions of ‘respectability’ and 
honourable behaviour: dressing in a chic western mode of short skirts 
and make-up so as to pass easily through parachutist check-points, 
moving about unescorted in urban space, and making contact alone 
with unknown males.9 However, most of this breaching of strict gender 
roles was largely on terms decided by males: the fi dayate never assumed 
positions of command, but always obeyed male orders and even in their 
most perilous exploits were still their adjuncts (Bouhired was initially 
appointed to Saadi’s top-secret cell as a cook). FLN militants, includ-
ing even fathers, were prepared to tolerate fi dayate breaking the rules 
of segregation under the exceptional conditions of nationalist struggle, 
a situation that demanded every sacrifi ce, but there was an assumption 
that things would return to ‘normal’ with the end of the war.
It was undoubtedly the case that some fi dayate like Zohra Drif were 
strong-willed women and Yacef Saadi, for example, through constant 
daily and close work with Drif in restricted safe-houses and dangerous 
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missions established a degree of closeness and trust that was unusual 
compared to the normal relations between unrelated men and women 
in Algerian society.10 But it should be kept in mind that the urban fi day-
ate were very few in number and that most of their actions in breaking 
through the constraints of conservative gender roles were restricted to 
a clandestine world that went unobserved by the majority of women. 
During Saadi’s famous secret meetings in Algiers with the ethnologist 
Germain Tillion, Zohra Drif reverted to the habitual role of the silent 
and subservient female, serving tea and cakes, taking a back seat and 
keeping her personal hostile opinion of the ethnologist to herself.11
However, the fi dayate did come to play an enormously important 
role in FLN propaganda as heroic fi ghters and martyrs to the national-
ist cause. The trial of the leading women bombers and, in particular, 
of Djamila Bouhired in July 1957, was an international media sensa-
tion and the leading FLN defence lawyer Jacques Vergès was skilled in 
developing a strategy that used the courtroom as a political space for 
the indictment of French military violence, torture and abuse of human 
rights, a monstrous violence that he was able to highlight by the inhu-
mane treatment and rape of FLN women.12 Vergès, who later married 
Bouhired, collaborated with the novelist Georges Arnaud, author of The 
Wages of Fear, in writing a small booklet, Pour Djamila Bouhired, and 
the heroic exploits of the young terrorist were soon celebrated through 
an Egyptian fi lm, Djamila l’Algérienne (1958) of Youcef Chacine, and 
by popular singers across North Africa, such as Ouardia El Djezaïria 
and Sou’ad Mohamed in Egypt, and Hadja Hamdaouïa in Morocco.13
In all six fi dayate received the death sentence during the war, and 
the campaigns by the French left and intellectuals to save them from 
the guillotine provided further global publicity. In the later stages of 
the war (1959–62) came the arrest and trial of the photogenic Djamila 
Boupacha, whose defence was taken up by the feminist lawyer Gisèle 
Halimi and by Simone de Beauvoir who set up the Comité pour Djamila 
Boupacha and jointly published Djamila Boupacha, illustrated with 
photographs and a Picasso portrait.14 The young women militants came 
to symbolise the Algerian cause, particularly for communists, socialists 
and liberals throughout the world, as well as for many ‘Third World’ 
women then engaged in revolutionary or anti-colonial struggle.15 The 
FLN propaganda organisation also distributed to the international 
media photographs of women soldiers in the maquis, dressed in uniform 
and displaying the ultimate symbol of manhood, automatic rifl es, 
although in reality the ALN avoided training women as combatants.16 
The images of female combatants were reinforced by the martyrology of 
women maquisards who, when outnumbered or captured, had fought to 
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the death, like Malika Gaïd and Messika Benziza.17 The ALN also made 
use of the image of the martyr to appeal to Algerian women to support 
the national struggle, as in one tract from mid-1958, ‘Algerian women! 
Listen! Do you not hear the boots of the French occupier clicking on the 
road? Do you not hear the screams of massacred or tortured Algerian 
women and men? Do you not hear the proud call of Djamila Bouhired? 
. . . Heroic and martyrised Algeria has its gaze fi xed on you’.18
The FLN was quite happy to make use of such propaganda since, 
while to the outside world it carried a strong revolutionary message, 
the icon of the female soldier and heroine did not necessarily offer a sig-
nifi cant challenge to established gender norms. Throughout the Muslim 
societies of the Middle East and Maghreb there existed a historical and 
religious tradition that presented famous real or mythical warriors, like 
the Algerian Kahina, who in times of exceptional danger to the people 
had assumed the role of men in resisting invaders and tyrants. A key 
point of reference here was the role model of Zainab, sister of Imam 
Hussain, who played a supporting role at the Battle of Karbala. A 
common structure to this topos was that in a world turned upside down 
by chaos and defeat, in which men themselves had failed to protect the 
nation and become ‘like women’, then it was up to women to assume 
the masculine role of the warrior and saviour.19 Afsaneh Najmabadi has 
noted that the rhetoric of Iranian male nationalists, in ‘calling patriotic 
women manly implied a reassuring restoration of gender order: only 
men performed such great acts’.20 This way of thinking surfaced con-
stantly during the Algerian War, as in the case of a young boy, angry and 
frustrated by his father’s unmanly silence towards an oppressive French 
authority, who dared berate the very symbol of masculine honour: 
‘Women are in prison, why not the men?’.21 Many moudjahidate inter-
nalised the masculine logic of the female warrior: theirs was only a 
temporary status, not proof of a lasting transformation of gender roles, 
and with the coming of independence in 1962 they quietly ‘demobilised’ 
by withdrawing from public life back into the private, domestic sphere 
of the home.
The urban moudjahidate in the maquis
The proactive role of women militants ruffl ed few feathers among their 
male comrades in the major towns, since most of the latter were city 
born and educated and quite used to a degree of mixing or contact with 
young ‘modern’ women who went unveiled and followed a European 
life-style. The situation was very different in the rural hinterland and 
it was here that the arrival of hundreds of young and educated women 
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in the maquis during 1956–57 led to widespread disquiet and hostility 
in the ALN ranks.22 During 1956 the ALN began to recruit qualifi ed 
nurses or women with medical experience into the maquis, and this fl ow 
was increased after May 1956 by lycée and university students who 
followed the FLN appeal for a boycott of the educational system, and 
during 1957 by militants who fl ed Algiers to escape imminent arrest. 
Many of these educated women were profoundly shocked by the condi-
tions of extreme hardship and backwardness they found in the interior, 
but in turn many of the army offi cers and rank-and-fi le treated them 
as unwelcome guests, especially as they presented a threat to the tradi-
tional gender roles and rigid sexual segregation that reigned in peasant 
society and in the universe of the male warrior. A high percentage of the 
ALN force was constituted of illiterate men, simple but tough combat-
ants who were immersed in the misogynist, patriarchal values of tradi-
tional rural society, and in whose eyes single, un-chaperoned women 
presented a kind of scandal and a disturbing sexual temptation to all 
men. The success of the French army ‘complot bleu’, by which they led 
the paranoid ALN leader Amirouche to believe in a plot to send students 
and urban intellectuals as agents into the maquis, created widespread 
suspicious towards the self-assertive, educated and often middle-class 
young women who were now in their midst.23 To this was added the 
distrust of the rough maquisards, the peasantry and clerics towards the 
city, a place which they associated with the soft living, decadence and 
sexual dangers of the west. Even Baya Laribi, toughened after a year 
in the maquis, came to share these perceptions and was hostile to the 
wave of young women who arrived in the bled in 1957: ‘They were well 
dressed, with red varnished nails, pretty shoes, nicely cut trousers, and 
wore brassieres’.24
ALN offi cers, faced with this unwanted intrusion, frequently felt that 
it was the duty of the army to act as a surrogate guardian and to impose 
draconian regulations on the moudjahidate, particularly their segre-
gated sleeping arrangements. In Wilaya I it was ordered, ‘it is forbidden 
to nurses to introduce themselves and to sleep among the combatants. 
They must only keep company with civilians and only with women. 
Brother Mekki Hihi is in charge of the nurses’.25 In some regions, 
notably Wilaya III, women were subjected on arrival to a degrading 
virginity test, although some strongly resisted this.26 A circular sent out 
by a zone council in Wilaya II in late 1958 noted, ‘it is formally forbid-
den for any women to join our ranks; if they should join us, they must 
be forced back to their place of origin, even if they are captured by the 
enemy. Those who accompany these women must be punished with the 
death sentence’.27
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   320 21/7/09   12:16:29
 The FLN and the role of women during the war 321
However, some moudjahidine noted that, after an initial shock or 
surprise, many of those who were hostile or disturbed by the presence 
of young women gradually came round to accept the valuable role that 
they played. Yamina Cherrad’s experience was quite typical:
The main problem was the refusal by many of the maquisards to accept 
our presence. There were some who took us for girls who had come to get 
married; they could not understand that we also wanted to be militants 
and to work. Some intellectuals took this in a good way. Others were 
astonished or intrigued. But certain soldiers were scornful, they tried to 
assert their superiority, their strength in relation to us. Later, with the 
passing of months, they came to recognise our worth, especially during a 
skirmish or on operations.28
During 1956–57 in areas controlled by more liberal commanders there 
were signs of a proto-feminist discourse as in Renaissance Algérienne, 
a publication of Wilaya III. If the 1 November 1954, noted the journal, 
rang ‘the toll bell of colonialism in Algeria, it also marked a new era in 
the Liberation of women . . . It is no exaggeration to say that nothing 
could be achieved without their aid’. Women, the ‘key-stone of all 
human societies’, had achieved a new level of political consciousness 
and self-confi dence, and recognised, ‘that to fi ght for the Liberation of 
her country was to fi ght for her own Liberation . . . The hub on which 
we will build the Algeria of tomorrow’.29 As another document of 1957 
proclaimed, ‘A people among whom women live on the margins of 
national life is only a half of itself. It is atrophied. Much more serious 
still, it slides slowly and surely towards a certain death’.30 However, the 
moudjahidate were invariably required to fulfi l traditional gendered 
support roles as nurses and aids to male fi ghters, and they were never 
granted a position within the military gradation of ranks or placed in 
authority over men. For example the fi rst woman doctor to reach the 
maquis was Nafi ssa Hamoud, but when the less experienced Mustapha 
Laliam arrived he was immediately promoted over her as chief doctor 
of Wilaya III.31
In contrast to the uncomfortable relationship between ALN soldiers 
and the urban évoluées, there is little, if any, evidence that the presence 
of peasant women (moussebilate) was found disturbing or problematic. 
These illiterate and anonymous women, who at great personal risk pro-
vided a global support function that was even more vital for the maquis 
than the moudjahidate, conformed quite ‘naturally’ to the everyday role 
that they had always fulfi lled in peasant society, carrying wood and 
water on their backs, preparing food, washing and drying clothes and 
showing the customary forms of deference to men (reserve, avoidance of 
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eye contact, not speaking unless spoken to, eating apart).32 The women 
from the city, educated and more vocal, presented a different challenge 
to men who were in many instances illiterate, shared a highly patriarchal 
mind-set, and, imbued with the teaching of religious leaders, viewed the 
distant city as a place of moral and sexual corruption.
The relationship of ALN fi ghting units to women in local society 
was in some instances violent and abusive. ALN units were constantly 
on the move within the rural-mountain zones, or deployed to carry out 
missions in distant locations, and the sometimes predatory attitude to 
women arose in part from the fact that soldiers, far from their home 
territory, were prepared to act like an army of occupation in their 
treatment of local populations. For example, Kabyles fi ghters often 
carried out raids against the MNA to the south of the Kabylia massive 
during which the Arab population, suspected of supporting the enemy, 
was treated with a brutality that was accentuated by regional, cultural 
and linguistic difference. One ALN report denounced its forces in the 
Nemenchas as ‘a kind of tribal band rather than units of the national 
army’, while elsewhere two cadres were denounced for calling the 
inhabitants of a village to a meeting where they insulted the women in 
front of the men, inciting one woman to protest, ‘Colonialism comes 
and tortures us during the day. When you come we are pleased, but you 
also torture us’.33 Some maquisard seem to have operated like war lords 
exercising a droit de seigneur over women,34 but the oft-repeated stories 
found in the French media of commanders using young women as sex-
slaves, until their happy escape to the French side, need to be treated 
with caution. However, the ALN practiced a classic double-standard in 
punishing sexual misdemeanours, one order in Wilaya V indicating that 
those men found guilty of rape should not be beaten or executed, but be 
given ‘a lesson in morality’.35
Women and political organisation
Despite the highly subordinate position of women within the FLN, there 
is some evidence of their beginning to move towards a more structured 
women’s organisation, although their political and social activity was 
largely restricted to propaganda and educational work aimed at other 
women. The pro-communist UFA and the Messalist AFMA (chapter 1) 
had been dissolved in the early stages of the war, and the president of the 
AFMA, Mamia Chentouf, was expelled from Algeria.36 There is little 
evidence of the AFMA ‘going underground’ and providing a degree of 
continuity with the generation of militants (moudjahidate) that became 
prominent within the FLN during 1956–57.37 Djamila Bouhired, 
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Hassiba Ben Bouali and Zohra Drif organised meetings of women during 
the general strike of January 1957 on the terraces of the Algiers Casbah 
to persuade them of the need to continue the struggle.38 This group 
was moving towards the idea of a more elaborate clandestine women’s 
network when they were arrested. When Zohra Drif was fi nally tracked 
down by the parachutists in the Casbah, they were able to capture docu-
ments relating to this new structure, and Colonel Godard, through close 
interrogation, was able to build up a detailed picture of the proposed 
organisation which was to consist of 356  militants arranged in a classic 
network of clandestine cells.
According to Drif a number of cells were to be grouped together, each 
unit specialising in particular tasks: one group to counter the SAS by 
undertaking various forms of welfare work (aid to poor families and 
the sick); another to carry out propaganda and detect informers; one to 
locate and register individuals or families related to killed, tortured or 
disappeared militants and to provide assistance; others to act as mes-
sengers for the FLN network. The groups were to meet regularly once a 
week in each quarter for political discussion, or to listen to and debate 
FLN radio broadcasts from Morocco and Tunisia. The fi rst direct action 
planned was to be a silent demonstration by women on a Friday at the 
traditional places of female association, the central mosque and the 
cemetery, as well as outside the General Government building, to protest 
against ‘the death sentence passed on the two djamila’ (Bouhired, 
Bouazza), and also the imprisonment, execution or disappearance of 
husbands, brothers and sons.39 Drif’s plan showed clear continuity with 
the forms of action undertaken by the UFA and AFMA between 1945 
and 1954 which centred on social welfare support and demonstrations 
against the arrest and imprisonment of male nationalists (chapter 1). In 
the later stages of the war the perimeter of prisons in both Algeria and 
France continued to provide a focus where the relatives of prisoners 
could meet in solidarity to protest, sometimes synchronised with hunger 
strikes by inmates.40 Djamila Briki recounted how demonstrations 
developed outside the Algiers prison of Berrouaghia, and on one occa-
sion a refusal to allow visitors triggered off a riot: ‘From the barracks 
next door to the prison the soldiers unleashed their dogs on us and tried 
to disperse us. Our veils were torn by the dogs, but we did not budge. 
We threw stones at the prison gates’.41 The enormously strong emo-
tional bonds between mother and son in Algerian culture,42 provided a 
powerful resonance to FLN propaganda and martyrology that depicted 
the heroic mother as a person who was transported by a superhuman 
courage in confronting, in the search for a lost son, the brutal parachut-
ists and torturers of the French army. However, it is noticeable that even 
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the most militant of women continued to see their own role primarily in 
terms of their nurturing and maternal function, a duty to support heroic 
sons and husbands.
In the rural areas the educated militants played a rather different func-
tion as political propagandists (morchida) who, when free from nursing 
fi dayines, went into the surrounding villages to make contact with local 
peasant women and to raise their political consciousness. An ALN cir-
cular from May 1957 refl ected a new stage in the planned organisation 
of ‘women combatants’. The women, who were fi rst to receive medical 
training at Wilaya level before serving in fi eld hospitals or infi rmaries, 
were also to assist local civilian women: ‘the female combatant plays a 
social and political role in relation to her sisters’, acting under the guid-
ance of political commissars. In the fi rst task, which had an unmistakable 
similarity to the ASSRA, she was ‘a veritable social assistant working in 
the service of the Algerian woman. She must give useful advice to the 
latter, assisting her to manage the household, to raise the children, and to 
respect the rules of hygiene’. In the second, political role the task was to 
educate women on the current situation, explain the nature of the ALN 
and FLN and the aims of the ‘Algerian Revolution’, be prepared to answer 
all questions and act as a role model.43 French intelligence offi cers in the 
Nord Constantinois, in an analysis of this captured document, noted 
that a drive was already underway to recruit women in Wilaya II where 
Messaoud Bouali had plans to incorporate fi fty women into Mintaqa I. 
These women were not merely nurses, but ‘veritable political agents’ and, 
‘we are seeing, in this domain, a development that it is advisable to watch 
very closely’.44 The FLN was concerned at the appearance of the ASSRA 
that were fi rst tested during the experimental Operation Pilot from 26 
January 1957 onwards, and the ALN creation of similar female cadres 
two months later may well have been a response to this challenge.
Oral evidence by participants in the new organisation is plentiful: 
Khadra Belami, for example, an eighteen-year-old médersa student who 
joined the maquis of Wilaya II in January 1957, recounts:
We held numerous discussions with the population. We explained to the 
women what the revolution was since they had no links with the town 
and knew nothing about it. We explained to them that the revolution was 
being made to liberate the country, so that we could live free and so chil-
dren could go to school. In addition we gave them educational lessons and 
in the health-care of their children. For example, they did not wash their 
infants until they were two years old, for fear that they would die.45
Malika Zerrouki, who was only fi fteen when she joined the maquis in 
April 1956 to escape arrest, was taught nursing skills by Dr Si Ali: ‘I 
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would go out one or two hours walking distance to care for the women 
and children and to give vaccinations when we had received some. I 
tried to teach them the elementary ideas of hygiene, I spoke to them 
about the emancipation of women, about the Algeria of tomorrow’.46 
The young assistants from the city were shocked by the heavy burden 
of work of the peasant women, not only in raising numerous children 
but also labouring in the fi elds or tending livestock, while waiting hand-
and-mouth on their husbands. In some instances they were prepared to 
challenge traditional gender roles. Yamina Cherrad recounted: ‘When I 
tried to give the men some advice about this, they told me to look after 
my own affairs. But the women adored us’.47 Fatiha Hermouche gained 
the trust of women in one hamlet, even learning Kabyle, and discussed 
the problems which they faced as women. The inhabitants agreed to 
swap roles for one week, the men undertaking the heavy tasks of carry-
ing water and wood, while the women took care of the house, but after 
only three days, ‘the women missed going down to the spring and the 
discussions and, fi nally, everyone resumed their usual occupation’.48
Finally, a quite exceptional use was made by the head of Wilaya V, 
Abdelhafi d Boussouf, of a small group of highly trained women agents 
who were sent in eight mixed teams consisting of one man and one 
woman, to carry out clandestine investigations of the ALN organisation 
in each zone. Six of the eight agents (contrôleuses) were lycée students 
and activists in the Oudja section of the Union générale des étudiants 
musulmans algériens (UGEMA) and two were lycée students from 
Tlemcen.49 After an individual interview by Boussouf, who was to gain 
a sinister reputation as the organiser of a powerful police and intel-
ligence apparatus,50 the recruits received a two-month training in the 
history and organisation of the FLN, guerrilla tactics, report writing, 
the use of small arms and other agent skills. Malik Hadjaj was given the 
task of reporting on MNA activity in Tlemcen, but the general mission 
of the teams was to report on the structure of the FLN organisation, the 
morale and combative state of militants, relations with the people and 
their morale, the state of welfare provision, and receptivity to French 
propaganda.51
The women controllers were also given the special task of investi-
gating ‘the feminine world in general’, and to engage in political work 
among the local women. Rachida Miri noted:
Above all we had to motivate the women. We listened to what they had to 
say and, among other things, gave them lessons in hygiene. In fact to some 
extent we carried out the same work as the French. It was necessary to 
thwart the French agenda and especially of the SAS. During our training 
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programme Boussouf repeated that the FLN was entrenched in the people, 
‘like fi sh in water: if the water was drained, the fi sh die’.52
The agents under Boussouf’s direction carried out social and propa-
ganda work that was in many respects like that of the morchidate in 
other Wilaya, but in their training and mission there is a sense of the 
way in which women controllers were being deployed as part of a highly 
effi cient and centralised apparatus to police the ALN internally, rather 
than to forward a progressive emancipation agenda.
Marriage and the FLN couple
As has been seen in the previous chapter, the personal status law pro-
vided the fundamental touchstone in relation to women’s rights and 
social position, the core site in the contest over modernity, national 
identity, cultural resistance and patriarchy. This section explores the 
extent to which the FLN, particularly in the internal maquis, made any 
impact during the course of the war on the deeply embedded socio-
cultural, economic and political practices relating to gender, the relative 
functions and power of men and women, and the overall emancipation 
of women. FLN regulation of marriage, divorce and relations between 
couples provides the best evidence of how it translated policy into 
 concrete practice.
Despite the fi erce puritanical and authoritarian opposition by many 
commanders to relationships between soldiers and women in the 
maquis, in some regions, most notably Wilaya II and IV, more secular 
and liberal leaders created a climate that was sympathetic and open to 
the presence of women and, almost inevitably, strong attachments grew 
between them and the soldiers. The unusual conditions of the maquis, 
in which young men and women were removed from the infl uence of 
the family, which usually controlled liaison, meant that companionate 
relationships could develop based on mutual love.53 Local command-
ers, who acted virtually as guardians, were constantly having to decide 
how to respond to requests from rank-and-fi le soldiers (djounoud) for 
permission to marry. A very detailed 1959 directive on marriage in 
Wilaya IV shows how some of these issues were regulated: the soldier 
should ideally marry a woman from a family of ‘moudjahidines and 
Martyrs’, must have at least one year of service in the maquis, be of 
exemplary morals, and make his request via the military hierarchy.54 
There are some indications in the order of a liberalisation of marriage 
arrangements, perhaps in response to the French reforms of 1959. While 
the ‘act of marriage will be, taking account of the conditions of war, 
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in conformity with the principles of Islam’, the traditional bride-price 
should be kept to a minimum and symbolic sum. The minimum age 
of marriage for women was set at sixteen years, one more than under 
the French law, and the maximum age gap between spouses was set at 
fi fteen years. While it was acknowledged that the woman’s decision to 
marry was still under the control of the parents or guardian, who would 
be consulted where possible, it was also necessary for women to give 
their free consent. Although the couple was allowed, where possible, a 
honeymoon of one week, after that the wife was not allowed to accom-
pany her husband in the maquis.55 Each zone was allowed to grant per-
mission for a maximum of ten marriages per month, but this might be 
reviewed or stopped in the future if the arrangement caused problems.
How did such orders work out in practice? Yamina Cherrad faced no 
opposition: ‘I was married in November 1960 with Doctor Benaceur. 
Permission was given to us quite readily’,56 although she went on to 
indicate the diffi culty of sustaining a marriage relationship under the 
conditions of guerrilla warfare. A month after the marriage her husband 
was posted elsewhere and was killed in 1961. Yamina was pregnant and 
for the birth she was sent from the maquis to stay with people in Djijel, ‘I 
did not know them, they welcomed me into their home, I gave birth and 
rejoined the maquis with the infant two months later. I worked in the 
infi rmary as before. I was well regarded’. Up until late 1957, when the 
ALN was able to maintain control over large areas of the interior and to 
establish relatively secure bases, commanders seem to have been more 
prepared to accept the presence of married couples. After this, as the 
Challe offensive made for permanent insecurity and the moudjahidate 
were ordered to retreat across the border into Morocco or Tunisia, regu-
lation appears to have become more draconian, as in an order of July 
1960 in Wilaya III, ‘the maquisard who gets married without authori-
sation from the ALN and without the knowledge of the people will be 
executed. If the marriage was not authorised but was concluded accord-
ing to Muslim law, the person concerned will be condemned to one 
month prison and then moved elsewhere. Non-commissioned  offi cers 
and offi cers will face the same penalties’.57
The conditions for relationships to develop between couples within 
the ALN maquis were exceptional compared to those found in peace-
time society. The controlling hand of family males was absent and the 
ALN commanders acted in loco parentis to assume the role of guardian 
in deciding who could marry and to ensure that the normal interests of 
patriarchal regulation were respected. The FLN, in its attempt to create 
a counter-state, also established its own juridical and bureaucratic 
system to regulate marriage, family law and a civil register for the entire 
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Algerian population. The Soummam Congress of August 1956, the fi rst 
opportunity since the start of the war for the FLN to create a coherent 
organisational structure, showed a clear intent to regulate family life 
through welfare provision, especially monthly allowances for the fami-
lies of ALN soldiers, or the dead and imprisoned, as well as by a system 
of local courts.58 The judicial system in the rural areas operated at two 
levels, that of elected Assemblées du people in the villages or committee 
of fi ve (referred to by the French as the OPA) which settled minor issues, 
and through peripatetic military tribunals for more serious offences.
As the ALN gradually expanded and established its control over new 
areas of the bled it frequently asserted its authority over the local popu-
lation by integrating existing political leaders, such as the council of 
village elders (djemâa) or tribal heads.59 This tactic extended to the inte-
gration of traditional religious leaders (imams, talebs, cadis, educated 
Ulemas) into the OPA structure precisely to oversee and direct areas of 
local life to do with family law, justice, religious practice and education. 
A report from the SAU of Clos-Salembier in April 1960 found that the 
Ulema, although constituting only 2 per cent of the OPA, were to be 
found at all levels of the organisation administering justice: ‘In rela-
tion to religion they are opposed to any evolution. The fi nes imposed 
by the Ulemas on those who infringe Koranic regulations are always 
very heavy’.60 This conservative application of customary Islamic law 
is confi rmed by other FLN orders, like one sent out in Wilaya III in late 
1956 or 1957: ‘The heads of the religious foundations (biens habous) 
will watch over the rigorous application of the laws and regulations 
contained in Muslim jurisprudence when they have to resolve affairs 
relating to marriage, repudiation, etc.’.61 This suggests that the FLN, 
instead of sweeping away the older generation of religious leaders in 
order to install a new revolutionary order of progressive and more 
secular justice, integrated them and in doing so maintained at the grass-
root level a seamless  continuity with pre-war custom and practice.
This conservative ethos was also evident at the higher levels of the 
FLN judicial system. The minutes of a meeting (majlis) of justices (cadi) 
in Wilaya I in October 1960 reaffi rmed the practice of the dowry, widely 
condemned by modernisers, setting this at 6,000 to 30,000 francs. In 
went on to support early marriage at puberty as an Islamic check on 
illicit sex: ‘Marriage of young girls without a spouse (virgins and older 
girls). To put a stop to the debauchery that is tending to become gener-
alised, the majlis has decided that every effort and honest means should 
be employed to marry young girls who are still without a husband, 
especially those who fear marriage or who give themselves over to 
debauchery’. It was agreed not to accept any accusation of rape brought 
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by a women unless this could, according to the Koran, be confi rmed 
by four witnesses, in the absence of which the accuser would receive 
eighty lashes of the whip.62 The fi erce puritanical justice of the FLN was 
refl ected in the harsh treatment of moral, and in particular, sexual delin-
quents. One ALN directive ordered to ‘kill all women and men who lead 
an evil life’,63 and adultery was on occasions punished by execution, 
including the case of one man who, ‘slept with the wives of soldiers and 
civilians. He would wink at every woman he passed by. And he was a 
major informer. He was executed by judgement of the ALN’.64
The FLN decision to surrender religious affairs and justice during 
the war to the clerics was to have long-term consequences for women’s 
rights, and set the scene for the conservative policy adopted after inde-
pendence (chapter 11). However, as Gilbert Meynier has shown, FLN 
policy and practice at the Wilaya or local level was far from mono-
lithic and a more modern idea of marriage can be found in some areas. 
Yamina Cherrad remarks how the female propagandists in the ALN 
spread a more enlightened model of marriage: ‘The dowry was limited 
and it was forbidden to force a girl to marry somebody who was much 
older than her’.65 Perhaps nowhere was the potential shift towards a 
modern concept of the couple more marked than in France. Algerian 
labour immigrants had been arriving in France since the fi rst decade of 
the twentieth century and, through their close contact with the French 
proletariat and urban life, had some experience of European life-styles 
and culture. In Paris by the 1930s some 10 per cent of all immigrants 
were married to, or cohabiting with, European women.66 During 
the War of Independence the number of Algerian women in France 
increased dramatically as they fl ed the violence and resettlement of the 
French army, and this meant that young immigrant men and women 
could escape the conservative restraints of family and society in Algeria. 
However, the FLN Fédération de France sought to impose its political 
and moral authority over the immigrant community, to create a disci-
plined and autonomous ‘counter-state’ that would segregate Algerians 
from attempts by the French police and authorities to control them and 
to gain intelligence.67 This included a system of Comités or Commissions 
de Justice that regulated all matters of disputes between Algerians, and 
supervised marriage and divorce. Internal FLN documents, for example, 
record the celebration of marriages, the payment of fi nes for unauthor-
ised marriages, and attempts by the Paris Commissions de Justice to 
reconcile couples before they had recourse to divorce: ‘Rue Polenceau: 
Dissension between spouses. Settlement not being possible, divorce 
was pronounced’, and ‘Rue des Partants: Divorce pronounced between 
spouses: a 5,000 Fr. fi ne’. The Lyons Comité de Justice in March 1960 
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even recorded a 1,000 Fr. fi ne on a polygamous Algerian who had failed 
the Koranic duty to treat wives equitably, and intervened in the case of a 
man, ‘whose wife has left him and we gave her a warning and made her 
return to the conjugal home’.68
FLN emigrants struggled, in the absence of religious authorities and 
their guidance, to regulate themselves and apply a legitimate interpreta-
tion of Islamic law by reference to the Koran. In the autumn of 1959 
the anti-terrorist police seized in outer Paris (Seine-et-Oise) a copy of 
a detailed FLN instruction to the Comités de Justice on how to adju-
dicate on matters of marriage and divorce, the Règlement concernant 
les marriages et le divorce suivant le droit musulman.69 These liberal 
regulations appear to have been infl uenced by the debate surrounding 
the new marriage and family code passed by the colonial government on 
17 September 1959 (see chapter 8). In particular the Règlement insisted 
on the ideal of companionate marriage, the happiness of the domestic 
circle depending on, ‘the good will of the two spouses and their good 
relations’. Both women and men, it stated, must give their free consent 
to the alliance: ‘Above all marriage must be a union based on affec-
tion, and agreed together and with complete accord between the two 
fi ancée and with their reciprocal consent’. The Règlement, as in the 
case of the Ordinance of 4 February 1959 which required the couple to 
attend in person before the offi cer of the état civil, required bride and 
groom to appear before the president of the Comités de Justice who 
would interview both to ensure that neither had, ‘undergone any pres-
sure or threats on the part of their parents or guardians . . . All unions 
carried out against the will of the young man or the young girl is strictly 
forbidden’. The dowry should be quite nominal, not more than 5,000 
Fr., and gifts limited. Husbands who used blows or violence towards 
their partners would be severely punished by the Committee. Husbands 
should not resort to repudiation or divorce without careful considera-
tion and should refrain from appropriating the dowry that was the legal 
 entitlement of the wife.
Although the Règlement contained some quite conservative or con-
ventional formulations, for example that the spouse must ‘keep the 
honour of her husband intact’, there are clear indications of a grass-
roots evolution of emigrant society towards a new model of marriage 
and the family.70 But at the same time this process was being neutralised 
by a growing debate within the FLN, inspired by religious conserva-
tives, who attacked the widespread existence of mixed marriages with 
European women as a threat to the integrity of Algerian culture and 
identity.71 The debate on mixed marriage, which began to assume 
a racist and defensive tone, was to fuel a highly negative current of 
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opinion within post-independence society that supported the status quo 
on Muslim women by extolling them as the pure guardians of Algerian 
identity.72 In the Règlement there are signs of this male agenda to guard 
the moral purity of the nations women and mothers: ‘It is formally 
forbidden for our compatriots to live in debauchery with our Algerian 
sisters or to keep them as mistresses’. This puritanical ethic sat rather 
uncomfortably with the fact that the Fédération de France raised huge 
sums of money through the spéciaux, the taxing of petty criminals, 
pimps and prostitutes. One wife of a bar-owner was recruited by the 
FLN to organise and lead twenty women, all prostitutes, divided into 
four cells whose job it was to carry out the monthly collection in the red-
light districts of Barbès, Pigalle, Clichy and the Champs-Élysées. The 
women also acquired guns and bullets from clients, notably American 
service-men from a base in Orleans.73
Demobilisation of the moudjahidate from the maquis
In late 1957 and early 1958 the ALN began to remove most of the 
moudjahidate from the maquis, a decision that was to mark a shift away 
from a more open or innovative policy towards women towards a reas-
sertion of male authority. But, as will be seen in the following section, 
this left the FLN in a weakened position to counter the EMSI and 
women’s circles at the very moment they were being rapidly expanded 
after May 1958. From October 1957 onwards the Wilaya commanders 
took the decision to remove, apart from some exceptional individual 
cases like Mimi Ben Mohamed,74 all the nurses and to integrate them 
back into civilian life in the towns or across the frontier in Tunisia and 
Morocco. Courrière reports that in Wilaya III this decision was made by 
Colonel Amirouche at a meeting on 22 October 1957, in an attempt to 
prevent the tensions created by the fact that some soldiers were allowed 
to marry nurses, while the rank-and-fi le had to suffer sexual abstinence 
or faced execution for sleeping with peasant women.75 While this was 
certainly a problem, for example Omar Oussedik was criticised for 
keeping his wife, Nassera, in the maquis,76 the primary reason for this 
change in policy was a signifi cant shift in the nature of the war.
Until 1957 the ALN was able to create quite stable bases or safe 
zones, including infi rmaries, in the mountain villages, so that the moud-
jahidate had a reasonably comfortable, if austere life which they shared 
with local peasant women. This phase appears to have been one in 
which it was easier to segregate the nurses, especially in their sleeping 
arrangements, from the ALN soldiers. However, after Operation Pilot 
the French army began to pursue a much more aggressive policy of using 
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commando units to harass the ALN in its redoubts and this forced the 
ALN to abandon static positions close to villages for a constant move-
ment between concealed caves and hide-outs.77 The constant forced 
marches, often over long distances at night, were physically exhausting 
for the fi ttest of men, and it became clear to the FLN command that few 
women could cope with the desperate conditions faced by ALN units. 
Although no central FLN order has been found, it seems likely that such 
a decision to withdraw women was made since several Wilaya moved 
in the same direction: Wilaya V at a meeting of 2–7 October,78 Wilaya 
III on 22 October, and Wilaya IV in ‘late 1957’. Azzedine notes in his 
memoirs that the nurses were withdrawn by Wilaya IV because of the 
exhausting physical conditions and growing danger that units faced,79 
and Kheira Bousafi  agrees, ‘Towards the end of 1957 the brothers called 
us to a meeting and told us that there had been too many skirmishes, that 
things were too tough, and that we were going to depart for Tunisia. We 
cried saying that we wanted to stay with them. But they refused’.80 By 
early 1958 most women had been withdrawn, apart from a few, mainly 
in Wilaya II, IV and V, who showed exceptional resilience and fulfi lled 
particularly valuable work.81 Baya Laribi was one of the very few who 
could have stayed, but she admits the conditions were too tough, ‘I was 
too tired, I couldn’t carry on’.82
However, as ALN units retreated into the mountains away from their 
provisioning base in the villages, there appeared a rather contradictory 
practice of recruiting young and extremely tough mountain women 
(amilate) to move constantly with the soldiers to cook bread and wash 
clothes.83 Perhaps peasant women were regarded as physically tough 
unlike the effete women from the towns, but as has been seen, the 
rural women presented little challenge to customary gender relations, 
and conservative commanders were eager to seize on any opportunity 
to marginalise the troublesome évoluées. Wilaya II issued an order in 
December 1958 that any women joining the ranks would be sent back, 
even if they risked arrest by the enemy, and any males accompanying 
them were to be executed.84
That the door had been fi rmly shut on any open or progressive 
agenda was made clear by the subsequent fate of the nurses and auxilia-
ries who were evacuated across the border to Tunisia and Morocco, and 
immediately disciplined to conform to traditional gender roles. Malika 
Zerrouki recounts how she crossed into Tunisia in a group of about 
fi fteen women from Wilaya IV who were then abandoned in a villa: 
‘there was nothing for us to do, which was really annoying. We could 
not go out, no kind of life, and this went on for a long while, for some 
seven to eight months’. The young women, who had gained a strong 
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sense of independence in the maquis, complained bitterly and were 
locked up in a cellar until rescued by Colonel Ouamrane.85 That this 
was no accident can be confi rmed by identical events in Morocco: when 
Michel Launay visited the refugee camps in Oudja in the summer of 
1961 he found that the moudjahidate had been virtually claustrated in 
a kind of boarding house, ‘The ALN considered itself to be like a father 
and conducted itself in their case like a head of a traditional family 
anxious about the reputation of his daughters’. They found it diffi cult 
to readjust from the freedom of the maquis to reveiling.86 The feminist 
activist Hélène Vandevelde-Daillière was told by her child-minder Sabah 
how she had joined the ALN in 1957 aged fi fteen, only to be evacuated 
to Oudja where she was one of 108 ex-maquisards, ‘locked up like 
prisoners. We did not even have enough to eat and three of us started a 
hunger strike to protest. Colonel [Boumédienne] came to see what was 
going on, and it was me who explained all our demands. He slapped me 
in the face. That was his reply. I tried to commit suicide’.87
Eventually the FLN began to organise structured training programmes 
for women in both Tunisia and Morocco in nursing, secretarial skills, 
weapons assembly and radio transmission.88 In early 1961 the FLN 
was carrying out a census of all young Algerian women aged fourteen 
to eighteen years in Fez to progressively enrol them into paramilitary 
organisations, but this plan does not appear to have come to anything. 
In general terms Algerian moudjahidate found themselves restricted 
and confi ned by the powerful hierarchical and severely disciplinary 
bureaucratic apparatus of the external army (EMG). Even the most well 
educated and experienced of women were excluded from assuming any 
signifi cant political role in the FLN. Boumédienne’s suggestion that a 
woman should be appointed to the top executive Conseil national de la 
Révolution algérienne (CNRA) was rejected,89 and the most prominent 
women, like Mamia Chentouf, former militant of the AFMA (chapter 
1), and Djamila Rahal, were largely restricted to symbolic acts of inter-
national solidarity that served the purposes of FLN propaganda such 
as attending various international women’s conferences in Vienna, 
Copenhagen, Cairo and elsewhere.90
There are signs that Djamila Rahal in Rabat attempted to establish 
an organisation of Algerian women and sent a delegation to discuss the 
matter with Chawki Mostefaï, a senior FLN diplomat, but this seems 
to have had no outcome.91 As Gilbert Meynier notes, the wives of 
leading army or FLN personnel remained largely invisible in line with 
the Algerian social norms of excluding married women from the public 
sphere and preserve of males,92 an invisibly that contrasted with the 
political role of the wives of French army offi cers. From 1958 until the 
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end of the war the small elite of educated Algerian women was signifi -
cantly marginalised by the FLN, re-absorbed from the ‘heroic’ and more 
experimental phase of moudjahidate engagement of 1956–57, which 
most of the male hierarchy came to regard as a threatening subversion 
of traditional gender roles, and once again safely constrained within a 
subordinate position.
FLN reactions to French emancipation
During the year from May 1958 to May 1959 the FLN found itself 
suddenly and dramatically confronted with an aggressive and multi-
faceted French campaign for emancipation, a propaganda offensive that 
included an expansion of the EMSI, the orchestrated unveiling events of 
‘13 May’, the creation of the MSF circles, the extension of the vote to 
women in September, and the promulgation of the Ordinance on per-
sonal status on 4 February 1959. The French strategy was designed by 
the Fifth Bureau to maximise disarray in the FLN by seizing on a latent 
contradiction between the growing prominence and liberty of women 
militants in urban and rural networks and the weight of conservative 
and patriarchal values.93 The journalist Hansjoerg Kock was fully aware 
of the dangers created for the FLN by the French reforms: for the, ‘ 
“évoluées women” . . . soldiers, nurses, informers, they take part in the 
military struggle hoping that the national Revolution will also grant 
them a social Revolution and the benefi ts of personal liberation. But, 
in the heart of the FLN certain strictly conservative forces are opposed 
to any kind of emancipation of women’. But, he added, ‘it is going to 
be diffi cult for the Algerian rebels to oppose this reform [of personal 
status]’, since women in the towns have long called for such an emanci-
pation, while young women no longer wore the veil in which they saw 
‘the detested symbol of a tyranny which is not based on the Koran’.94
The ALN inside Algeria was quick to recognise the very real propa-
ganda dangers presented to its own position among both the rural and 
urban inhabitants by the French emancipation campaign that could 
offer not only rhetoric, but very real material rewards such as medicines, 
food supplies and clothing to a desperately poor population. FLN anxi-
eties were revealed in detail in an internal directive, Propagande et con-
tre-propagande à mener vis-à-vis de la femme musulmane, which was 
found by the French army on the body of an assistant political offi cer, Si 
Boumédienne, killed in the south Oranais on 26 November 1958.95 The 
circular noted that, ‘the enemy is proposing to free our Algerian sisters 
from archaic traditions that keep her under their yoke. They show a 
keen interest in her evolution and do not hesitate to use all means to 
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hasten her “emancipation” copied on that of the Frenchwoman’. The 
directive, which instructed ALN cadres how to engage in a planned 
counter-propaganda campaign, noted that the enemy had two goals: by 
winning the trust of Algerian women it could get at husbands, broth-
ers and sons, ‘the instigators of the Algerian revolution’, and secondly 
achieve important propaganda goals by informing the world of its 
 so-called ‘humanitarian task’.
The ALN analysis went on to recognise the sophisticated nature of 
the French emancipation offensive, how propaganda was tuned to the 
varying conditions of Algerian women in urban or rural societies. By 
deploying Muslim women as social assistants who had a close knowl-
edge of local languages or dialects and way of life the army had a better 
chance of psychological actions that would pierce the vulnerable spots, 
‘which had the best chance of being effective and gradually succeeding; 
it exploits maternal and paternal love, the pride of the happy mother 
that one takes interest in her son’. There was a real possibility that 
the emancipation agenda would win over women, since they were by 
their nature susceptible to praise and self-promotion: ‘In seeing certain 
powers granted to her that she did not have before, women, sensitive to 
this attention, to this interest that is shown in them, will be apprecia-
tive and try to impose their opinions inside the household, and will be 
invited, should this happen, to leave the maquis, to move to regroupe-
ment camps, to provide intelligence’. The directive provides evidence of 
the way in which a central theme of nationalist discourse, the idea that 
the private domestic world of women represented the ultimate bastion 
of Algerian identity and security, was diffused into the lower levels of 
the ALN maquis.
The directive then concluded by outlining various forms of counter-
propaganda which, in a mirror image of the French campaign, should 
be carefully adapted to regional or local variations in the condition of 
women, especially differentiating the more religious societies of the bled 
from the secular urban context. In approaching ‘our Bedouin sister’, the 
highly religious and nomadic peoples of the Sahara, the aim should be 
to remind women of the atrocities, massacres and humiliations imposed 
by the French, and on the dangers presented to Muslim faith and iden-
tity. By agreeing to vote, ‘you, Algerian women, you agree to become 
French, thus to renounce your RELIGION, your COUNTRY . . . you 
commit yourself to make ALGERIA a French land’. The directive played 
on the profound populist fear of secularisation, and on one of the great 
anxieties of rural women that emigration would lead sons and hus-
bands to become ‘corrupted’ in France, to enter common-law relations 
with European women, and to break ties with the kin solidarities of 
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home. Equally threatening was the army’s educational programme for 
children through which, ‘The enemy teaches them its language so as to 
de- Islamise them . . . When grown up they will repudiate their parents, 
marry French women, and will become soldiers to fi ght for France’.
However, for ‘our urban sisters’, the better educated and modern 
women of the towns, the message should be somewhat different and 
lay less emphasis on the protection of religion and custom, than on the 
fact that a progressive emancipatory agenda did not have to come from 
France but was perfectly compatible with the Muslim state once liber-
ated from colonial domination: ‘They lure us with the idea of the eman-
cipation of other Muslim sisters in independent countries, like Egypt, 
Syria, Turkey . . . One does not have to be French to become emanci-
pated’. Finally, it was recommended that the ALN should counter the 
EMSI and MSF by increasing the vitality of the OPA: political commis-
sars needed to increase their tours of villages to speak to the people, 
while the material and seductive aid of the French should be countered 
by parallel operations, the distribution of clothing and money to the 
needy, and increased activity of ALN nurses.
The Fifth Bureau, in its analysis of this captured document, were 
ecstatic at this proof of the success of their emancipation strategy and 
increased its determination to widen the activity of the EMSI.96 The 
Bureau in March 1959 circulated extracts from the directive to encour-
age all the EMSI teams through this evidence of their success.97 Some 
of this optimism was warranted since by late 1958 the FLN faced very 
real diffi culty in implementing its own counter-propaganda strategy. 
The huge, ‘steam-roller’ offensive of the Challe Plan, combined with the 
impact of the high-voltage defences along the Tunisian and Moroccan 
borders in cutting off supplies of manpower and military equipment to 
the ALN in the interior, meant that the maquis was desperately short 
of weapons and supplies and was reduced to desperate and continuous 
long-distance forced marches to survive. This made political and welfare 
work with local village populations ever more diffi cult. To make matters 
worse the ALN decided to demobilise the moudjahidate to Morocco 
and Tunisia, so removing the educated militants who were engaged in 
political propaganda and welfare work, at the very moment that EMSI 
and MSF groups were rapidly expanding their activities. Faced with this 
crisis the FLN appears to have instructed its ex-moudjahidate to try and 
infi ltrate the EMSI so as to subvert the French operations from within 
and to provide intelligence (see chapter 7). But the most direct response 
of the ALN on the ground to the French emancipation strategy was to 
engage in compliance terrorism that warned Algerian women to abstain 
from voting or to boycott EMSI activities, while ASSRA and other social 
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workers were targeted for assassination. However, the ALN in general 
refrained from using physical violence against ordinary Algerian women 
for making use of SAS or EMSI welfare: it was too aware of the desper-
ate conditions facing peasant women and their children to try and deny 
them access to army supplies of medical aid, medicines, food and cloth-
ing, and in addition this provided a source of materials that was fi ltered 
through to the local maquis.
Finally we need to consider how the FLN decided to respond centrally 
to the French emancipation agenda through its own public declarations 
of policy. The most obvious counter, one that was best represented by 
the work of Frantz Fanon, was to reveal the way in which the French 
programme was primarily driven by counter-insurgency objectives. 
However, there was a real danger that a global and all-embracing assault 
on the French agenda, in denouncing reformism as part of an insidious 
colonial plot, could end up denigrating the very principle of progres-
sive emancipation and women’s rights as alien and anti-national. The 
remaining part of this chapter examines two key strands in FLN dis-
course that were used to camoufl age its conservative position but which 
were to carry negative, long-term implications for the post- independence 
women’s movement: fi rstly, the argument that a programme of women’s 
rights should be put on hold until independence had been achieved, 
and secondly, the construction of the myth of women as the bastion of 
Algerian social and religio-cultural identity.
A recurrent feature of wars of national liberation during the twentieth 
century was the idea that women, who frequently made a huge sacri-
fi ce in the struggle, would be compensated with some form of political 
‘reward’ when victory was fi nally achieved in the form of progressive 
legislation or socio-political emancipation.98 The emergency suspen-
sion, however, of a clear policy on women appeared to be justifi ed 
during revolutionary or resistance wars when indigenous forces needed 
to prioritise the armed struggle in order merely to survive and when 
the maquis was lacking in any semblance of a state apparatus. FLN 
propaganda during the war embodied this discursive strategy: libera-
tion from the yoke of colonialism and capitalism would, of itself, create 
automatically the conditions for female emancipation by restoring the 
integrity of a non-colonial religio-utopian order. This position carried 
some obvious dangers in that it proved a useful instrument or cover for 
not having to develop any specifi c programme, even during the later 
stages of the war when a fully operational FLN bureaucratic apparatus 
existed to engage in planning for a post-independence society. However, 
despite the general refusal to elaborate a blue-print of the position of 
women in the future socio-political order, FLN documents frequently 
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revealed the mind-set of the leadership, as in a Notes aux militants du 
FLN circulated in early 1957:
Algerian women living for decades under Medieval material, moral and 
intellectual conditions constitutes a half of the body of the nation that is 
almost unconscious.
 In consequence, particularly urgent help must be lavished on them, in 
conformity with the spirit of our National Revolution and the new and 
numerous demands we face, to prepare them for the tasks of liberation 
and the construction of the future Algeria within the framework of their 
natural privileges as wives, mothers, housewives and citizens.99
The idea that women in post-independence Algeria would essentially 
stay confi ned within their maternal and domestic functions was occa-
sionally affi rmed quite bluntly, as by Captain Si Allal in Wilaya V: ‘I 
remind you for the last time that it is forbidden to recruit in the zone, 
without authorisation, female soldiers and nurses. In an independent 
Algeria the freedom of the Muslim woman will stop at her threshold. 
Women will never be the equal of men’.100
The claim that the FLN was in no position to develop a cogent policy 
on women during the course of the war because of the priority and 
immediacy of armed struggle was fl awed since from 1956 onwards it 
was laying the basis for a state apparatus that by 1958 assumed the 
form of a Provisional government (GPRA) with a fully-fl edged adminis-
trative structure. By far the most important foundation was laid at the 
Soummam Conference held secretly in the interior in August 1956, and 
this was to provide the only major statement on women until the ‘left’ 
Charter of Tripoli on the eve of independence (28 May–7 June 1962).
In the Soummam platform the section Le movement des femmes 
was relegated to the sixth and last place under the heading ‘Methods 
of action and propaganda’ after the movement of peasants, workers, 
youth, intellectuals and liberal professions, and small businessmen and 
artisans, as if women occupied a separate enclave.101 Women received 
the usual accolade as heroic fi ghters, but their brave sacrifi ce for the 
national cause was framed mainly as a form of moral support or 
succour for the male warrior, ‘the moral support for combatants and 
resistance fi ghters’.102 The shining example of female heroism held up, 
in a display of what Meynier has called an ‘everyday Masculine narcis-
sism’,103 was ‘the recent example of the young Kabyle girl who rejected 
an offer of marriage because it did not come from a maquisard’. Overall 
the Soummam platform represented a step backwards on the position 
that women had come to occupy in the ALN and it was symptomatic 
that Ramdane Abbane, the leading ideologue of the FLN, on arriving 
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at Soummam was astonished at the presence of young women who 
he felt to be ‘out of place’ in the maquis.104 As Amrane notes of both 
Soummam and Tripoli, ‘The political texts are clear, the militant woman 
is courageous and admirable, but she must stay confi ned within the 
tasks that are in harmony with her female nature’.105
The failure of the FLN to go much beyond grandiloquent, but ulti-
mately vacuous, statements on women’s heroic role was refl ected in the 
diffi culty that rank-and-fi le militants had in imagining or conceptualis-
ing the post-independence order. Mimi Ben Mohamed, a well-educated 
militant who achieved the highest position of any nurse in the maquis, 
recounts the conversations she had with her colleagues about their 
dreams for the future:
They each had their little ideas about the future . . . Right, there is the 
problem of women. In the case of women how was it going to be . . . For 
example, the beaches . . . some saw private beaches for women . . . On 
the independent women they were generally not in agreement. Some were 
against the veil, others were for it . . . We didn’t know at all how independ-
ence was going to be since we couldn’t form a picture.106
The absence of a clear political project, the blurred vision restricted 
to questions of unveiling or a vague utopia based on the segregation 
of beach swimming, is indicative of the extent to which the FLN had 
failed to engage in a basic political education of the rank-and-fi le as to 
the future position of women. The failure to outline a programme also 
left the hands of the post-independence regime untied and free to pursue 
what turned out to be a deeply conservative policy.
Women: the myth of the national bastion
The second and potentially most negative, but insidious strand underly-
ing the FLN failure to conceptualise a coherent policy for women arose 
from the topos or ideological construction of a ‘fortress identity’. The 
roots of this topos, which were shared equally by Muslim and European 
intellectuals from at least the 1930s, if not earlier, derived from the 
recognition of two spheres in Algerian culture and society, the private 
domestic space of the home which belonged to women and children, 
and the public sphere of the adult male who represented the family in all 
external matters. This model derived in part from the classic bourgeois 
doctrine of separate spheres that became universalised in European 
culture between the Enlightenment, Rousseau’s Emile providing a 
foundation text, and the 1950s. The model crucially essentialised the 
inherent, and therefore unchangeable, nature of women as nurturing, 
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maternal and sentimental, as opposed to males who were geared to 
the external universe of physical force, confl ict, politics and rational 
 decision making.
From the 1930s onwards the Algerian intelligentsia, particularly 
the Ulema, re-interpreted the western model by idealising the private 
sphere of the family as a religious space in which women were the 
guardians of tradition, the transmitters of the essence of Muslim values 
and identity, through the education or socialisation of children and the 
future generation. As we have seen (chapter 1) the colonial rulers and 
the Muslim conservative elites entered into a tacit alliance by which the 
former would respect the sanctity and autonomy of the religious sphere, 
defi ned most crucially as the law of personal status (marriage, divorce), 
in exchange for the latter quietly accepting the status of subjects without 
full political rights who would not challenge the colonial order. As the 
nationalist movement gained strength from the 1930s it, like national-
ism in many other ‘Third World’ struggles of decolonisation, increas-
ingly represented women as the bearers of tradition.107
The myth of women as the fortress of religious, cultural and national 
identity has been widely treated by contemporary historians not as an 
ideological construct but as an objective, sociological phenomenon 
that has been used by them as the basis for the understanding of resist-
ance to colonialism. Such interpretations are legion in the analysis of 
Algerian culture and society, but typical is the comment of Nefi ssa 
Zerdoumi that, ‘the space of women shrunk to the dimensions of a 
refuge which was of primary importance to keeping and preserving. 
Thus women became the guardian of the Algerian-House instituted as a 
bastion of traditional values against foreign infl uences’.108 Frantz Fanon 
played a key role in the generalisation of this topos among Algerian 
and European intellectuals, the idea that French military occupation 
and colonialism since 1830 had profoundly destroyed the structures of 
Algerian society (tribal associations, landownership, customs) but had 
failed to penetrate and subvert the last bastion of Algerian identity, the 
sacred and private sphere of the family. The wisdom of the colonial 
administrator was phrased by Fanon as follows: ‘ “If we wish to strike 
at Algerian society in its structure, in its capacity for resistance, we must 
fi rst of all conquer the women; we must go and seek them out hidden 
behind the veil and in the houses where the men conceal them” . . . To 
convert women, to win them over to foreign values and to tear them 
away from their personal status, is to gain a real power over the men 
and, at the same time, to possess the practical and effective means to dis-
mantle Algerian culture’.109 For Ferhat Abbas also, ‘The Muslim woman 
loves children. As the guardian of moral values, she raises them in the 
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ancestral traditions, the legends and myths. She constitutes the bedrock 
of the family cell, the dynamic element of tribal life . . . And as she was 
particularly hostile to European penetration, she concentrated in herself 
the patriotism and unity of the people’.110
Rarely have historians or sociologists attempted to penetrate beyond 
the myth, to question or challenge this ideological construct. The 
colonial and nationalist idea of the ‘family-as-fortress’, rather than 
being subjected to critical examination, has survived in contempo-
rary political science and sociology as a key interpretative tool with 
which to understand modern Algerian history. As such, what might be 
labelled ‘Fanonist feminism’ has served to reproduce a key element of 
this discourse: that the essential being of women in a liberated society 
is to fulfi l her domesticated destiny as wife and mother, a destiny made 
sacred through its core function of guarding the holy nation. Few com-
mentators have stopped to ask what it might mean for any progressive 
picture of contemporary Algeria if Muslim women should be idealised 
as the defenders of algérianité precisely to the extent that they were 
isolated from the mainstream of public and political life. It was not 
necessarily advantageous to the development of a modern society that a 
key model of basic socialisation and education of the future generation 
should ideally be placed in the hands of the most secluded, ignorant and 
 un-educated section of society.
The popularity of the formulation of women as the fortress of identity 
was linked to the sentimental and patriotic theme of wives and mothers 
as heroic combatants, but at the same time it locked women into the 
status quo as guardians of the segregated and private sphere of the 
home, as reproducers and subordinate servants of males. By implica-
tion if women should try and encroach on the sphere of men, the public 
domain of politics, they would risk weakening the walls built around 
the domestic space which was a guarantee of the purity, integrity and 
continuity of tradition: emancipation could only be the work of the 
devil and subversive western design.
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From women’s radical nationalism to the 
restoration of patriarchy (1959–62)
The fi nal stages of the war from late 1959 until early 1962 saw the most 
overt and radical phase of women’s nationalist activism and evident 
signs of the failure of the emancipation agenda to make any signifi cant 
or durable impact on Muslim women. However, this apparent sign of 
female radicalisation proved to be illusory since at a more hidden, but 
potent level, it was paralleled during the fi nal years of the war by two 
developments that in the long term were to carry enormous negative 
consequences for women in post-independence society. The fi rst of 
these was the underlying strength and continuity of conservative Islamic 
religion and culture that was to shape the post-war political order, and 
secondly, the massive disruption and challenge to patriarchy caused by 
war-time conditions that determined males at independence to reassert 
their domination over women and youth with a vengeance.
The failure of the EMSI and the emancipation apparatus
As has been seen throughout this study, the emancipation strategy con-
sisted of a package of different forms of intervention, from unveiling 
and propaganda campaigns, to mobile socio-medical teams, improved 
access to schooling for girls, youth training programmes, the joint 
European–Muslim women’s circles, to the granting of voting rights and 
promulgation of the 1959 personal status law. This emancipation, for 
a variety of reasons, made very little durable impact on the bed-rock 
of Algerian society: as Omar Carlier notes, ‘If the weight of colonial 
history is enormous, if the responsibility of the former coloniser for 
the post-1962 order is not insignifi cant . . . the internal dynamic of the 
country is far more decisive’.1
The scale of SAS, EMSI and MSF operations was so thin on the 
ground, under-funded and fragile that they barely scratched the surface 
of the enormous weight of social and economic problems faced by a 
desperately poor and traumatised population. The key ideological and 
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transformative intention of the army, to win Algerian women over to 
a French model of civilisation, had little impact since it was associ-
ated with the occupying power, and the FLN, which in general terms 
had mass popular support, directly opposed and countered the enter-
prise. Statistically the number of women who became associated with 
the activities of the local women’s circles on a regular basis remained 
infi nitely small. For example, most women scattered through the huge 
territory of the Aumale sector had no circle which they could attend, 
and those who did, mainly in the small town of Aumale, represented 
only one or two women in every thousand. Moreover, as it became 
slowly more evident from late 1959 that an eventual French retreat was 
likely, so it became more dangerous for young women, as well as for the 
extended family group to which they belonged, to be seen to become 
too closely associated with the French. Since women were always 
regarded as virtual minors, being under the control of males, such asso-
ciation threatened to jeopardise the entire kin group, both in relation 
to  immediate FLN violence and its survival and status in the eventual 
post-independence order.
It is undoubtedly the case that many hundreds of thousands of women, 
especially in the bled, the camps and urban slums, did have recourse to 
the welfare operations of the army, especially where the health and 
well-being of their own children was concerned (treatment of trachoma, 
inoculation programmes, supply of medicines, food and clothing). The 
French army misinterpreted the huge queues of women that often came 
from miles around to attend the sessions of the mobile medical teams as 
concrete evidence of turning the tide against the FLN ‘terrorists’ who, 
it was thought, looked on helplessly. But after the over-optimistic ‘revo-
lutionary’ phase of emancipation (1958–59), army intelligence reports 
began to show a much more sober or pessimistic assessment of French 
infl uence on Muslim women, and in particular an underlying consensus 
that Algerians held a highly instrumental attitude to the strategies of 
‘contact’. Women, it was noted, turned out en masse to gain material 
goods or services, but increasingly did not even attempt to disguise their 
lack of interest or open hostility towards ideological propaganda and 
the broader political goals of the French project. The EMSI of the Oran 
region reported in December 1960, ‘the female Muslim population, 
especially in the douars, is more interested in the small and immediate 
material benefi ts they can gain from these contacts and meetings than by 
the idea of social emancipation that we try to teach them’.2 The French 
army, after the radical phase of emancipation, moved towards a more 
sober assessment that any meaningful transformation of women’s lives 
would require not years, but decades of reform, particularly via the 
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long-term impacts of universal education. General Challe, in his impor-
tant directive Action sur les milieux féminins en Algérie of March 1960, 
noted, ‘The evolution of the female milieu is a long-term project since it 
involves a transformation of deeply rooted customs. It will be the fruit 
of the work of several generations’.3 However, the time-scale of the 
emancipation campaign was at most a mere six years (1957–62), during 
the fi nal two years of which the French were merely treading water and 
preparing for withdrawal.4
The one exception to this pattern of minimal or superfi cial impacts 
of French ideology concerns the numerically very small number of 
girls or young women who came from relatively well-off families and 
had received a sound education to secondary level. The urban middle-
class elites were deeply divided politically, culturally and linguistically 
between a francophone and francophile strata that had been educated 
within the French lycée system and were closely tied to the colonial 
state as junior civil servants, teachers, lawyers and technicians, and a 
class of Arab speakers who, educated in the reformist médersa and in 
the universities of Tunisia (Zitouna) and Egypt (El Azhar), remained 
deeply resistant to French secularism and were often excluded from the 
rewards of government employment.5 One of the tragic consequences 
of the Algerian war of decolonisation, which also shared the features 
of a civil war, was that the numerically small, educated elite, which was 
potentially so valuable to the future independent society, was split down 
the middle. The political decisions of young women tended to refl ect 
their location in families that stood on one side or another of this divide. 
The évoluées who had received an education within the French system 
to secondary or university level, and who had absorbed the intellectual 
and cultural traditions of the French humanities and science, and the 
universal values that underpinned them, embraced emancipation with 
fervour: on the other side stood the ‘Arabo-Muslim’ nationalists who 
fought for an integral Algerian identity. In many respects the two oppos-
ing groups shared identical visions of women in the good society, a 
modernist future of universal education, access to employment, and full 
political participation: but such a potential for unity was over-ridden by 
the all-consuming immediacy of the battle for independence or a French 
alliance.
Historians, as Ryme Seferdjeli notes, have neglected the study of the 
Francophile évoluées, not only because they were on the losing side and 
therefore of little interest to Algerian and left-wing historiography, but 
also because they could be type-caste as traitors to the nationalist cause 
and lackeys of the repressive occupying forces.6 However, this group – 
like that of the pre-war JUDMA (see chapter 1) – supported the reformist 
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side of French emancipation and aspired to a liberal, progressive agenda 
on women’s rights that was not dissimilar to that which was to be later 
held by many Algerian feminists from the 1980s onwards. The évoluées, 
symbolised by the Secrétaire d’Etat Nafi ssa Sid Cara, did not hold to a 
militant secularising tendency as the FLN claimed, as puppets of French 
cultural imperialism, but sought to support a body of reform that was 
compatible with the Koran and a modern Muslim society through the 
tradition of ijtihad (independent reasoning). However, the évoluées, 
who were viewed by the FLN as ‘collaborators’, became increasingly 
nervous as a French retreat approached and which, noted an offi cer, 
‘probably means for them a brutal return to an ancestral way of life that 
they do not want at any price’.7
Very little is known about the political fate of this educated pro-French 
elite at independence: many of those whose families were closely linked 
to the French army and administration would have departed for France; 
some may even have been killed by mobs; but the majority probably 
survived, along with the pro-French families to which they belonged, by 
either a last minute conversion to independence (sometimes named the 
martiens) or by keeping their heads down. But overall it can be assumed 
that they were excluded from the offi cial post-independence women’s 
organisations since these tended to promote those who carried the 
symbolic prestige of FLN war-time militants and who were vetted and 
registered by the Ministère des Moudjahidine.8 The women’s movement 
post-1962 was considerably weakened by the loss of a signifi cant portion 
of the tiny class of secondary educated and more politicised women who 
might otherwise have been expected to play a key activist role.
The radicalisation of nationalist women, 1959–62
The adverse conditions under which the French emancipation campaign 
began to labour from 1959 onwards can be in part related to a deep 
shift in the political balance of power away from the French army to the 
FLN. Relatively little is known about the role of Algerian women during 
the fi nal stages of the war, in part because the oral evidence gathered by 
Danièle Amrane and others has been largely based on the testament of 
the educated moudjahidate, most of whom had been killed or arrested 
by 19589 or were removed abroad by order of the FLN in late 1957 and 
early 1958. As the tide began to turn against Algérie française, a process 
that was marked most clearly by de Gaulle’s speech of 16 September 
1959 on ‘self-determination’, and signs increased that the FLN, even if 
it had lost the military battle, would win an eventual political victory, so 
the self-confi dence of the settler population ebbed away.
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Algerian women, especially in the bigger towns, sensing this demor-
alisation, began to assert an open defi ance of the French authorities. 
For example, on the anniversary of the events of ‘13 May’ the army 
and government attempted to re-enact the hugely successful Forum 
mass demonstrations. The conservative newspaper L’Echo d’Alger 
published numerous photographs of columns of veiled Algerian women 
under the rubric, ‘Muslim women come out from the dark. For the fi rst 
time, their faces revealed, they enter into public life’.10 But most of the 
colonial press admitted that the attempt to recapture the heady spirit 
of May 1958 had failed and Europeans seemed dispirited or lacking 
in enthusiasm. Most telling of all was the presence of Algerian women 
counter-demonstrators who had the extraordinary courage, since they 
ran the very real risk of being lynched, to mount a protest in the midst 
of tens of thousands of Europeans. One woman waved ‘a fellagha fl ag’, 
until it was torn from her hands, while a group shouted ‘give us back 
our prisoners’.11 In a situation in which Algerian men were absent, often 
in underground FLN networks or in detention, or in which their open 
protest would usually lead to arrest or physical violence, women began 
to replace men in the sphere of public militancy and street demonstra-
tions. The army commander at Tizi-Ouzou reported, ‘Very often . . . the 
male population is happy to maintain a glum passivity while the women 
show a violent hostility, even attempting to engage in aggression against 
the forces of order’.12
From late 1959 onwards such public signs of protest or disaffection 
began to multiply. As we have seen (chapter 7), the EMSI and MSF 
circles were faced with signs of growing and overt political opposition, 
especially among young women who made clear that their sole reason 
for attending activities was to profi t from material benefi ts and to gain 
access to such advantages as sewing machines, clothing and semolina. 
The army recorded a growing volume of small, but signifi cant acts of 
resistance: for example, it was not unusual to overhear Algerian women 
saying to European women, ‘We will chuck you out and we will have 
fi ne dresses and beautiful houses’.13 An intelligence report commented, 
‘the EMSI have noted a deterioration in the climate, much diffi culty 
in getting women to meetings, and think that it is most urgent to deal 
with the young girls who are more affected by the enemy propaganda. 
During the organised visits to the beaches (an army chore) they insist on 
singing in Arabic and when they do, start singing rebel songs’.14
Evidence of the extent to which young women, especially of Algiers, 
were increasingly drawn into militant nationalist activism was pro-
vided during the violent street clashes of 10–12 December 1960 which 
marked, in the words of Ben Khedda, the ‘decisive turning-point of 
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the war’.15 On 9 December de Gaulle arrived in Algeria for a tour of 
the major cities, but this triggered massive street violence by extreme 
right-wing settler organisations against both the security forces and the 
Algerian population. The SAU attempted to orchestrate pro-Gaullist 
demonstrations by Algerian inhabitants of the Casbah and popular 
quarters, but this went badly wrong when thousands poured out from 
the slums waving green-and-white nationalist fl ags and chanting ‘Abbas 
au pouvoir’, ‘Libérez Ben Bella’ and ‘Algérie musulmane’. In the ensuing 
repression, during which both the pieds-noirs and the army fi red at the 
crowds, an estimated 120 Algerians died.16 The crucial political impor-
tance of these four days of rioting lay in the fact that de Gaulle became 
convinced that Algérie française and the integration of the two com-
munities was an impossible dream, and recognised that the FLN consti-
tuted a legitimate expression of the popular will of the Algerian people 
with whom he would need to negotiate sooner or later.
In a society in which women were normally excluded from public 
spaces and the political sphere arrogated by men, women now came to 
play an unusually prominent role during these spontaneous mass dem-
onstrations, helping to make dozens of FLN fl ags, or taking the lead in 
the advancing columns, dressed in the national colours and galvanising 
the crowds by singing the Algerian anthem. The SAU offi cer for the Bas 
Casbah reported on the 12 December: ‘Demonstration Rue de la Lyre, 
headed by a woman carrying an infant and a rebel fl ag, dispersed by a 
charge of the Zouaves (Fifth Company)’.17 Many of these young women 
were killed or injured, including a twelve-year-old girl struck by the 
police while shouting ‘Vive l’Algérie algérienne’ who later died in hospi-
tal.18 The funeral of this girl was, against the Muslim custom of interment 
as an all-male affair, organised almost solely by women who turned it 
into a mass nationalist protest, to which the army responded by further 
gunfi re.19 Djamila Briki, who took part in these events, explained how 
the political mobilisation of women in Algiers fi rst developed among 
the hundreds who gathered daily outside the prisons to bring food and 
clothing to arrested husbands, brothers and sons, or who attended trials 
and provided mutual support in the face of execution orders. From this 
solidarity of women, most of whom were veiled, illiterate and had pre-
viously rarely left the confi nes of the home, emerged a movement that 
demanded improved prison conditions and visiting rights, and that on 
occasion resulted in full-scale riots outside the prison gates.20
The mobilisation of women during the fi nal stages of the war was 
in particular a revolt of teenage girls and young married women. 
Historically, independence or liberation movements, from the Kenyan 
‘Mau Mau’ revolt of the 1950s to the Soweto rising of 1976, have 
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frequently found a strong support base among the disaffected youth of 
sprawling shantytowns, often rooted in youth sub-cultures, street gangs 
and anti-authoritarian ‘delinquency’.21 In the case of Algeria, there has 
been little research on the links between the nationalist movement and 
the rapid increase in alienated urban youth, a consequence of the combi-
nation of extraordinary demographic expansion, military deracination 
of rural populations, migration of refugees into the northern towns, and 
lack of educational and employment opportunities.22 The reports of 
the Algiers SAU provide a detailed picture of growing offi cial concern 
at the tidal wave of refugees pouring into the shantytowns and which 
was overwhelming attempts to provide welfare, health care, housing 
and employment.23 The FLN-led boycott of schools and subsequent 
pupil strikes left thousands of disaffected youths free to congregate in 
the street, where they, rather like the Palestinian Intifada, harassed the 
forces of order or collaborationist demonstrations through stone-throw-
ing.24 There are indications that teenage girls or young women shared 
in this radicalisation of youth and there existed a growing political and 
generation gap between them and older, more conservative women. A 
Fifth Bureau report noted instances of growing hostility by boys and 
girls, infl uenced by the FLN, towards their mothers for listening to 
French propaganda and, ‘threaten their mother when she comes into 
the house by saying she has been “to listen to propaganda” and they are 
happy to think she will be beaten’.25 When Lieutenant Morel chased and 
arrested a girl for carrying a nationalist fl ag, older women disapproved 
of her actions, saying to him, ‘Well done, we’ve had enough’, suggesting 
a tension between the younger radicals and older women.
What the older, more conservative women resented was the extent to 
which young women, in the absence of males and their authoritarian 
control, seized the opportunity to invade public spaces and to engage in 
highly expressive acts of militancy. Djamila Briki comments on the dem-
onstrations of 11 December, ‘It was a battle by women: there were some 
men, especially the young and elderly, but compared to the women one 
could count them on one hand. Women were in the majority at Climat 
de France . . . it was an explosion: there was shouting, the you-yous, 
the veils torn up to make fl ags’.26 The SAU offi cer for the Bas Casbah, 
Captain Bapst, also remarked on the role of women in his sector, 
‘Women appeared at the windows and on the terraces. They uttered 
violent “you-yous” which spread throughout the quarter . . . The dem-
onstrations were made up largely of youths and women: adult male 
workers were in a minority’.27 This spontaneous street action signifi -
cantly escaped the control of the FLN, which began to fear a dynamic 
rank-and-fi le movement that threatened to challenge its authoritarian 
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leadership,28 a challenge that was all the more disquieting since it simul-
taneously subverted patriarchal authority.
To many journalists and outside observers in the summer of 1962 
it looked as if the rising tide of female militancy, the shear energy and 
revolutionary élan of the populace, would inevitably result in a radical 
transformation of the position of Muslim women in the new society. The 
elation of the crowds on independence day, 3 July 1962, that seemed to 
promise the dawn of a new age, was captured by a number of contem-
porary photographers, as in Marc Riboud’s picture of a young, unveiled 
woman leaning through the open window of a passing car waving the 
national fl ag. She looks straight at the camera, delighted, dark glasses 
clutched in her left hand and the caption below reads, ‘In the centre 
of Algiers women bursting with joy at the prospect of the liberation 
of women’.29 However, as the future was soon to reveal, the national-
ist euphoria and energy of mid-1962 did not translate into a vibrant 
post-independence women’s movement that was able to play a major 
political role in the construction of the new Algerian society. Indeed, 
Algeria stands today as one of the most remarkable instances of a huge 
gap between the often-claimed credentials of a ‘revolutionary’, ‘social-
ist’ and emancipation movement, and the negative, long-term repressive 
nature of a post-colonial state that imposed a conservative agenda on 
women and imprisoned them as the virtual minors of men. This anti-
feminist politics stood out in even starker relief because Algerian women 
combatants had achieved international acclaim as the symbol of a fi erce 
and engaged militancy, the archetypal heroines of anti-imperialism and 
anti-colonial liberation. So dramatic was the hiatus between the glory of 
the war-time moudjahidate and post-independence exclusion of women 
from political life that Palestinian women involved in the later Intifada 
treated Algeria as an exemplary warning of what they should themselves 
avoid in their own national struggle.30
Why Algeria, which during the 1960s shone on the international 
stage as a beacon for anti-colonial, socialist and ‘Third World’ lib-
eration movements, should have so singularly failed in the area 
of women’s rights presents a key problematic that has long exer-
cised historians, political scientists and contemporary feminists. To 
provide a complete answer would require a further volume on post-
 independence Algeria which is beyond the scope of this study. Here 
the focus is specifi cally on the impact of the War of Independence in 
shaping the post-colonial order and the long-term failure of a progres-
sive women’s movement. The remaining part of this chapter examines 
two key elements of the war period that were to carry negative impli-
cations for the post-independence order: fi rstly, the deep continuity 
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in conservative religious tradition and secondly, linked to this, the 
disruption of patriarchal family structures which weakened male 
control over women and which they were determined to reverse once 
independence was achieved.
The roots of populist Islamic nationalism during the War of 
Independence
Although many commentators have dated the penetration of radical 
Islamist currents into the FLN regime from the 1970s onwards, this hap-
pened in some areas of policy-making from at least 1957–58. Socialist 
or Marxist interpretations of the Algerian War of Independence as a 
‘revolutionary’ struggle tended during the 1960s and 1970s to under-
play the centrality of religion in populist nationalism. FLN documents 
show that the organisation, wherever it could establish a presence at the 
local level both in the maquis as well as in the big cities, including Paris, 
asserted a strict respect for religious practice and a puritanical form of 
justice based on Islamic principles (sharia). Although the FLN assumed 
a hostile stance towards traditional religious leaders (imams, sheikhs, 
marabouts) who supported the French, and was prepared to assassinate 
them, it was willing to integrate such men into its own apparatus where 
possible, especially as they might retain wide infl uence and prestige 
among local people. In Wilaya I (south Constantinois), for example, 
each of the six sub-divisions (Mintaqa) had its own Muslim justice and 
the minutes of a Wilaya level council of the cadis in October 1960 show 
them making agreement on regulations relating to everything from 
property disputes, regulation of inheritance and contracts, to issues 
of marriage, divorce and dowry payments. The FLN cadis in Wilaya I 
exercised a general surveillance over the moral life of the community, 
‘they lead the people in the path of goodness, stop that which is evil’, 
ensured provision of mosque buildings for Koranic schools and prayer, 
and recruited imams and teachers.31
Such a minute regulation of religious life and Islamic justice was 
not restricted to the illiterate peasant and nomadic populations of the 
interior, but extended into the shantytowns of the major cities in both 
Algeria and France. For example, the Paris police captured in October 
1959 in Seine-et-Oise an extremely detailed instruction, ‘based on 
the commands of the Holy Koran’, to the FLN Comités de Justice on 
how they were to adjudicate on matters of marriage and divorce.32 In 
the maquis the ALN commanders, many of whom had received a reli-
gious education in Koranic schools and médersas, often imposed strict 
religious observance and a rigid control of moral behaviour among 
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both the soldiers and the local population, backed up by draconian 
punishment.33
A number of factors contributed to such a powerful religious culture. 
Firstly, the origins and long-term evolution of Algerian nationalism, 
particularly under the leadership of Messali Hadj between 1926 and 
1954, was built around a populist discourse and symbolism that was 
deeply religious. When ALN commanders, who were in many instances 
of urban origin and education, fi rst arrived in the maquis they came 
into close daily contact with rural societies that were barely touched 
by secularism and regulated by age-old customary practices and beliefs. 
Even the minority of ALN leaders who were personally attached to 
a more socialist or secular vision recognised that any revolutionary 
assault on peasant beliefs would be counterproductive. The FLN was far 
more inclined to adapt its message to the deeply embedded traditional 
mentalités of the peasantry, and the social structures that underpinned 
it, than to engage in the kind of Bolshevik onslaught on Islam that the 
Soviet Union unleashed in Central Asia during the 1920s. Indeed, given 
the enormous diffi culties that Algerian nationalism faced in developing 
a single, binding ideology that could over-ride spatial and cultural frag-
mentation, the competing loyalties based on region, language and clan 
endemic in society, religion and the shared community of faith (umma) 
offered the strongest cement.
What this meant in practice was that as the FLN began to infi ltrate in 
the early stages of the war into rural communities where its own position 
was tenuous it tended to follow a quite pragmatic, rather than overly 
ideological line in relation to the existing political elites, the assembly 
of village elders (djemâa), and the ‘big-men’ of the grandes familles who 
carried considerable infl uence within local clientele and clan networks. 
Since in the initial stages of FLN penetration into new rural areas the 
number of ALN militants was frequently very small and fragile in rela-
tion to the tens of thousands of inhabitants they were seeking to control, 
it was more advantageous to co-opt local power-brokers, even when 
they came from conservative elites (wealthy landowners, caïds), than to 
alienate or assassinate them.
A good example of this process relates to the Ourabah family, the 
most prestigious and infl uential grande famille in the lower Soummam 
valley, headed by the ex-deputy Abdelmadjid Ourabah who held quasi-
feudal protective powers (‘aiyanaiyya) over several Kabyles villages. 
The ALN commander Amirouche tried on several occasions to win the 
Ourabah clan over to the FLN side, and it was only when this failed 
that this opened the way to the tragic massacre of Melouza, of villages 
that were thought to have rallied to the French army or the MNA.34 
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While the ALN was quite prepared to use terrorism against its oppo-
nents, in general it preferred where possible to work with pre-existing 
political or clan networks: Mintaqa commanders were instructed to use 
methods, when making contact with civilian populations, ‘stamped with 
a total courtesy’, including towards any ‘member of the djemâa or tribal 
council’.35 The model commander of the Wilaya was a leader who should 
ensure that his soldiers ‘must always respect the people’, particularly as 
‘an abject colonialism’ had kept them in ignorance and, ‘maraboutisme, 
for example, must be fought intelligently. It is stupid, even criminal, to 
treat people roughly’.36 An ALN report noted that the local fi ve-man 
committees which it set up to run village life, the ‘People’s Assemblies’, 
tended to be based on the old djemâa and, as such, ‘are still composed of 
wealthy and elderly individuals’, or even of individuals ‘who in the past 
served a colonialism of which the people still carry the scars’.37 There 
are signs of a ‘re-Islamisation’ of Algerian society at grass-roots level as 
the poor, faced with an apocalyptic slaughter and destruction, turned 
towards a millenarial faith or ecstatic escapism. Mouloud Feraoun 
reports, with some irony, how the peasants in his home village of Tizi-
Hibel were impressed by the fi rst mass meetings addressed by an FLN 
leader: ‘their leader was wonderful. He began reciting from the Koran. 
A fatiha entirely done in Arabic. You should have heard his pronuncia-
tion, his tone, and his zeal . . . And so, the people of Tizi-Hibel, once the 
most villainous on the surface of the earth, have found their faith again; 
they are now paying the salary of a muezzin and frequent the mosque 
assiduously. God is great!’38
It would be a mistake to fall into the trap of assuming a simple 
equation between poverty and radicalism, that the more oppressed the 
peasantry, the stronger would be their determination to fi ght against 
the colonial system. Although there has been very little investigation 
of the class basis of the FLN and nationalist mobilisation in the rural 
interior where 80 per cent of the population lived, the evidence suggests 
that the core militants came not from the great mass of the landless 
poor, but from a strata of slightly better-off independent landowners 
and shopkeepers, craftsmen, teachers and petty entrepreneurs who lived 
in the small towns and commercial centres of the bled. Michel Launay, 
in his study of a wine-producing region of Oran, noted hostility between 
the category of petit-bourgeoisie that had access to education and the 
egalitarian religious ideology of the Ulema and provided the cadres of 
the FLN, and the mass of impoverished day-labourers who resented 
this elite.39 Eric Wolf noted that poor peasants or landless labourers 
have often lacked the tactical power to challenge oppression and were 
‘often merely passive spectators of political struggles or long[ed] for the 
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sudden advent of a millennium’. By contrast a more independent strata 
of middle, ‘free’ or ‘tactically mobile’ peasants led the path to revolu-
tion. But by a curious paradox this class was also the bearer of tradition 
and ‘it is precisely this culturally conservative stratum which is the most 
instrumental in dynamiting the peasant social order’.40
While at the higher levels of the ALN and FLN a younger generation 
of militants tended to displace pre-war Algerian political elites,41 this 
leadership recognised the shear weight of the conservative religious, 
cultural and social values that permeated the grass-roots nationalist 
movement. The Algerian War did not constitute a classic revolutionary 
movement like that in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917 that sought to 
sweep away the fabric of the old society. This continuity in the deeper 
level of culture and the matrix of family and clan life in which it was 
embedded was to carry fundamental consequences for the position of 
women.
The war-time challenge to male domination and patriarchy
The post-independence Algerian state prevaricated over emancipation 
and reform of family law because it recognised the enormous and almost 
immovable weight of patriarchy, of an embedded system of family struc-
tures, sentiment and power that would be diffi cult to transform without 
creating dangerous political opposition. Mounira Charrad has, to date, 
provided the most cogent explanation for the post-independence failure 
of Algeria to elaborate a family code that would match the needs of a 
rapidly changing society and bring Muslim women fully into the cité. In 
a comparative study of state formation in the three Maghrebi nations, 
she argues that the very different outcomes in family legislation between 
the progressive Tunisian code of 1956, the conservative Moroccan code 
of 1958, and the peculiar ‘stalled’ situation in Algeria that lasted until 
1984, can be explained by the relative ability of central governments 
to exert political domination over traditional kin or clan-like bases 
of power that defended the most conservative readings of Maliki law. 
Charrad provides a useful macro-level hypothesis for an understand-
ing of post-independence Algeria: the newly formed state showed deep 
contradictions in its drive to assert national integration over and against 
localised or regionalist interests, while simultaneously allowing space 
for kin or clan-based associations which paralysed moves to legislate on 
family law and to assert control over the private domestic sphere.42
Charrad’s analysis, while providing a very useful model as a point of 
departure, remains at a quite general level and does not identify how or 
why ‘tribal’ structures were able to remain so powerful over and against 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   359 21/7/09   12:16:31
360 Burning the veil
the encroachment of the centralising state. What made it possible for 
socio-cultural patterns of male domination over women, particularly 
within the family group, to survive through two decades of enormous 
political and economic crisis and change between 1954 and the late 
1970s? Part of the answer to this question can be found in two interlinked 
phases: fi rst, the massive social disruption of the war dislocated the family 
group and created a deep crisis for Algerian male virility by temporarily 
marginalising adults and subverting their ‘traditional’ role and honour as 
protectors of women and children. In a second phase that followed inde-
pendence men, many of whom returned to family life from the maquis, 
prison camps and French factories, sought immediately to reassert their 
authority with a vengeance and to restructure patriarchal arrangements.
In the fi rst phase we examine the enormous scale of the war-time 
dislocation of the family group and its internal structures. The French 
army programme of ‘pacifi cation’ involved a massive uprooting of the 
peasantry from the mountainous interior, the destruction of thousands 
of hamlets, and relocation into militarised encampments. Between two 
and three million people, half of the rural population, were defi nitively 
torn away from the land and dumped in camps that, in many instances, 
formed the nucleus of post-war urban settlements (see chapter 6). 
The General Inspectorate for Resettlement reported how, in response 
to forced displacement by the army, the population descended like 
a torrent into the valleys where they were herded into barbed-wire 
compounds, without even basic housing. ‘The people then re-house 
themselves with relatives or strangers (who hire their fi lthy huts out at 
exorbitant prices), are squashed ten to a room, living in a state of pro-
miscuity and disgusting fi lth . . . such a dislocation of rural society was 
not foreseen’.43 In addition a quarter of a million refugees sought safety 
across the borders in Morocco and Tunisia,44 or fl ed the insecurity and 
hunger of the interior for the shantytowns of the northern literal. The 
population of some towns doubled in size between 1954 and 1966, 
including that of Constantine which went from 111,000 to 240,000.45 
Most of this refugee population did not regain their villages of origin on 
independence since the ties to the land had been defi nitively fractured, 
indeed the departure of close to a million pieds-noirs during 1962–63 
further accelerated rural–urban migration as Algerians moved quickly 
to occupy empty European properties in the towns.46 The process of 
déracinement meant that family units were in many instances torn away 
from the extended kin networks of the village which had in the past 
structured local, endogamous marriage alliances, and forced into urban 
zones in which they had to share housing and communal space with 
strangers.
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At the same time displaced family units were stripped of their 
‘natural’ protectors in a time of danger: fathers, brothers and sons. The 
war was marked by the massive departure of younger, active males 
from rural society who joined the FLN in the maquis or abroad in 
Tunisia, Morocco, France and elsewhere, or migrated to the northern 
cities and to metropolitan France to fi nd employment and to escape vio-
lence and forced recruitment by the French army or war-bands (MNA, 
ALN, Bellounists) that competed for manpower. An approximate 
estimate indicates that up to a half of all able-bodied men of working 
age (fi fteen to fi fty years) would have been either killed or absent from 
their families for years on end.47 This meant that in many villages, 
especially in Kabylia, populations were reduced to women, children 
and the elderly, a society of ‘women without men’. By this term the 
anthropologist Willy Jansen refers to a key element of Algerian socio-
religious culture which regarded celibacy of all adults, but in particular 
of women, as reprehensible and a threat to good order. Women who 
lived on their own, or headed households in which adult men were 
absent, were regarded with suspicion and hostility as a grave danger 
to the sexual order, and opprobrium extended to the growing number 
of poor widows and repudiated women who were forced to work as 
domestic servants, seasonal agricultural labourers, or on the margins of 
society as prostitutes, bath-house attendants, musicians and washers of 
the dead.48
Although some contemporary observers argued that Algerian women, 
in the absence of husbands, remained fi rmly under the power of older 
males (grandfathers, uncles), most agreed that women had to cope 
without men and gained experience of a new-found autonomy.49 Quite 
typical is a report of the French commander of Azazga in 1959: ‘on a 
large part of the territory villages are practically empty of the active 
male population, the men being either in France or in the ranks of the 
rebels’.50 By 1958 Mouloud Feraoun was noting in his diary how Kabyles 
women were taking over the kinds of work previously strictly allocated 
to men, carrying the wounded on their backs, burying the dead, collect-
ing money, standing guard, working the fi elds. He  speculated on signs of 
a radical transformation of gender roles:
Perhaps a new world is being constructed out of ruins, a world where 
women will be wearing the trousers, literally and fi guratively, a world 
where what remains of the old traditions that adhere to the inviolability 
of women, both literally and fi guratively, will be viewed as a nuisance 
and swept away. This constitutes a form of brilliant revenge for all those 
peaceful attempts at emancipation that were generally resisted as not at all 
helpful for the unfortunate woman on the road to liberty. Tomorrow, the 
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women of Algeria will no longer have any reason to envy other women, 
except, perhaps, education.51
In the second phase that commenced with the coming of independence 
in mid-1962, Algerian men immediately sought to reassert their lost 
authority over women, to return to the status quo ante bellum. Part of 
this was fuelled by a deep psychological ressentiment and even revan-
chism against women that arose from the feeling of humiliation, anxiety 
and lost honour experienced by many men in their inability to fulfi l 
their protective role towards their wives, daughters and female relatives 
during the chaos of war.52 There are close parallels between Algeria and 
the situation in metropolitan France during the Liberation when men, 
humiliated and ‘feminised’ by the defeat of 1940, the exode, and mass 
internment, and challenged by the war-time role of women in the work 
force and the Resistance, sought to assert their masculinity through the 
ritual shaving of collaborators (femmes tondues).53 Indeed, since hun-
dreds of thousands of Algerian men had lived through and witnessed 
the Liberation in France at fi rst hand, it seems likely that the hunting 
down and violence against Algerian women ‘collaborators’ in 1962 was 
a symbolic replay of August 1944.54 While French men had sought to 
assert themselves against the super-virility of German soldiers, and then 
of American GI ‘liberators’ embraced by young women on tanks,55 so 
Algerian men in July 1962 could fi nally act to erase the experience and 
memory of Bigeard’s crack paratroopers parading machine-like through 
the streets of Algiers. But in the case of Algerian males the psychological 
scars of sexual humiliation were far deeper than anything experienced in 
France because of the way in which a colonial army engaged in actions 
that represented a deliberate, frontal assault on the fundamental values, 
the sacrosanct respect of female seclusion and male honour. While the 
psychological damage of such a subversion could be, to some extent, 
mitigated by the thought that this was an inescapable fact of war that 
could be heroically born by the national community, male insecurity 
was further deepened by the inability of men, in a situation of massive 
deracination and endemic poverty, to fulfi l their classic roles as pro-
viders whose duty it was to ensure the well-being of the household 
(decent housing, clothing and subsistence), the seclusion of women, 
and obedience to the rules of honour, including avoidance of women’s 
employment.56
When the war ended in mid-1962 the desire of most Algerian men was 
to return to their families, but for hundreds of thousands ‘home’ was 
not the peasant house or village that they had last seen but an entirely 
different location (resettlement camps, shantytowns, urban slums), and 
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the very structure of the family and its kin or village networks was radi-
cally dislocated. Hoping to pick up life where they had left it, returning 
soldiers, prisoners and migrant workers found the domestic circle geo-
graphically displaced and dispersed, reduced to smaller, nuclear units 
cut adrift from the framework of village clan networks, and run by 
women who had learned to cope without men. The highly educated and 
Francophile teacher Mouloud Feraoun betrayed a sense of the general 
male resentment at new-found female independence: ‘In the village, the 
women openly took the places left vacant by the men. This is something 
that gives them a lot of confi dence and even insolence’.57 Or again, in 
another passage, ‘The men have taken on a haggard look . . . They have 
lost, my sister told me, all their arrogance as well as their superiority 
complex regarding women’.58 Feraoun reveals a prudish anxiety about 
the deregulation of women’s sexuality: the young daughter of Salem, 
a relative, found refuge in his house after she had run away from her 
village to avoid rape: ‘But I think that she already has been, just looking 
at her easy manner, the audacious and slightly covert expression on her 
face, and her fully developed body’.59
Returning men felt deeply anxious and insecure in relation to such 
change, and set about asserting their domination over women with a 
new energy.60 As Mohammed Harbi notes, at independence the lower 
classes surged back into the public spaces from which they had been 
excluded with a messianic puritanism that sought revenge on all collab-
orators, the harkis and pro-French bourgeoisie and in particular those 
immoral women who symbolised the subversion of Islamic society:
Invitations were forced on the bourgeoisie and notables to matrimonial 
alliances that went against their deepest wish. Things went as far as humil-
iating them publicly. At Nedromah they were made to sweep the street. 
The moral order reappeared in full strength, in the name of Islam. At 
Mila a woman was stoned for adultery. In Algiers they hunted down the 
‘girls of 13 May’ and demanded that men accompanied by a woman show 
their livret de famille. In Adrar a hashish smoker was publicly whipped. 
In Guelma the population went with the imam to the Roman theatre to 
destroy the statues to shouts of ‘no more idols’.61
This populist integrism has strong resonances with the moralism of the 
Taliban and their destruction of the great Buddha statue at Bamiyam. 
Attacks on women ‘collaborators’ mirrored the public rituals of humili-
ation carried out at the French Liberation and by the army and police 
during the War of Independence :62 ‘The “suspects” are crushed into 
cells full of human excrement. Women, after being shorn, are locked up 
separately under the same conditions’.63
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The attack on the women of ‘13 May’ was directly linked to 
the emancipation campaign that men had had to endure in silence. 
Numerous French reports on the emancipation campaign carried out 
by the EMSI, the MSF and the mobile propaganda units at village level, 
report the morose silence of the men as they watched ‘their’ women 
lined up and harangued by interpreters. Colonel Crozafon ascribed this 
in an Orientalist way to the primitive jealousy of the Arab, noting the 
fear, ‘of the dispossessed male and it is important to recognise the part 
played by sexuality in the life of the Oriental, and also the important 
role played by Muslim women in his household’, such that any reform 
would undermine his privileged position as, ‘an unchanging and arbi-
trary power in the conjugal domain’.64 The silence of the peasantry 
was not a sign of disinterest but rather of the fact that the French army 
practised a ruthless violence and any man showing the least sign of overt 
criticism or resistance to the military intervention with women ran the 
risk of immediate arrest, interrogation and incarceration. At independ-
ence Algerian men were suddenly released from this restraint and sought 
to eradicate any indications of the hated emancipation campaign that 
they had had to bear so long in silence.
What made it possible for men to reassert their authority over women 
post-independence was, as we see in the fi nal chapter, the fl exibility and 
durability of patriarchal norms and the family structures that under-
pinned them, and the extent to which the one-party state, recognis-
ing the enormous weight of such religiously sanctioned practices, for 
reasons of political opportunism quietly shelved any meaningful attempt 
to promote a progressive reform or agenda on women’s rights.
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The post-independence state and the 
conservative marginalisation of women
This chapter examines fi rst how it was that the structure of the ‘tra-
ditional’ extended family and its values, often referred to as ‘neo-
 patriarchy’, was able to adapt in a dynamic way to the challenge of 
rapid social and economic change. This survival helps to explain why 
patterns of male domination remained so all-powerful and generalised 
within Algerian society, so that politically vulnerable post-independence 
governments preferred not to challenge the status quo on the position 
and rights of women. This failure to engage in any signifi cant pro-
gramme of progressive reform is illustrated by reference, fi rstly, to the 
inability to transform the conservative laws of personal status, indeed 
the government went backwards on this issue compared to the French 
reform of 1959, and secondly, by reference to a one-party state control 
and stifl ing of an organised women’s movement.
Neo-patriarchy:1 family structure and a blocked society
Between 1954 and the 1970s Algeria experienced an extraordinary 
degree of change: the disruption of war was followed after independ-
ence by chaos and economic dislocation as a million settlers, who held 
the key technical, administrative and professional functions, departed. 
After 1962 the new government, confronted with economic and social 
disintegration, mass rural–urban fl ight, high unemployment and a 
quite staggering population explosion, attempted to resolve the crisis 
of rural under-development through an agrarian revolution, while oil 
revenues were invested in a Soviet style industrialisation programme.2 
One classic modernisation theory maintains that the global, long-term 
progress in the position of women is a result of economic change, 
leading to education, entry into the work force, change in the balance 
of ‘traditional’ gender roles within the family, and access to health care 
and family planning.3 However, a distinctive feature of Algerian socio-
economic development after 1962 is that for at least two decades rapid 
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modernisation, including an enormous expansion in female education 
and literacy, had a quite minimal impact on gender roles, equality 
and overall rights. Kamel Kateb has measured an explosive growth 
in girls’ education: the percentage of those receiving primary educa-
tion (age six to fourteen years) increased from 9.5 per cent in 1954 
to 71.56 per cent in 1987.4 However, this dramatic change had, for at 
least two decades, minimal impact on the position of women and, for 
example, their level of employment increased from 2 per cent in 1954 
to only 2.6 per cent in 1977, one of the lowest in the Muslim world.5 
This apparent contradiction between improved access to education 
and ongoing exclusion from the labour market can be explained in 
part by a post-independence model of labour-saving industrialisation 
that excluded women, and by agricultural reforms that weakened their 
traditional role in the peasant economy, reducing them to the position 
of homemakers.6
As Kateb and others have pointed out, patriarchy trumped the 
forces that might have led to social and political emancipation: the 
Algerian family, faced with the challenge of modernisation, proved 
to be highly inventive in adapting the ‘traditional’ male-dominated, 
extended family so that it served as a basis of economic and political 
strength, rather than as a conservative corset that led towards inevi-
table social decline. The anthropologist Camille Lacoste-Dujardin and 
sociologists like Claudine Chaulet and Lahouari Addi have shown 
how this dynamic restructuring took place, so that kin networks and 
marriage strategies could adapt to modernisation and facilitate access 
to new forms of political and economic power.7 The typical post-1962 
household was constituted of three generations in which, because of 
the desperate crisis in housing, parents shared the same space with 
married sons, their wives and children, or, if more wealthy, acquired 
adjacent fl ats. This extended family group, instead of fi ssuring into 
autonomous, nuclear units, continued to function as a collective and 
adult brothers and elders were able to insure and protect it best by 
avoiding putting all their eggs in one basket and diversifying the eco-
nomic base. Typically one son might emigrate and send remittances 
from France, another to work in the big cities of northern Algeria, 
while others remained on the family farm cultivating the land, or used 
it as a base from which to set up small local businesses (as traders, taxi 
drivers, hauliers) or travelling daily to jobs in local towns or industry 
(day-labourers, postmen, masons).
This adaptive, dynamic capacity of the ‘traditional’ family provided 
it with considerable strength in times of massive economic and politi-
cal dislocation and change but went hand-in-hand with a vigorous 
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reinforcement of the patrilineal ideology that maintained women in 
their ‘natural’ role of mothers and daughters claustrated within the 
home. Lacoste-Dujardin says of this family as ‘refuge’: ‘These new 
families, fragments of lineage groups dispossessed of so many of their 
privileges, still jealously guarded, according to the length of time 
passed since its disruption and the degree of links retained with the 
parental clan, a consciousness of family honour and still adhered to 
a patrilineal ideology’.8 Claudine Chaulet rejects the Eurocentric idea 
that there exists a necessary link between processes of economic mod-
ernisation and the evolution of the nuclear family, and points to a fl ex-
ible, extended family network in which women as individuals were still 
subordinated to the masculine-controlled interests of the group, ‘which 
aimed to prevent any divisions that could be provoked by the spouse’, 
through arranged, endogamous marriage of young brides who could 
be easily controlled, and subjected to the strict regulations of gender 
segregation and seclusion.9 Kin networks also operated like clientele 
systems to gain access to political power, for example through relatives 
in local government who could fi x access to jobs, land and favourable 
planning decisions.10
This patriarchal model held true not only for rural and provincial 
small-town society, but also for large numbers in the big cities, many of 
whom were refugees or recent migrants from the interior. The traditional 
Maghrebi house, with its sealed in private spaces (absence of ground-
fl oor windows, inner courtyards) was designed to protect women from 
the eyes of strangers, a condition of male and familial honour.11 But 
the huge population movement into the towns during and after the war 
created an enormous housing crisis and overcrowding, conditions which 
made it extremely diffi cult to maintain the seclusion and privacy of 
women. The anthropologist Willy Jansen shows how, despite the most 
adverse conditions, attempts were made to maintain the appearance of 
segregation. In multi-occupation housing shared by families who were 
strangers to each other men would follow the rule of giving a warning, 
such as a cough or calling ‘tarîq’ (way) whenever they wished to pass 
through a communal courtyard in which unrelated women might be 
present, so that they could hide or cover themselves.12 What can be 
seen from this is how the family, despite enormous pressures of uproot-
ing, rural–urban migration, overcrowding and promiscuity clung on to 
the core values of honour and patriarchy. In a situation in which male 
immigrants to the city faced deep anxiety about the spatial regulation 
of segregation, in which women of the household were exposed to the 
dangers of contact with strangers, men frequently resorted to more 
draconian female seclusion than was normal in the village, including 
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imposition of the veil, strict surveillance and refusal to allow women to 
go unaccompanied by a male into public spaces.13
Some commentators have tended to draw a picture in which the 
oppression of Algerian women has been ascribed to a ‘battle of the 
sexes’, an aggressive male subjugation of women. Certainly Hélène 
Vandevelde-Daillière produced a considerable body of evidence from 
her survey in 1969–70, to show that many women felt so isolated 
within the home that they had no means to escape from a life of resig-
nation and ignorance, and were passive and de-politicised. Typical of 
the statements recorded is the following by a middle-aged woman, ‘No 
women take part in social life because of customs. Women are made 
for the house, which basically means they have no life. They rarely go 
out . . . Put in another way, Arab women are buried alive’.14 So radical 
was female seclusion that a third of rural women had no contact even 
with neighbours, while their husbands avoided conversation with them 
and some wives were even ignorant of the nature of their husband’s 
employment.15
However, as Lacoste-Dujardin has shown, older women as mothers 
and mothers-in-law could achieve a considerable degree of domestic 
power and status in so far as they brokered marriages and exercised a 
strict disciplinary control over their daughters and co-habiting daugh-
ters-in-law, thus reproducing the ideology of female submission and 
serving as ‘agents of masculine domination’.16 Numerous reports by 
French army itinerant social and welfare teams during the war noted 
that resistance to emancipation of Algerian women came mainly from 
the dominant older women or adjouzat who blocked any reforming 
intent and prevented contact between the French and the young women 
in their households. Patriarchy, far from being solely imposed by force 
on women by males, was a powerful system of belief and practice that 
was sustained by both men and women and this explains in part the 
ability of the ideology to survive post-war changes.17 It was also in the 
rational self-interest of Algerian women to aspire to membership of 
cohesive and extended family networks since this provided them with 
the best guarantees of a degree of economic security and respect: for 
example, the usual escape route for wives who suffered abuse at the 
hands of husbands or were repudiated was to return to the protection of 
their family of origin. Willy Jansen shows how the situation of ‘women 
without men’ was not enviable: they faced extreme poverty and hard-
ship as virtual social outcasts, and the ambition of most widowed or 
divorced women, as of their male kin or guardians, would be to try and 
ensure that they remarried as quickly as possible so as to return to the 
protection and security of the patriarchal collective.
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Women and the conservative function of post-independence 
government
The newly independent state made resounding and high-principled 
general statements on women’s rights. A sequence of ‘foundation’ dec-
larations such as the Tripoli Programme of 1962, the Constitution of 
28 August 1963, and the Algiers Charter of April 1964, as well as Ben 
Bella and Boumédienne in key speeches, made bold statements on the 
full equality of women. For example, Article 12 of the 1963 constitution 
stated, ‘All citizens of both sexes share the same rights and duties’.18 In 
later years, as an emerging women’s movement struggled to assert itself 
against a conservative, male-dominated political regime, these basic 
constitutional rights would be constantly referred to, but as many com-
mentators have noted, there continued to exist a fatal and contradictory 
gap between such general statements of high principle and the failure 
of the FLN one-party state to develop a coherent programme of reform 
that would translate basic rights into reality.19
One of the reasons for this failure lay in the political turmoil and 
instability that accompanied the transition to independence, as a range 
of ‘clans’, clientele systems and ideological blocks competed for power. 
Between early July and early September 1962 Algeria came close to a 
full-scale civil war as the ‘external’ armed forces headed by Ben Bella 
moved to crush the ‘internal’ Wilaya commanders during an advance 
on Algiers that led to several thousand deaths.20 Ben Bella, during his 
brief period as president (13 September 1962 to 19 June 1965) was 
plagued by political insecurity and this absence of stable authority led 
him to make a number of compromises with religious conservatives 
that was to have particularly negative consequences for women whose 
interests were seen as expendable when weighed against the retention 
of personal power by FLN apparatchiks. In recent years, especially 
with the surge of radical Islamist movements after 1988, commenta-
tors have begun to revise an earlier historiography that exaggerated the 
more secular, socialist and progressive side of the Algerian regime, by 
placing a stronger emphasis on the popular Islamist and archaic features 
of nationalism.21 The educated intellectuals who, infl uenced by French 
laicité and the Enlightenment, provided a materialist or Marxist analysis 
of Algerian history and political development, constituted a tiny minor-
ity,22 compared to the masses and the FLN leadership that followed 
the Messalist tradition which sought to weld the disparate regional, 
religious and linguistic forces into a cohesive unity and nationalism 
based on the idealisation of a mythical order that was to be resurrected 
over and against the hated ‘Christian West’. As Harbi notes: ‘Algeria 
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advances with its eyes fi xed on the past, riveted to its sacred archaisms 
because they belong to the body of the community. The nationalist ide-
ology combines a nostalgia for the past and the revolutionary hope of a 
new world’.23 As has been seen, the defence of an Arabo-Islamic iden-
tity was formulated most crucially in terms of women, as mothers and 
educators, and of the private sphere of the family viewed as a bastion 
in which core values were transmitted from one generation to the next. 
In particular FLN propaganda had helped to reinforce the association 
between French emancipation and counter-insurgency, so that any 
moves to reform the position of women after 1962 could be aggres-
sively denounced as a dangerous instrument of western neo-colonialist 
 penetration and subversion.
The new political elite that came to power at independence under the 
leadership of Ben Bella (1962–65) and then Boumédienne (1965–78) 
recognised perfectly well, in a situation of deep political instability, 
the profoundly entrenched and unyielding nature of popular Algerian 
social, cultural and religious tradition.24 At the core of this lay the patri-
archal family, the fundamental building block of the entire social and 
political order. The political elites quietly turned their backs on the issue 
of women: there was no reason to meddle in or stir up opposition, in 
relation to reforms for which there existed little signifi cant pressure or 
demand. Thus while the FLN elites felt comfortable in utilising the lan-
guage of ‘socialism’ and secular law in the technocratic and economic 
sphere (of oil production, planning, industrialisation, land reform), the 
cultural-religious agenda was basically drawn from the Ulema tradi-
tion. The PPA of Messali Hadj (1937–54), and its successor the FLN, 
both shared a populist and messianic religious nationalism that was 
shaped by the Ulema,25 and its leading ideologue, Tawfi q al-Madani, 
became Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs in the fi rst FLN provi-
sional government and later under Ben Bella. In the post-1962 political 
struggle between the minority current of socialism and Arabo-Islamic 
traditionalism, both Ben Bella and Boumédienne discreetly sided with 
the latter on the question of women, particularly as in a search for 
political legitimacy they had most to gain from appealing to populist 
Islam and the austere salafi yya movement which sought a return to 
the purity of tradition and sharia. An authentic womanhood was to be 
located more in the restoration of an essence that was defi ned in rela-
tion to an immutable past than through any process of modernisation. 
As Mohammed Harbi, a leading oppositional fi gure within the FLN 
has argued, the post-1962 governments showed an essential weakness 
of Algerian nationalism from its very beginning in the 1920s, a form of 
populism that based unity on a religious and mythical idealisation of a 
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past community that obscured elaboration of a clear ideology or politi-
cal project, so acting to the detriment of universal and individual rights, 
a process in which women were the greatest losers.26
The dynamics of this failure can be most clearly traced through the 
post-independence blockage of reform of the marriage and family laws.
The failure to carry out reform of the personal status law
Some feminists have argued that to centre on legal reform and individ-
ual rights is to impose a western model that may obscure, as ‘declension 
narratives’ claim, the forms of traditional status and community-based 
power held by Algerian women.27 However, the modernisation of 
family codes has been one of the key instruments by which independ-
ent Muslim nations, since Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s onwards, have 
through ‘top-down’, and often authoritarian, intervention attempted 
to end the subjugation of women, and liberate the potential of half the 
population to play a full role in economic, social and political develop-
ment. Algeria is no exception and reform of the family code has been 
the single most crucial issue around which both the Algerian women’s 
movement and international feminist organisations have, and continue, 
to campaign.28
As has been shown in chapter 9, the colonial regime faced consider-
able diffi culty in enforcing the new personal status law of 1959, and 
was confronted by a society in which a widespread culture of non-
compliance with the état civil and marriage legislation was deeply 
entrenched. Unlike Tunisia and Morocco, which seized the opportune 
moment of independence to introduce new family codes while the newly 
independent state could benefi t from high levels of support, the Algerian 
government simply passed an act (31 December 1962) to leave French 
legislation on the statute books. This meant that the French Ordinance 
on marriage of 1959 was to remain in force until the law of 5 July 
1975. But it was to take yet another decade before the family code of 
1984 came to fi ll the vacuum. The Algerian government was prepared 
to quietly leave the 1959 law in place, although preferring not to speak 
too much about this tacit tolerance of what had been slated as an ‘anti-
Islamic’ measure. Such tolerance was possible precisely to the extent 
that the law was in practice ignored or fl exibly marginalised, both by 
society and by the courts, and so did not arouse troublesome political 
opposition from conservative religious forces in society.
The paralysis of government became particularly evident in the long-
drawn-out, twenty-two-year failure to legislate a family code to meet 
the needs of a rapidly changing, post-colonial society. During this period 
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(1962–84) there were no less than fi ve failed attempts, mainly by secre-
tive committees on which there was no female representation, to draw 
up draft legislation (1963–64, 1966, 1972, 1979, 1981). Those drafts, 
which were leaked to the press, showed a general trend through time 
towards a radical erosion of the 1959 law and the assertion of the core 
values of traditional Maliki law. The secrecy surrounding the various 
commissions was in itself an indication of the deep anxiety of the one-
party state in relation to the potentially explosive and politically desta-
bilising nature of the issue. Space does not allow a close examination of 
the detail of the various drafts, but the overall direction of the conserva-
tive shift is indicated by the fact that the fi nal 1984 law, in the words of 
Lucie Pruvost, codifi ed ‘a family of a patriarchal type based on respect 
for agnatic solidarities and hierarchies under which women were treated 
as permanent minors’.29 For example, wives owed strict obedience to 
their husbands as sovereign head of the family, as well as respect for his 
lineage (parents and kin); women no matter what their age could only 
marry through the authority of a male guardian (walî), which in the case 
of a widow might be her son; polygamy was retained, and repudiation 
was restored as a unilateral male prerogative.30
The twenty-two-year-long vacuum created by the state and the failure 
to provide a clear legislative lead on a family code meant that judges and 
the court system which adjudicated on the reality of marriage, divorce 
and family life were left adrift to follow their own devices.31 From 1962 
until the abrogation of the code in July 1975, many judges, following 
their personal religious or ideological bias, simply ignored the 1959 
Ordinance which was still in force, and based judgements on classic 
Islamic law.32 The way the wind was blowing was clearly refl ected 
during a 1968 conference of jurists on the instability of the Algerian 
family, during which Mohand Issad of the Algiers faculty of law noted 
that the supreme court had shown preference for the position that ‘the 
husband held sovereign power to repudiate his wife at will’, even if 
this was an abusive practice and in breach of the statutes. Issad justi-
fi ed this on the casuistical grounds that the law of 31 December 1962 
retained French legislation, including the Ordinance of 1959, only on 
condition that it was not ‘of colonial inspiration and discriminatory’ or 
‘contrary to national sovereignty’.33 The right of husbands to unilater-
ally end a marriage, even without cause, was thus argued to be in the 
national interest, and Issad swept aside the progressive law of 1959 that 
served to give greater protection to women as both a colonial evil and 
discriminatory.
However, Issad was expressing his individual opinion as a jurist rather 
than a strict reading of statute law, and this was typical of a situation in 
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which judges were relatively free to follow their own agendas, a situa-
tion that created a mass of confusion and contradictory practices in the 
legal process. In many ways this juridical anarchy facilitated and, at the 
same time, legitimated the deep conservative currents in Algerian society 
that had frustrated or ignored the 1959 law from its inception. In 1968 
even the offi cial FLN newspaper El Moudjahid was able to offer a fatwa 
that condoned a strictly illegal disregard for the law. In reply to a ques-
tion posed by a women who had been married by a fatiha ceremony to 
a man who later turned out to be already married with two children, it 
suggested that she could contest this before a judge, but the fatiha mar-
riage was, ‘from the point of view of Muslim law pure’, and if she was 
to contest this in the courts, ‘if you are pious you will always have some-
thing on your conscience . . . also in Muslim law polygamy is licit’.34 
Lahouari Addi has gone so far as to suggest that Algeria in failing to 
establish a culture of individual rights was not a Rechtsstaat and was 
prepared to surrender the monopoly of justice in relation to domestic 
space and women to the religious-moral order of the community and the 
man in the street. For example, the authorities appear to have tolerated 
or turned a blind eye to the widespread use of male violence towards 
women who they felt had, by appearing alone or ‘improperly’ dressed in 
the street, impugned the moral order.35
The conservative turn in marriage and family law after 1962 did 
not mean that Algerian women were lacking in agency and that they 
were the passive objects of repressive male agendas. Just as civil society 
had been able to escape the implementation of the 1959 law, so that 
there was a large gap between the statute book and the social reality 
of marriage arrangements, so court documents of legal procedure also 
reveal the kinds of strategies that women deployed to defend their own 
interests in court.36 Although historians have explored this issue for 
the colonial period, little if any work has been carried out for the post-
 Independence era.37 However, some of the published court adjudications 
provide a tantalising glimpse of how women attempted to utilise the law 
to their own benefi t and, rather signifi cantly, did so by appealing to the 
colonial Ordinance of 1959. For example, Khedidja Ait Idir brought 
a court action against her husband Tahar Nabti in July 1965 because 
he had repudiated her, but acted illegally by failing to get the marriage 
registered by the état civil. However, the great majority of women were 
illiterate and too poor to be able to make use of legal process, and if they 
did so it was in most instances where, having returned to their parents 
home after repudiation, court action was brought by male relatives on 
their behalf.38 But ultimately, the overall conservative direction which 
marriage law took after independence in 1962 severely narrowed the 
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already restricted room for manoeuvre that women had to defend their 
interests before a judge.
Women’s organisations such as the offi cial Union nationale des 
femmes algériennes (UNFA), as well as individual feminists such as 
Fadéla M’Rabet, voiced with growing concern the failure of the courts 
to implement current laws inherited from the French. This became par-
ticularly clear in the two key areas of enforced marriage and unilateral 
repudiation. A growing number of religious leaders and cadis openly 
expressed the right of jebr by which a marriage partner was chosen by 
the father or male guardian (walî), since, it was argued, women lacked 
the experience, information or inherent intelligence of men to make such 
an important decision. The consent of the woman, who they argued 
must be absent from the marriage ceremony, should always be given by 
the walî. It was precisely this system that the 1959 law had tried to end 
by insisting that women must be present at the registration before a state 
offi cial who would verify her assent, as well as her legal age.
From 1962 onwards, however, a mass of evidence points to forced 
marriage, often of under-age minors, in spite of the Khemisti law of 
1963 which extended the age of marriage for girls from fi fteen to sixteen 
years.39 In the Constantinois region even the offi cial census of 1966 
recorded 5 per cent of all girls aged twelve to fi fteen years as married 
(2,774 individuals), undoubtedly the tip of the iceberg since most illegal 
marriages would have escaped the état civil altogether. Vandevelde-
Daillière’s extensive survey of 1968–72 found that 42 per cent of hus-
bands were imposed on women in urban society, and 65 per cent in rural 
zones.40 M’Rabet, after publicising evidence of widespread and increas-
ing psychiatric problems, including 175 attempted suicides in Algiers 
in 1964 among young women forced into marriage, had her weekly 
radio programme for women closed down.41 In addition there was a 
growing wave of repudiation or divorce in which women and children 
were abandoned, frequently without any form of support, and in 1963 
there was an estimated 10,000 repudiations and abandoned families in 
greater Algiers alone.42
The conservative attack on the colonial legislation of 1959, as on the 
heritage of French emancipation in general, was powerfully legitimated 
by the FLN nationalist ideology. Internal documents dating from the war 
itself show that the FLN was perfectly aware of the extent to which the 
package of emancipation measures was driven by a counter-insurgency 
strategy to penetrate, gather intelligence and subvert the FLN base in 
domestic society.43 However, in its attack on the 1959 law the FLN fell 
back on, and reinforced, the conservative topos of the immutable family 
as a bastion of identity, a form of religious nationalism that bound 
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women into the status quo. The offi cial FLN newspaper El Moudjahid 
noted of the 1959 law:
Thus the French, who moreover are Christians or of the Jewish confession, 
as is, it seems, Mr Michel Debré, have dared to deliberately violate the 
Koran, immutable in its essence, and to impose by the sword on Algerian 
Muslims the secular laws of France, and this, in the most sacred of things, 
notably the statut personnel . . . a domain that belongs exclusively to the 
community of believers.44
Frantz Fanon sensed the dangers of such a reactive FLN agenda rein-
forcing traditional practices that might carry negative consequences for 
women.45 But while he viewed this as only a temporary sacrifi ce of the 
war period this proved not to be the case and the FLN helped to create 
a long-term, post-independence mental association between almost 
any form of progressive agenda on women or emancipation, and the 
idea of an alien, western invasion and subversion of Algerian culture 
and society. As the conservative ideologue Malek Bennabi remarked in 
1968, feminism represented a foreign import: ‘Our feminism must not 
be “made in somewhere”. It must be of our own brand’; while for the 
Minister of Justice, Benhamouda, the goal of any new Algerian code, ‘is 
above all to purify the structure of the family of all its un-Islamic ele-
ments’.46 The close links between the nationalist myth of Arabo-Islamic 
identity and the emphasis on a necessary reinforcement of classic Islamic 
law was promoted by Saïd Benabdallah, a leading ideologue and jurist, 
in his book La Justice du FLN pendant la guerre de libération. The 
nature of Algerian justice, he argued, could only be understood in rela-
tion to ‘the religious function of the revolutionary myth’ and a War of 
Independence that had been fought by the moudjahid (warrior of the 
faith) as a jihad (holy war) which was essentially, ‘a dynamic manifesta-
tion of auto-defence for the preservation and recovery of a patrimony 
of the highest value . . . It so happens that it was precisely in Algeria 
that Islam was the fi nal refuge of these values that were hounded and 
profaned by an outrageous colonialism’.47 Nationalist discourse invari-
ably presented women and the domestic habitus as the ultimate redoubt 
of Algerian identity, and this construct meant that the Islamic code of 
law which regulated the family would need to be cleansed of all French 
or western accretions that had polluted the pure tradition. Benabdallah 
wrote: ‘The strength of Algerian Islam resides in effect in the extent to 
which its spirit is in harmony with that of Algerian civilisation. It con-
tains prescriptions that conform to the traditionalist way of life, and 
the system of juridical norms that it proposes are in agreement with 
the deeper structures of Algerian society’.48 This recourse to tradition 
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appears to have ruled out any attempt to engage in a progressive or 
liberal interpretation of Islam, but meant in effect a defence of the status 
quo and the most conservative features of marriage and family law.
In summary, the Algerian government delayed legislation on a post-
independence family code since its hold on power was precarious and 
it preferred to avoid politically destabilising battles over such a sensi-
tive issue between opposing camps that viewed themselves as socialist/
secular modernisers or as Arabo-Islamist defenders of ‘tradition’.49 
Certainly Borrmans, a close contemporary observer, detected signs of 
such a split in the secretive workings of the drafting commissions of 
1963–64 and 1966, and gave this as a reason why government shelved 
these projects.50 It is now evident, especially from the work of Gilbert 
Meynier, that such a split over the position of women had existed 
already among the higher echelons of the FLN during the war itself,51 
but the weaker socialist or secularising current eventually lost out to 
the colonels (Ben Bella, Boumédienne) who seized political power at 
independence.
Although there were some initial signs of promise on the women’s 
question from the Ben Bella government, particularly in the passing of 
the Khemisti law of 1963, which increased the minimum age of mar-
riage for girls from fi fteen to sixteen years, this quickly evaporated. On 
International Women’s Day, 8 March 1965, a dramatic demonstration 
passed through central Algiers, during which many women threw their 
veils into the sea, blocked traffi c and shouted slogans demanding an 
end to discrimination: ‘go and do the cooking, we’ll take care of the 
politics’. Ben Bella, during a deeply ambiguous speech in the Majestic 
cinema, stated there could never be socialism without the participation 
of women ‘within the framework of our Arabo-Islamic values’.52 On 
the same occasion one year later, Boumédienne, having seized power 
through an army coup, made an almost identical speech: progress, he 
said, ‘does not mean in any way imitation of western feminism. We say 
no to this kind of evolution since our society is an Islamic and social-
ist society . . . this evolution must not be the cause of the corruption of 
our society’.53 Lazreg, an eye-witness to the event, reports that women 
who tried to leave in protest were forced back to their seats by armed 
guards.54
Politics and the failure of an organised women’s movement
Quite at odds with FLN populist nationalism, was the optimism of 
many commentators on the international socialist left in 1961–62 
that the new republic would mark an extraordinary phase in the 
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simultaneous liberation of Algerian women from the fetters of colonial-
ism and ‘feudal’ patriarchy. Frantz Fanon, for example, in L’An V de 
la révolution algérienne, optimistically forecast a ‘radical mutation’ in 
the role of women, gender relations and traditional family structures 
and the birth of a ‘new society’.55 Algerian women, it would seem, had 
through both their heroic sacrifi ce and the demonstration of an ability 
to act on a par with men, earned recognition of their moral right to full 
post-independence equality.
However, this was not to be, and the very group of women who might 
have been expected to form an avant-garde for a post-independence 
movement, the moudjahidate who had experienced an unusual degree of 
independence during the war and also enjoyed a high level of symbolic 
power, returned to a domestic role and withdrew from political activ-
ism.56 The atmosphere of political demobilisation and dejection at the 
reassertion of male domination and seclusion was typically expressed by 
Fatma Baichi: ‘After independence I no longer worked and I could not 
militate. My husband prevented me from going out: I could not even go 
and see my sisters in combat . . . And then even my brothers, even the 
youngest with whom I militated during the war, encouraged my husband 
to stop me from going out: “It’s all over now, she must not be allowed 
out, things are different now”’. For Baya Hocine too, ‘we [Algerian 
women] broke through the barriers and it was very diffi cult for us to 
go back to how things were. In 1962 the barriers were rebuilt in a way 
that was terrible for us’.57 Symbolic of this dramatic shift in the fortunes 
of women militants at independence was the fate of Djamila Boupacha, 
the most mediatised heroine, on her release from a French prison on 26 
April 1962. Reluctant to return to Algeria where ‘the brothers [FLN] are 
going to return me to my life as a woman down there’, she was forced 
by the FLN to leave the protection of her feminist lawyer Gisèle Halimi, 
and was bundled under guard onto a fl ight to Algeria.58
Why was it that so many of the moudjahidate, a highly militant 
and formidable group of women, should have so readily retreated 
from public life into domesticity? Many of the women interviewed by 
Amrane gave personal reasons: they were deeply scarred and exhausted 
by the war, and by 1962 were yearning for a return to ‘normality’ and, 
in particular, to get married and to have the children and family life 
that had been in many instances put on hold during the long eight-year 
war. However, such reasons do not explain the widespread disengage-
ment from politics. Typical was the statement of one woman militant: 
‘Independence, it’s the liberation of the country: our goal was achieved, 
we stopped there’, and, ‘I fought for independence, I had no other idea 
in mind. Me, I’m a woman: I thought after it’s them, the men, who are 
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going to take over, they know what has to be done for the independent 
country’.59 Saleha Boudefa has shown how this position was reinforced 
by a post-independence offi cial discourse that, by claiming full emanci-
pation of women had been gained at the moment of liberation, rejected 
any demands for further reform or change as illegitimate since full 
‘liberation’ had already been achieved.60 Any agitation by women not 
under the umbrella of the FLN or the UNFA was treated as potentially 
subversive and anti-national. But in general there was a lack of political 
education and experience among the moudjahidate who were unable to 
develop a consciousness of the problems faced by women and the kinds 
of programme or demands that might begin to break the mould of patri-
archy. Rather, the war-time élan of militant women was almost entirely 
captured by a simple, nationalist vision: as Zehor, a student, remarked, 
‘Independence . . . it was not something clear . . . it was a paradise, a 
paradisiacal universe where everything would be easy’.61
The outbreak of the War of Independence in 1954 had also led to the 
dissolution of the signifi cant women’s organisations that had emerged 
between 1944 and 1954 (UFA, AFMA, JUDMA) (see chapter 1). By 
1962 the majority of militant women who wished to continue political 
activism could only fi nd an outlet for this within the hegemonic, ‘state 
feminism’ of the FLN.62 As women militants disbanded in 1962 from the 
ranks of the FLN so they found themselves isolated, cut off from other 
militant women, without any alternative means of organising outside 
the conservative and stifl ing embrace of the one-party state apparatus. 
Finally, comparative evidence from many other twentieth-century wars 
in which women were called upon to make a huge sacrifi ce – both in 
taking on board roles or forms of work previously reserved for men, 
as well as extremely dangerous and vital forms of resistance that often 
went unacknowledged by men (organising clandestine supply routes, 
safe-houses, look-outs, medical aid) – have shown how extremely 
powerful the processes of demobilisation and domestic ‘normalisation’ 
have been, even in societies that had a much longer and more developed 
history of feminism. This was particularly true for women in metro-
politan France who after the Liberation, despite enfranchisement by de 
Gaulle in 1944, did not witness any dramatic break with the past.63 As 
one woman remarked, ‘For me, the Liberation brought no changes. We 
took our lives up as we had left them before and I was very happy to 
do so’.64
This was also the experience shared by ‘Muslim sisters’ after radical 
phases of nationalist resurgence in the Maghreb and Middle East, and 
there was nothing particularly ‘remiss’ or unusual in this respect about 
Algerian women.65 The most remarkable similarity existed between the 
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experience of Algerian and Moroccan women militants: at the moment 
of independence in 1956 the majority of Moroccan moudjahidate 
withdrew from post-independence political activity into the role of 
housewives and mothers. The husband of the resistance fi ghter Saadia 
Bouhaddou, for example, insisted that she wear the djellaba, ‘After 
independence, my husband told me, “You’ve proved yourself capable of 
doing all that. Now it’s time for you to stay at home”’.66 Alison Baker, 
in her study of Moroccan veterans, found that only one of them, Fatna 
Mansar, had stayed involved in politics after independence or had any 
‘concrete ideas of political, economic, and social programs that might 
have come out of the national liberation movement’.67 Baker concludes 
that the majority of the resistance veterans did not emerge from the 
War of Independence, having radically breached traditional boundaries 
of gender seclusion, with the developed political consciousness that 
western observers might have expected: on the contrary they remained 
conservative on most social issues and shared the views of the men in 
their milieu.68
Some of the best evidence on the enormous diffi culties faced by 
Algerian women trying to mobilise and gain any kind of voice in rela-
tion to women’s issues and rights in the immediate post-war period 
comes from the research of Hèlene Vandevelde-Daillière. While teaching 
at the University of Constantine she carried out, with the aid of stu-
dents, between February 1969 and February 1970 an extensive survey 
of opinion among 1,059 women and 233 men in both urban and rural 
zones.69 Vandevelde-Daillière shows in detail how women were almost 
totally excluded from the male-dominated political system, both from 
the FLN one-party apparatus, the trade union movement, as well as 
from elected representation at local and national level. For example, 
in the fi rst local elections for the Assemblées Populaires Communales 
(APC) on 5 February 1967, only ninety-nine women were elected to the 
10,852 seats (0.9 per cent), and by 1971 this had declined even further 
to forty-six (0.5 per cent).70 The sole offi cial organisation for women, the 
UNFA, which did not even hold its fi rst Congress until November 1966, 
was an integral part of the FLN machine, followed the party line, and 
lacked any signifi cant base among the female population. This organisa-
tion fi ts closely Ellen Fleischmann’s category of ‘state feminism’, a form 
that served to channel and contain any potential movement, stifl ing and 
discouraging any initiatives that might challenge male-led conservative 
policies. When the fi rst provisional Executive Committee of the UNFA 
organised a street demonstration on 8 March 1964, International 
Women’s Day, the government ordered a change in the membership, 
leading the entire committee to resign in protest.71 Most of the more 
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politicised militants who were involved in the early days of the UNFA 
began to drop out from its activities, like the peasant and ex-maquisard 
Jemaa: ‘At independence I tried to get involved in the UNFA, but I was 
of no use to them, they preferred women who make applause and who 
do not talk too much like me’.72
The majority of women interviewed by Vandevelde-Daillière dem-
onstrated a crushing demoralisation and resignation, and an apparent 
inability to conceptualise the political universe beyond the doorstep or 
to answer the most basic questions on the outside world, which was 
viewed as the domain of men. One sign of the political marginalisation of 
women was the tolerance by government in 1967–70 of husbands going 
to the ballot station on behalf of their wives, a practice eventually legal-
ised between 1975 and 1991.73 However, Vandevelde-Daillière’s survey 
did detect signs of a real, but latent, discontent among both urban and 
rural women; a wish to see a major change in values, and a more open 
access to social life and the realm of politics. Because such aspirations 
were massively blocked by men, who were more content to support the 
status quo in relation to gender roles, there was every indication of a pro-
found malaise. The degree of alienation and unhappiness among women 
tended to remain buried away and largely invisible, in part because there 
was no organisational basis through which women could express their 
individual and collective voice: ‘It is a matter of concern that the behav-
iour of women who, for the great majority, appear submissive to social 
convention, is in fact constrained by social pressure and that women 
submit to social norms because they have no other choice . . . Women 
remain submissive in appearance but are internally victimised’.74
The role of women during the War of Independence played a signifi -
cant part in this incipient prise de conscience, as well as their ability to 
vote, fi rst gained from the colonial regime in 1958. In the opinion poll a 
majority of women mentioned the struggle for national liberation as the 
prime cause of their interest in politics.75 But the evidence suggests that 
the majority of the moudjahidate, and of women in general who had 
experienced the radicalising impact of involvement in the war, became 
rapidly disillusioned with the post-independence regime and retreated 
into the private domestic sphere or, for the better educated, threw their 
energy into professional occupations as teachers, doctors and social 
workers.76 But, as Amrane shows, of the eighty-eight militants in her 
study, only three profi ted from any upward social mobility, and in two 
of these instances this was primarily due to the elite position of their 
marriage partners.77 More typical perhaps was Kheira, who went into 
the maquis as a nursing assistant, but by the 1970s was divorced with 
four children and living in a dark, cellar-like room.78 About a third of 
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urban and two-thirds of rural women studied by Vandevelde-Daillière 
believed that their position in relation to men had remained the same or 
had become ‘more submissive’ since the end of the war.79
This is not to say that there was no active women’s movement that 
challenged the regime during the 1960s and 1970s, but this was largely 
confi ned to a few hundred educated and professional women and even 
they, as the feminist Marie-Aimée Helie-Lucas notes personally, found 
it diffi cult to acknowledge the strength of the chains of nationalist 
ideology and to begin to oppose it.80 However, the war as a memory 
and symbol of women’s potential did have an eventual, longer-term 
impact on the emergence of an independent women’s movement when it 
 resurfaced after 1980.81
Finally, particularly revealing is the overwhelming hegemonic power 
of the offi cial discourse on women that was internalised by members 
of the UNFA and other potential activists.82 This discourse defi ned 
women’s essential role as that of mother and wife, ‘submissive in her 
function of reproduction and the satisfaction of the needs of men’.83 But 
in this domestic function women, far from being separated from the life 
of the nation, fulfi lled their fundamental vocation by giving birth to, 
and nurturing, male heroes of the past (the soldiers and chouhada of the 
war) and the generations of the future Algeria. To celebrate the Year of 
the Child in 1979, El Moudjahid commented: ‘the infant reassures the 
mother as to her fertility, strengthens her position within the family and 
social group, attests to the virility of the male, throws light on his capac-
ity . . . Grant us as husband the male who will increase our economic 
power’.84 Here the vision of women joined up with the long-established 
ideology that presented them as the moral and cultural guardians 
of the core values of national identity. The maternal-nationalist dis-
course was charged with a sentimental affectivity which valued women 
through their silent suffering and their willing sacrifi ce of martyr sons 
and husbands in the liberation struggle.85 Implicit in this ideology was 
that women could only lay claim to heroism through Algerian males: 
and this construction served to conceal and to block investigation of 
the kinds of economic, social and legal issues that specifi cally affected 
women in their own right.
The offi cial discourse further marginalised or isolated the voice of 
independent women by categorising them as ‘feminists’, a term that 
carried particularly negative connotations of a dangerous and foreign 
movement that threatened the national interest. The conservative dis-
course of Ben Badis and the Ulemas had, since the 1930s, engaged in 
a strong moralising and puritanical stereotyping of western women 
as decadent and effete beings, self-centred creatures dedicated to the 
M1822 - MACMASTER TEXT.indd   385 21/7/09   12:16:33
386 Burning the veil
pursuit of leisure, who had lost touch with the true maternal destiny 
of women and dedication to child-care and the home. This discourse 
created a dualistic model in which the authentic Algerian woman, as 
guardian of the Arabo-Islamic society, was the radical opposite of the 
western woman.
This discourse was clearly refl ected in a series of letters published by 
the ex-communist newspaper Alger républicain in early 1963 in which 
men engaged in a debate on the emancipation of women. Signifi cantly, 
men opposed to feminism portrayed it through a stereotyped image 
that was drawn from the urban west, French cinema, advertising and 
magazines, the universe of Brigitte Bardot and Roger Vadim’s And God 
Created Woman (1956). ‘K. I. A’ of Climat-de-France in Algiers wrote 
to say that, with the notable exception of women maquisards and a 
few highly educated professionals, he did not want to see an emancipa-
tion that meant women going to milk bars and dancing the twist or the 
‘cha cha cha’.86 Ahmed Agrane of Medea also rejected feminism ‘à la 
“Sophia Loren” or the woman who puts on make-up to go out ‘for a 
walk’ while leaving her children to hang about in the street’. Youth was 
being seduced by western values and losing touch with Algerian customs 
that remained best preserved in rural society, ‘that which our ancestors 
handed down to us (the wife of the prophet, etc.)’. The solution was to 
close the doors to Occidentalism and to place emancipation in the hands 
of men: ‘Give work to every man, educate them, teach them the rights 
of women in Muslim society’.87 ‘K. H.’ wrote to Jeune Afrique, ‘I want 
to bring the attention of our leaders to the perversion of morals . . . 
Young ladies have abandoned the veil and, with it, all decency. Obscene, 
their bodies half naked, with a provocative walk, they infest the streets. 
They seek to compete with men and, to do this, they smoke and give 
themselves over to drink’.88 This conservative moralism, which was in a 
straight line of descent from the preaching of the puritanical Ulema, far 
from being an expression of uneducated prejudice, could be found at the 
highest levels of the government.89
A minority of men, who shared a socialist perspective and belonged 
to the FLN French Federation, supported a more progressive agenda 
on women. For example, Areskiou Lamari wrote from the thirteenth 
arrondissement in Paris on behalf of several ‘brothers’ in favour of 
abolishing seclusion, polygamy, arranged marriage and repudiation and 
upheld the shining example of the Soviets in Central Asia. ‘No nation 
is free as long as half the population remains oppressed’. But Lamari’s 
model of emancipation was also based on a rejection of western femi-
nism, ‘a pretend liberty à la colonialiste’, symbolised by the dangers of 
sisters drinking beer and engaging in other excesses.90
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The association between the term ‘feminism’ and a stereotypical, 
moralistic view of western women seems to have been shared by many 
Algerian women and even the UNFA, which warned, ‘we must avoid 
feminism’.91 The offi cial discourse placed women almost entirely within 
a moral-cultural perspective: through their dedication to the family and 
the home they were seen as providing a barrier to the ills of modern 
society, ‘the decline in morals’, ‘the erosion of the family’, the ‘rise in 
juvenile delinquency’, etc. This ideology served to conceal and block 
understanding of the social and economic causes of the problems facing 
post-independence Algeria, as well as the specifi c political issues facing 
women, from problems of health and birth-control to training, employ-
ment, child-care and housing. If the nation was perceived to be going to 
the dogs this was singularly the responsibility of women in erring from 
their allotted function as reproducers, educators and providers. Finally, 
and most crucially, the dominant discourse could attack the subversive 
agenda of western ‘feminism’ since it was all-too-clearly associated 
with the concerted emancipation drive of French colonialism between 
1957 and 1962. This association between the detested oppressor and 
‘feminism’ provided the conservative religious and patriarchal forces in 
Algerian society almost unlimited powers of marginalising any nascent 
political women’s movement as fundamentally anti-nationalist, a fi fth 
column for cultural imperialism.92 One of the unseen consequences of 
the French campaign for emancipation was thus to assist in the creation 
of a conservative nationalism that was to carry extremely negative con-
sequences for Algerian women for the next twenty years and beyond.
In conclusion, and returning briefl y to the key test of legal reform, 
we have seen how the late colonial state faced considerable diffi culty in 
making any major impact on Algerian social and family structures. The 
basic administrative means, including a comprehensive état civil, were 
simply too inadequate to guarantee enforcement of the liberal marriage 
and family law of 1959. However, the newly independent republic 
maintained a discreet silence on the fact that a law that had been so 
fi ercely attacked as an instrument of colonial subversion was left on the 
statute books until 1975. One reason why the new state was willing to 
do this was because the 1959 law was so widely ignored by both the 
population and the courts. Avoidance of an objectively progressive law 
suited the purposes of the FLN government since it helped guarantee 
political tranquillity. Likewise the state constantly stalled on a new code, 
allowed courts to follow their own devices (mainly leaning to a tradi-
tional reliance on sharia), and abandoned civil society to an entrenched 
patriarchy. As Claudine Chaulet notes, ‘The function of family solidari-
ties changed: from a method of survival, they changed into a means of 
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establishing an autonomous nucleus working within and against the 
multifaceted penetration of the State’, an interpretation supported by 
the work of Mounira Charrad.93 Ben Bella and Boumédienne, in con-
trast to Bourguiba, abandoned the issue of reform for women because 
they believed the weight of family structures and ideology were simply 
too entrenched to be transformed without incurring the risk of a politi-
cal earthquake. However, while it may in general be true that govern-
ments which introduce radical legal change far in advance of the degree 
of social progress reached by a nation take the risk of generating a 
political backlash, this is not to say that they have no room for manoeu-
vre. In the Algerian case the political elites made the costly mistake of 
formulating an offi cial discourse and policy that reinforced, rather than 
helping to contain or alter, the most negative features of Arabo-Islamic 
conservatism, patriarchy and misogyny. In doing so they set Algerian 
society on course for an eventual catastrophe and the resurrection of 
Islamic fundamentalism that erupted in bloody civil war, a confl ict that 
was distinguished above all by a vicious, generalised violence which 
once again targeted women as the symbols of a westernised subversion 
of Islam.
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Contemporary western concerns about Islamic resurgence, particularly 
since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the spread of radicalism post-
9/11, has led to a huge revival of academic interest and debate in rela-
tion to a much older component of Orientalism, the theory that Muslim 
societies face an inherent diffi culty in making the transition to occiden-
tal forms of liberalism or parliamentary democracy. Islam, many have 
argued, is in essence incompatible with the good or ‘open society’.1 The 
debate on the modernisation paradigm in Muslim states has invariably 
centred on gender and the role of women, and has crystallised around 
certain enduring symbols of perceived Islamic oppression, such as the 
veil, the harem, seclusion, forced marriage and physical violence. The 
deep ambiguity of the conservative colonial regime in Algeria, right 
down until the start of the War of Independence in 1954, was that it 
condemned the uncivilised and inferior nature of the Muslim family 
and the treatment of women, but simultaneously had a deep political 
interest in sustaining such a system of oppression as it provided the key 
legitimation for maintaining the exclusion of Algerians from full citi-
zenship and power-sharing. Polygamy and child-marriage were viewed 
by colonial ideologues as incompatible with the republican order. This 
reactionary position seemed to be all the easier to sustain before 1954, 
since the colonial governing class entered into a tacit ‘gender pact’ with 
conservative Islamic religious clerics and leaders who also had an inter-
est in protecting the family and women from the dangers of secularism 
and ‘westernisation’.
A minority of better-educated, urban Algerian women, along with 
communist and progressive Catholic activists, began to challenge this 
conservative block during the turbulent phase of nationalism between 
the Liberation and 1954. But the outbreak of the War of Independence 
marked a radical shift in two respects: fi rstly, the emerging women’s 
organisations were rapidly dissolved and merged under the unitary 
umbrella of the authoritarian FLN. The most widely shared socialist 
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and liberal internationalist perception of Algerian women at war, one 
that was later powerfully reinforced through Pontecorvo’s Battle of 
Algiers and the works of Franz Fanon, was one of heroic armed fi ghters 
that were actively dynamiting all the Orientalist stereotypes of Muslim 
women as secluded and supine slaves of male domination. But this 
misperception provided evidence more of the successful nature of FLN 
propaganda than a meaningful transformation of the role of women. 
Algerian women did break through some of the constraints of gender, as 
have women almost universally in modern times under the exceptional 
conditions of ‘total’ war in which their labour power and skills became 
necessary in the desperate struggle for national survival. But the most 
widely shared male perception of women’s active participation in strug-
gle was that this was a purely temporary thing, and that once independ-
ence was gained they would revert to their ‘natural’ domestic function 
as mothers and wives.
For many historians this particular pattern of war-time ‘liberation’ of 
Algerian women, followed by a peacetime reassertion of ‘normality’ and 
the status-quo ante, will hold few surprises since it is a pattern that has 
been witnessed in innumerable global wars, insurrections and patriotic 
struggles. But what was unusual about the War of Independence was the 
extent to which this rather typical pattern was further radically distorted 
by the cross-interference from a French ‘emancipation’ strategy which 
was to carry extremely negative long-term consequences for the future 
women’s movement. Algerian nationalism, building on the intellectual 
traditions of Ulema reformism, characterised women’s emancipation as 
an alien, secularising movement orchestrated by military and colonialist 
interests. This interpretation was quite correct, however, in the post-
independence context this nationalist reaction to the subversive germ of 
an alien and dangerous feminism was deployed to attack the very prin-
ciple of equality and women’s rights, in favour of a highly conservative 
patriarchal model of society.
Which takes us to the second radical shift precipitated by the war, the 
U-turn executed by the colonial government after 1954 in relation to 
Muslim women’s rights. Initially it seems surprising or highly contradic-
tory that a huge army of occupation, a largely male-dominated organi-
sation in which the values of the warrior rested on a conservative view 
of female domesticity and subordination, should have had any interest 
in the plight of Algerian women. A complex of factors contributed to 
this innovative shift: faced with signifi cant progressive reform of family 
law in Tunisia, Morocco and elsewhere, the French government did not 
want to be seen to fall behind and to give a hostage to those interests 
that were seeking to pillory French colonialism before the UN and the 
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court of international opinion. Emancipation was also seen as pre-
empting the dangers of the FLN itself organising women and offering to 
liberate them; as the means to win over an oppressed half of the popula-
tion to support Algérie française and as a means of penetrating into the 
protected sphere of the Algerian family in order to gain intelligence; and 
fi nally as a way to modernise the overall society and economy, through 
civic engagement, education and training.
Overall this strategy failed miserably, a failure that was linked to the 
extraordinary inability of European decision-makers to recognise the 
enormous weight and complexity of Muslim society and its deep-seated 
durability and powers of resistance to colonial attempts to re-shape it in 
its own image. The pseudo-revolutionary optimism of ‘13 May 1958’ and 
the secretive orchestration of crowd euphoria by psychological warfare 
offi cers convinced many soldiers and settlers that there was indeed mass 
Algerian popular support for unveiling and emancipation. But this was 
largely an illusion. Also working in the direction of a naive optimism and 
over-confi dence in the ease with which transformation could be brought 
about was the unquestioning Eurocentric belief in the superiority of 
western familial values, and the assumption of an inexorable evolution 
towards this model that would be readily embraced by all educated and 
rational beings. In reality the French, even when backed up by a huge 
army of occupation, faced extraordinary diffi culty in introducing reforms 
or social engineering that attempted to transform the fundamental social 
and cultural structures, and in particular of the family, the core building 
block of the entire Algerian order and a key site of resistance.
‘Post-Marxist’ or revisionist historians of the ‘classic’ revolutions, 
especially of the French and Russian Revolutions, have since the 
1970s tended to emphasise the limitations of radical movements to 
effect a root-and-branch change in the deeper social structures of the 
ancien régime, structures which tended to survive underground only to 
resurface later. From the 1920s onwards several states engaged in the 
authoritarian, ‘top-down’, modernisation of Muslim societies, and in 
particular of the role of women and marriage law. The best conditions 
for such ‘state feminism’, as in the case of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey 
and Bourguiba in Tunisia, was where a charismatic leader was able to 
benefi t from a high level of populist support and nationalist fervour to 
effect change. Even under such optimum conditions traditional family 
and tribal structures remained deeply entrenched and resilient, but in 
the instance of Algeria such a reform agenda was both imported by a 
foreign power and attempted under the worst of conditions, during the 
political chaos and massive violence that accompanied a particularly 
long war of decolonisation.
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Any meaningful transformation of the patriarchal family would have 
required a long time-scale, a sustained reformist endeavour, but time was 
not on the side of the French government and the generals, who were 
driven by the instrumental goal of obtaining a rapid or even immediate 
change in women’s lives as part of the ambition to win and terminate an 
unsustainable and crippling colonial war. Moreover, for all the glowing 
propaganda surrounding the MSF women’s circles, the EMSI medical 
teams, and schooling of girls, these interventionist organisations were 
simply too thin on the ground to effect any signifi cant change. The gov-
ernment lacked the economic and qualifi ed human resources to sustain 
this programme, and the army commanders consistently prioritised 
budget allocations to counter-guerrilla operations (acquisition of heli-
copters, weaponry, etc.) and the ‘real’ war, which left those dedicated 
on the ground to a strategy of contact with Muslim women desperately 
short of funds and equipment. Finally, the objective of emancipating 
Algerian women as a key ingredient of the strategy of revolutionary 
warfare, the battle for hearts and minds, was fatally contradicted and 
undermined by the violence and repression of military operations, and 
in particular by the large-scale destruction, uprooting and displacement 
of the peasantry into quasi-concentration camp conditions. As Vincent 
Monteil commented, before quitting Algeria as the Soustelle regime 
sank into a cycle of deepening repression, ‘I am convinced that we are 
heading for a catastrophe. I persist in my belief that it is not possible to 
combine both repression and “reform”: a choice must be made’.2
A comparative perspective shows that the French emancipation 
agenda in Algeria was not entirely unique and can be related to a much 
longer tradition of the western ‘civilising mission’ in the Maghreb, 
Middle East and Asia. Over the last century the power-games of 
Orientalism have, in particular, been played out over the representations 
of Muslim women and their bodies, and especially of veiling, which was 
strategically deployed as a sign of the very essence of Islamic society, 
the perception of an ‘uncivilised’ order that was based on the subjuga-
tion of women, despotism, polygamy, the harem and sexual perversion. 
The French military intervention in Algeria during 1954–62, in its 
emphasis on un-veiling and the drive to a western style emancipation, 
derived its force from this Orientalist current in European colonialism, 
but also seemed to foreshadow the revival of global Islamophobia after 
1979 and the eventual moves to ‘liberate’ Muslim societies by US-led 
 neo-imperialism in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The seismic shift of 9/11 has tended to obscure the fact that the roots 
of an Islamophobic surge in the USA and Europe can be found much 
earlier, in particular from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 that was 
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symbolised by westernised women reverting to the chador.3 The bitter 
controversy in France after 1989 over the ‘headscarves affair’, whether 
Muslim girls should be allowed to wear Islamic dress in secular state 
schools, was indicative of a shift towards fear of an Islamist threat that 
was no longer perceived as only an external enemy, but one that was 
now located inside the ‘west’. But the closest parallel to the Algerian 
War was to come with the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq when 
the coalition forces attempted, through military conquest, to induce 
‘regime change’ and to export a western model of ‘democracy’ and of 
the good society.
The tone of this ‘liberation’ was established fi rst in its most evident 
‘Orientalist’ form during the invasion of Afghanistan when President 
Bush and the American right discovered a newfound mission to free 
Afghan women from the oppression of the ‘medieval’ Taliban and 
the sinister burqa. Not unlike the women propagandists of the MSF 
during the Algerian War, US ‘feminists’, funded by Revlon, Clairol, 
L’Oréal and various fashion magazines, promised to bring to unveiled 
Afghan women, western beauticians and tips on make-up and style.4 
That George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld should suddenly appear as 
the defenders of women’s rights might seem anomalous, but was not 
without historical precedent. A century earlier Lord Cromer, Governor 
of Egypt, had supported the liberation of Egyptian women from the 
living incarceration of Islam, while simultaneously opposing the suf-
fragette movement in Britain,5 while Generals Massu and Salan were 
unlikely champions of female emancipation. The common link between 
Cromer, Massu and Bush is that all three conservatives deployed a 
stereotype of cruel Orientalist oppression so as to legitimate western 
 intervention, rescue fantasies and the ‘civilising mission’.
Susan Faludi notes that the White House concern for Muslim women 
stopped as quickly as it had started, once the bombing intervention 
had begun in October 2001,6 but the propaganda image of the burqa 
set the tone for the later invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In the case of 
Iraq the Orientalist stereotyping of a backward Islam, as symbolised 
by women, did not serve American propaganda purposes quite as well, 
since the coalition confronted a more secular and modernised society in 
which women had achieved a high level of education, welfare rights and 
employment. If women needed to be ‘rescued’ from poverty and repres-
sion in 2003, this had less to do with the regime of Saddam Hussein 
than with the drastic deterioration in living standards due to the fero-
cious economic sanctions imposed over the previous thirteen years. The 
illiteracy rate for women climbed from a low of 8 per cent in 1985 to 45 
per cent in 1995.7
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As the US and British governments pushed towards war through late 
2002 and early 2003 numerous experts on Iraq and the Middle East 
warned of the problems that could be faced in attempting to ‘liber-
ate’ such a complex society, the diffi culty of engaging in post-invasion 
economic investment and reconstruction, and the dangers of political 
destabilisation that might undermine ‘regime change’. The question was 
raised as to whether America had an exit strategy that would enable it to 
hand over power to a stable, ‘democratic’ Iraqi government. Events on 
the ground, including the triggering of a civil war and economic melt-
down, were quickly to confi rm the direst predictions. The catastrophic 
failure of US decision makers and planners can be signifi cantly linked to 
an inability or refusal to learn from history, and to understand why it was 
that similar neo-imperial military interventions into Muslim societies, 
from the French in Algeria to the Soviet role in Afghanistan, had ended 
in defeat. This is not to say that the US military showed no interest at 
all post-9/11 in the Algerian War: indeed the Pentagon, bracing itself for 
the invasion of Baghdad, began to study Pontecorvo’s fi lm, The Battle 
of Algiers, but this was not to learn from the crucial political lessons of 
French defeat but rather from an interest in the triumphalist claims of 
Massu’s parachutists that they had developed counter-insurgency tech-
niques that had successfully crushed Muslim terrorist networks embed-
ded in an urban society.8 Media sources claimed that President Bush 
kept a copy of Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace as his bedside 
reading. But US leaders were more interested in anti-guerrilla strategies 
than taking note of the bigger picture, and examining why France had, 
despite its military superiority, lost the war.
Underlying the imperial hubris of Bush and Blair was a singular 
failure to engage in a well-considered evaluation of the history, sociol-
ogy and politics of the ‘enemy’ nation. Four months before the invasion 
of Iraq Blair invited six academics to Downing Street, three specialists 
on Iraq and three on international security. The Arabacist George Joffe 
recalled, ‘We all pretty much said the same thing. Iraq is a very com-
plicated country, there are tremendous inter-communal resentments, 
and don’t imagine you’ll be welcomed’.9 Blair, added Charles Tripp, 
showed little interest: ‘I felt he wanted us to reinforce his gut instinct 
that Saddam was a monster. It was a weird mixture of total cynicism 
and moral fervour’. Even more extraordinary was the fact that fi fty-two 
retired British diplomats, many with a close knowledge of the Middle 
East, wrote in April 2004 an open letter to Blair deploring the lack of a 
pre-war analysis of Iraq and the naivety of plans to import a democratic 
society. A similar disdain for the lessons of the past, a fatal amnesia, was 
also noted among US leaders by many commentators. Irene Gendzier 
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noted the impoverishment of US analysis of the Middle East which, 
‘refl ects a loss of historical memory, the disappearance from view of the 
impact of past policies, and an indifference to their human and social as 
well as political consequences’.10
By the early twenty-fi rst century it might have been expected that 
educated political elites would have been highly attuned to the negative 
impacts of past colonial empires that had unthinkingly imposed their 
own values on ‘inferior’ subject peoples. In the post-colonial age of mul-
ticulturalism, anti-racism and universal rights it was widely acknowl-
edged that it was no longer morally or politically right to steamroller the 
culture of other ‘races’ or peoples. But since 9/11 there has been a sig-
nifi cant revival among academic historians and political commentators 
of the imperial paradigm, a model which suggests continuity between 
the contemporary USA and past global empires and the ideological 
over-determination of international policy. An outstanding characteris-
tic of the ‘new imperialism’ has been a profound failure by key decision 
makers to try and understand the political, sociological and cultural 
structures of Afghan and Iraqi societies. The Bush vision of invasion 
and the ‘quick fi x’ was a dangerous delusion, a misguided optimism that 
rather backward oppressed ‘Arabs’ were bound to gratefully welcome 
US troops with open arms once ‘set free’.
In a scenario that was striking in its similarity to Algeria, the US gov-
ernment failed to investigate or understand family and ‘clan’ structures; 
entertained a false and dangerous optimism as to its ability to carry 
out a rapid transformation of occupied societies; provided inadequate 
funding and resources for programmes of reform and reconstruction; 
and rapidly lost any initial support among the population through ‘good 
works’ by the descent into violence, anarchy and the collapse of already 
weakened infrastructures. Iraqi resistance to the coalition rapidly coa-
lesced around Sunni and Shi’i militias that lurched towards conservative 
forms of radical Islamism that portrayed ‘western’ intervention, as in 
Algeria, as a secularist assault on the fundamental religious beliefs and 
identity of Muslims. The progressive Iraqi personal status laws of 1959 
and 1978 that banned forced marriage, restricted polygamy, empowered 
women to seek divorce, and enforced the intervention of the courts, 
came under attack in the new Constitution,11 while Islamist groups 
unleashed a wave of violence against women, forcing them to wear the 
hijab, or to retreat from education and employment back into the seclu-
sion of the home. The US thus entered into a catastrophic situation that 
was largely predictable from the earlier history of Algerian decolonisa-
tion. The long-term impacts of French emancipation of Algerian women 
had been equally perverse, and achieved the very opposite results from 
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its proclaimed goals. Through the fatal association between women’s 
liberation and the assault on the Muslim nation, the French succeeded 
in reinforcing the reactionary elements within the FLN and Islamist cur-
rents that blocked reform after independence and consolidated the con-
servative forces that ultimately resurfaced in the brutal civil war after 
1992 and a decade of extreme violence that once again was to centre on 
reveiling and the bodies of women.
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